Dual branding strategy for a successful new product launch in China

Marketers may increase the chance of success for a new product launch by using a sub-brand name and a parent brand name simultaneously. In this article, we report the successful case of using two brand names—dual branding strategy—by practitioners in China for the Minute Maid Orange Pulp juice drink launch. A suggestive sub-brand name helps consumers recall the key benefits and features of the new product. A suggestive parent brand name communicates the benefits of the product category. A dual branding strategy addresses the problem of using only one brand name for a new product launch. After the successful launch of the first new product by a parent brand, marketers are able to launch other new products under other sub-brand names in the future to meet different consumer needs. Marketers may use the same parent brand to introduce different products to build scale for the brand, and are able to clearly differentiate the different product offerings under different sub-brand names. If a company acquires a brand from another company, a marketer may position the acquired brand as a sub-brand under the parent brand if the marketer has defined the business scope of the parent brand broadly enough and with a suggestive parent brand name.     

产品质量变化对母子品牌名-质量联结关系的影响

消费者对母品牌产品的感知质量是决定品牌延伸成功的关键因素。文章通过两个实验,考察母子品牌延伸条件下产品质量变化对品牌名与质量联结关系的影响。结果表明：⑴当母品牌产品质量高时,子品牌产品质量下降将同时减弱母、子品牌与高质量的联结强度;反之,对母品牌影响不显著。(2)当子品牌产品质量高时,母品牌产品质量下降减弱母品牌与高质量的联结强度,提高子品牌名与高质量的联结强度。反之,同时减弱母、子品牌与质量的联结强度。最小均方联结主义模型比联想记忆模型更适合解释品牌名-质量联结关系的变化。     

Information and channel profits

New marketing information technologies, associated with point-of-purchase scanner systems, have increased the potential information available to manufacturers and retailers. In this paper, we explore the pricing and profit implications of this technology within a channel setting. We find that improved information about demand always results in greater absolute profits, as well as a claim on greater division of channel profits for the informed channel member. The greater profitability is due to the informed channel member's ability to “fine tune” prices in response to changes in demand conditions. However, total channel profits are highest when only one channel member acquires information. We also show that fine-tuning of price has the effect of smoothing sales, as informed firms charge higher prices during high demand periods and charge lower prices during low demand periods. Lastly, we show that an equilibrium where both channel members acquire information does not lead to a prisoners' dilemma.     

Competitiveness of Firm Behavior and Public Policy for New Technology Adoption in an Oligopoly

Economic growth requires that firms adopt new technologies. However, it may be insufficient or excessive in less competitive industries from the social welfare point of view. In this case, a government subsidy or tax is necessary. We analyze the optimum subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption by firms when firms maximize the weighted average of absolute and relative profits. We do not consider that firms really maximize the weighted average, but the weight on the relative profit is used as a parameter indicating competitiveness of firm behavior. We show that the optimum policy is likely to be subsidization (or taxation) when the set-up cost for new technology adoption is large (or small). It is likely to be subsidization (or taxation) when competitiveness is large (or small), that is, it is near to perfect competition (or joint profit maximization).     

A Note on Vertical Differentiation of Durable Goods: Sellers,Renters and Moral Hazard

This paper examines strategic interaction between firms that differentiate their goods with respect to durability and compete in prices. Two separate cases in which competing firms are either renters or sellers are examined. Although sellers face a dynamic consistency problem and pricing equilibria in the two cases are different, profits and consumer surpluses are identical within the two games. The introduction of moral hazard in the rental market creates an interesting complication because it increases equilibrium rental prices and has a profit enhancing effect for the low-durability renter.     

Digital distribution and the prohibition of resale markets for information goods

An existing theoretical literature finds that frictionless resale markets cannot reduce profits of monopolist producers of perfectly durable goods. This paper starts by presenting logical arguments suggesting this finding does not hold for goods consumers tire of with use, implying the impact of resale is an empirical question. The empirical impact is then estimated in the market for video games, one of many markets in which producers may soon legally prevent resale by distributing their products digitally as downloads or streamed rentals. Estimation proceeds in two steps. First, demand parameters are estimated using a dynamic discrete choice model in a market with allowed resale, using data on new sales and used trade-ins. Then, using these parameter estimates, prices, profits, and consumer welfare are simulated under counterfactual environments. When resale is allowed, firms are unable to prevent their goods from selling for low prices in later periods. The ability to do so by restricting resale outright yields significant profit increases. Renting, however, does not raise profits as much due to a revenue extraction problem.     

Private label line proliferation and private label tier pricing: A new dimension of competition between private labels and national brands

In this study, we explore the impact of private label (PL) proliferation and pricing on consumer demand and derive profit implications for different scenarios: (i) dropping or adding a line (kids, health or muesli) within a PL tier and (ii) changing the PL tier prices. We use a representative household panel dataset (2008–2009) for the ready to eat (RTE) cereal category of two leading U.K. grocery retailers. Our results indicate line extension/delisting within the standard and premium PL tiers cannibalize each other and also steal business from NBs for the kids, healthy and muesli lines. Overall, premium PLs seem a profit generator tier that allows some room for further brand variant introductions within this tier. However, the retailer is better off, in terms of profits, if the proliferation within the economy PL tier is downgraded. Furthermore, both the retailer and NB manufacturers gain from an economy, standard and premium PL price increase, as it leads to a demand shift to NBs accompanied by a profit lift for the retailer.     

Customer relationship management in competitive environments: The positive implications of a short-term focus

Researchers and business thought leaders have emphasized that firms must think and act with a long-term horizon when managing customer relationships. We demonstrate that, in contrast to this widely held view, profits in competitive environments may be maximized when firms ignore the future and instead maximize period-by-period profits from customers. Intuitively, while a long-term focus yields more loyal customers, it greatly increases short-term price competition to gain and keep customers. Consequently, overall firm profits and customer lifetime value may be lower when firms directly maximize multi-period profits from customers. Specifically, we analyze a model with segment-level pricing where firms in a duopoly can choose between period-by-period and multi-period profit maximization and demonstrate that, in many cases, a symmetric focus on period-by-period profit maximization emerges as the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium. We extend the model in two directions. First, we demonstrate that this superiority of the short-term focus endures even when a revenue expansion effect applies—that is, when customer loyalty leads to enhanced revenues. Second, we examine the case where customers are strategic and incorporate the long-term implications of their choices into their decision-making. Here we demonstrate that it may pay for firms to be myopic even when customers are strategic. The focus on multi-period surplus makes customers less price sensitive to price variations at the early stage of the game. Consequently, the focus on maximizing period-by-period profits enables the firms to charge higher upfront prices and leverage this lower price sensitivity into higher profits. Overall, our results highlight the paradox that, when it comes to managing customer relationships in competitive environments, a short-term focus may constitute the optimal long-term strategy.

Who pays for switching costs?

Earlier work characterized pricing with switching costs as a dilemma between a short-term “harvesting” incentive to increase prices versus a long-term “investing” incentive to decrease prices. This paper shows that small switching costs may reduce firm profits and provide short-term incentives to lower rather than raise prices. We provide a simple expression which characterizes the impact of the introduction of switching costs on prices and profits for a general model. We then explore the impact of switching costs in a variety of specific examples which are special cases of our model. We emphasize the importance of a short term “compensating” effect on switching costs. When consumers switch in equilibrium, firms offset the costs of consumers that are switching into the firm. If switching costs are low, this compensating effect of switching costs causes even myopic firms to decrease prices. The incentive to decrease prices is even stronger for forward looking firms.     

A Micromodel of New Product Adoption with Heterogeneous and Forward-Looking Consumers: Application to the Digital Camera Category

We develop an empirical model for the adoption process of a new durable product that accounts for consumer heterogeneity as well as consumers forward-looking behavior. Accounting for heterogeneity is important for two reasons. As the mix of consumers with different preferences and price sensitivities could change over time, firms need to update their marketing strategies. Further, it allows for a variety of shapes for the aggregate adoption process over time. As prices for durable and technology products fall over time with firms continually introducing enhanced products, consumers may anticipate these prices and improvements and delay their purchases in the product category. Forward-looking consumers optimize purchase timing by trading off their utilities from buying the product and their expectations on future prices, quality levels, and brand availability. Such forward-looking behavior will result in price dynamics in the marketplace as price changes today influence future purchases. And it results in different shapes of the new product sales pattern over time by influencing the time to take-off. We show how the parameters of our model can be estimated using aggregate data on the sales, prices, and attributes of brands in a product category. We apply our model to market data from the digital camera category. Our data are consistent with the presence of both heterogeneity and forward looking behavior among consumers. At the product category level, we are able to decompose the effects of the entry of Sony into primary demand expansion and switching from other brands. At the brand level, we find that there exist several segments in the market with different preferences for the brands and different price sensitivities leading to differences in adoption timing and brand choice across segments. For a given brand, we show how the changing customer mix over time has implications for that brands pricing strategies. We characterize how price effects vary across brands and over time and how price changes in a given time period influence sales in subsequent periods. Model comparison and validation results are also provided.     

Price competition during and after promotions

We provide a framework for setting regular prices and using promotional discounts in a duopoly where long‐term promotional effects are present and the firms' pricing and promotional strategies are common knowledge (e.g., as in online markets). We show that at equilibrium, the two firms may not promote and instead adopt an Everyday Low Price (EDLP) strategy. Consumers' tendency to stockpile promoted products, the level of brand loyalty and product differentiation, and the possibility of a postpromotional sales increase critically influence regular prices, price discount rates, and profits. Under some conditions consumer stockpiling intensifies promotional competition and reduces firms' profits while the possibility of attracting new consumers reduces the need to heavily promote and ensures better profits. Managerial implications are discussed. Copyright © 2007 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Television ad-skipping,consumption complementarities and the consumer demand for advertising

Endogenous consumption of advertising is common. Consumers choose to change channels to avoid TV ads, click away from paid online video ads, or discard direct mail without reading advertised details. As technological advances give firms improved abilities to target individual consumers through various media, it is becoming increasingly important for models to reflect the endogenous nature of ad consumption and to consider the implications that ad choice has for firms’ targeting strategies. With this motivation, we develop an empirical model of consumer demand for advertising in which demand for ads is jointly determined with demand for the advertised products. Building on Becker and Murphy (The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(4), 941–964 1993)’s ideas, the model treats advertising as a good over which consumers have utility and obtains demands as the outcome of a joint utility maximization problem. Leveraging new data that links household-level TV ad-viewing with product purchases, we provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the model: ad-skipping is found to be lower when a household has purchased more of the advertised brand, and purchases are higher when more ads have been watched recently, suggesting that advertising and product consumption are jointly determined. Fitting a structural model of joint demand to the data, we evaluate consumer welfare and advertiser profitability in advertising targeting counterfactuals motivated by an “addressable” future of TV. We find that targeting on the predicted ad-skip probability is an attractive strategy, as it indirectly selects consumers that value the product. Reflecting the positive view of advertising in the model, we also find that net consumer welfare may increase in several targeting scenarios. This occurs because under improved targeting, firms shift advertising to those who are likely to value it. At the same time, consumers that do not value the ads end up skipping them, mitigating possible welfare losses. Both forces are relevant to assessing advertising effects in a world with improved targeting and ad-skipping technology.     

Bridge,Focus, Attack,or Stimulate: Retail Category Management Strategies with a Store Brand

We investigate a monopolist retailer's category management strategy where the main strategic decisions are how to horizontally position a store brand relative to the incumbent national brands and how to price the store and national brands for retail category profit maximization. We analyze a market composed of two consumer segments with differing tastes and heterogeneity with respect to willingness to pay and a product category consisting of two competing national brands and one store brand. We find that contrary to the existing literature, it is not always optimal for a retailer to position its store brand against the leading national brand; instead there are many situations where it is best to position the store brand close to the weaker national brand or to position it in the “middle” so it appeals to both national brands' target segments. In the process we identify four distinct category management strategies that a retailer can use with a store brand. In three of these the optimal store brand price is the brand's monopoly price, while in the remaining one strategy the price is lower. We also suggest an easy to implement means for a retailer to determine which strategy is best to use, depending on the particular competitive environment present before the introduction of the store brand and the relative quality of the store brand. We find that the store brand entry is most beneficial to the retailer when the national brands are moderately differentiated. Finally we show that introducing a store brand not only allows the retailer to garner a higher share of the channel profits through higher retail margins, but also often provides the retailer the benefit of increases in national brand unit sales as well as incremental sales from the store brand. JEL Classification: M310     

Complementary Goods: Prices and Consumer Welfare Under Duopoly and Monopoly

We examine prices, profits, and consumer surplus for differentiated complementary goods under duopoly and a multi‐product monopoly. We find that little can be said about the relative magnitudes of prices of the components of a system of complementary goods under the alternative market structures. Although demand complementarity can lead to lower prices for either the primary or the secondary good under monopoly, both prices are not necessarily lower. The results unique to this paper are that, when two complementary goods form a system, the system price is unambiguously lower and consumer surplus and profits are higher under a multi‐product monopoly.     

When MR = MC: Ethical Efficiencies in Valuing and Pricing

How do we determine value? What are the ethical implications of valuing goods and services with respect to economic profit maximization? To answer those questions, Primeaux and Stieber move their discussion of the ethical principles inherent to economic profit maximization from production to distribution, from internal costs to external pricing and consumer demand.     

Empirical investigation of channel reactions to brand introductions

We investigate how incumbent manufacturers and retailers alter their pricing behavior in response to new product introduction. In performing our analysis, we need to be cognizant of the fact that the observed price changes can be due to entry-induced changes in a) demand conditions or b) costs or, on the other hand, to the competitive behavior of c) manufacturers and/or d) the retailer. In order to separate these four changes, we posit that manufacturer and retailer pricing is an outcome of maximizing a combination of shares and profits. This enhanced objective function allows us to measure competitive conduct benchmarked as less or more competitive than under the Bertrand-Nash framework. Our empirical analysis is based on the toothpaste category for the time period January 1993–February 1995. During this period, there were three brand introductions in two rounds of entry. Using the estimates from the demand and the supply model, we compute the changes in the retail and wholesale prices that are attributable to changes in demand conditions, manufacturer and retailer competitive conduct, and cost changes. These results support our conjecture that inferring the change in conduct solely based on a change in observed prices is likely to be erroneous. For the first new brand entry, we find that the brand introduction did not significantly increase competition between manufacturers. As a result, the balance of channel power between the manufacturers and the retailers remained unaltered. Both retailer and manufacturer profit margins increased after the first entry. However, subsequent to the second entry, retailer share of channel profits increased at the expense of the manufacturers; manufacturers even saw a decline in their absolute profit margins. We believe that this research will provide insight for manufacturers and retailers regarding how the various channel participants are likely to react to new product introduction. Furthermore, policymakers interested in understanding competitive reactions to new product introduction should find this research useful.     

A comparative analysis of marketing promotions and implications for data analytics

Retailers use many different marketing promotions to increase sales and profits. These promotions include price reductions, coupons, cash mail-in rebates, free gift cards, and buy-one-get-one (BOGO) discounts. The type of promotion used results in different outcomes for demand, profit, average price, consumer surplus, and sales taxes collected. We perform comparative analysis of these five promotions and their outcomes. We show that for the same discount amount, price reductions result in the lowest average price. For products with weakly diminishing consumer utility and low consumer stockpiling, BOGO promotions result in the largest demand, profit, consumer surplus, and taxes collected. Cash mail-in rebates may result in large profit and taxes collected, but they perform poorly in terms of average price paid and consumer surplus. We also find that a retailer offering a delayed incentive (i.e. gift cards and mail-in rebates) offers a larger reward but provides lower consumer surplus than when offering an immediate incentive (i.e. price reduction and BOGO). In a segmented market with a price-insensitive consumer segment, immediate incentives have the disadvantage of allowing price-insensitive consumers arriving during the promotion to obtain the discount, which reduces the discount effectiveness. The addition of more retailer objectives to maximizing profit, such as demand maximization or consumer surplus, increases the effectiveness of immediate incentives. We also provide a framework for estimating the important parameters for evaluating promotion effectiveness using readily available transactional data and examine its accuracy using a simulation experiment.     

Balancing Profitability and Customer Welfare in a Supermarket Chain

We investigate the impact of price discrimination by a large Chicago supermarket chain. First we measure the impact of the chain's current zone-pricing policy on shelf prices, variable profits and consumer welfare across its stores. Using the chain's database to simulate a finer store-specific micro-pricing policy, we study the implications of this policy on profits and welfare. We show how a store-pricing policy that is constrained to offer consumers at least as much surplus as a uniform chain wide pricing policy still enables the retailer to generate substantial incremental profits.To ensure our pricing problem exhibits a well-defined optimum, we use the parsimonious, mixed-logit demand function that allows for flexible substitution patterns across brands and also retains a link to consumer theory. We discuss the issue of price endogeneity when estimating the demand parameters with weekly store-level data. Standard instrumental variables techniques used to account for such endogeneity also seem to increase the magnitudes of own-price elasticities thereby offsetting the problem encountered by previous researchers of predicted prices from a demand model exceeding those in the actual data.     

The impact of social media conversations on consumer brand choices

This paper estimates the impact of social media conversations on consumer valuation of brand characteristics and demand for carbonated soft drinks (CSDs). We formulate a random coefficient, discrete choice model of consumer demand that includes social media conversations, and estimate it matching Nielsen sales data on carbonated soft drinks to social media conversations on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Empirical results indicate that consumers’ conversations about brands and nutritional aspects of CSDs have a significant impact on their valuation of brand characteristics and ultimately on their choices of CSDs. These findings have important implications not only for firms using social media as a strategic tool for effective brand promotion and product design but also for public health policies aimed at reducing the consumption of sugary beverages and high-calorie foods.     

Asymmetric Collusion with Growing Demand

We characterize collusion sustainability in markets where demand growth triggers the entry of a new firm whose efficiency may be different from the efficiency of the incumbents. We find that the profit-sharing rule that firms adopt to divide the cartel profit after entry is a key determinant of the incentives for collusion (before and after entry). In particular, if the incumbents and the entrant are very asymmetric, collusion without side-payments cannot be sustained. However, if firms divide joint profits through bargaining and are sufficiently patient, collusion is sustainable even if firms are very asymmetric.