上市公司控股股东特征与盈余质量关系的实证研究

本文在阐述控股股东特征与盈余质量相关理论的基础上,以我国A股制造业上市公司2011年度数据为研究对象,运用多元回归分析法对我国上市公司控股股东特征与盈余质量的关系进行分析。实证结果显示:控股股东的身份构成、控股股东的持股比例、控股股东担任总经理或董事长与盈余质量呈负相关关系,其他股东的制衡能力、独立董事占董事会的比例与盈余质量呈正相关关系。     

控股股东股权质押、企业社会责任与真实盈余管理

本文从利益相关者角度出发,采用2015-2017年沪深A股上市公司数据,实证检验企业社会责任对控股股东股权质押企业的真实盈余管理行为的影响。研究发现:控股股东股权质押能够诱发企业利润操纵行为,而企业社会责任的履行能够约束控股股东及管理层的利润操纵行为。进一步研究发现,企业对不同的利益相关者承担的责任不同,对控股股东及管理层的利润操纵行为的治理效应也不同。     

三个审计师签字与盈余反应系数

审计准则规定,审计报告应由两名具备相关业务资格的审计师签字。然而,审计报告中出现三个审计师签字现象,并呈逐年增长趋势,投资者如何看待这一自发行为？为此,使用盈余反应系数度量投资者感知的审计质量,分析三个审计师签字对盈余反应系数的影响。研究发现,三个审计师签字伴随着更高的公司盈余反应系数。异质性检验发现,三个审计师签字对公司盈余反应系数的正向影响,在投资者专业能力低、公司交易风险高或者审计师行业专长能力低的样本组中更显著。经济后果检验发现,三个审计师签字能改善公司的财务业绩和市场业绩。该研究有助于分析三个审计师签字的经济后果,也为相关部门后续规范审计师签字行为提供依据。     

连锁非控股股东的内部治理效应研究——基于控股股东掏空视角

本文选取2007-2020年A股上市公司样本,对连锁非控股股东的内部治理效应进行考察。研究结果表明非控股股东行业内连锁持股与控股股东掏空负相关,进一步研究发现,企业的产品市场势力水平强化了非控股股东连锁持股的内部治理效应,而机构投资者信息优势与行业连锁持股信息优势存在一定的替代效应。机制检验表明,非控股连锁股东对企业控股股东自利性行为的抑制作用分别通过企业间的信息资源整合与对控股股东的退出威胁实现,具体路径为向持股单位委派董事、监事和高级管理人员。同时,非控股股东连锁持股的内部治理效应降低了企业的经营风险,有效保护了中小股东的合法权益。     

所有权结构、盈余质量与股东回报——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据

本文以2003年-2016年沪深两市A股非金融行业上市公司数据作为研究样本,运用回归分析法研究所有权结构对股东回报的影响,以及盈余质量对股东回报的影响。通过实证分析得出合理的所有权结构能有效提升股东回报,盈余质量对股东回报具有显著影响,高质量的盈余能够有效提升股东回报的结论。     

A股上市公司盈余反应系数的季节性差异研究

本文以2003年1季度至2022年4季度A股上市公司为样本,研究发现盈余反应系数存在显著的季节性差异,具体表现为1季度的盈余反应系数大幅高于其他季度,分别比2、3、4季度的盈余反应系数高77.27%,44.44%和85.71%,且这一季节性差异在绝大多数年度和绝大多数行业中稳定存在。本文从盈余信息含量、盈余信息在非盈余公告窗口的价格效应、盈余公告的信息含量和盈余信息的披露格式、同期事件、市场和宏观因素等不同视角对上述现象的成因进行了探索,我们发现盈余信息含量、盈余信息在盈余公告前的价格效应在非常有限的程度上解释了盈余反应系数的部分季节性差异,但已有线索还远不足以对此提供完备的解释。此外,也有较弱的证据显示3季度的盈余反应系数大于2、4季度。     

关联交易、控制权收益与盈余质量

控股股东通常使用关联交易追求控制权收益(包括私有收益和共享收益)。在不同控制权收益驱使下,关联交易对盈余质量的影响也完全不同。本文使用2001、2002年中国上市公司的数据检验发现,当控股股东持股在50%及以下时,更多通过关联交易追求控制权私有收益,结果降低了盈余质量;而当控股股东持股超过50%时,偏好通过关联交易获取控制权共享收益,最终提高了盈余质量。     

内部控制、应计质量与盈余反应——基于中国2009年A股上市公司的经验证据

本文以2009年中国A股上市公司为样本,从财务信息内部生产和投资者反应两个视角研究内部控制质量与会计信息质量之间的关系。研究表明:在信息生产方面,高质量的内部控制提高了应计质量;在投资者反应方面,内部控制质量越高,盈余反应系数越大。这证实了内部控制的财务报告目标,也证实了内部控制制度在我国的适用性。我国政府监管部门目前正在积极建立和实施内部控制体系,本文的研究结论为其提供了经验数据支持。     

Large shareholders and the pressure to manage earnings

We present empirical evidence that firms inflate earnings around seasoned equity offerings in the presence of large outsider blockholdings, but not in their absence. The finding is robust to several alternative explanations, including differences in firm characteristics, growth, performance, CEO incentives, and capital usage. While we do not dispute that CEOs behave opportunistically, we challenge that earnings management is solely a symptom of weak governance. We conclude that strengthening shareholder power to alleviate the conflict between shareholders and management can also have the unintended consequence of intensifying the conflict between current and future shareholders.     

Controlling shareholders and market timing in share issuance

We examine market timing in the equity issuance of firms controlled by large shareholders using a hand-collected data set of controlling shareholders' ownership stakes in Chile between 1990 and 2009. When a firm issues shares, the controlling shareholder can either maintain or change his ownership stake depending on how many of the new shares he subscribes. Issuance predicts poor future returns and is preceded by high returns, but only when the controlling shareholder's stake is significantly reduced. Consistent with market timing, the results are stronger in the absence of institutional investors and in hot issuance markets.     

Types of nonaudit service fees and earnings response coefficients in the post-sarbanes-oxley era

In this study, we partition the joint provision of nonaudit services (NAS) into audit-related, tax, and all other services, and examine whether these services have varying impacts on independence-in-appearance, as measured by earnings response coefficients, over an extended period following the enactment of SOX. Prior research examining independence-in-appearance generally focuses on the years surrounding SOX and uses an aggregate NAS measure despite anecdotal and experimental evidence that there may be heterogeneity in how investors perceive different types of NAS. We first show, consistent with prior research, that an aggregate measure of NAS does not, on average, significantly influence earnings response coefficients. We then partition NAS fees by type and provide evidence that investors have negative perceptions of audit-related NAS and positive perceptions of tax NAS, and that these two effects cancel out one another in aggregate. Further investigation reveals that our results are driven by firms with high levels of accruals and smaller firms, which further corroborates our findings. We also find that measures of financial dependence fail to fully capture the channels through which NAS influences investor perceptions. Lastly, we provide evidence that perceptions of tax NAS are, in part, driven by their effect on a firm's tax strategies.     

Controlling shareholders and corporate value: Evidence from Thailand

This study investigates the effects of controlling shareholders on corporate performance. The empirical results, based on a unique database of Thai firms, do not support the hypothesis that controlling shareholders expropriate corporate assets. In fact, the presence of controlling shareholders is associated with higher performance, when measured by accounting measures such as the ROA and the sales–asset ratio. Since most of the firms do not implement control mechanisms to separate voting and cash flow rights, the controlling shareholders might be self-constrained not to extract private benefits. Otherwise, they would internalize higher costs of expropriation from holding high stakes. The controlling shareholders' involvement in the management, however, has a negative effect on the performance. The negative effect is more pronounced when the controlling shareholder-and-manager's ownership is at the 25–50%. The evidence also reveals that family-controlled firms display significantly higher performance. Foreign controlled firms as well as firms with more than one controlling shareholder also have higher ROA, relative to firms with no controlling shareholder.     

Commitment or entrenchment?: Controlling shareholders and board composition

This paper examines the determinants of board composition and firm valuation as a function of board composition in Taiwan – a country that features relatively weak protection for investors, firms with controlling shareholders, and pyramidal groups. The results suggest that there is poor governance when the board is dominated by members who are affiliated with the controlling family but good governance when the board is dominated by members who are not affiliated with the controlling family. In particular board affiliation is higher when negative entrenchment effects – measured by (1) divergence in control and cash flow rights, (2) family control, and (3) same CEO and Chairman – are strong and lower when positive incentive effects, measured by cash flow rights, are strong. Moreover, relative firm value is negatively related to board affiliation in family-controlled firms. Thus, the proportion of directors represented by a controlling family appears to be a reasonable proxy for the quality of corporate governance at the firm level when investor protection is relatively weak and it is difficult to determine the degree of separation between ownership and control.     

Controlling shareholders and market timing: Evidence from cross-listing events

We find partial support for a permanent increase in firm value following U.S. cross-listings. Cross-listed firms with capital-raising intentions on U.S. exchanges and firms cross-listing after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act exhibit an increase in firm value. Yet, investors are worse off in the long run when owning insider-controlled cross-listings. Compared to non-insider-owned cross-listings, insider-owned firms have a greater rise in value around the cross-listing year but also a larger decline in the post-cross-listing years. In fact, insider-owned firms lose value by the fifth year, compared with their value before cross-listing. Lastly, we show that liquidity and visibility enhance the value of cross-listings.     

Negative earnings,positive earnings and stock return predictability: An empirical examination of market timing

We examine the predictive ability of earnings-price ratios or yields for the S&P 500 index. We decompose the aggregate earnings-price ratio into its positive and negative components (“winners” vs “losers”) and find that the negative component has the most predictive ability. We also find that the earnings-price measures forecast both future returns and earnings growth. Our models display substantial variation in explanatory power over time with forecast power resurfacing in the latter 1990s. We conclude that to the extent that earnings-price yields predict future S&P 500 returns, the negative earnings component is the driving factor.     

Controlling shareholders,board structure,and firm performance: Evidence from India

We examine the prevalence and performance impact of controlling shareholders and study corporate board structures and ownership structures in 1796 Indian firms. Families (founders) are present on the boards in 63.2 (65.5) percent of the sample firms. On average, founders own over 50% of outstanding shares. In contrast to the findings of Anderson and Reeb (2003) in the U.S. context, we find that controlling shareholder board membership in Indian firms has a statistically significant negative association with Tobin's Q. Higher proportion of independent directors, higher institutional ownership or larger firm size does not appear to mitigate this relationship. Overall, board membership of controlling shareholders appears to be costly for minority shareholders.     

Further evidence on the ethics of managing earnings: an examination of the ethically related judgments of shareholders and non-shareholders

The current experimental study examines whether financial statement users' assessments of the ethicalness of earnings management is a function of intended benefit. Evening MBA students, assigned to the role of either a shareholder or non-shareholder, read three hypothetical scenarios involving a manager engaging in earnings management. In response to each scenario, participants judged the ethicalness of the earnings management incident and the likelihood that shareholders will suffer financially from the earnings management incident. The results of the study indicate that the ethicalness of earnings management was assessed less unethically for one of the three scenarios by shareholders when the earnings management was intended for company benefit. The results also show that intent did not influence ethicalness assessments among non-shareholders. These results provide some evidence to support Dye's (1988, pp. 201–207) analytic model and indicate that under certain conditions shareholders and non-shareholders are differentially influenced by the intent of earnings management.     

Options and earnings announcements: an empirical study of volatility, trading volume, open interest and liquidity

In this paper we study the impact of earnings announcements on implied volatility, trading volume, open interest and spreads in the stock options market. We find that implied volatility increases before announcement days and drops afterwards. Also option trading volume is higher around announcement days. During the days before the announcement open interest tends to increase, while it returns to regular levels afterwards. Changes in the quoted spread largely respond to higher trading volume and changes in implied volatility. The effective spread increases on the event day and on the first two days following the earnings announcement.