Policy uncertainty and aggregate fluctuations

This paper estimates the impact on the US economy of four types of uncertainty about (i) government spending, (ii) tax changes, (iii) public debt, and (iv) monetary policy. Uncertainty about government debt has a large and persistent effect on output, consumption, investment, consumer confidence, and business confidence. Uncertainty about tax changes also has detrimental consequences for real activity but the effect of spending and monetary policy uncertainty appears to be small. About 25% of output fluctuations are accounted for by policy uncertainty, with government debt making the largest contribution at longer horizons.     

The macroeconomic impact of economic uncertainty and financial shocks under low and high financial stress

External financial frictions might increase the severity of economic uncertainty shocks. We analyze the impact of aggregate uncertainty and financial condition shocks using a threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) model with stochastic volatility during distinct US financial stress regimes. We further examine the international spillover of the US financial shock. Our results show that the peak contraction in euro area industrial production due to uncertainty shocks during a financial crisis is nearly-four times larger than the peak contraction during normal times. The US financial shocks have an influential asymmetric spillover effect on the euro area. Furthermore, the estimates reveal that the European Central Bank (ECB) is more cautious in implementing a monetary policy against uncertainty shocks while adopting hawkish monetary policies against financial shocks. In contrast, the Fed adopts a more hawkish monetary policy during heightened uncertainty, whereas it acts more steadily when financial stress rises in the economy.     

Monetary policy regimes and the term structure of interest rates

US monetary policy is investigated using a regime-switching no-arbitrage term structure model that relies on inflation, output, and the short interest rate as factors. The model is complemented with a set of assumptions that allow the dynamics of the private sector to be separated from monetary policy. The monetary policy regimes cannot be estimated if the yield curve is ignored during estimation. Counterfactual analysis evaluates importance of regimes in policy and shocks for the great moderation. The low-volatility regime of exogenous shocks plays an important role. Monetary policy contributes by trading off asymmetric responses of output and inflation under different regimes.     

Monetary Targets and the World Economy

The dominant obsessions to watchers of the world economy at the moment are the weakness of the US dollar and the fear that the world economy is stagnating. In this ‘Briefing Paper’ we seek to put both events into the same intellectual framework, and to show that they are the consequence of monetary policies which are not logically related to each other, nor to a common objective of bringing world inflation steadily down to an acceptable level. Specifically, the US - which for reasons outlined below can warrant monetary growth rather below the world average if it is to preserve some dollar stability - is showing an above average outturn in its monetary aggregates. Germany and Japan, which can accommodate increases well above the average, are in fact adopting monetary targets which are leading to exchange rate appreciation, arid a reduction in both countries' expectations for real growth. The dangers for the world economy in this situation are very serious, particularly at a time when further dollar devaluation could be risky both from the viewpoint of US inflation wide the dollar's role as the key reserve asset. It could lead at worst to US protectionism and a monetaryled recession, rein forcing the slow growth rates already being widely predicted in 1978 for many other industrial countries. However, we show in this ‘Briefing Paper’ that this is not a necessity outcome of the present situation, given three vital perceptions. The first, required by statesmen as much as by technicians. is that the recent stagnation in European & Japanese output and exchange rate instability are essentially a monetary phenomenon, requiring essentially monetary (rather than fiscal) remedies. The second is acceptance of the need and practicability of some monetary consignation, based on reasonably common objectives among the major countries regarding inflation, bands for exchange rate movement and red rates of growth. the third, at the most practical level, is agreement on the actual monetary numbers which broadly reconcile these objectives and also take account of the very different ‘unwanted’ rates of monetary growth between countries which reflect their different underlying conditions of output, productivity and demand for money. It is the (ambitious) aim of this ‘Briefing Paper’ to substantiate these perceptions and to provide the numbers mound which a consideration of monetary policies can be framed. The numbers are necessarily based on trends established over a number of years and need to be supplemented by detailed understanding of each country's financial status But the monetary targets provided do, in our judgement, embody trade-offs between inflation, growth and exchange rate movements which should broadly satisfy national ambitions, and reset the world economy on a worthwhile growth path during 1978 or 1979.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The rise in the oil price since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in early August does not radically alter prospects for the world economy; rather it exacerbates existing trends. The US economy was, in any case, heading towards recession and a sizeable overshoot of its budget deficit targets. Japan, especially, but also continental Europe had still not reached the peak of the economic cycle so that inflation and interest rates were still rising. While the higher oil price adds to costs and prices in all countries, the policy response is unlikely to be unborn. In the US the adverse effects on output are being emphasized while elsewhere the inflationary implications are to the fore. In Japan, where acute labour shortages are emerging, the monetary authorities have already raised interest rates and we expect a similar response from the Bunds bank In the US such a move is unlikely; indeed once an agreement on the budget deficit is obtained between President and Congress, we would effect the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates. Despite this view on policy, the forecast offers little prospect of the US avoiding a pronounced slowdown and takes a gloomy view on US growth in the medium term. In Japan and Germany on the other hand the short-term inflation outlook appears containable and growth prospects over the medium term robust. The central forecast is based on a $25 oil price; we explore in a simulation what might happen if the price rose to $45 a barrel for a limited period.     

The Dollar, the Oil Price and Policy Divergence

There is currently a clear divergence of policy between the United States, Japan and Germany. With the US in recession and concern growing over the severity of the slump, interest rates have been cut in a move to revive the economy. In contrast Japan and Germany are both experiencing strong growth and monetary policy remains tight to combat inflation. This divergence was seen most clearly when the Federal Reserve Board lowered its discount rate to 6 per cent on 1 February, the day after the Bundesbank had raised its Lombard rate to 9 per cent. With G7 increasingly concerned about domestic factors, less emphasis is placed upon stable exchange rates and as a result the dollar is at an all-time low. The last two G7 communiqués have stressed ‘stability oriented monetary policies’, an ambiguous phrase which fails to define ‘stability’ either in terms of exchange rates, inflation or growth. Thus both the German and Japanese policy of high interest rates to reduce inflation and low US interest rates aimed at stimulating the economy can be termed as ‘stability oriented’. This analysis focuses on these divergent policy responses in two alternative scenarios to the world forecast we presented last month. The first scenario considers what might happen if the Federal Reserve Board were to stimulate the US economy by further cuts in interest rates, whilst Japanese and German rates were unchanged in the face of inflationary pressures. This case may be relevant if the recent US loosening of monetary policy is not sufficient to encourage growth because of a ‘credit crunch’, so that a more expansionary policy is required by the Fed. As a consequence, policy diverges further and the dollar weakens. The second scenario focuses upon a reduction in inflationary pressures in Japan and Germany brought about by an oil price fall. In this case we assume that US policy is already loose enough to avoid a prolonged recession, but that German and Japanese monetary policy is relaxed as inflationary forces recede. In this case policies converge. Each scenario thus concentrates on one of !he two features which are causing the policy divergence amongst G3 countries: recession in the US, inflation in Germany and Japan.     

Does trade integration alter monetary policy transmission?

This paper explores the role of trade integration—or openness—for monetary policy transmission in a medium-scale new Keynesian model. Allowing for strategic complementarities in price setting, we highlight a new dimension of the exchange rate channel by which monetary policy directly impacts domestic inflation: a monetary contraction which appreciates the exchange rate lowers the local currency price of imported goods; this, in turn, induces domestic producers to lower their prices too. We pin down key parameters of the model by matching impulse responses obtained from a vector autoregression on time series for the US relative to the euro area. Our estimation procedure yields plausible parameter values and suggests a strong role for strategic complementarities. Counterfactual simulations show that openness alters monetary transmission significantly. While the contractionary effect of a monetary policy shock on inflation and output tends to increase in openness, we find that monetary policy's control over inflation increases, as the output decline which is necessary to bring about a given reduction of inflation is smaller in more open economies.     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Global deflation – a genuine risk?

• The notable decline in inflation in the Eurozone, US and UK since mid-2013 has led to suggestions that a period of widespread price deflation across the major economies is a risk. Adding to these concerns has been the trajectory of producer prices – already declining in the Eurozone and China and showing very subdued growth elsewhere.
• Our global GDP forecasts do not, in isolation, point to a worldwide deflation risk. We expect growth at 2.8% this year and 3.2% next, little changed from last month.
• But the starting point for this growth matters, specifically the gap between actual and potential output last year. Even with reasonable growth, an initially large output gap would imply downward pressure on inflation over the next two years.
• Unfortunately, the size of the output gap is very uncertain. There is a wide range of estimates for the major economies, especially Japan. Part of the problem is that it is hard to know how much potential output was (or was not) permanently lost during the global financial crisis and recession.
• Assuming substantial permanent losses, output gaps might be relatively modest now, but a more optimistic view of the supply side of the economy would suggest output gaps could be quite large – and arguably this fits better with the recent evidence from inflation.
• Overall, while we see a genuine risk of deflation in the Eurozone (with around a 15% probability) we are more upbeat about the other major economies, where growth in the broad money supply and nominal GDP do not seem to be signaling deflation risks.
• But the difficulty of measuring ‘slack’ in the economy for us underlines the case for central banks to err on the side of caution when setting monetary policy, and either not tightening too soon or easing further. This month we have built in a further ECB rate cut to our Eurozone forecast. In Japan, we have revised down growth for 2014–15 with recent data strengthening the case for additional monetary easing this year.

     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The strength of US domestic demand is exerting a very strong pull on the world economy. Japan in particular is benefiting from soaring export demand, but the effects on European exports have been offset by weak domestic demand and, in the case of West Germany and the UK, by damaging industrial disputes which have interrupted supply. Over the next 12 months we expect the US economy to slow down under the weight of the financial and external balance pressures, which two years of very rapid but unbalanced growth have built up. For the world economy, however, we expect the slowdown in the US to be counterbalanced by expanding domestic demand in Europe and Japan, especially if a lower dollar permits reductions in interest rates. We forecast world output growth of about 3 per cent next year, well below the near-5 per cent projected for 1984 - the cyclical peak. By the second half of 1985 the world recovery will be three years old and we expect a pause in the growth of output. Against a background of stable monetary growth we expect world inflation in the 5–6 per cent range over the medium term. This is consistent with some increase in US inflation, low and stable inflation in Japan and West Germany and further progress in reducing inflation in countries such as France and Italy. Our forecast is based on the assumption that the dollar falls next year. If it does not fail we believe there is a significant risk of slower growth.     

Input–output interactions and optimal monetary policy

This paper deals with the implications of factor demand linkages for monetary policy design in a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model. Part of the output of each sector serves as a production input in both sectors, in accordance with a realistic input–output structure. Strategic complementarities induced by factor demand linkages significantly alter the transmission of shocks and amplify the loss of social welfare under optimal monetary policy, compared to what is observed in standard two-sector models. The distinction between value added and gross output that naturally arises in this context is of key importance to explore the welfare properties of the model economy. A flexible inflation targeting regime is close to optimal only if the central bank balances inflation and value added variability. Otherwise, targeting gross output variability entails a substantial increase in the loss of welfare.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

After six years of steadily rising OECD output, fears of a significant rise in world inflation are now increasing. In the last year there has been a slight pick-up in inflation with producer prices up nearly d per cent. But prompt action by the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates before the presidential election appears to have damped inflationary expectations in the US and has given Japan and Germany an opportunity to tighten monetary policy without causing major currency fluctuations. It is also apparent that the other possible source of world inflation, commodity prices, is not a problem. OPEC over-production has ensured that the oil price remains weak and other commodity prices appear to have stopped rising after a brief acceleration at the beginning of the year. Nevertheless the major imbalances in world trade are declining only slowly and without a change in fiscal policy in the major economies it is difficult to believe that minor changes in monetary policy will be sufficient if the process of adjustment begins to falter. Despite these risks, we take a sanguine view of world prospects. Tighter monetary policy should effect a slowdown in world growth next year (already indicated by recent developments, particularly in the US) and this should be sufficient to control inflation which we expect to peak at just under 5 per cent at the beginning of next year. From 1990 onwards we see steady growth accompanied by low inflation.     

Note on ‘Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game’

Jensen (1994a) finds that loss of monetary discretion leads to lower welfare. However, by extending his model we show that if real base money holdings are relatively low, as is likely to be the case for modern economics, a zero-inflation rule may well be preferable to monetary discretion. If the emphasis on achieving the output and public spending targets falls, a zero-inflation rule is more likely to be preferred. The increased support for binding policy rules thus conforms with a less tolerant attitude towards inflation.     

On the feasibility of monetary union among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries: does the symmetry of shocks extend to the non-oil sector?

GCC countries’ output is heavily dichotomized into oil and non-oil. Oil shocks have similar effects on all member countries but little is known about their responses to non-oil shocks. This paper sets out to determine (1) whether aggregate demand (AD) and non-oil supply shocks (AS) are symmetrical across these countries to justify their suitability for monetary union; and (2) whether there is any commonality of shocks with the United States and the three major European countries, namely France, Germany, and Italy, which can warrant the choice of either the US dollar or the Euro as the anchor for the expected common currency of the bloc. We use bivariate structural vector autoregression models identified with long-run restrictions to extract the shocks. Our results show that (a) AD shocks are unequivocally symmetrical but non-oil AS shocks are weakly symmetrical across GCC countries thereby suggesting a monetary union is feasible, but not overwhelmingly; (b) neither AD nor AS shocks are symmetrical between GCC countries and the selected European countries; (c) GCC’s AD shocks are symmetrical with the US but non-oil AS shock are not. Furthermore, there are no significant changes in the results when we aggregate the GCC countries as a bloc. We therefore surmise that the US dollar is a more appropriate anchor for the new currency than the Euro since US monetary policy can at least help smooth demand shocks in GCC countries.     

Cross redundancy and sensitivity in DEA models

Data envelopment analysis (DEA) measures the efficiency of each decision making unit (DMU) by maximizing the ratio of virtual output to virtual input with the constraint that the ratio does not exceed one for each DMU. In the case that one output variable has a linear dependence (conic dependence, to be precise) with the other output variables, it can be hypothesized that the addition or deletion of such an output variable would not change the efficiency estimates. This is also the case for input variables. However, in the case that a certain set of input and output variables is linearly dependent, the effect of such a dependency on DEA is not clear. In this paper, we call such a dependency a cross redundancy and examine the effect of a cross redundancy on DEA. We prove that the addition or deletion of a cross-redundant variable does not affect the efficiency estimates yielded by the CCR or BCC models. Furthermore, we present a sensitivity analysis to examine the effect of an imperfect cross redundancy on DEA by using accounting data obtained from United States exchange-listed companies.     

European Monetary Union or competing currencies: which way for monetary integration in Europe?

In theAntibes in September, Mr. Laws on perplexed and irritated his fellow European finance ministers by proposing a scheme for allowing currencies to compete one against the other in Europe. It perplexed them because it was presented as a basis for proceeding towards monetary union within the European Community in accordance with the resolve of European Heads of State at the Madrid Summit, whereas it appeared as a recipe for monetary confusion, not fusion. It irritated them because it appeared to them to be yet another British manoeuvre to derail agreed progress towards greater economic and monetary integration in Europe. It especially annoyed the potential allies of the UK on this issue who regard the French and Commission attempts to push rapidly towards monetary union as ill-advised, and who saw the Chancellor's ill-thought out proposal as playing into their hands. Some political commentators have suggested that Mr. Lawson was seeking to play a clever hand. He is known to favour UK entry to the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System, and on this is at odds with Mrs. Thatcher. Professor Alan Walters, adviser to the Prime Minister, is said to favour the idea of competing currencies in Europe. It may be that the Chancellor was not displeased to have this idea knocked down in the Antibes, leaving a strengthened EMS as the only realistic alternative to full monetary union in Europe. Whatever the truth of this, it seems inevitable that UK opposition to ambitious proposals for European Monetary Union will be met with less sympathy in future as a result of the Antibes meeting. This is a pity. For as we suggested in the June Economic Viewpoint, there is a serious case yet to be made in favour of the idea of competing currencies. This idea need not be in conflict with the objective of exchange rate stability, so that it is not incompatible with the EMS. Competition between currencies need not mean exchange rate instability. Rather it may mean competition over responsible monetary policies, encouraging their spread within Europe. An implication is that full monetary union may not be desirable. If the UK advanced this position in Europe, it may well carry the day. In this Viewpoint, we develop this argument about the direction for further monetary integration in Europe.     

De-industrialization and comparative advantage in the global value chain

We investigate the causes of de-industrialization and potential for re-industrialization using trade-linked input–output data from WIOD. By introducing a new global value chain measure of comparative advantage, we relate a sector's share in domestic final demand to that in production and separate the direct effect of trade on its income share. This method identifies the declining share of manufacturing value added in domestic final expenditures to be the main cause of de-industrialization. Differences in comparative advantage between countries do matter, especially in the case of employment shares, but have a limited impact via the direct trade effect on value added. The findings point to a peculiar paradox of industrial policy: precisely when it is successful in raising competitiveness and hence productivity growth of manufacturing, it also furthers the global decline of relative prices in manufacturing. In contrast to the national objectives of re-industrialization, effective industrial policies accelerate de-industrialization in the global economy.     

The policy mix in the US and EMU: Evidence from a SVAR analysis

We use a SVAR approach to the effects of fiscal and monetary policies, as well as their interactions (policy mix) for the US and the Euro Area (EMU). Overall, our results show that these two cases are different from each other. First, while in the case of the US there is evidence of Keynesian monetary policy, the same is not true in the case of the EMU. Second, considering the effects of the global economic and financial crisis, there is evidence of non-Keynesian fiscal policy in the case of the EMU (expansionary fiscal consolidation), while it does not hold in the case of the US. Third, there is evidence supporting the traditional inverse relationship between monetary policy interest rates and inflation in the case of the US, whereas in the case of the EMU there is a price puzzle (frequent in SVAR studies). Fourth, the baseline model seems to be robust in the case of the US, when considering the effects of the economic and financial crisis 2007–2009, while the opposite holds in the case of the EMU. However, in both cases, the policies seem to act as complements. Another similarity appears when analysing the relationship between public spending and taxation, where there is evidence supporting a fiscal retrenchment.     

Monetary Targets and the World Economy: A Progress Report

The recent changes in the value of the dollar and the talk of an interest rate ‘war’ demonstrate again that the world finds it difficult to cope with rapid exchange rate movements. In some ways the experience - and the reactions to it - are similar to the events of 1978. As now, the world was in a recession (though on a milder scale) and there were fears that exchange rate problems would obstruct economic recovery. The main difference is that in 1978 it was the strength of the Deutschmark which caused concern whereas this time the problems are associated with the rise in the value of the dollar. In a Briefing Paper in Economic Outlook, February 1978, ‘Monetary Targets and the World Economy’ we suggested that the problem arose from inconsistencies between national monetary policies and exchange rate objectives. In general, countries dislike exchange rate changes - in either direction - and there were problems because countries would not accept the exchange rate consequences of their own or other countries' monetary policies. We estimated the required monetary policies for stable exchange rates and suggested specific national monetary targets for 1978 which would at least move the world economy towards consistent monetary policies. In this Economic Viewpoint we return to those ideas. We consider what happened in 1978 and we also revise the underlying monetary rules. More recent experience suggests that although there has been some progress towards the convergence of monetary policies there will continue to be trend changes in exchange rates. It is also clear that there will be short-term fluctuations around these trends. We believe that greater convergence of monetary policies would be desirable but failing that it is important that countries should avoid abrupt changes in monetary policy. It is also important that countries should become accustomed to exchange rate changes. They should direct monetary policy towards their objectives for inflation and should not be diverted from it by temporary or permanent changes in their exchange rates.     

Markov switching causality and the money–output relationship

The causal link between monetary variables and output is one of the most studied issues in macroeconomics. One puzzle from this literature is that the results of causality tests appear to be sensitive with respect to the sample period that one considers. As a way of overcoming this difficulty, we propose a method for analysing Granger causality which is based on a vector autoregressive model with time‐varying parameters. We model parameter time‐variation so as to reflect changes in Granger causality, and assume that these changes are stochastic and governed by an unobservable Markov chain. When applied to US data, our methodology allows us to reconcile previous puzzling differences in the outcome of conventional tests for money–output causality. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the informational role of term structure in the US monetary policy rule

This paper uses a structural approach based on the indirect inference principle to estimate a standard version of the new Keynesian monetary (NKM) model augmented with term structure using both revised and real-time data. The estimation results show that the term spread and policy inertia are both important determinants of the US estimated monetary policy rule whereas the persistence of shocks plays a small but significant role when revised and real-time data of output and inflation are both considered. More importantly, the relative importance of term spread and persistent shocks in the policy rule and the shock transmission mechanism drastically change when it is taken into account that real-time data are not well behaved.