Commuters route choice behaviour

The paper reports laboratory experiments with a two route choice scenario. In each session 18 subjects had to choose between a main road M and a side road S. The capacity of M was larger. Feedback was given in treatment I only on the subjects' own travel time and in treatment II on travel time for M and S. The main results are as follows:

• Mean numbers on M and S are near to pure equilibrium.

• Fluctuations persist until the end of the sessions.

• The total number of changes is significantly greater in treatment I.

• Subjects' road changes and payoffs are negatively correlated.

• A direct response mode results in more changes for bad payoffs whereas a contrary response mode shows opposite reactions.

• Simulations of an extended payoff sum learning model fits the main results of the statistical evaluation of the data.

Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry

Summary. The paper extends Diamond's (1984) analysis of financial contracting with information asymmetry ex post and endogenous “bankruptcy penalties” to allow for risk aversion of the borrower. The optimality of debt contracts, which Diamond obtained for the case of risk neutrality, is shown to be nonrobust to the introduction of risk aversion. This contrasts with the costly state verification literature, in which debt contracts are optimal for risk averse as well as risk neutral borrowers. Received: December 7, 1998; revised version: June 9, 1999     

The optimality of nominal contracts

Summary. This paper presents a model in which agents choose to use money as a medium of exchange, a means of payment, and a unit of account. The paper defines conditions under which nominal contracts, promising future payment of a fixed number of units of fiat money, prove to be the optimal contract form in the presence of either relative or aggregate price risk. When relative prices are random, nominal contracts are optimal if individuals have ex ante similar preferences over future consumption. When the aggregate price level is random, whether from shocks to the money supply or aggregate output, nominal contracts (perhaps coupled with equity contracts) lead to optimal risk-sharing if individuals have the same degree of relative risk aversion. Finally, nominal contracts may be optimal if the repayment of contracts is subject to a binding cash-in-advance constraint. In this case, a contingent contract increases the risk of holding excessive cash balances. Received: March 29, 1996; revised version: February 25, 1997     

Portfolio delegation under short-selling constraints

Summary. In this paper we study delegated portfolio management when the manager’s ability to short-sell is restricted. Contrary to previous results, we show that under moral hazard, linear performance-adjusted contracts do provide portfolio managers with incentives to gather information. We find that the risk-averse manager’s effort is an increasing function of her share in the portfolio’s return. This result affects the risk-averse investor’s choice of contracts. Unlike previous results, the purely risk-sharing contract is now shown to be suboptimal. Using numerical methods we show that under the optimal linear contract, the manager’s share in the portfolio return is higher than what it is under a purely risk sharing contract. Additionally, this deviation is shown to be: (i) increasing in the manager’s risk aversion and (ii) larger for tighter short-selling restrictions. As the constraint is relaxed the deviation converges to zero.Received: 25 July 2002, Revised: 12 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D81, D82, J33.Juan-Pedro Gómez: Correspondence toAn earlier version of the paper was circulated under the title “Providing Managerial Incentives: Do Benchmarks Matter?” We are grateful to an anonymous referee whose comments helped to improve the paper. We also thank comments by Viral Acharya, Alexei Goriaev, Ernst Maug, Kristian Rydqvist, Neil Stoughton, Rangarajan Sundaram, Fernando Zapatero and seminar participants at the 1999 SED meetings in Sardinia, the 1999 Workshop in Mutual Fund Performance at EIASM, Brussels, the 2000 EFA meetings in London, the Bank of Norway, the Stockholm Schools of Economics, the Norwegian School of Management and the 2001 WFA meetings in Tucson. Sharma gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Asociacion Mexicana de Cultura.     

Regulating a risk-averse firm under incomplete information

We examine the optimal regulatory policy for a risk-averse firm when the firm is imperfectly informed about its efficiency parameter for a project at the time of contracting. The firm’s risk aversion shifts the optimal regulatory policy from a fixed-price contract to a cost-plus contract. The optimal regulatory policy entails undereffort by an inefficient firm as in Laffont and Tirole (J Polit Econ 94(3):614–641, 1986) and the effort distortion increases as the firm becomes more risk-averse. Further, the regulator benefits from sequential contracting with the firm where the firm chooses contract terms gradually as it acquires information, albeit the benefit diminishes as the firm becomes more risk-averse.      

Corporate insurance with optimal financial contracting

Summary. This paper attemps to rationalize the use of insurance covenants in financial contracts, and shows how external financing generates a demand for insurance by risk-neutral entrepreneurs. In our model, the entrepreneur needs external financing for a risky project that can be affected by an accident during its realization. Accident losses and final returns are private information to the firm, but they can be evaluated by two costly auditing technologies. We derive the optimal financial contract: it is a bundle of a standard debt contract and an insurance contract with franchise, trading off bankruptcy costs vs auditing costs. We then analyze how this optimal contract can be achieved by decentralized trading on competitive markets when insurance and credit activities are exogenously separated. With additive risks, the insurance contract involves full coverage above a straight deductible. We interpret this result by showing how our results imply induced risk aversion for risk-neutral firms. Received: December 14, 1998; revised version: August 11, 1999     

The Optimal Provision of Curative Goods

We analyze the optimal contract between a risk neutral regulator providing a curative goods and a risk averse patient who learns the realized value of his/her health status after the contracting stage. Consumption of a curative good (healthcare) reduces the disutility associated with a disease. We show that the consumption of curative goods is larger than in the complete information case, that this overprovision increases with the degree of patients’ risk‐aversion and the marginal cost of treatment. Ceilings on the amount of healthcare are part of the optimal contract when risk aversion is important.     

Frontiers of futures research: What's next?

This paper describes some important frontiers of futures research with the aim of identifying new opportunities for improving the value and utility of the field. These frontiers include the exploration and/or the reexamination of

(a) Potential for integrating new technology with futures research methods,

(b) Ways to reduce the domain of the unknowable,

(c) Ways to account for uncertainty in decision making,

(d) Strategies for planning and management of nonlinear systems operating in the chaotic regime,

(e) Ways to improve understanding of psychological factors that lead to irrational decisions

(f) Appropriate levels of aggregation in investigation of forecasting problems.

(g) The potential offered by new sources of social data.

The Impact of Regret on Exports

We examine optimal production and export decisions of a firm facing exchange rate uncertainty, where the firm's management is not only risk averse but also regret averse, i.e., is characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex post suboptimal alternatives. Experimental and empirical results support the view that managers tend to be regret averse. Under regret aversion a negative risk premium need not preclude the firm from exporting which would be the case if the firm were only risk averse. Exporting creates an implicit hedge against the possibility of regret when the realized spot exchange rate turns out to be high. The regret‐averse firm as such has a greater ex ante incentive to export than the purely risk averse firm. Finally, we use a two‐state example to illustrate that the firm optimally exports more (less) to the foreign country than in the case of pure risk aversion if the low (high) spot exchange rate is more likely to prevail. Regret aversion as such plays a crucial role in determining the firm's optimal allocation between domestic sales and foreign exports.     

Optimal insurance design of ambiguous risks

We examine the characteristics of the optimal insurance contract under linear transaction costs and an ambiguous distribution of losses. Under the standard expected utility model, we know from Arrow (1965) that it contains a straight deductible. In this paper, we assume that the policyholder is ambiguity averse in the sense of Klibanoff et al. (Econometrica 73(6):1849–1892, 2005). The optimal contract depends upon the structure of the ambiguity. For example, if the set of possible priors can be ranked according to the monotone likelihood ratio order, the optimal contract contains a disappearing deductible. We also show that the policyholder’s ambiguity aversion may have the counterintuitive effect to reduce the optimal insurance coverage of an ambiguous risk.     

Insurance and the behavior of competitive firms under revenue risks: a note

This paper re-examines the model of Ford, Mpuku, and Pattanaik [“Revenue Risks, Insurance, and the Behavior of Competitive Firms”.Journal of Economics 64 (1996): 233–246] wherein a risk-averse competitive firm faces insurable revenue risk. The optimal output and insurance cover of the firm are shown to be deterministically related in that the marginal costs of self-insurance and market insurance are equated. In response to increasing risk aversion, the firm always takes a higher insurance cover. Increasing fixed costs generate an income effect which induces the firm to take a higher insurance cover should the preference of the firm satisfy decreasing absolute risk aversion. Market insurance and self-insurance can be either substitutes or complements, depending on the shape of the variable insurance-premium schedule.     

BACKGROUND RISK AND THE THEORY OF THE COMPETITIVE FIRM UNDER UNCERTAINTY*

This paper examines the optimal production decision of a firm under output price risk á la Sandmo when the firm also faces a dependent background risk. It is shown that standard risk aversion plus a non-negative association between the output price risk and the background risk are sufficient to ensure a reduction in the firms optimal output upon introduction of the background risk. The paper investigates the impact of a deterministic transformation of the background risk on the firms optimal production decision. It is shown that decreasing absolute risk aversion in Ross' sense is among the sufficient conditions that generate an unambiguous negative comparative static result.     

Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model

We analyse the effects of different labour‐market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold‐up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. “Flexicurity”, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk‐averse and the hold‐up problem is relatively important.     

Systematic acceleration of radical discovery and innovation in science and technology

A systematic two-component approach (front-end component, back-end component) to bridging unconnected disciplines and accelerating potentially radical discovery and innovation (based wholly or partially on text mining procedures) is presented. The front-end component has similar objectives to those in the classical literature-based discovery (LBD) approach, although it is different mechanistically and operationally. The front-end component will systematically identify technical disciplines (and their associated leading experts) that are directly or indirectly-related to solving technical problems of high interest. The back-end component is actually a family of back-end techniques, only one of which shares the strictly literature-based analysis of the classical LBD approach. The non-LBD back-end techniques (literature-assisted discovery) make use of the human experts associated with the disparate literatures (disciplines) uncovered in the front-end to generate radical discovery and innovation.Specifically, in the literature-assisted discovery operational mode, these disparate discipline experts could be used as:

1. Recipients of solicitation announcements (BAA, SBIR, MURI, journal Special Issue calls for papers, etc.),

2. Participants in Workshops, Advisory Panels, Review Panels, Roadmaps, and War Games,

3. Points of Contact for Field Science Advisors, Foreign Field Offices, Program Officer site visits, and potential transitions.

Layoffs,wages and unemployment insurance

The influence of unemployment insurance on wage and layoff behavior is analyzed in the context of optimal labor contracts. Responses of contract terms to changes in economic parameters are shown to depend in general on the nature of the initial contract, the degree of workers' risk aversion, and the resolution of bargaining conflict. Layoffs are not necessarily reduced by an increase in experience rating or a reduction in the UI benefit. Product demand fluctuations tend to induce procyclical employment fluctuations but not wage fluctuation. An implication of optimal contracts with private insurance suggests a reason for government intervention in UI provision.     

On Efficiency of Decentralized Environmental Regulation

Contrary to conventional wisdom about an environmental race to the bottom, the theoretical literature as exemplified by Oates and Schwab [1988, Journal of Public Economics, 35:333–354] maintains that homogeneous jurisdictions’ decentralized choices are likely to be socially optimal because each locale sets capital tax rates to zero and sets optimal environmental standards. This paper shows the well-received Oates–Schwab-style efficiency result is not likely if allowed aggregate-emissions act as a firm-augmenting public input that benefits mobile firms.Thanks to participants at the University of Alberta and the reviewers and editors for their helpful comments     

The research strategy in management of technological innovation

The increasing importance of technology in the application world has imposed high demand on the research community for insightful and useful principles about “management of technological innovation” (MTI). This paper examines the academic legacy in terms of conceptual categories, causal relationships and taxonomy of relevant systems, and asserts from a system perspective that MTI as an applied science is still in its infancy.Based on methodological argument, this paper warns of the danger of hasty compromise of strategically important topics to “popular” definition of “researchability,” and suggests several research guidelines and approaches for this young interdisciplinary discipline:

1. (1)To explore new frontiers, use “proximate variables,” consider contextual factors and causation in broad terms, conceptualize “independently,” and pay more attention to case study method.

2. (2)To understand driving forces, be aware of practice, and focus on internal dynamics.

3. (3)To transcend complexity, adopt a hierarchical structure perspective and state-and-flow concept, and condense findings into configurations.

Finally, this paper urges the formation of an overall research strategy to accelerate the accumulation of MTI grounded knowledge.     

“Probability of risk aversion” and other applications of derivatives of the certainty equivalent

“Probability of risk” aversion is principally concerned with reactions to scaling up of probabilities of non-zero values of a non-positive random variable by a common factor. Decreasing probability-of-risk aversion is defined and shown to be equivalent to ordinary risk aversion. Implications of this for insurance are pointed out. The sort of scaling involved is the same as that involved in “self-protection,” and it is shown that, for any expenditure on self-protection, say x, a concave utility function will prefer a coinsurance policy, costing x, which leaves probabilities unchanged, but scales down loss amounts by the same proportion as probabilities are scaled under self-protection. Properties of several comparative concepts of decreasing risk aversion are established. Derivatives of the certainty equivalent (CE) are used to elucidate well-known comparative static results in models of expected utility maximization. Finally, the study proves that concavity of the CE implies convexity of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and examines the role of curvature of the CE in exploring relationships between properties of risk vulnerability, properness, and standardness.

Production and insurance under regret aversion

This paper examines the behavior of a regret-averse producer facing revenue risk. To insure against the revenue risk, the producer can purchase a coinsurance contract with an endogenously chosen coinsurance rate. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. We show that the regret-averse producer never fully insures against the revenue risk even though the coinsurance contract is actuarially fair. When the producer is sufficiently regret averse and the loss probability is high, we further show that the regret-averse producer chooses not to purchase the actuarially fair coinsurance contract. Even when purchasing the actuarially fair coinsurance contract is optimal, we derive sufficient conditions under which the regret-averse producer reduces the optimal output level as compared to that without the coinsurance contract. These results are distinct from those under pure risk aversion, thereby making the consideration of regret aversion crucial.