家族控股、终极所有权与企业绩效——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

借鉴Driffield等(2007)的研究方法,运用终极产权论追踪上市公司的终极控股股东,分析我国家族企业金字塔结构下的控股股东和终极所有权对企业绩效的影响。研究发现:第一大股东持股比例与企业绩效呈倒U型关系,第二至五大股东持股比例之和与企业绩效呈U型关系;家族上市公司的企业绩效与家族控股股东的控制权负相关,与现金流权正相关,与超控制权负相关;另外,家族上市公司的企业绩效与是否委派管理层负相关,与董事长与总经理是否合一负相关。同时,按家族控股股东的控制权大小分组检验也得到了类似的结论。     

家族上市公司治理与绩效研究——基于企业家、资本家视角的比较

文章选取了截至2006年底383住家族富豪控制的419个家族上市公司为研究样本,从最终控制家族是"企业家"还是"资本家"这一新的视角考察最终控制家族的这种经营倾向上的差别对上市公司治理结构以及公司绩效的影响,设计了两个模型对绩效分别进行单变量分析和多元回归分析.实证分析表明不同控制家族下的公司治理结构具有明显差异,而这种差异在一定程度上也对公司绩效有显著影响,这从完善公司治理结构角度,提高我国家族上市公司的绩效提供了一定的借鉴意义.     

法律环境、金字塔结构与家族企业的“掏空”行为

我国家族上市公司的最终控制人多数采用金字塔结构实现对上市公司的超额控制,现金流量权和控制权的分离程度较为严重。以2002-2004年家族上市公司为研究样本,本文实证考察了家族上市公司所处地区的法律环境及金字塔结构与"掏空"行为之间的关系。研究结果表明:控制性家族"掏空"上市公司的概率与其拥有的现金流量权显著负相关,与现金流量权和控制权的分离程度正相关;同时,较高的法治水平能够有效地遏制控制性家族的"掏空"行为。因此,建立一个有效的股东权利保护机制,同时完善家族上市公司的现金流量权和控制权结构,对于推进公司治理具有重要意义。     

家族控制、支付方式与并购绩效关系的经验研究

主要从控制权稀释威胁与委托代理的视角分别研究家族控制对并购支付方式选择以及并购绩效的影响。对505家中国家族上市公司于2007-2009年发起的347起并购事件构成的研究样本进行实证检验表明:家族终极控股股东持股比例与现金支付方式的使用正相关,家族终极控股权与现金流权分离度与股票支付方式的使用正相关,控制权稀释与强化机制对并购支付方式的选择产生了显著影响;家族终极控股股东持股比例与并购绩效正相关,利益协同效应占主导地位;并购支付方式对家族上市公司的并购绩效并无显著影响。     

家族企业敛财秘笈

他们布置了错综复杂的持股结构,却有一个共同特点：上市公司永远在结构的最底层。家族在上市公司中,拥有权很小,控制权却被金字塔结构放大。一系列剥削行为由此产生：或者低派股息,或者将上市公司资产低于正价售给家族公司,或向家族公司高价购买资产。他们创造了一个又一个赚钱神话,制造了亚洲经济眩目的时候,他们筋骨无损,坐看上市公司的倒闭,等待下一轮敛财机会的到来。     

交叉持股行为对上市公司影响分析

交叉持股的上市公司在中国的行业分布是非常广泛的,在我国竞争激烈的地区上市公司往往更多地参与交叉持股。资本运作是交叉持股公司的一种常用的策略,是公司的增长和扩张的常用手段,但由此会导致虚增公司资本、内部人控制等一系列问题。研究了上市公司间交叉持股的现状,同时分析了交叉持股对上市公司的负面影响,并提出改进和完善上市公司交叉持股制度的几点建议。     

中小企业板上市公司治理实证研究

中小企业板上市公司的主体是民营企业,由于特殊生成途径及传统文化深厚影响,这些上市公司治理结构存在许多问题:如控股股东持股比例过高,且实际控制人多为自然人及其家族;董事会设立存在一些缺陷,有一部分独立董事失职;缺乏系统的投资者关系管理;机构投资者进入不积极以及公开信息披露不完善等等。这些治理问题成为民营企业发展壮大的瓶颈,导致了许多证券监管难题,形成具有中国特色的民营上市公司治理模式还有待探索。     

国内家族上市公司治理结构实证研究——基于创业型(FFB)和非创业型(N-FFB)的比较分析

根据最终控制性家族与上市公司及其核心业务的关系,本文将212家家族上市公司分为创业型家族上市公司（FFB）和非创业型家族上市公司（N-FFB）两大类。通过实证比较研究发现,虽然两类企业都存在某一控制性家族或个人,但两者在家族介入程度、金字塔结构、控制权和现金流权分离程度、债务融资水平等治理特征上存在显著差异。     

交叉持股对上市公司影响研究

现在中国上市公司交叉持股已成普遍现象,通过对交叉持股的背景和动因的探析,对国外母子和非母子上市公司交叉持股的法律做了简单的对比,讨论了交叉持股对上市公司的影响,并且对中国上市公司交叉持股的规范提出了若干建议。     

最终控制人类型对投资影响的研究

以中国在沪深两市上市的359家制造业公司2001年至2004年的数据为样本,研究上市公司最终控制人类型对投资的影响。研究发现:最终控制人是国家或者国有法人时,企业显著的存在过度投资,而最终控制人不是国家或者国有法人时,企业显著的存在投资不足。     

基于股权结构的家族控制与现金股利政策

影响上市公司现金股利政策的因素很多,家族上市公司普遍存在终极控制人,金字塔式的股权结构使其拥有的现金流权与控制权相分离,而且存在从自身利益最大化出发制定现金股利政策的倾向。本文在回顾前人研究文献的基础上进行了相关的理论分析,并选取了2004-2008年1411家A股家族上市公司作为研究样本,分别采用Logistic回归模型和多元线性回归模型,分析终极控制人特征对现金股利分配倾向和分配力度的影响,同时还分析了股权分置改革对所研究内容的影响。     

Stock Market’s Reaction to Disclosure of Environmental Violations: Evidence from China

The stock market’s reaction to information disclosure of environmental violation events (EVEs) is investigated multi-dimensionally for Chinese listed companies, including variables such as pollution types, information disclosure sources, information disclosure levels, modernization levels of the region where the company locates, ultimate ownership of the company, and ownership held by the largest shareholder. Using the method of event study, daily abnormal return (AR) and accumulative abnormal return (CAR) are calculated under different event window for examining the extent to which the stock market responds to the EVEs. Furthermore, statistical significance of the difference in stock market reaction is compared between event firms with different characteristics. The relationship between CAR and its impact factors is examined by multivariate analysis. The findings reveal that the average reduction in market value is estimated to be much lower than the estimated changes in market value for similar events in other countries, demonstrating that the negative environmental events of Chinese listed companies currently have weak impact on the stock market.     

投机倾向下的股权结构变迁

多年来我国上市公司的股权结构经历了数次大规模调整 ,在公司上市治理的过程中一再强调有效的股权结构 ,但实际治理情况不佳。其原因在于股权结构变迁是在政府诱致性政策下完成的 ,股权结构剔除非流通股成份后 ,投机者机会主义行为是构成现行股权模式的主要因素 ,由此形成的股东缺乏对公司治理机制的“关怀” ,所以提出股权结构要具有对生产要素的激励与约束能力的建议。     

Ownership Reform,Foreign Competition and Efficiency of Chinese Commercial Banks: A Non‐parametric Approach

Since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, the pressure for bank reforms has mounted as China ought to have fully opened up its financial market to foreign competition by 2006. Efficiency is key for domestic banks to survive in a liberalised environment, but it appears that the last hope for raising bank efficiency is through ownership reform. Whether ownership reform and foreign competition can solve China's banking problem remains to be tested. This paper aims to answer this question using a non‐parametric approach to analyse the efficiency changes of 15 large commercial banks during 1998–2005. We find that ownership reform and foreign competition have forced Chinese commercial banks to improve performance, as their total factor productivity rose by 5.6 per cent per annum. This coincides with the recent bullish Chinese stock markets led by three listed state‐owned commercial banks. Despite such encouraging results, we remain cautious about the future of Chinese banks, as the good results may have been artificially created with massive government support and the fundamentals of the banks may be still weak.     

国有商业银行上市模式研究

四大国有银行上市目前被认为是中国银行业发展的重要方向。整体上市和联合上市由于其先天的不足而不能成为选择,而分拆上市以其不会对股市造成较大的影响,同时有利于上市公司建立明晰的产权制度和完善的法人治理结构成为现阶段国有商业银行上市最具可能性的模式。     

Leverage made at home: Investors' margin loan usage and firm leverage

The “homemade leverage” conjecture by Modigliani and Miller (1958) implies that firm leverage and investors' leverage are substitutes. Using the data of margin loans by Chinese stock investors, we find that investors take significantly fewer margin loans on a stock when the company announces new bank loans. This effect is entirely driven by investors' margin loan repayment upon announcements, and is stronger for firms with higher institutional ownership or lower leverage. The findings suggest that investors undo the change in firm leverage by adjusting margin loans usage, supporting the “homemade leverage” conjecture.     

Political Connection,Ownership Structure,and Corporate Philanthropy in China: A Strategic-Political Perspective

This paper investigates whether philanthropic giving decisions and amount of charitable giving are related to firms’ political connections and ownership type. To this end, Chinese firms listed on either the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchange between 2004 and 2011 are examined, where government interference in the business sector is prevalent, state ownership structure is dominant, and corporate political connections prevail. Our analyses show (1) a significant and positive relationship between political connections and the likelihood and extent of firm contributions; (2) a significant and negative relationship between state ownership and extent of firm contributions; and (3) a stronger relationship between political connections and corporate philanthropy in non-state-owned firms. These findings with regard to the relationship between corporate giving, political connections, and ownership type have important implications for understanding corporate giving behavior in China and in emerging markets in general.     

Investor participation and the volatility-volume relation: Evidence from an emerging market

Using a unique dataset from the Chinese stock market that keeps track of the daily number of shareholders, we find that the ownership breadth (proxied by the number of shareholders) is negatively related to stock price volatility. However, consistent with the previous literature on volatility-volume relation, we find that the stock price volatility remains positively related to number of traders participating in the market. We also find that the relations of both the daily order imbalance and the daily depth imbalance with the number of shareholders (traders) are negative (positive). Our results suggest that a higher number of shareholders tend to supply liquidity and reduce volatility, while a higher number of traders tend to compete for liquidity and increase volatility.     

中央政府与地方政府在所有制结构调整中的博弈分析

中央政府与地方政府在所有制结构调整中的博弈主要体现在两个方面,即所有制结构的增量调整和存量调整。在我们的博弈模型中,中央政府与地方政府在所有制结构调整上的博弈策略是不一样的。从中央政府与地方政府所有制结构的增量调整和存量调整的实际来看,不同的博弈策略确实导致了不同的所有制结构调整速度。与我们的博弈模型大体一致,地方政府在与中央政府进行所有制结构调整的博弈时,不同的地方政府所选择的调整速度又是有差异的。     

The separation of ownership from control and investment performance

There is much evidence of a growing separation of corporate ownership from its control by management. This paper compares the performance of several diversified portfolios containing a total of 199 industrial corporations' common stocks in which the class of a given portfolio's stocks is a range of percentage of the total voting stock held by management. This is a test of stock market performance with respect to public information on the relative separation of ownership from control.Performance measures from a naive arbitrage model that is an adaptation of a simplified market model showed that stock market performance was independent of the relative separation of ownership from control over the 1964–1973 period.