Optimal tax treatment of private contributions for public goods with and without warm glow preferences

Tax-favored contributions for financing some public goods may be a useful part of optimal nonlinear income tax and expenditure policy. There are two sides to the potential gain from subsidized donations. First, for a given level of public good provision, higher private donations from high earners than low earners eases the incentive compatibility constraint for donors and so can raise social welfare. This follows since considering a lower-paid job includes a perception of a drop in public good provision. Second, private donation reduces consumption, easing the resource constraint. This paper explores optimal policy, using first a model with standard preferences and then a model with a warm glow of giving. In addition to showing the conditions for the level of public goods, the paper considers the pattern of optimal subsidization across earnings levels. Analysis of optimal taxation with warm glow preferences is sensitive to the choice of preferences that are relevant for a social welfare evaluation. After considering optimal rules with formulations of social welfare which do and do not include warm glow utility, the paper considers the choice of normative criterion. Like the earlier literature, this paper assumes that organizing private donations is costless while tax collection has a deadweight burden. Since private charitable fundraising is very far from costless, the paper is an exploration of economic mechanisms, not a direct guide to policy.     

Variable risk preferences and adaptive aspirations

Observations of human decision making indicate that risk preferences depend on the values of possible outcomes relative to levels of aspiration. A model of such variable risk preference is specified. It suggests that some risk averse behavior may result from a human tendency to focus on targets and from the adaptation of those targets to experience rather than from a fixed trait of risk aversion. In addition, the model shows how risk preferences varying around adaptive aspirations produce both a greater long-run likelihood of survival and a higher average return for survivors than do fixed risk preferences.     

Revealed smooth nontransitive preferences

In the present paper, we are concerned with the behavioural consequences of consumers having nontransitive preference relations. Data sets consist of finitely many observations of price vectors and consumption bundles. A preference relation rationalizes a data set provided that for every observed consumption bundle, all strictly preferred bundles are more expensive than the observed bundle. Our main result is that data sets can be rationalized by a smooth nontransitive preference relation if and only if prices can normalized such that the law of demand is satisfied. Market data sets consist of finitely many observations of price vectors, lists of individual incomes and aggregate demands. We apply our main result to characterize market data sets consistent with equilibrium behaviour of pure-exchange economies with smooth nontransitive consumers.     

Revealed preferences in macroeconomic policy decisions

This paper extends the usual instrument-target framework by directly estimating macroeconomic policy preferences over a number of policy targets using a derived reduced form and then solving the nonlinear optimality conditions for optimal instrument choice. Solving the optimality equations using observations on predetermined variables yields the implicit set of preference weights which induced the observed choices. The derivation format parallels the integrability discussions about consumer preferences implicitly expressed through demand functions. The approach is applied to a simple macro model estimated over the period from 1955 through 1972.     

Revealed preferences by topological methods

Topological conditions for completeness of a preference order are used to show that a certain class of choice functions can be rationalized by means of a utility function. For example, a demand correspondence derived from a piecewise affine concave utility function belongs to this class.     

An experimental test of warm glow giving

This paper reports the results of an experimental test of the warm glow hypothesis. A participant is presented with the opportunity to contribute from her own endowment to a charity of choice. The experiment is designed so that a pure altruist has no incentive to donate. The amount the designated charity will receive is preset; any contribution by the participant crowds out dollar-for-dollar giving by the proctor. We find that participants, on average, donated 20% of their endowments and that approximately 57% of the participants made a donation.     

Testing deontological warm glow motivation for carbon abatements

Do people contribute to CO₂ abatements even when these contributions are completely crowded out by a third party? This study reports from an experimental test of contributions to carbon abatements when the contributions are completely crowded out by the experimenter. Contributions are determined to decline by 44% compared to a policy in which the contributions are spent directly on carbon abatements. Still, contributions remain at 18% of endowments and are relatively stable over six rounds of the crowding-out policy. These results support previous psychological findings that a deontological warm glow is important for motivating environmentally friendly behavior.     

When expectations become aspirations: reference-dependent preferences and liquidity constraints

A large body of literature suggests that consumers derive utility from gains and losses relative to a reference point. This paper shows that such reference dependence can affect savings in opposite directions depending on whether people face liquidity constraints. Existing models for wealth and intertemporal choice predict that reference dependence reduces savings, but these models abstract from liquidity constraints. Introducing a liquidity constraint, I find that reference dependence can increase optimal savings for people without access to credit. Ex post, after reference points have been formed, liquidity constraints force consumers to take part of an income loss in early periods, inducing those who are reference dependent to concentrate the full loss in early periods and save in order to eliminate future losses. Further, anticipating a liquidity constraint raises the expected level of future consumption and thus the expectations-based reference point for future periods, creating an ex-ante savings motive. These findings underscore that it is important to account for financial market imperfections when applying or testing reference-dependent models in low-income settings, and potentially explain heterogeneity in how much the poor save when facing binding liquidity constraints.     

Revealed group preferences on non-convex choice problems

Summary. This paper studies the conditions under which the basic results of the revealed preference theory can be established on the domain of choice problems which include non-convex feasible sets; the exercise is closely related to the works of Peters and Wakker (1991) and Bossert (1994). We show that while no continuous choice function can satisfy strong Pareto optimality over the class of all compact and comprehensive choice problems, strong Pareto optimality, Arrow's choice axiom, upper hemicontinuity and a weak compromisation postulate turn out to be necessary and sufficient to represent choice correspondences by continuous, strictly increasing and quasiconcave real-valued functions. Some applications of our main findings to axiomatic bargaining theory are also studied. Received: December 2, 1996; revised version: February 27, 1998     

Optimal contract theory with time-inconsistent preferences

This paper incorporates managers' time-inconsistent preferences into the classical DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) contract model to study corresponding impacts on the optimal contract, corporate financial policies, and the optimal capital structure. The extended model shows that the impatience of the time-inconsistent agent has positive effects on the optimal payout decision which is opposite to DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and consequently provides a guideline to tailor the contract between investors and the agent. It also shows in the optimal capital structure, the total debt capacity shrinks with the degree of the agent's time inconsistency, and the long-term one shrinks more. In addition, our model predicts that the agent's time inconsistency not only imposes significant limits on the use of long-term debt but also has great effects on firms' capital structures. Thus our finding can potentially explain observed cross-sectional differences in firms' capital structures.     

On the theory of reference-dependent preferences

A theory is proposed in which preferences are conditional on reference points. It is related to Tversky and Kahneman’s reference-dependent preference theory, but is simpler and deviates less from conventional consumer theory. Preferences conditional on any given reference point satisfy conventional assumptions. Apart from a continuity condition, the only additional restriction is to rule out cycles of pairwise choice. The theory is consistent with observations of status quo bias and related effects. Reference points are treated as subject to change during the course of trade. The implications of endogeneity of reference points for behaviour in markets are investigated.     

Distortion of preferences and the Nash theory of bargaining

It is shown that in Nash bargaining over division of a single good, when agents are allowed to distort their von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions into any (weakly) concave form, reporting linear utility functions constitutes a unique dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium.     

Revealed preferences for car tax cuts: an empirical study of perceived fiscal incidence

In this paper, the authors examine the economic and policy implications of the National Football League (NFL) ‘blackout rule,’ a league rule that prohibits local television broadcast of games that are not sold out at least 72 hours prior to game time. The foundation for understanding and assessing the impact of the blackout rule is an analysis of attendance using data on games during the 1996–1997 National Football League season. Expanding on previous research, three separate components of attendance (season ticket sales, game day ticket sales, and game day noshows) are examined in detail. Accounting for the endogeneity of key variables, Tobit and Probit analyses are used to estimate and predict individual game attendance. These empirical estimates are then used as a vehicle to assess the implications of game day blackouts and the potential for public policy intervention. More specifically, the authors begin by estimating the impact of the blackout on game day attendance. Using these estimates, they assess the implications of imposing a local blackout for individual team revenues. The gain in on-site stadium revenue due to the blackout (e.g., through additional ticket and concession sales) are then viewed in the broader context of the societal loss due to the game not being broadcast in the local area. The empirical results suggest that the gain in team revenue is small in comparison to the loss of viewership rights. This suggests that public policy intervention may be possible that would result in a Pareto superior market outcome. The paper concludes by exploring possible intervention strategies.     

Unemployment duration and workers' wage aspirations in Spain

This paper examines unemployed workers' declared willingness to work for wages lower than the one adequate for their qualification. We analyze which personal and economic characteristics determine this willingness and how it changes along the individuals' unemployment spells. The main results are: (i) Young workers, less educated and those living in regions or times of high unemployment are more willing to accept reduced wages while married women with a working husband are much less willing to do so; (ii) Once the individual fixed effect is controlled for, the willingness to work for reduced wages increases with the duration of unemployment; (iii) Not having access to unemployment benefits increases the probability that initially unwilling workers become willing to accept reduced wages.     

A dual theory approach to estimating risk preferences in the parimutuel betting market

This paper introduces an alternative empirical approach to estimating risk preferences in the parimutuel betting market using a dual theory model which is amended to include bettors’ misperceptions of probabilities. We replicate previous empirical results and test our alternative empirical approach using parimutuel horse race betting data. Our results suggest that while bettors are risk-averse, they are also prone to misperceiving probabilities by overweighting low probabilities and underweighting high probabilities. As an application, these results replicate the choice patterns consistent with the Allais paradox.     

Growth, income taxes and consumption aspirations

In a Barro-type economy with exogenous consumption aspirations, raising income taxes favors growth even in the presence of lump-sum taxes. Such a policy is compatible with the behavior of private consumption, income taxes and growth rates observed in actual economies.     

Consumption aspirations in dirty and clean goods and economic growth

This paper builds a two-sector, two-factor environmental model in which agents optimally choose the clean and dirty goods in order to display their social status. In contrast to the conventional notion, we show that greater social aspirations in consumption regardless of either clean or dirty goods have an ambiguous impact on growth, depending on whether the production of conspicuous goods is relatively labor- or capital-intensive, whether the production of conspicuous goods generates more or fewer emissions, and whether labor supply is or is not responsive to social status seeking. By connecting two conflicting aspects of consumer preference involving social aspirations and environmental concerns, our analysis offers a novel explanation for the environmental Kuznets curve and a theoretical support for the empirical possibility of a negative employment-growth relationship and the so-called Green New Deal. Our welfare analysis shows that social comparisons in consumption may increase, rather than decrease, social welfare. The Pigovian tax may only be socially sub-optimal in the two-sector economy because it is unable to completely correct the distortion caused by consumption externalities.