The value of 1800 MHz and 2100 MHz spectrums in India and implications for auction design

The sequence of events leading up to the upcoming auction of 1800 MHz spectrum in India has led to the auctions acquiring an extraordinary significance for the future of the Indian mobile industry. A key feature of the auction design proposed by the regulator TRAI is the benchmarking of the reserve price of 1800 MHz to the price of 2100 – 3G spectrum revealed in the 2010 auction. In the context of the low number of LTE devices available and the fragmentation in the 1800 MHz band, this paper proposes reducing the duration of spectrum holding to ten years (from the current level of twenty years), and calibrating the reserve price of 1800 MHz with its value with GSM deployment. An economic model is used to compute the value of startup and incremental 1800 MHz spectrum. The estimated values are shown to differ from the value of 2100 MHz spectrum at a pan-India level and also in their distribution across circles. A new set of reserve prices are computed based on the estimation. The estimated values are also shown to be close to the AGR-adjusted price revealed in the 2001 auction. A reserve price based on the 2001 auction is also provided. Concomitant features of the auction are suggested to give coherence to the auction design.     

Analysing the C-Band spectrum auctions for 5G in Europe: Achieving efficiency and fair decisions in radio spectrum management

This paper offers a detailed analysis of selected regulatory parameters used as instruments to promote efficiency with fairness for all stakeholders (in the legal sense of equity) in 5G spectrum auctions. Data were collected from sixteen auctions for the C-band that took place in the Member States of the European Union (EU) and in the United Kingdom (UK) between 2017 and 2020 for the introduction of the fifth generation (5G) of mobile communication technology. The selected instruments of intervention are: spectrum packaging, spectrum caps, set-asides, geographical scope of the license, license duration, various forms of license obligations, reserve prices and auction format.Significant differences were observed in national approaches to spectrum packaging, license obligations and reserve prices for efficiency purposes. Our analysis also shows that European national regulators are paying increasing attention to concerns over fairness of decisions on spectrum, or equity, especially by creating opportunities for local private networks to access the spectrum and by imposing requirements on network operators to guarantee more uniform population coverage of newly created 5G networks.     

Impact of spectrum management policy on the penetration of 3G technology

Diffusion of 3G cellular technology varies widely across countries and regions. Past studies have shown that lower levels of diffusion of previous technologies and higher levels of income are significant factors in accelerating the take up of 1st and 2nd generation of mobile telephony. In addition, spectrum management policy plays a significant role in shaping 3G diffusion. Regulatory policies regarding spectrum management include mandating band and technology and decisions to hold spectrum auctions. An econometric analysis over a multi-country panel dataset shows that these spectrum management policies do have significant influence on the take-up of 3G. Findings suggest that the presence of multiple technologies for the previous generation is associated with rollout delay. The estimations indicate that countries that mandated a specific frequency band for 3G saw faster roll out, but in the long run those countries experienced a slower growth rate. Also estimations find that 3G diffusion is not significantly affected by the choice of auctions vs. alternative license award processes. Insights gained from this study of the 2G to 3G transition can provide guidance to regulators now contemplating the transition to newer generations.     

Analysis of spectrum auctions in India—An application of the opportunity cost approach to explain large variations in spectrum prices

The remarkable growth of mobile communication has reinforced the significance of the radio spectrum for mobile network operators. The availability of spectrum varies considerably between different countries due to national regulatory decisions. The focus in this paper is on India where operators have access to a limited amount of spectrum. This paper analyses the value of spectrum by estimating the opportunity cost, which is calculated by the savings that can be achieved by acquiring appropriate amount of spectrum rather than investing in additional base stations. The applied approach combines network deployment, user demand levels, cost, and capacity issues, which are integrated in the application in the opportunity cost approach for spectrum. The opportunity cost of spectrum is compared with prices paid at spectrum auctions. The analysis includes a discussion of drivers that determine the willingness to pay for spectrum. The results show that the opportunity cost of spectrum in relation to auction prices is lower than prices operators paid for 3G spectrum in the metro circles (service areas) while the value derived from the opportunity cost is higher than auction prices in the remaining circles.     

Dynamic usage of narrowband spectrum

We examine the potential for expansion of the white space spectrum sharing model in the 400 MHz band. As opposed to UHF broadcast spectrum, which contains unassigned or idle segments known as white spaces, the 400 MHz band is characterised by intensive licence usage. However, productive spectrum usage does not guarantee allocative efficiency, which would require knowledge of the highest value service for each licence. 400 MHz frequencies are not priced on opportunity cost. It is therefore difficult to ascertain the economically efficient mix of services to deploy in the 400 MHz band. Drawing parallels with the high-economic value revealed and generated through the operations of unlicensed white space devices in UHF broadcast spectrum, we identify untapped 400 MHz spectrum capacity, which we refer to as narrowband spaces. Encouraging dynamic spectrum usage of narrowband spaces could, similarly to TV white space usage help realise the efficient allocation of the 400 MHz band. However, the narrowband nature of the 400 MHz licences and high licensing turnover imply a significantly different concept of dynamic spectrum access than that considered for TV Bands. The paper discusses regulatory implications and the type of services suited to exploit narrowband spaces.     

Reserve Prices in Repeated Auctions

This paper aims to estimate the effect of imposing a reserve price in repeated auctions of homogeneous items. I model the behavior of impatient bidders who search for the best auction outcome over time. The model is used to develop estimating equations for the bidders’ valuations, and to evaluate the effect of reserve prices on bids and revenue. Using data collected from surplus auctions of personal computer processors, I find economically significant gains from imposing a reserve price. The revenue-maximizing reserve price improves revenue by about 23% for a large subsample of the auctions in the data.     

Synergistic valuations and efficiency in spectrum auctions

In spectrum auctions, bidders typically have synergistic values for combinations of licenses. This has been the key argument for the use of combinatorial auctions in the recent years. Considering synergistic valuations turns the allocation problem into a computationally hard optimization problem that generally cannot be approximated to a constant factor in polynomial time. Ascending auction designs such as the Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction (SMRA) and the single-stage or two-stage Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) can be seen as simple heuristic algorithms to solve this problem. Such heuristics do not necessarily compute the optimal solution, even if bidders are truthful. We study the average efficiency loss that can be attributed to the simplicity of the auction algorithm with different levels of synergies. Our simulations are based on realistic instances of bidder valuations we inferred from bid data from the 2014 Canadian 700 MHz auction. The goal of the paper is not to reproduce the results of the Canadian auction but rather to perform “out-of-sample” counterfactuals comparing SMRA and CCA under different synergy conditions when bidders maximize payoff in each round. With “linear” synergies, a bidder's marginal value for a license grows linearly with the total number of licenses won, while with the “extreme national” synergies, this marginal value is independent of the number of licenses won unless the bidder wins all licenses in a national package. We find that with the extreme national synergy model, the CCA is indeed more efficient than SMRA. However, for the more realistic case of linear synergies, SMRA outperforms various versions of CCA that have been implemented in the field including the one used in the Canadian 700 MHz auction. Overall, the efficiency loss of all ascending auction algorithms is small even with high synergies, which is remarkable given the simplicity of the algorithms.     

The 5G spectrum auction in Chile

In 2021, the Chilean government implemented a first-price package auction to allocate electromagnetic spectrum for 5G mobile services. The auction was run sequentially for different spectrum bands, allowing firms to exploit band complementarities. It was a combinatorial auction, so firms could bid for any combination of blocks within a band. It contemplated spectrum caps – upper limits on the spectrum for each firm – to ensure competitiveness. The beauty contests used in previous processes became obsolete, as there was a need to promote competitiveness and transparency in the telecommunication sector. Four incumbents and one potential entrant participated in the auction. The auction raised more than USD $450 million, which was six times more than the sum of the revenues of all previous contests in the country. We discuss this experience and show how different aspects of the context justified our design choices.     

Economic and policy implications of spectrum license fee payment methods

This paper argues that “Do auctions raise consumer prices?” is a misleading question. License fee payment methods, rather than spectrum assignment methods, are key factors that bring forth different market outcomes in the wireless telecommunication industry. This paper analyzes and discusses the effects of three spectrum license fee payment methods—upfront lump-sum fees, royalties, and profit sharing—on economic efficiency, spectrum supply, and government revenue. Royalties create distortions in product and factor markets but can induce the government to increase spectrum supply and encourage firms’ investments. A caveat is that the analyses are based on the model assuming monopoly market and information certainty.     

Secret reserve prices in first-price auctions

This article offers a theoretical explanation for the use of secret reserve prices in auctions. I study first-price auctions with and without secret reserve price in an independent private values environment with risk-neutral buyers and a seller who cares at least minimally about risk. The seller can fix the auction rules either before or after she learns her reservation value. Fixing the rules early and keeping the right to set a secret reserve price can be strictly optimal. Moreover, I describe the relation of using a secret reserve price to phantom bidding and non-commitment to sell.     

Optimal reserve prices in sealed-bid auctions with reference effects

The reference effect and loss aversion are incorporated into the buyer’s utility in the symmetric independent private value models of sealed-bid auctions. The buyer’s equilibrium bidding strategy and the seller’s optimal reserve price are derived for the first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions. In both auction mechanisms, the seller’s optimal reserve price and expected revenue are increasing in the reference point. We compare the seller’s expected revenues as well as the optimal reserve prices in the two auctions. The results show that the seller will set a higher optimal reserve price but obtain lower optimal expected revenue in the second-price auction compared to the first-price auction. Further, we extend the model to the gain-seeking case, and endogenize the reference point as the ex-ante expected price of the item in equilibrium. In contrast to the loss-averse case, the seller will set a lower optimal reserve price but obtain higher optimal expected revenue in the second-price auction compared to the first-price auction if the buyers are gain-seeking. With an endogenous reference point, similar results are obtained in terms of revenue comparison between the two auctions.     

Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany

The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending-bid multi-unit auctions. In particular, it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids.     

Auctions with quantity externalities and endogenous supply

This paper studies the design of license auctions when the number of licenses allocated in the auction determines structure of the post-auction market. I first show that a sequence of conditional reserve prices that specify minimum acceptable bid at each supply level can be used to determine supply endogenously. Then I construct a static auction called multi-dimensional uniform-price auction and a dynamic auction called Walrasian clock auction that allow the auctioneer to condition reserve price on supply and allow bidders to condition bids on supply. I show that both proposed auctions can implement the efficient market structure that maximizes total surplus in the post-auction market in a dominant strategy equilibrium. I next characterize the optimal auction and show that the two proposed auctions can yield the optimal revenue under a sequence of optimal reserve prices.     

Trade subsidies,export bans and price stabilization: Lessons of Bangladesh–India rice trade in the 2000s

During the world food price crisis of 2007–08, rice importing countries suffered through a sharp increase in international rice prices and disruptions in supply as several rice exporters restricted trade to mitigate their domestic price increases. Perhaps no country was more affected by these disruptions than Bangladesh. Our analysis shows that prior to the 2007 crisis, when Bangladesh imported an average of nearly 1 million tons of rice per year from India, domestic wholesale prices of rice in Bangladesh were co-integrated with import parity prices of subsidized Below Poverty Line (BPL) rice. When in mid-2007, India sharply curtailed exports, rice prices surged in Bangladesh.Model simulations show that a relatively small increase in private consumer stocks equivalent to about 2 weeks of normal consumption could account for the large surge in domestic prices in Bangladesh and that an additional 300,000 tons (in addition to approximately 700,000 tons of net rice distribution that actually occurred) would have been sufficient to stabilize prices in the November 2007–April 2008 period. The Bangladesh analysis thus shows that in spite of the uncertainty in international markets, careful planning, timely interventions and openness to trade can substantially reduce requirements for public stockholding.     

Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Reserve Prices in English Auctions

We study the impact of reserve prices on the revenue of English auctions using a unique hand‐collected database of virtual football players from the online football management game Hattrick. As theoretically predicted, setting a reserve price entails a trade‐off between the cost of setting it too high and having the good go unsold, and the benefit associated with a higher revenue should the reserve price successfully extract surplus from the highest bidder. Overall, we find the net benefit of setting a higher reserve price to be negative, regardless of the value of the reserve price. This is a novel result insofar as previous literature has generally found an insignificant or positive effect of the reserve price on unconditional auction revenue.     

Evaluation of the opportunity cost of the spectrum: Application to the digital dividend

The transition to digital television transmission (DTT) creates an opportunity for revising the current allocation and use of the spectrum, and for enhancing its efficiency. The fairly large amount of spectrum that will be freed up in the analog TV switch-off is known as the digital dividend. Many EU countries have decided to partially allocate these frequencies, through market mechanisms, to mobile use, but a large fraction of the dividend is supposed to remain in the hands of broadcasters. An efficient management of the spectrum requires that the use of this resource should be supported through appropriate incentive policies. This paper presents a techno-analytical approach to evaluate the opportunity cost of using a spectrum portion within the digital dividends’ bandwidths, for example around 800-900 MHz, for both DVB-T and UMTS services, specifically addressing the extraordinary rise in the use of mobile broadband in the European context. The methodology is then applied to Italy to derive a baseline for administered prices reflecting the cost of spectrum use. Results obtained are then compared with existing evidences from other studies and Countries’ experiences.     

Polish experience from first-ever spectrum auction

The Polish 4G spectrum auction was a watershed event for the Polish telecommunications market. For the first time in history, the Office of Electronic Communications decided to award spectrum by using an auction process. Polish regulators implemented a simultaneous multiple-round ascending-bid auction, which was widely used worldwide for selling spectrum. The process leading to the auction and the auction itself was lengthy and eventful. Due to the wrong auction design, the auction dragged on indefinitely, causing a delay in spectrum distribution. The auction ended only as a result of the government's intervention, after 8 months (513 rounds) of bidding that raised revenue of over PLN 9 billion (over EUR 2 billion). This paper describes in detail the rules of the Polish 4G auction, analyses bidding behaviour and auction dynamics of the crucial phases of auctions, and presents the final outcomes. It also draws lessons that could help policy makers in Poland and other countries in auction design.     

PENNIES FROM EBAY: THE DETERMINANTS OF PRICE IN ONLINE AUCTIONS*

This paper presents an exploratory analysis of the determinants of prices in online auctions for collectible United States one‐cent coins at the eBay web site. Starting with an initial data set of 20,000 auctions, we perform regression analysis on a restricted sample of 461 coins for which we obtained estimates of book value. We have three major findings. First, a seller's feedback ratings, reported by other eBay users, have a measurable effect on her auction prices. Negative feedback ratings have a much greater effect than positive feedback ratings do. Second, minimum bids and reserve prices have positive effects on the final auction price. In particular, minimum bids appear only to have a significant effect when they are binding on a single bidder, as predicted by theory. Third, when a seller chooses to have her auction last for a longer period of days, this significantly increases the auction price on average.     

How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids, with an Application to Real Estate Auctions

In a general auction model with affiliated signals, common components to valuations and endogenous entry, we compute the equilibrium bidding strategies and outcomes, and derive a lower bound on the optimal reserve price. This lower bound can be computed using data on past auctions combined with information about the subsequent sales prices of unsold goods. We illustrate how to compute the lower bound using data from real estate auctions.     

Estimating demand from eBay prices

This paper presents results for identification and estimation of the value distribution from eBay auction prices. The paper presents results for eBay type auctions with independent private values and unobserved participation. It is first shown that the distribution of values is identified from observing the distribution of prices and knowing the distribution of potential bidders. The main identification result presents conditions for which the distribution of values and the distribution of potential bidders are simultaneously identified. Not surprisingly, the intuition is similar to the standard results for identifying demand from observed equilibrium prices. The estimation method suggested by the identification results is used to estimate the value distribution for the “C5” Chevrolet Corvette sold on eBay. The results suggest that a simple OLS model on prices will over estimate the mean value of the item. The estimation results are then used to calculate the optimal reserve price for these cars. The estimated optimal reserves are compared to the actual reserves. Actual hidden reserves are set much higher than actual non-hidden reserves. The evidence suggests sellers set Buy-It-Nows and hidden reserves optimally to account for re-listing opportunities.