Moonlighting politicians

In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life. If high-ability citizens can keep earning money outside of parliament, they will be more likely to run for election; for the same reason, they will also be more likely to shirk once elected. These predictions are confronted with a dataset about members of the Italian Parliament from 1996 to 2006. The empirical evidence shows that bad but dedicated politicians come along with good but not fully committed politicians. There is in fact a non-negligible fraction of citizens with remarkably high pre-election income who are appointed in parliament. These citizens are those who gain relatively more from being elected in terms of outside income. At the same time, they are less committed to the parliamentary activity in terms of voting attendance.     

Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the rationality of selection to office by lot

Contrary to modern democracies ancient Athens appointed large numbers of government officers by lot. After describing the Athenian arrangements, the paper reviews the literature on the choice between election and lot focusing on representativeness of the population, distributive justice, minimization of conflicts, quality of appointees and administrative economy. It then examines why in drawing up the constitution a self-interested citizen may give up voting for government officials and appoint them by lot. It is shown that appointment by lot is preferred when the effort required to choose candidates is less than the benefit expected from their actions as government officials. It is also found that, given the choice, office motivated candidates may unanimously agree to selection by lot but not to election.     

Local elections and consumption insurance

During our sample period from 1987 to 2002, Chinese villages completed the transition from government‐appointed village leaders to elected ones. This article examines if and how much democratic elections of the village leaders affected consumption insurance by Chinese village residents. Exploring a panel dataset of 1,400 households from this period, we find that consumption insurance is around 20 percent more complete with elected village leaders. Furthermore, local elections improve consumption insurance only for the poor and middle‐income farmers, but not for the rich. The results are robust when we allow for pretrending, potential endogeneity of elections, and higher measurement errors for rich residents. We also find that the effects on consumption insurance are stronger when closer to the upcoming election year and when the village committees consist largely of non‐Communist Party members. These findings suggest that the election effects on consumption insurance partly come from increasing accountability to local constituents.     

The American system of shared powers: the President, Congress, and the NLRB

The purpose of this article is to develop and test a model ofpolitical influence on regulation that incorporates both thecompeting interests of elected officials and the relevant institutionalconstraints. To do this, we focus on one channel of politicalinfluence: the appointment of agency leaders to a multimemberregulatory board. The model has two stages: first, a bargainingstage between the president and Senate in which they choosea target policy; and second, the appointments stage in whichthey attempt to implement this target by choosing the medianboard member. The model's empirical leverage arises becauseelected officials can replace board members only when seatson the board become available through term expiration or resignation.This yields specific predictions about how and whether eachappointment will change policy. We apply the model to the NLRB.The empirical results, investigating all appointments to theNLRB from 1949 until 1988, fit our theory remarkably well.     

Gender bias and women’s political performance

We model voters’ gender bias as a prejudice on women’s competence coming from a distorted prior. We analyse the effect of this bias in a two-period two-party election model in which voters care about both policy preference and competence. We find that, if voters (wrongly) believe that women are drawn from a distribution of competences with higher weights on lower values, female politicians are less likely to win office but, when elected, they are on average more competent than male elected officials. As a consequence, female incumbents seek re-election more often.     

Corruption and the public display of wealth

We study an agent–client model of corruption, in which potential corruptors are uncertain about the probability with which officials are subjected to an audit, either high or low. We characterize a signaling equilibrium, in which officials who are less likely to be audited engage in public conspicuous consumption, whereas those who are more likely to be audited do not. In this equilibrium, officials are better off than in the equilibria without conspicuous consumption. The signaling equilibrium exists if the officials' bargaining power vis‐à‐vis potential corruptors is sufficiently high, which implies that corruption can be curbed by creating competition among officials.     

Long-term appointment of central bankers: costs and benefits

Why do independent central bank boards have a reputation for more moderate policy than do elected governments, even if the board's members have been appointed by the current or former government? This paper gives an explanation for the case of a political world with ‘zeitgeist shocks’ on the electorate's preferences. If the median position of preferences inside the board determines the monetary policy, a trade-off concerning member term length arises: a longer term entails more moderation, while enhancing the likelihood of detachment from contact to the electorate's current preferences.     

Choosing Among Regulatory Options in the United States Telecommunications Industry

We examine the determinants of the choice between rate-of-return regulation and incentive regulation in the United States telecommunications industry. We find that a state is more likely to select incentive regulation in any year: (1) when it has employed incentive regulation in the past; (2) when the Republican party controls both the executive and the legislative branches of the state government, but the Democratic party has controlled these branches historically; and (3) as the firms earnings under rate-of-return regulation increase toward the industry average. We also find that appointed regulators are more likely than their elected counterparts to revert to rate-of-return regulation.     

The control of politicians within a constitutional framework: the case of state-level recall provisions

As previously recognized, the structure of representative democracy is endogenous and the choice of constitutional provisions selected by such organizations is important. The present paper focuses on constitutional choices that work to control the behaviour of elected officials by examining the constitutional ease of recalling elected officials across the 50 states. After developing a numerical measure of the ‘ease’ with which registered voters can recall officials, ordinary logistic, ordered logistic and tobit models are employed to examine the factors of such an endogenous choice across states. The results are quite consistent with the theoretical models developed previously by public choice and constitutional scholars.     

The value of financial outside directors on corporate boards

The appointment of a financial outside director to the board of a public corporation is associated with positive abnormal returns, attributable entirely to the smaller than median-size firms in our sample. In addition, investment bankers are appointed to the boards of much smaller companies, on average, than commercial bankers or insurance executives. These results suggest that smaller firms, which may have limited access to financial markets and less financial expertise, benefit substantially from these appointments.     

Do elected public utility commissioners behave more politically than appointed ones?

In the United States, public utility commissioners are either appointed or elected and the vast majority is either Republican or Democrat. While previous research has analyzed whether selection method and political affiliation have independent effects on the policy choices of these commissioners, this paper investigates whether these influences may be interrelated and how this question can be analyzed empirically. The context explored in this paper is telecommunications network lease prices and retail prices. While data limitations preclude causal interpretations, the political affiliation of elected commissioners may be correlated with the lease prices that they set. Further, retail prices may vary with the political affiliation of appointed regulators.      

The political determinants of liberalization: do ideological cleavages still matter?

We investigate the political determinants of liberalization in OECD network industries, performing a panel estimation over 30 years, through the largest and most updated sample available. Our results contrast with the traditional wisdom according to which right-wing governments do promote market-oriented policies more intensively than left-wing ones. Our findings reveal a neglected role of the so-called neoliberalism in promoting left-wing market-oriented policy. As a result, we claim that ideological cleavages ceased to act as determinants of the liberalization wave observed in network industries. This result is confirmed when controlling for the existing regulatory conditions that executives find when elected. Furthermore, we find that the country’s exposure to other countries’ policy initiatives acts as a positive stimulus for liberalization policies.     

Bicameralism and corruption

This paper studies the impact of bicameralism on the level of corruption of elected officials. The relationship between parliamentary organization and corruption is analyzed in a two-period game between legislators, citizens and a lobby group, which delivers several predictions that we empirically investigate using a panel of 35 democracies during the period 1996-2004. Assuming that legislators choose a multidimensional policy on which citizens and a lobby group have opposing interests, we show that bicameralism improves the accountability of legislators to the electorate when the same party controls the two chambers and party polarization is high, while the opposite holds if the two chambers are controlled by different parties. These predictions find strong support in our empirical analysis.     

Winning or losing in investor‐to‐state dispute resolution: The role of arbitrator bias and experience

When an investor sues a state for alleged breaches of its obligations under an investment treaty or a trade agreement with investment provisions, all that should matter for who wins the case are the merits of the claim itself. Alas, investor‐to‐state dispute settlement (ISDS) does not take place in a vacuum. Such cases are decided by a tribunal typically consisting of three arbitrators, one each nominated by the two parties while the president is mutually agreed upon. We demonstrate that the kind of involvement of these arbitrators in previous ISDS cases matters for the case under dispute. Specifically, we show that what we label the presidents' pro‐investor appointment bias—the number of times they have previously been nominated by an investor minus the number of times they have represented respondent states—raises the likelihood that an investor wins an ISDS case. The same holds for the pro‐investor appointment bias of state‐appointed arbitrators. Given the president's crucial role, the main implication of our findings is that presidents should be drawn from among those who have not systematically represented more one side than the other in previous cases.     

Newspaper Circulation and Local Government Efficiency*

In this paper, we examine the role of the newspaper market for a key aspect of political accountability: the efficient use of public funds by elected politicians. Newspapers are a major provider of the political information voters use to monitor their elected officials, especially at the local level. Thus, the incentives for politicians to reduce budgetary slack should be stronger in jurisdictions where the electorate is well informed by newspapers. Using panel data on the circulation of some 150 newspapers in Norwegian municipalities, we show that increases in local newspaper circulation are associated with higher levels of local government efficiency.     

任命制下的官员经济增长行为

本文考察地方官员的经济增长行为.在理论上,本文证明了在政治上集权、经济上分权的经济体,即中央任命地方官员、地方官员为增长而竞争的经济体里,不仅会出现竞争效应,还会出现极化效应,正是极化效应决定了理性的地方官员在增长竞争中将采取不同的经济增长行为.在实证上,本文贡献了一种度量极化效应的方法,并基于中国省级官员数据证实了极化效应的存在.     

Independent courts and administrative agencies: an empirical analysis of the states

This article explores the hypothesis that state administrativeagencies spend more time and effort attempting to protect theiractions from judicial review in states with more independentappointed courts (as opposed to less independent elected courts).This is because more independent courts are (by definition)less influenced by the political/electoral forces that underlieagency - policymaking - as rational actors, agencies may thereforebe expected to recognize the degree of judicial independenceand respond to it. Three state agencies subject to substantialjudicial review in the 1970s are examined: utility commissions,insurance commissions, and the public education bureaucracy.Controlling for relevant political factors, each is found tohave significantly larger staffing for a given regulatory workloadin states with more independent appointed courts, consistentwith the hypothesis.     

Modelling the dynamics of corruption and unemployment with heterogeneous labour

This paper presents an endogenous growth model with heterogeneous labour, endogenous unemployment, and public sector corruption. Unlike most previous studies, the model does not separate public officials and private individuals into two distinct groups. Instead, taking up bureaucratic appointment as a public servant is modelled as an occupational choice, which then allows for the endogenous determination of the proportion of public officials, the share of corrupt officials among them, and the public investment efficiency of the economy. The dynamics of endogenous corruption and unemployment are studied using numerical policy experiments based on a stylized representation of a middle-income African economy with high corruption and unemployment. The main finding is that, large-scale public infrastructure push has no effect on raising growth in an economy with high corruption. However, if preceded by social and anti-corruption policies that successfully induce a structural change, it will then be effective in raising growth.     

Local government type and municipal bond ratings: what’s the relationship?

There is an extensive literature analysing the executive branch within local U.S. government jurisdictions. This has largely revolved around the differences between elected mayors and appointed city managers. Much of the academic work has considered the potential efficiency gains that may be associated with either form of government and comparative analyses between the two. However, the empirical literature has been divided regarding the relative efficiency of either form. This article attempts to add to that literature by considering how bond markets may perceive potential efficiencies that emerge from one executive type over the other by evaluating bond ratings for a sample of large municipal governments in the United States. Overall, the results suggest that municipalities headed by a city manager are associated with increased bond ratings (and thus lower borrowing costs), which may lend support that this form of administration is, on some margin, relatively more efficient than others. These results are robust to a number of specifications.     

Publish or Perish? The Increasing Importance of Publications for Prospective Economics Professors in Austria,Germany and Switzerland

Abstract. Tenure decisions depend, among other factors, on a candidate's career age and publication record. We associate publications with journal articles indexed in EconLit and measure publication output in equivalents of both top‐five journal articles and European Economic Review (EER) articles. We find that the average age of a professor in the year of his/her first appointment is 38, i.e. he or she is appointed approximately eight years after completing the PhD. Between 1970 and 2006, the average publication record at the time of the first appointment is equivalent to 1.5 standardized top‐five articles or 2.3 standardized EER articles. Publication records vary across subfields and have become more substantial over time. We predict that someone aspiring to a tenured position after 2011 should aim at an equivalent of four standardized top‐five articles or six standardized EER articles.