基于激励相容的商业银行监管有效性研究综述

激励相容的银行监管是使监管者、银行和社会公众效用最大的一种监管模式。银行与监管部门、社会公众与银行之间都存在委托代理关系,如何利用已知的不完全信息激励代理人做出使委托人效用最大行动,是激励相容要解决的问题。通过对金融监管中各参与者的博弈分析,认为在存在道德风险和信息不对称的前提下,监管当局提供的有效监管激励缺失以及不合理的制度安排是造成监管效率低下的主要原因。只有加快建立激励相容的银行监管机制,提高银行监管的有效性,才能顺应国际金融的发展形势,提高我国在国际金融体系中的地位。     

Compensating corporate venture managers

This article reports the results of a questionnaire survey addressed to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies concerning incentive practices for venture managers. Data was also collected for venture performance history in these companies.Highlights of the results are:Most companies are not providing different incentives for venture managers than for other managers.Companies that do and companies that do not provide special incentives seem to agree on the types of incentives which would promote improved venture performance, which include milestone bonuses, equity, and/or options in the new venture, variable bonuses based on venture ROI.The primary obstacle to installing such incentives is reported by firms without special incentives in place to be concern about internal equity.Firms with special incentives already in place have less concern with this problem. A moderate problem to such firms is difficulty in defining venture objectives.There is no evidence, from this study, that special incentives for venture managers affected the outcome in venture performance, when such performance was measured by the percentage of “successes” and “failures.” About 50% success rate was reported by each group.The article deals with these questions:Are performance incentives essential?Certainly not, from the data in this sample, but this was a “head count” of successes and failures—a study of overall economic performance might yield a different result. One expensive failure can wipe out the gains from many small successes.Are the incentives reported effective?Obviously not enough to show a difference between those who use them and those who don't. Analysis of the incentive elements used and the earnings limits imposed suggest that the special incentives are not particularly special, nor very much of an incentive. Further, the most common incentive reported, based on venture ROI, fails to consider the time period usually required to achieve a positive ROI, and the many changes of management which occur during that period.What criteria should be used for designing an incentive program for venture managers?Recognition of the probability of management change, incentives which promote early identification of need for change of direction or to abort, focus on event completion milestones rather than the calendar, the relationship of reward potential to risk potential including job security and actual financial risk by the venture manager, achievability, and simplicity are factors to be considered.What kind of financial incentives might be included in incentive design?Depending on the life cycle stage of the venture, fixed and variable bonuses, options for equity or shadow equity in the venture itself, actual equity in the new venture, and to a lesser extent, salary increases and equity or equity options in the parent are suggested. How can the obstacles to installation of performance incentives for venture managers be reduced?To reduce perception of internal inequity, relating potential risk to potential reward and extending performance incentives to other managers is suggested. The problem of defining venture objectives as an obstacle is instantly solved as an incentive issue by making ownership possibility a reality for venture management, especially with financial investment required by venture management.     

The effect of incentives on intrinsic motivation and employee attitudes: A multilevel study across nations and cultural clusters

In a study of employees across 29 nations and 9 of the 10 Global Leadership and Organizational Effectiveness (GLOBE) cultural clusters, the association between economic and psychological incentives and intrinsic motivation, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment were examined. Self‐Determination Theory (SDT) is utilized to develop a theoretical model and then compare structural relationships across nations and cultural clusters. Results confirm the positive relationship between basic psychological needs and intrinsic motivation across all nations and cultures. However there is an effect of cultural cluster on the relationships between incentives and motivation, wherein external incentives are intrinsically motivating in Southern and Confucian Asian clusters. The implications for the design of incentive systems are discussed.     

Foreign investment impact and incentive: a strategic approach to the relationship between the objectives of foreign investment policy and their promotion

This paper offers hypotheses and tests empirically the relationship between the objectives of foreign direct investment (FDI) policy and it results (i.e. the various types of impact of FDI and investment incentives) within a strategic fit concept. In the process, this paper demonstrates a strong correlation between specific objectives and particular incentives. Specifically, it points to a strong correlation between, on the one hand, the advancement of industrial structure and fiscal incentives and on the other, between regional expansion/development and financial incentives. The results point out how a host government should establish a coherent investment incentive system matching specific objectives of FDI policy.     

Managerial Incentives and Investment Policy in Family Firms: Evidence from a Structural Analysis

This paper provides evidence that CEO incentive pay mediates the effect of family preferences on corporate investment policy. Our study focuses on the option portfolio volatility sensitivity vega, which motivates the risk‐taking behavior of undiversified managers. After controlling for factors that affect incentive pay and investment policy simultaneously, we find that one‐third of underinvestment in riskier R&D projects in active family firms can be attributed to a significantly lower vega. Passive family firms allocate more capital to R&D as opposed to active family firms, and are more active in M&A deal making. In contrast to many prior studies, pay incentives and families are not associated with capital expenditures. Overall, our empirical results suggest that CEO pay incentives induce investment policy contingent on firm risk. Family CEO incentive pay manifests the family preference for lower risk, especially in firms with higher firm risk. Nonetheless, after replacing family CEOs with outside professionals, investments in both R&D and M&A increase, which is consistent with the family preference for extended investment horizons. Interestingly, such a preference seems not to be manifested in incentive pay.     

Analytic collaboration in virtual innovation projects

Researchers attend to innovation and collaboration issues. Yet, the relevant literature devotes scant attention to the relationship between collaboration effectiveness and virtual innovation team context, while there are clear indications that both subjects relate with growing concerns in today's business setting. This article reviews extant literature and state-of-the art collaboration systems, and elucidate dynamic contextual factors among virtual innovation team members. The results show the antecedents and interrelationship among these factors, suggesting an optimal collaboration model for virtual innovation project teams. This paper documents the empirical observations of a virtual innovation project for advanced textile manufacturing technologies, and examines the due collaboration taking place among different project participants. Understanding the set of contextual factors emerging from virtual innovation projects can help managers classify, and employ the most effective collaboration mechanism for enhancing the corresponding project performance and effectiveness pragmatically.     

浅析股权激励方案设计

股权激励作为一种对管理层激励的有效方式，在公司激励机制中发挥着重要的作用。但任何一个工具和方法都是一把双刃剑，股权激励会稀释产权，用得不好也会适得其反。因此，在设计股权激励方案中，要坚持“两个结合”和明确方案的目的；选择适合企业的股权激励设计方案时，应考虑企业的发展周期，同时注重股票的来源与定价问题、激励对象等关键点。     

财税政策激励企业技术创新的理论与实证分析

技术创新是一个复杂的系统,其不同阶段具有不同的特点。财税政策对技术创新的各个阶段都有一定的激励作用,但在不同阶段起主要作用的具体政策是不同的:在研发阶段与成果转化阶段,财政支持与税收优惠都很重要,但研发阶段对财政支持更为敏感,而成果转化阶段对财政支持与税收优惠的敏感性大体相当;在产业化生产阶段,政府采购政策与税收政策具有重要影响,对政府采购政策更为敏感。     

How Economic Incentives May Destroy Social,Ecological and Existential Values: The Case of Executive Compensation

Executive compensation has long been a prominent topic in the management literature. A main question that is also given substantial attention in the business ethics literature—even more so in the wake of the recent financial crisis—is whether increasing levels of executive compensation can be justified from an ethical point of view. Also, the relationship of executive compensation to instances of unethical behavior or outcomes has received considerable attention. The purpose of this paper is to explore the social, ecological, and existential costs of economic incentives, by discussing how relying on increasing levels of executive compensation may have an adverse effect on managerial performance in a broad sense. Specifically, we argue that one-dimensional economic incentives may destroy existential, social, and systemic values that influence the manager’s commitment to ensure responsible business conduct, and have negative spillover effects that may reduce the manager’s performance. There are well-documented findings that demonstrate that reliance on sources of extrinsic motivation (such as economic incentives) may displace intrinsic motivation. Our perspective is a holistic one, in the sense that we will explore the influence of sources of extrinsic motivation on the manager’s intrinsic commitment to different types of values. We will in particular investigate how it may influence the manager’s ethical reflection and behavior or lack thereof.     

Long‐term Investments and Financial Structure

This paper examines how the financial structure of a firm affects the incentives of managers to act myopically. The paper shows that managers tend to choose investments that pay off too quickly if there is a possibility that shareholders will fire the managers in the future. However, this problem can be avoided if firms are appropriately financed. Since the gains from firing the managers accrue first to the creditors, the shareholders’ incentive to fire the managers is reduced when the firm increases its debt ratio. The firm should thus choose an optimal financial structure to ensure that the level of incentive for shareholders to dismiss managers is appropriately controlled.     

An Investigation on Incentive Strategies in Community Building in Business-to-Business Electronic Markets

ABSTRACT

Purpose: Community building is recognized as an important governance mechanism in business-to-business (B-to-B) electronic markets by enhancing firms’ participation in these platform markets. However, little research has been done regarding the role of incentive strategies in community building. The main purpose of this paper is to understand how to motivate merchants to participate in a merchant community with incentive strategies.

Methodology: Data were collected in a community of a large B-to-B electronic platform market in China. We randomly chose a sample of 605 participants from among all merchant firms registered in this community, and track their behaviors for 2 weeks. Their behaviors are recorded based on our research design.

Findings: With the empirical analysis from a community of a large B-to-B electronic platform market in China, our results show that (1) both platform and peer incentive strategies can significantly enhance community participation, while platform incentives is more effective in general; (2) platform incentive strategy is a more effective strategy as seller firm uncertainty increases; (3) peer incentive strategy is a more effective strategy as buyer firm uncertainty increases.

Originality: This paper is among the first to investigate two types of incentive strategies in community building, platform level and peer level. We also investigate the moderating role of market uncertainties due to market participants from seller and buyer when examining the effectiveness of these two incentive strategies.     

The relationship between incentive compensation and performance related CEO turnover

We study the relationship between incentive compensation and performance related CEO turnover. Our theoretical model predicts that the slope of the compensation contract and forced turnover may be complements. Our results support this prediction. We find that incentives and turnover are positively related. This relationship however, varies with the equity ownership of CEOs and does not hold for CEOs who own more than 5% equity. Moreover, this relationship is stronger if the firm under performs its industry. Our results suggest that high-powered incentives may increase the signaling power of performance measures and lead to higher likelihood of turnover.     

The Economics of Business Process Design: Motivation,Information and Coordination Within the Firm

This paper presents a transaction cost analysis of the internal business processes of firms. Business processes are collections of activities which are technologically or managerially linked so that they jointly affect value added. Their organisation is characterised by their ‘architecture’—the allocation of responsibilities amongst individuals and groups and communication between them for information and coordination—and their incentive structure. The overall costs of organisation are determined by losses due to imperfect motivation of process members, which flows from the incentive structure, and imperfect information and coordination, which flow from the architecture, together with the resource costs associated with incentives and architecture. Perfect motivation corresponds to ‘team behaviour’ and a quantitative model, based on team theory, indicates how the best architecture depends on the degree interaction between activities comprising the business process.     

金融科技发展、金融结构调整与企业研发创新

金融体系对企业研发创新的激励是我国实现经济高质量发展转型的关键。系统分析不同金融体系结构与企业创新绩效之间的关系,结果表明:市场主导型金融体系的创新激励效应随着企业创新流程的不断深化呈上升趋势,而银行主导型金融体系的创新激励效应呈现“倒U型”趋势,整体上来看,市场主导型金融体系的创新激励效应优于银行主导型金融体系;但金融体系结构调整显著存在门槛效应,唯市场导向的结构调整并不代表最优金融结构。从金融生态环境角度进一步探究金融科技发展与不同金融结构创新激励效应之间的关系,结果发现:金融科技发展明显提升了不同金融结构的创新激励效应,在金融科技的调节作用下,银行主导型体系的创新边际贡献随着创新流程的深化呈现上升趋势,而金融市场的边际贡献却在成果转化阶段呈现下降趋势。我国金融结构调整应根据外部金融环境的变化进行动态调整,不能盲目追求市场化;重视金融科技创新的作用,鼓励企业根据创新价值流程匹配多元化融资,确保实现金融资本高效服务实体企业创新的目标。     

对所得税中两种R&D税收激励方式的评估

在所得税中采用不同的R&D税收激励方式,对企业的刺激效应会表现出很大的差别.本文评估了两种主要的R&D税收激励措施对企业R&D投入效应的影响,并结合西方国家对企业R&D税收激励的具体做法进行了比较和总结;最后,提出促进我国企业R&D投入的税收激励制度安排的政策建议.     

Can behavioral nudges and incentives help lower-income households build emergency savings with tax refunds? Evidence from field and survey experiments

Tax refunds are an opportunity for lower-income households to accumulate emergency savings so they have cash on hand to cover expenses when income is insufficient. Our field experiments testing different behavioral interventions to encourage refund saving via online tax filing show small effect sizes (0.12–0.14) and a low aggregate savings rate (12%) that might be increased were filers to receive financial incentives. We test a key provision of the Refund to Rainy Day Saving and Financial Security Credit Acts using a survey experiment, finding that hypothetical refund saving jumps from 16% with no financial incentive, to 71% and 80% with 25% and 50% matches, respectively, findings which are mostly insensitive to refund size. Our results suggest that public policies to provide greater financial support—including stronger income supports—will better prepare lower-income households for financial emergencies than behavioral interventions to nudge refund saving.     

Coordinating Loosely-Coupled Work in Construction Inspection Activities

Inspections represent key activities in construction projects. They allow coordinating the work of the main contractor and the subcontracted companies participating in the project. Today the inspection activities and the coordination process are done using information recorded into paper-based blueprints. As a consequence of it, coordinating the activities derived from inspection processes become expensive, slow and error-prone. This paper presents a mobile shared workspace, named COIN (Construction Inspector), which helps the participants in a construction project to overcome these limitations. COIN was particularly designed to be used on tablet PCs, but it is able to run on several computing devices. This workspace has been tested in a controlled work scenario. The preliminary results are highly positive, indicating this proposal could have an important impact on the construction management process.     

感知激励对员工战略共识影响的实证分析——以工作卷入为中介变量

本研究采用定性及定量方法,探讨了中国情景下感知激励对员工战略共识的影响机理。实证分析的结果表明：在员工感知激励的4个维度中,内在激励、互惠激励与员工战略理解显著正相关。但对于员工战略认同和员工战略承诺,薪酬激励、内在激励、互惠激励与声誉激励均具有直接的正向预测作用。员工工作卷入在内在激励与员工战略认同的关系中起完全中介作用,在内在激励与员工战略承诺的关系中起部分中介作用。同时,员工工作卷入在互惠激励与员工战略认同、互惠激励与员工战略承诺的关系中起部分中介作用。     

如何做好建筑工程的设计监理工作

设计费虽然只占工程全部投资的极少部分,但是,工程投资总量中绝大部分的投资由设计决定,工程设计决定着项目的建设投资,因此,做好建筑工程的设计监理工作势在必行.本文从保持设计监理部门的独立性、有效监控设计投资、有效监控设计质量、建立设计监理的激励机制四方面对设计阶段的监理工作进行了探讨.     

Owner as Manager,Extended Horizons and the Family Firm

Previous work on firm ownership structure suggests that organizations in which ownership and control are combined may be undervalued relative to the market investment rule because decision makers have an incentive to forgo investment projects that managers in firms with specialized ownership find profitable. However, the specialization of ownership and decision-making functions may result in substantial agency costs. This paper shows that these tradeoffs may not exist in family firms. The extended horizons characteristic of family businesses may provide the necessary incentives for decision makers to invest according to the market rule while limiting agency costs that arise when ownership and control are separated. Family ties, loyalty, insurance, and stability are expected to be effective in lengthening the horizons of managers and in providing the incentives for family managers to make efficient investments in the family business.