农户土地征用意愿的影响因素分析

尝试运用probit模型,对影响农户征地意愿的因素进行分析,分析结果表明:被征土地类型、补偿时限以及对农地的投资这些因素引起农户征地意愿同方向的变化;被征土地的面积、是否从征地中受益和征地权的决定等因素引起农户征地意愿反方向的变化。最后得出结论:通过关注农户的谈判地位、征地权的正确行使、征地范围的划分和解决好失地农民的非农就业,来维护被征地农民的利益。     

Expropriation risk,investment decisions and economic sectors

We build a Real Options model to assess the importance of private provision and the impact of expropriation risk on investment timing, business values, governmental costs and social welfare. We consider two types of businesses (essential and non-essential) and two stages (operating businesses and investment opportunities) and answer questions regarding three main topics: the firm's reaction to expropriation risk, the government drivers to expropriate, and the welfare costs of expropriation. Our results show that responding to expropriation risk the private investor is driven to suboptimal investment decisions. When we endogenize the reputational costs of expropriation, our results show that the decision of the government to expropriate largely depends on the type of business being targeted. In terms of welfare, our results show that expropriation is always associated with a loss.     

Protecting Property: The Politics of Redistribution,Expropriation, and Market Openness

This paper develops a formal model to disentangle the competing political incentives for redistribution, expropriation, and market openness. Although redistribution and expropriation are both types of government extraction, redistribution re‐allocates wealth within the citizenry, while expropriation re‐allocates wealth from citizens to the government. Representative political institutions increase redistribution and reduce expropriation. Market openness changes these incentives, as foreign investors prefer reductions in both redistribution and expropriation. When political institutions are representative, the government will rely more on reducing expropriation, rather than limiting redistribution, to attract foreign investment. Under representative institutions then, openness partially reinforces the preferences of voters rather than undermining them. In addition, market liberalization occurs only when the policy changes needed to attract foreign investment are relatively small. If existing policies are satisfactory to foreign investors, moves toward openness may be accompanied by greater redistribution and expropriation, as governments are tempted by a larger base for extraction. Thus, openness has ambiguous effects on economic policy, at times encouraging and at times constraining extraction.     

Mode of International Investment and Endogenous Risk of Expropriation

This paper analyzes the relationship between the mode of international investment and institutional quality. Foreign investors from a capital‐rich North can either purchase productive assets in a capital‐poor South and transfer their capital within integrated multinational firms or they can form joint ventures with local asset owners. The South is ruled by an autocratic elite that may use its political power to expropriate productive assets. The expropriation risk lowers the incentive to provide specific capital in an integrated firm and distorts the decision between joint ventures and integrated production. We determine the equilibrium risk of expropriation in this framework and the resulting pattern of international production. We also analyze as to how globalization, which is reflected in a decline in investment costs, influences institutional quality.     

Should we write prenuptial contracts?

A successful marriage requires for both parties to make investments in their relationship and marital assets. How such assets would be divided if and when the parties divorce is an important factor determining each party's ex ante investment incentives. Using the incomplete contracting approach, we characterize the optimal asset division rule, one that provides the parties with the best investment incentives. We then discuss the circumstances under which the spouses would agree, in equilibrium, to contract out state-imposed rules governing the allocation of marital assets upon divorce. We conclude by exploring the implications of our results in the context of various asset division rules currently discussed by policy-makers.     

双轨制、价格市场化与总量投资分析

本文在新古典投资理论的框架下引入中国转轨时期的制度性因素,建立包括私有部门、国企部门以及政府部门的投资行为模型,论证了国有企业多重目标而导致其过度投资和资本积累,同时解释了在转轨过程中出现的诸如"国退民进"等演化现象,论证了政府倾向于干预经济,施行"逆风向行事"规则,然而因其对项目真实利润的不可准确估测性会导致投资的过度波动,从而表明政府投资可能是经济中投资波动的来源。     

Efficiency and sharing of investment in specific human capital under risk aversion

This paper analyses the investment behavior of a risk-averse worker who searches for other jobs in a two-period model. It will be shown that given an appropriate investment technology, the worker will invest in specific human capital efficiently if his investment costs and return can be shared with some parties. The presence of sharing allows the worker to invest efficiently without being affected by his risk aversion since he can adjust his share of the investment in a way compatible with his attitude towards risk.     

网络借贷中羊群效应的存在性、驱动机制与投资者投资效率*

本文探究了网络借贷中羊群效应的存在性、背后的驱动机制以及对投资者投资效率的影响。实证结果表明，在控制了标的流标风险和时间固定效应后，我国网络借贷投资者群体中存在显著的羊群效应。进一步，标的羊群效应程度与借款人信息以及投资者类型紧密相关，借款人的还款能力越低，参与投资的投资者风险厌恶程度越低，则该标的的羊群效应越显著，说明羊群效应是“风险厌恶程度较低的投资者期望通过模仿他人的投资选择来消除由于信息不对称带来的违约风险”造成的结果。最后，网络借贷中的羊群效应有利于提升投资者的投资效率，具体表现在羊群效应提高了投资者成功投资的概率，并且有助于投资者在低质量标的中将资金投资到潜在违约风险更低的标的之中。     

Foreign investment and expropriation under oligarchy and democracy

We study the incentives to expropriate foreign capital under democracy and oligarchy. We model a two‐sector small open economy where foreign investment triggers Stolper–Samuelson effects through reducing exporting costs. The incentives to expropriate depend on the distributional effects associated to the investment. How investment affects the incomes of the different groups in society depends on the sectors where these investments are undertaken and on structural features of the economy such as factor intensity, factor substitutability, and price and output elasticities. We characterize the equilibria of the expropriation game and show that if investment is undertaken in the sector that uses labor less intensively then democratic expropriations are more likely to take place. We test this prediction and provide strong evidence of its validity.     

Expropriation risk and FDI in developing countries: Does return of capital dominate return on capital?

Previously reported effects of institutional quality and political risks on foreign direct investment (FDI) are mixed and, therefore, difficult to interpret. We present empirical evidence suggesting a relatively clear, statistically robust, and intuitive characterization. Institutional factors that affect the likelihood of an abrupt and total loss of foreigners’ capital (i.e., return of capital) dominate factors that affect rates of return conditional on a strictly positive terminal investment value (i.e., return on capital). The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that expropriation risk is most important among the available measures of different dimensions of institutional quality. A one-standard-deviation reduction in expropriation risk is associated with a 72% increase in FDI, which is substantially larger than the effects of any other dimensions of institutional quality as simultaneously estimated in our empirical models of expected FDI inflows. We show that this evidence is consistent with the predictions of a standard theory of FDI under imperfect contract enforcement and multiple dimensions of political risk.     

A journey from a corruption port to a tax haven

We sketch a model according to which tax havens attract corporate income generated in corrupted countries. We consider the choice of optimal bribes by corrupt officials and the share of the proceeds of corruption that will be concealed in tax havens. Our framework provides novel welfare implications of tax havens. First, tax havens’ services have a positive effect on welfare through encouraging investment by firms fearing expropriation and bribes in corrupt countries. Second, by supporting corruption and the concealment of officials’ bribes, tax havens discourage the provision of public goods and hence have also a negative effect on welfare. The net welfare effect depends on the specified preferences and parameters. One source of this ambiguity is that the presence of multinational firms in corrupted countries is positively associated with demanding tax havens’ operations. Using firm-level data, we provide new empirical results supporting this hypothesis.     

Trade and expropriation

We examine the effect of international trade on expropriation in a setting where law enforcement is costly. We show that, in general equilibrium, trade liberalization can reduce expropriation activities and have a first-order effect on the gains from trade. One interpretation of our results is that unskilled-labor abundant countries facing popular militia or rebel groups will experience amplified gains from trade, as expropriation levels and cost of enforcement decline with trade liberalization. However, the model also admits the possibility that globalization causes an increase in crime, particularly for skilled-labor abundant countries.     

After You Sir. Hold-Up,Direct Externalities,and Sequential Investment

We propose a solution to the hold-up problem: the parties in a contract can avoid the inefficiencies caused by the possibility of opportunistic behaviour and implement the first best level of investment if they make their investment decision sequentially, one party observing the choice made by the other party before making his own choice. Unlike the existing literature, the proposed solution leads to the efficient choice of investment even when there are two-sided direct externalities.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D23, D82.     

股权分置改革能抑制控股股东过度投资行为吗?

文章基于上市公司投资行为的视角研究了控股股东侵占与公司治理问题,特别考察了股权分置改革是否有助于缓解控股股东过度投资。基于Richardson(2006)预期投资模型,文章的研究结果显示控制权与现金流权分离度对过度投资有显著的正向影响,而股权分置改革能够显著弱化这种分离度与过度投资之间的正向关系。政府控股公司比私人控股公司的过度投资更为严重,而改善外部治理环境在一定程度上可以抑制过度投资。文章为控股股东侵占行为提供了证据,同时表明股权分置改革有效缓解了过度投资。     

Ownership,Access, and Sequential Investment

We extend the property‐rights framework to allow for a separation of the ownership rights of access and veto and for sequential investment. Parties investing first do so before contracting is feasible. It is possible, however, that parties investing second can share (at least some of) their investment costs. Along with this cost‐sharing effect, the incentive to invest is affected by a strategic effect generated by sequential investment. Together these effects can overturn some of the predictions of the property‐rights literature. For example, the most inclusive ownership structure might not be optimal, even if all investments are complementary.     

Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics

Summary. We consider a model in which parties that differ in perceived valence choose how to allocate electoral promises (money, pork-barrel projects) among voters. The party perceived to be less valent has a greater incentive to “sell out” to a favored minority and completely expropriate a fraction of the electorate. By reducing the difference in perceived valence, campaign-finance regulations may reduce the extent of the expropriation and achieve a more equitable political outcome. We analyze various instruments of campaign-finance regulation from this perspective.Received: 20 Februay 2003, Revised: 25 January 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: D72, H2.Nicolas Sahuguet: Correspondence toWe thank Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, and Andrew Postlewaite for their comments. We also thank the editor Dan Kovenock and an anonymous referee. The second author is grateful to the National Science Foundation for financial support under grant SES-0078870.     

Politics,institutions, and outcomes: Electricity regulation in Argentina and Chile

Risk, whether market or political, is an important determinant of private investment decisions. One important risk, subject to control by the government, is the risk associated with the hold-up problem: governments can force utilities to shoulder burdensome taxes, to use input factors ineffectively, or to charge unprofitable rates for their service. To attract private investment governments must be able to make commitments to policies that are nonexpropriative (either to contracts that guarantee very high rates of return or to favorable regulatory policies). These commitments, of course, must be credible.

Judgments about the credibility of commitments to regulatoty policies are based upon two political factors: regulatory predictability and regime stability. Regulatory predictability implies that the regulatory process, in which prices and levels of service are set, is not arbitrary. If the condition of regulatory predictability holds, then investors can forecast their returns over time and hence can calculate the value of their investment. If there is regime stability, then there is minimal risk of wholesale changes in the way the government regulates the industry—the most extreme type of change being the denial of property rights, or expropriation. We argue that three characteristics of the regulatory process are, in turn, important determinants of regulatory predictability: agenda control, reversionary regulatory policy, and veto gates. Moreover, regime stability is also, in part, a function of these three characteristics. We examine our theory of political risk and regulatoty commitment by comparing the cases of Argentine and Chilean electricity investment and regulation.     

MONETARY CREDIBILITY VS. VOTER APPROVAL: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND EXCHANGE‐RATE STABILIZATION DURING CRISES

This paper analyzes how political institutions affect the execution of exchange‐rate policy. By focusing on policy‐makers' responses to the emergence of speculative pressure on their currencies, we argue that the effect of democratic institutions on exchange‐rate stability is likely to be conditioned by the officially announced exchange‐rate regime. Officially fixed exchange rates are the main instrument of autocrats to signal commitment to long‐term stability. Autocratic governments with strictly fixed exchange rates are thus more likely to defend their exchange rates than autocrats with an intermediate regime because the latter implicitly signal that they care less about monetary stability. In contrast, democrats defend more often in intermediately than in fully fixed official regimes by using a combination of external and internal adjustments, which reduce the negative effects of a devaluation on voters. Our analysis of 189 currency crises between 1975 and 1999 supports this conditional effect.     

Trade Intermediation and the Organization of Exporters

Empirical papers show that successful exporting firms either use unaffiliated foreign trade intermediaries or own foreign wholesale subsidiaries. However, conventional trade theory models assume that producers can directly access foreign consumers. We introduce intermediaries in an international trade model where producers differ with respect to productivity as well as regarding their varieties' perceived quality and tradability. Trade intermediation is prone to frictions owing to the absence of enforceable cross‐country contracts while own wholesale subsidiaries require additional capital investment. The sorting pattern of firms depends on their degree of competitive advantage; the equilibrium prevalence of intermediation in the industry depends negatively on the heterogeneity among producers, and the market‐specificity of goods, and positively on expropriation risk. Using sectoral US export data by destination country, we confirm the empirical validity of these predictions.     

Bargaining with Rent Seekers

Consider a rent‐seeking game, which has government bargain with firms over dividing the rents. In period 1, each firm can invest to increase the probability that the rent will appear. In period 2, the parties bargain. In equilibrium, though firms will invest more than the socially optimal level, rent‐seeking expenditures may be low. Firms that collude to restrict investment maximize joint profits by investing at a positive, non‐infinitesimal level, and restrict investment even if the cost of rent‐seeking effort is zero.