掠夺性定价行为的异化及其竞争策略研究

在网络经济条件下,掠夺性定价行为的主体、掠夺条件、表现形式和实施效果都出现了异化,因此,针对掠夺性定价行为的竞争政策也需作相应调整,从效率与公平两个角度系统考量新经济条件下掠夺性定价行为,而不是简单地加以限制.     

The Broadband Access Market: Competition,Uniform Pricing and Geographical Coverage

In this paper we analyze the market for broadband access. A key feature of this market is that it is considerably more expensive to connect consumers in rural locations than in urban locations. We show that while competition increases welfare compared to monopoly when prices are free to differ across locations, the opposite may be true if there is a requirement of uniform pricing across locations. Furthermore, we show that given uniform pricing, the regulator may increase consumer surplus as well as profit by requiring a higher regional coverage than the market outcome.     

两阶段动态博弈定价在天然气管道运输中的应用

本文利用两阶段动态博弈理论,对自由竞争情况下的博弈定价、税收调整下的博弈定价、存在交叉补贴下的博弈定价、政府限价下的博弈定价等四种情况进行研究.讨论了不同情况下的价格与各参数之间的关系以及政府行为的不同对价格的影响.该结论为天然气管道运输行业以及其他具有部分公益职能的企业产品定价提供了理论依据.     

Producer and Consumer Interests, the State-Owned Pipeline, and Public Authority Pricing of Natural Gas*

This paper considers producer and consumer interests when state ownership of a pipeline provides a public authority with monopoly and monopsony power. In contrast with the producer/consumer conflict in the regulatory setting where self-interested authorities choose the price at which producers and consumers directly transact with one another, in the pipeline case producers and consumers have a commonality of interest which is sustained even if the authorities take the view that it is politically inexpedient to take advantage of monopoly power with respect to consumers.     

Tax Policy and Tax Administration in Russia: The Case of the Banking Sector

The 'informal' sector of an economy is generally seen as a private sphere, where agents seek to escape the reach of the state and, in particular, the tax organs. However, given the weakness of the Russian state and the enormous scale of informal economic activity, the fiscal authorities try to cope, at least in part, by adopting informal strategies of their own. This paper aims to deepen our understanding of how this informal fiscal system actually works. While the analysis here focuses on the banking system, its implications for tax and accounting reform extend far beyond the banking sector.     

Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition

This paper demonstrates that under conditions of imperfect (oligopolistic) competition, a transition from separate accounting (SA) to formula apportionment (FA) does not eliminate the problem of profit shifting via transfer pricing. In particular, if affiliates of a multinational firm face oligopolistic competition, it is beneficial for the multinational to manipulate transfer prices for tax–saving as well as strategic reasons under both FA and SA. The analysis shows that a switch from SA rules to FA rules may actually strengthen profit shifting activities by multinationals.     

垄断竞争的电信业定价策略研究

讨论垄断竞争条件下电信业定价策略,对理解电信运营商的竞争行为、制定电信业竞争政策有重要的意义。本文将呼叫外部性引入模型,考察了呼叫方内部化接听方效用条件下企业定价策略,从而扩展了目前理论内容和结论。研究表明：当呼叫方内部化接听方的效用时,在线性定价条件下,电信运营商仍然会通过提高接入费进行合谋;在非线性定价条件下,由于电信运营商可以利用固定费进行市场份额的争夺,电信运营商不再有利用接入费进行合谋的动机;在基于终接网络的价格歧视条件下,当消费者接听效用接近于呼叫效用时,电信运营商将会通过制定无穷大的呼叫异网价格来获取更大的市场份额,因此网络联接发生了中断。     

Public Sector Pricing,Capital Mobility and National Income: A Two‐Sector General‐Equilibrium Analysis

Abstract This paper examines the resource allocation and income effects of public‐sector pricing. During the short run, raising public‐sector prices leads to a worsening in public‐sector efficiency, causing a decline in GNP. In the intermediate run, the policy begins to improve public‐sector efficiency and, hence, increases GNP. At the outset of the transition to a steady state, the pricing policy continues to improve efficiency. Nevertheless, efficiency and GNP remain invariant across steady states in the long‐run equilibrium. The implications of the pricing policy are also discussed.     

Trade Policy and Natural Resource Use: The Case for a Quantitative Restriction

This paper presents a simple way for countries to reap the benefits of trade liberalization without exacerbating problems of overexploitation of natural resources. In the context of a Ricardo–Viner dynamic trade model, it is shown that when a binding quantitative restriction regulates extraction of a natural resource, free trade is optimal. This is true even if the quantitative restriction is not optimal. In contrast, in the presence of a suboptimal tax (including a zero tax in the special case of open access) on the use of natural resources, trade liberalization is not necessarily welfare improving.     

Scenarios and Actors' Strategies:: The Case of the Agri-Foodstuff Sector

The importance of the agricultural market in France prompted BASF to seek out a new way of strengthening relations with its partners in the agrifood sector. In 1996, against a backdrop of change (EU legislation) and upheaval (Mad Cow Disease), BASF offered operations managers or officers of distribution companies an opportunity to reflect upon the future in a workshop setting. This innovative three-stage exercise, guided by Professor Michel Godet (CNAM) and the Gerpa consulting team, met with enthusiasm, and was expanded beyond the original group and time frame. In fact, the distribution chain was opened up to include various actors, for example, consumer advocacy groups, so that we speak of the agri-food channel and sector. Original questions focused on farmers' expectations and distribution problems with specific horizon lines. Environmental and genetic issues soon came to the forefront. Besides workshops and meetings, the Delphi-Régnier Abacus technique was applied, as explained in this step-by-step review of the BASF project. Overall, futures thinking has become part of the BASF France way of doing business. Indeed, the BASF “Futures Studies Group,” expanded to include mass distribution representatives, intends to continue working on the very timely theme of food safety.     

The Financial and Operational Impacts of FERC Order 636 on the Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Industry

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Order 636 fundamentally altered the regulatory and operational environment of the natural gas industry in 1992, as the culmination of several directives aimed at relaxing regulation and fostering competition. We hypothesize that gas pipeline firms subsequently changed their operational and financial behavior in ways consistent with reduced balkanization, increased competition, and reduced expense preference behavior. Our results indicate that these firms have become more homogeneous financially but less so operationally. We find evidence that the marginal profitability of various pipeline activities has responded more to financial market conditions than to the regulatory environment.     

国家特征、市场竞争与产业政策效率的决定

在已有的经济学文献中,国家产业政策是作为市场竞争的替代手段被广泛讨论的。本文进一步引入国家特征与社会结构两个概念,分析了转型国家产业政策效率的决定机制。一个在意识形态、地缘政治影响上有着鲜明特征的转型国家,在确立产业发展模式、甚至是国家发展道路时,通过政府投资和政府主导来实现追赶目标具有现实合理性;但同时亦有可能使国家被迫承受产业政策带来的诸如抑制市场竞争、政府被利益集团俘获等负效应,本文将之概括为转型过程中的国家产业政策悖论。本文的分析表明,在拥有一个强大的、致力于国家现代化的(相对集权)政府的前提下,产业政策效率最大化与维持社会结构不变两个目标不可能同时实现。只有通过坚定不移的推进社会主义市场经济体制的建设,才能保证中国政府的产业政策实践具有帕累托改进的性质。     

稳健财政政策下国债的适度规模与管理

2005年起,我国开始实行稳健的财政政策,经济运行方式发生了变化,国债政策作为以前积极财政政策调节经济方向的重要工具也应采取相应变化以促进经济向前发展.由此加强我国国债规模管理,不仅应从总体上缩小国债规模,更应该注重国债资金的使用效率,对其加强监督管理.     

The Most-Favoured-Customer Pricing Policy and Competitive Advantage

The paper investigates the effects on competition of the unilateral most-favoured-customer pricing policy. A model is considered in which a multimarket incumbent firm faces a threat of entry in one of its two markets. It is shown that contemporaneous most-favoured-customer clauses may change competition to the advantage of the incumbent both under strategic substitutes and strategic complements. If the duopolistic market is strong, the most-favoured-customer policy makes the incumbent 'tough' and may be used for entry deterrence purposes.     

转轨国家的竞争政策与立法研究——以俄罗斯为例

竞争法作为市场经济国家维护竞争自由的基本法,在一些西方国家里被誉为"经济宪法".自20世纪90年代以来,随着经济转轨进程的深化,转轨国家普遍认识到,要增强经济实力,实现经济的持续增长,必须建立必要的法律和制度等基础设施,而竞争政策便是其中的一个主要方面.俄罗斯作为主要的转轨国家,它制定的《反垄断法》是一部广义上的竞争法,其内容既涉及反不正当竞争,又涉及反垄断.随着经济全球化的发展,转轨国家不断与世界其他国家开展反垄断领域的协调与合作.     

Optimal Pricing and Price-Cap Regulation in the Postal Sector

This paper studies the optimal price structure in the postal sector when worksharing is available (e.g., for collection, sorting and transportation) and when the operator faces a break-even constraint. Users differ in opportunity and cost to engage in worksharing. We determine the optimal worksharing discount and provide sufficient conditions (on demand functions) under which it exceeds the ECPR level. Furthermore, we show that the optimal prices can be implemented through a global price cap imposed on a weighted average of the prices of all products. The appropriate weights are proportional to the market demand (evaluated at optimal prices) of the corresponding products.     

Competition and Cooperation in the Small Firm Sector

This paper examines the nature of economies of scale in the small firm sector and aims to provide new insight into the economic efficiency of small firm industrial districts. The theoretical analysis identifies the role played by collective external economies of scale that are realised through cooperation over input activities. Using game theory it is shown that cooperation can emerge both as a result of rational profit maximising behaviour and as a result of institutional and cultural environments that encourage cooperation and trust. The implications for industrial policy are discussed in the concluding section.     

Regulation and Access Pricing: Comparison of Regulated Regimes

The statutory duties of regulators of British utilities include both the encouragement of competition and protection of consumers (through price caps). Competition depends on the terms on which new entrants can gain access to the monopolist's network. Where the incumbent in the retail market also owns the network, the regulator may determine prices in the capped and access markets separately or may make the price cap explicitly dependent on entry in the uncapped market. Contrary to the received wisdom that access charges should be separately regulated we show that higher welfare can be obtained in some circumstances by allowing the incumbent to determine access charges. This is achieved by permitting the incumbent to choose from a menu of retail prices which the regulator makes conditional on the extent of entry in the retail market.