高管薪酬、在职消费、薪酬差距与企业绩效——来自2010～2012年沪深上市中央管理企业的经验数据

本文以2010~2012年沪深两市中央管理企业的经验数据为样本,系统分析了高管薪酬、在职消费、薪酬差距和企业绩效之间的相关性。经过研究发现:央企高管薪酬与企业绩效显著正相关,单纯限制高管薪酬实际上并不利于企业绩效的整体提升;在职消费与高管薪酬负相关但不显著,仅仅从两者之间的相关性角度分析来看,薪酬的增减会影响在职消费,但是当纳入其他可能影响在职消费的因素做整体回归后,两者之间的相关关系变得不再显著,这说明薪酬的增减并不是诱发在职消费的主要动因;薪酬差距与企业绩效负相关但不显著,缩小高管与一般员工之间的薪酬差距,有利于维护社会公平和正义,但对于企业绩效提升在短期内没有实质性作用。     

内部控制、管理层权力与在职消费

本文以2012-2016年沪深A股主板非金融类上市公司为样本,通过分析内部控制、管理层权力与在职消费之间的关系,研究内部控制是否能抑制管理层权力对在职消费的影响,并分析不同产权下这种抑制作用的差异。研究发现,内部控制能抑制管理层权力对在职消费的影响。国家控制增强了内部控制的影响,这种抑制作用在国有企业中显著,在非国有企业中不显著。     

政治联系、隐性激励与企业价值——以民营企业在职消费为例

以民营企业在职消费为例,考察政治关联如何影响隐性激励及企业价值。研究发现,相对于无政治联系的民营企业,有政治联系的民营企业在职消费更低;民营企业的在职消费对企业价值具有负面影响,而政治联系削弱了在职消费对民营企业价值的负面影响。总体来看,民营企业的政治联系有助于节约企业的交易成本与减少政府的利益侵占,从而提升了企业价值。     

在职消费、高管-员工薪酬差距与公司绩效--基于浙江民营上市公司的实证研究

本文以2010-2012年浙江民营上市公司为样本,以高管-员工薪酬差距为传导媒介,深入研究在职消费对公司绩效的影响。研究发现,在浙江民营上市公司中,在职消费和高管-员工薪酬差距之间显著负相关,表明高管在享受在职消费的同时,也考虑了员工的公平性需求。本文研究还发现,在职消费对民营上市公司的高管有一定的激励作用,但这种激励作用会随着高管-员工薪酬差距的缩小而降低。     

产权属性、管理层激励与企业过度投资

本文以股东与管理层之间的代理冲突为出发点,以我国产权属性和薪酬管制为制度背景,分析了上市公司货币薪酬、持股比例以及在职消费水平三种激励手段与管理层过度投资的相关性,并实证检验了我国上市公司管理层激励契约对过度投资的治理作用。实证结果表明,有效的激励契约可以在一定程度上缓解企业的过度投资冲动,与非国有控股上市公司相比,国有控股上市公司的契约安排缺乏应有的激励效率,对过度投资的抑制作用较弱,这为我国上市公司激励机制的完善提供了有益的经验证据。     

资产质量、管理层薪酬激励与企业可持续发展

以2010~2017年我国制造业上市公司为研究对象,分析资产质量、管理层薪酬与企业可持续发展之间的内在关系。结果表明:资产质量越好,企业可持续增长率越高;管理层绝对薪酬水平与企业可持续增长率正相关,而管理层外部薪酬差距与企业可持续增长率负相关。进一步地,在管理层薪酬激励对管理层行为的作用下,管理层绝对薪酬水平的提高和外部薪酬差距的缩小可以强化资产质量对企业可持续发展的促进作用。研究证实了资产质量在企业可持续发展中的重要作用,同时强调了管理层薪酬激励的调节作用,不仅为企业可持续发展提供了新的研究视角,而且符合我国经济高质量发展和实体企业可持续发展的现实要求。     

创新型企业管理层薪酬激励有效性比较分析

文章以2009年创新型企业上市公司管理层为研究对象,以上市公司前三名管理层薪酬总额的平均值为切八点,对静态截面数据进行了横向比较,对动态时间序列数据进行了纵向比较,发现创新型企业上市公司管理层薪酬与业绩成正相关关系,实施股权激励制度以后薪酬激励效果更好.     

The Incentives for Innovative Activity in the Managerial Firm

This paper discusses the incentives for innovation by a manager‐led firm. In particular, it is investigated how remuneration practices influence the choice of a risky project. In the first place, a dynamic model with uncertainty is used to determine the optimal employment level with exogenous growth and risk. In the second part of the paper, growth and risk are explained by R&D expenditures. Optimal investment expenditures for R&D are derived for (i) the profit‐maximizing firm and (ii) the managerial firm, where the manager receives a fixed salary as well as a variable share of profits. If risk neutrality is assumed, then no difference exists. However, if risk aversion is considered, the managerial firm will invest more into R&D than the owner‐led company. Size‐related salaries are an additional reason for higher expenditures of R&D by managers. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives

We posit that the value of a manager's human capital depends on the firm's business strategy. The resulting interaction between business strategy and managerial incentives affects the organization of business activities. We illustrate the impact of this interaction on firm boundaries in a dynamic agency model. There may be disadvantages in merging two firms even when such a merger allows the internalization of externalities between the two firms. Merging, by making unprofitable certain decisions, increases the cost of inducing managerial effort. This incentive cost is a natural consequence of the manager's business-strategy-specific human capital.     

Implicit Contracts, Managerial Incentives, and Financial Structure

This paper examines how managers may be given incentives to exert effort, and to implement efficient implicit contracts with workers. Under certain assumptions, this can be achieved by tying managerial compensation to shareholder value. However, if reputation effects are weak, it is more efficient to adopt an incentive scheme in which the manager is punished by outside investor intervention when performance falls below a critical level, and otherwise retains control, receiving a fixed reward. The required form of outside intervention can be implemented through a financial structure combining hard debt with a dispersed ownership structure.     

Managerial Incentives for Takeovers

The paper studies managerial incentives in a model where managers choose product market strategies and make takeover decisions. The equilibrium contract includes an incentive to increase the firm's sales, under either quantity or price Competition. This result contrasts with previous findings in the literature, and hinges on the fact that when managers are more aggressive, rival firms earn lower profits and thus are willing to sell out at a lower price. However, as a side effect of such a contract, the manager might undertake unprofitable takeovers.     

管理者权力、内部薪酬差距与公司价值

本文针对2006～2010年中国上市公司数据对管理者权力、内部薪酬差距与公司价值之间的关系进行了研究.结果表明:中国上市公司内部的管理者与员工薪酬差距与公司价值正相关,内部薪酬差距具有正面的价值激励效应,支持锦标赛理论,但是管理者权力的存在抑制了内部薪酬差距激励效应的发挥.结合股权性质的研究发现,国有股权性质不仅抑制了内部薪酬差距的正面价值激励效应,并且强化了管理者权力对内部薪酬差距价值激励效应的抑制作用.此外,对管理者权力与内部薪酬差距影响公司价值的内在机理进行研究,结果发现,内部薪酬差距能够提高管理者的薪酬—业绩敏感性,但管理者权力抑制了内部薪酬差距对薪酬—业绩敏感性的提高.本文的结果表明薪酬差距激励效应的发挥需要其他公司治理机制的配合,合理配置公司控制权,对管理者权力设置相应约束机制,薪酬差距的激励效应才能得到更好的体现.     

Antitrust Compliance: Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behavior

This article analyzes a manager's incentives to establish and sustain an illegal collusive agreement if her firm is subject to profit shocks, if her utility function is concave in profits (e.g., because of risk aversion), and if she incurs opportunity costs (e.g., by violating a social norm). The model supports the empirical observation that if collusion is to be established and sustained in a state with low profits, then this state must be quite persistent. It also indicates that compliance with antitrust laws can be ensured best by combining a zero tolerance policy with a strategy of forgiveness. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial Incentives Based on Acquisition of Information

In a moral hazard setting, we model the fact that the agent may get private signals about the final outcome of his effort before the public realization of this outcome. Actions affect both the distribution of the outcome and the quality of the agent's private information. We compare simple contracts, based on output only, with revelation contracts, based on output and messages about signals. Revelation contracts give the agent some discretionary power during the course of the relationship; they are optimal if and only if lowering effort does not increase the quality of private information in the sense of Blackwell (1953). In the context of managerial compensation schemes, the revelation contracts we analyze can be viewed as allowing the agent to exercise an option on the final profits before the realization of these profits. The theory thus provides an alternative justification of the widespread use of stock options in managerial compensation schemes, as opposed to compensation schemes that rely only on salary, bonus, and (restricted) stock plans.     

International Expansion,Diversification and Regulated Firm Nonmarket Strategy

Previous studies have shown that regulated firms diversify for reasons that are different than for unregulated firms. We explore some of these differences by providing a theoretical model that starts by considering the firm–regulator relationship as an incomplete information issue, in which a regulated incumbent has knowledge that the regulator does not have, but the firm cannot convey hard information about this knowledge. The incumbent faces both market and nonmarket competition from a new entrant. In that context, we show that when the firm faces tough nonmarket competition domestically, going abroad can create a mechanism that makes information transmission to the regulator more credible. International expansion can thus be a way to solve domestic nonmarket issues in addition to being a catalyst for growth. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Power in the Firm and Managerial Career Concerns

More powerful managers make more important decisions. Therefore, firm performance is more informative about the abilities of such managers, who, realizing that they are more visible, are more eager to improve performance. If this reputation effect exists, how should firms allocate power? I analyze the optimal allocation of power and derive implications for several issues that often arise in management practice: the choice of departmentation criteria, the importance given to seniority, and the width of job definitions. Finally, I show that the model is consistent with the empirical evidence on managerial succession.     

Green Innovation,Managerial Concern and Firm Performance: An Empirical Study

Extant literature, while often suggesting a positive link between green innovation and firm performance, is inconclusive. Moreover, the possibly moderating role of management has not been sufficiently considered. Using a unique dataset sampling 188 manufacturing firms in China, we examine how managerial concern (for green issues) moderates the relationship between green innovation and firm performance. We find that green process innovation and green product innovation both significantly (positively) predict firm performance, when not considering managerial concern for the environment. Once managerial concern is included, we observe that it compounds the positive effect of green process innovation on firm performance – but not product innovation, which no longer explains significant unique variance in firm performance. The findings hold various implications for future research and business policy. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment