河北省上市公司资本结构与代理成本实证研究

<正>一问题提出资本结构问题一直是企业财务研究的重要领域。1958年,Modigliani和Miller共同开创了著名的MM理论,开启了财务研究领域崭新的篇章。研究资本结构时,代理成本是我们应该考虑的一个重要方面。1976年,Jensen和Meckling首次提出了资本结构的代理成本问题,认为从资本结构的角度出发,代理成本由股东与债权人的利益冲突带来的"债务代理成本"和股东与管理层的利益冲突带来的"外部股票代理成本"组成。一方面,由     

财务治理理论研究述评

一、财务治理理论萌芽与产生(一)财务治理理论研究的萌芽目前理论界比较一致的认识是,财务治理理论思想萌芽至少可以追溯到1976年詹森(Jensen)和梅克林(Meckling)的资本结构代理理论。该理论将财务领域的资本结构问题从代理理论、公司治理理论角度加以研究,从而开始了公司治理理论与公司财务理论的融合性研究,产生了财务治理     

上市公司控制权私有收益实现途径与管制策略探讨

传统公司治理理论认为,公司代理问题的主要矛盾是外部投资者与管理层之间的利益冲突,被称为"贝利—米恩斯命题"(Berle and Means,1932;Jensen and Meckling,1976)。而Shleifer和Vishny(1997)和LaPort等(1998,1999)的研究发现,现代公司的所有权结构完全不同于被广泛接受的"贝利—米恩斯命题",当股     

煤炭上市公司资本结构与代理成本

一、代理成本的理论研究与实证分析 代理成本最先由Jensen和Meckling(1976)提出,他们在综合资本结构理论、企业理论和产权理论的基础上,分析了现代股份公司存在的两类典型的利益冲突和代理关系:管理者与股东之间的利益冲突及其之间的代理关系;股东与债权人之间的利益冲突及其之间的代理关系.     

我国上市公司资本结构与绩效实证分析

资本结构理论从MM开始至今已经取得了很大的成果，Modigliani和Miller(1958)认为，企业价值与企业资本结构不相关，后来在MM的修正模型中认为企业负债越多，价值越大，认为企业应该100％负债。Masulis(1983)对资本结构与企业绩效的关系进行了实证检验，结果表明：企业绩效与其负债水平呈正相关关系；能够对企业绩效产生影响的负债水平介于0．23与0．45之间。Jensen和Meelding(1976)认为，     

第三类代理成本及其度量研究——基于我国上市公司拉克尔系数的分析

一、代理成本及其分类1976年,詹森(Jensen)和麦克林(Meckling)在《企业理论:管理行为、代理成本与所有权结构》一文中正式提出了代理成本理论。所谓代理成本,是指由于两权分离,代理人有机会损害委托人的经济利益而产生的相关成本。根据Jensen & Meckling(1976)的研究,代理成本的总和由委托人的监督成本、代理人的担保成本和剩余损失三部分组成。其中,委托人的监督成本是指委托人计量或观察代理人行为的成本,以及对代理人实施控制的成本;代理人的担保成本是指代理人实施自我约束,以保证为委托人利益尽职勤勉的成本;剩余损失是指委托人因代理人代行决策而产生的一种价值损失,等于代理人决策和委托人在同等条件下采取的效用最大化决策之间的企业价值差异。     

投资者保护与权益市场均衡模型

本文介绍这样一个模型，在企业家面向公众融资；而法律制度对外部股东的保护较差的条件下，我们将Becker(1968)“犯罪与惩罚”理论引入Jensen和Meckling(1976)理论框架中，研究企业家的融资决策与权益市场均衡，该模型的结论与有关投资者保护和企业融资之间关系的一系列实证研究结果一致。     

市场、政府与会计管制的经济学分析

现代企业理论认为，企业本质上是由各利益相关所缔结的“契约联合体”(Jensen and Meckling，1976)。“基于企业是‘若干契约关系的结合’这种观点，会计在制定契约条款以及监督这些条款，保持契约均衡中发挥着巨大的作用(Watts and Zimmerman，1986)。”财务会计     

上市公司大股东掏空行为探析

传统的公司治理理论,基本上都是基于Berle和Means(1932)关于现代公司所有权和控制权高度分离这一基本特征的观点来展开的,特别是Jensen和Meckling(1976)首次使用代理     

基于代理成本的我国上市公司资本结构优化研究

本文从代理成本这一角度出发，通过对Jensen和Meckling提出的资本结构中代理成本理论的分析，结合我国上市公司的实际情况进行研究，为我国上市公司优化资本结构提出一些建议。     

Workfare,welfare, agency,and well-being

Workfare programs are state-instituted programs that require able-bodied persons with children of school age who wish to claim welfare payments to participate in job training programs, and, eventually, to enter the work force. The philosophy of workfare is based on the value of work and the goal of self-determination. However, as a mandatory program for welfare recipients, workfare requires of those recipients certain duties which, according to those who challenge workfare, interfere with the freedom to choose what one will do with one's life. Whether some form of workfare will be adopted as part of our national welfare system remains to be seen. What the debate about such a program suggests is that welfare, in itself, by ignoring the necessity of security and education for full human agency, neither satisfies basic needs nor prepares its recipients for any life other than that of dependency. With all its difficulties workfare nevertheless presents an alternative to welfare that, at least in theory, more closely identifies its purpose with the values of our society.     

Externalities, Indivisibility, Nonreplicability, and Agglomeration

In this paper we argue that the impact of external scale economies and diseconomies on city size is not nearly as clear-cut as it is tacitly believed in urban economics. Similarly, city-size distortions are not caused by externalities alone. Indivisibility and nonreplicability, which prevent establishing the “right” number of cities, may represent a source for city-size distortions which can be stronger than the standard resource misallocation resulting from external scale economies and diseconomies. It follows that a direct population dispersion policy is not just an inferior substitute to Pigouvian taxes and subsidies but rather a useful complement.     

Streets, Malls, and Supermarkets

We develop a model of competition between shopping centers, comparing competitive outcomes in three alternative modes of retail organization, namely: streets (in which neither developers or retailers internalize agglomeration effects between products); malls (in which developers internalize); and supermarkets (in which both developers and retailers internalize). For a fixed number of centers: (i) converting streets to malls intensifies developer (but not retailer) competition, which increases product range (i.e., the number of shops built by the developers) and consumer surplus, reduces profits, and has ambiguous effects on welfare; (ii) converting streets to supermarkets intensifies retailer and developer competition, has ambiguous effects on product range (number of shops), reduces profits, and increases social welfare. With free entry both conversions reduce the number of centers and, if there is excess entry, conversion to supermarkets (but not malls) unambiguously increases welfare.     

Profit,productivity, and profit-sharing

This study is an investigation of the effect of profit-sharing on labor productivity. When monitoring labor performance is costly for management, a regular wage/salary contract is insufficient to induce profit-maximizing behavior from the worker. The authors demonstrate that when this profit-maximizing behavior can be induced only through profit-sharing, a linear profit-sharing program will increase productivity and the welfare of both management and labor. The benefit from profit-sharing is increasing up to the point where the utility of additional income is offset by the negative utility of extraordinary effort (working harder or providing higher quality work). The income effect, i.e., the change in negative utility of extraordinary effort given a change in income, can potentially either increase or decrease the point at which the income-effort tradeoff-reaches zero.     

Packaging,business, and society

The objective of this paper is to present the impact of packaging material on sustainability. The article analyzes the size of the problem that arises from the use of packaging and the effect of various types of packaging material on waste management. The data on solid waste from the United States and the European Union reinforce that the problem is not only huge but also requires immediate attention. The research found that paying attention to packaging has the potential to improve economic, environmental, and social sustainability. Reducing packaging in supply chains improves profitability for organizations, reduces environmental impact, and helps societies in lowering the cost of disposal. The cost of packaging materials and the costs of disposal and landfill, are borne by the end consumers. Suggested approaches to minimizing the generation of packaging waste include concerted efforts for reducing packaging throughout supply chains where elimination of packaging is not feasible, the formation of a global policy on the use and disposal of packaging materials, and educating consumers.     

Delegation, Committees, and Managers

Attempts to economize on decision-making time imply that groups of peers may delegate authority to a small committee of managers even though this means that the information and preferences of the uninvolved players are neglected. Decisions are more likely to be delegated to players with better information and more representative preferences. The possibility of ex post protests may force managers to take the preferences of others into account but may also give them incentives to ignore their private information. The argument may explain employees' willingness to let bosses decide, and thus throw some light on the theory of the firm.     

Indifference,indecision, and coin-flipping

This article operationalizes a non-empty relation as implied if strict preference and indifference jointly do not completely order the choice set. Specifically, indecision is operationalized as a positive preference for delegating choice to a least predictable device.     

Debt,equity, and information

Most firms issue financial assets such as debt or equity (e.g. bonds or stock) to outside investors. While these financial assets differ greatly in their characteristics, their diversity has received little attention in the literature. Filling this important gap in the literature, this paper views debt and equity as financial contracts, and asks why they are optimal instead of other financial contracts. By endogenizing the bankruptcy process, this paper shows how debt and equity arise as a consequence of an optimal allocation of cash-flow rights and monitoring rights, and how equity leads to dividend signaling.