Do financial constraints in an unstable emerging economy mitigate the opportunistic behavior of entrenched family owners?

Prior research is not conclusive whether information asymmetries or managerial discretion are the cause of observed investment-cash flow sensitivity. This paper examines the effect of family firms' governance heterogeneity on firm's investment-cash flow sensitivity in Brazil. The Brazilian economic and corporate governance context present several idiosyncratic features, including weak minority shareholder protection, an underdeveloped capital market, macro-economic uncertainties, the presence of controlling shareholders (especially families), and the excessive use of control-enhancing mechanisms, allowing us to explore in greater detail the drivers of investment-cash flow sensitivity. We find that investment is more sensitive to cash flow for firms with a highly entrenched family presence (divergence between corporate control and voting rights coupled with family management) than in less entrenched family firms. This result emerges primarily due to financial constraints from asymmetric information, rather than agency problems of free cash flow from abuse of managerial discretion. Our findings shed new light on the role of excessive control rights in investment decisions, allowing family managers to reallocate capital to cope with financial constraints in times of economic uncertainties.     

管理者过度自信与企业投资行为异化——来自我国证券市场的证据

Based on data of A-shares listed companies in China, this paper studies the relationship between managerial overconfidence and firms’ overinvestment behaviors. We first define a manager as an overconfident one if his or her compan’s announced earnings forecast is higher than its actual earnings at least once in 2002–2004. After controlling such factors as growing opportunity, size, etc., we find that overconfident managers tend to over-invest and their overinvestment behaviors have higher sensitivity to cash flow generated by financing activities. In other word, when their firms obtain an abundant cash flow from financing activities, overconfident managers will over-invest, or vise versa. Contrary to other relevant studies, we find that the sensitivity between over-investment and free cash flow has little to do with managerial overconfidence. Robustness testing is conducted to verify the reliability of our conclusions. We also use “whether top managers increase their holdings of company shares within the observation period” as a substitute variable for managerial overconfidence and run the tests again, and the results are consistent with the above. Finally, findings of this paper indicate that it is necessary for firms to establish a scientific and rigorous investment managing mechanism. Translated and revised from Nankai Guanli Pinglun 南开管理评论 (Nankai Business Review), 2008, (2): 77–83     

Sensitivity of external resources to cash flow under financial constraints

This paper explores the external financing–cash flow relationship in capital structure theory by comparing unlisted (financially constrained) and listed (financially unconstrained) companies. We postulate that investment is determined endogenously in the case of unlisted firms, as they are strongly dependent on internally generated funds (cash flow). Consequently, unlisted firms invest their cash flow in profitable projects, using any residual cash flow to increase their holdings of safe assets. In turn, listed companies determine their investment exogenously and may reduce leverage if they raise an excess of cash flow. As a result, listed companies would react more negatively to shocks in cash flow. Our findings reveal that both unlisted and listed companies show a negative external financing–cash flow relationship, that of the latter being clearly more intense.     

Is there Informational Value in Corporate Giving?

In this article, we propose that giving in cash and non-cash (in-kind) differ in their relation with the giving firm’s future corporate financial performance (CFP) and only cash giving is associated with future CFP. Using a novel dataset from ASSET4 that differentiates corporate giving over a sample period of 2002–2012, we examine three competing hypotheses: (1) agency cost hypothesis that cash giving reflects agency cost and destroys value for shareholders, (2) investment hypothesis that cash giving is an investment by management that aims for better future return, and (3) information hypothesis that cash giving has informational value to shareholders as cash is a critical resource at a firm and giving is a decision by managers who are insiders. We find that indeed, only cash giving is positively associated with future CFP and firm value, measured by Fama–French five-factor abnormal risk-adjusted stock returns, future return on assets, and Tobin’s Q. In addition, we find that the positive association exists only between excess, i.e., unexpected, but not expected cash giving and future CFP. Our empirical findings support the information hypothesis, but neither the agency hypothesis nor the investment hypothesis, and are robust to a number of endogeneity tests, including orthogonalized cash giving, instrumental variable regression using geography-based instruments, and propensity score matching. Furthermore, we show that the positive association between future CFP and unexpected cash giving is only pronounced at firms with good governance and relatively higher sales growth where agency problems are less likely, and at firms with no alternative mechanisms to demonstrate the strength of cash flow. Additionally, we do not find evidence that suggests in-kind giving to possess any informational value.     

Investment Decisions, Liquidity, and Institutional Activism: An International Study

The activism of institutional investors tends more and more toward the supervision and control of the behavior of the managers of big companies. In this article, we present a model based on the creation of an activism index that lets us evaluate such activism’s effect on the sensitivity of the investment policies of a company in the face of financial variables (such as cash flow and liquidity ratio) and market variables (ownership concentration and value creation index). To test our assertions, we analyze firm-level data for United Kingdom (U.K.), Germany, France, Denmark, and Spain during the period 1995–2004. Our results point to a significant reduction in the sensitivity of company investment decisions in the face of these variables, especially relative to intangible capital, as a result of the neutralizing effect of activism on the high agency costs of free cash flow and on the information asymmetries of the market.     

Does switching from NASDAQ to the NYSE affect investment–cash flow sensitivity?

We examine whether a firm's sensitivity of investments to cash flow changes when it switches from the NASDAQ to the NYSE over the period 1992–2002. Contrary views exist on the effect of listing switches on investment sensitivity to cash flow. Investment–cash flow sensitivity is a proxy for the degree of uncertainty of using internal funds to finance a firm's investments. We use a least square dummy variable model to analyze panel data before and after switching to determine the impact of switching. Based on pooled data, our evidence is consistent with the view that NASDAQ-to-NYSE switchers have significantly lower investment–cash flow sensitivity, which means that firms rely less heavily on internal financing after switching and find accessing external financing easier. Thus, firms may benefit from switching in terms of a lower cost of external capital due to such factors as increasing visibility, liquidity, and reputation.     

Corporate governance and investment-cash flow sensitivity: Evidence from emerging markets

Controlling for country-level governance, we investigate how firms' corporate governance influences financing constraints. Using firm-level corporate governance rankings across 14 emerging markets, we find that better corporate governance lowers the dependence of emerging market firms on internally generated cash flows, and reduces financing constraints that would otherwise distort efficient allocation of investment and destroy firm value. Additionally and more importantly, firm-level corporate governance matters more significantly in countries with weaker country-level governance. This suggests substitutability between firm-specific and country-level governance in determining a firm's investment sensitivity to internal cash flows.     

Why Greater Cash Holdings and Short-Term Debt Simultaneously Persist? The Case of Transition Economy

This study observes and explores a puzzle in Chinese firms whereby both cash holdings and short-term debt simultaneously account for more than 20% of total assets for at least two consecutive years over the sample period. This phenomenon conflicts with the principle of corporate value maximization, and is not clearly explained by the classical theories in corporate finance. Based on the implications in the extant literature and discussions of institutional constraints of the transition economy in China, this paper develops four hypotheses that are involved with agency conflicts between the largest shareholders and creditors and the formation of this puzzling financial structure. The empirical analyses suggest that the largest shareholders with tunneling motives seek to hold more cash to serve their private interests and/or the consequent operational deficit of the listed corporations. To the ends, these corporations tend to manage the timing of short term debt financing to increase cash reserves temporarily at the end of year. Essentially, greater cash holdings on the balance sheet of these corporations related with the puzzle become a misleading signal for potential creditors, possibly contributing to the refinancing of short-term debt of these listed firms for the following year. Hence, the puzzling financial structure is connected with the timing of debt financing and adverse selection of creditors. This study enriches the stream of literature on cash holdings and debt maturity, and provides new evidence on the impact of agency problems of the largest shareholders on the association between cash holdings and debt maturity in the context of a transition economy.     

融资约束、过度投资与现金流的价格敏感性

已有研究证实了盈余管理、会计稳健性以及边际投资收益递减规律均可能影响应计成分的持续性,揭示了资本市场对盈余的应计成分不存在“功能锁定”现象,但鲜有研究关注盈余的现金流成分与股价关系的影响因素。文章发现,过度投资会显著地降低现金流的价格敏感性,且对于现金持有水平高及融资约束程度高的公司,过度投资对现金流价格敏感性的影响更为显著。文章的研究结论一方面从经营活动现金流的价格敏感性视角揭示了过度投资的负面经济后果,另一方面也证实了市场对经营活动现金流同样不存在“功能锁定”现象。     

管理者过度自信,融资偏好与公司投资

通过公司投资与现金流之间的敏感度具体考察管理者的过度自信行为对我国上市公司内部或者外部融资偏好行为的影响,结果表明:总经理的年龄越大,任职时间越长,学历越高,以及当总经理拥有理工类教育背景时,总经理的过度自信行为越弱,因此,总经理更多地利用外部融资而不是内部融资,从而公司投资与现金流之间的敏感度越弱;而当总经理拥有经管类教育背景时,总经理的过度自信行为越强,因此,总经理更少地利用外部融资,从而公司投资与现金流之间的敏感度越强。     

The Agency Problems Embedded in Firm’s Equity Investment

We find that agency problems are embedded in firm’s excess and abnormal equity investments that are mainly dictated by controlling shareholder’s motives and ethical choices manifested in ownership and board structure. The excess equity investment is gauged with respect to industry average. The abnormal equity investment is specifically referred to the number of nominal investment companies that are fully controlled by the controlling owners while subject to little governance. Our empirical evidences of 345 Taiwanese non-financial listed firms show that firm’s excess and abnormal equity investments are negatively correlated with controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights while are positively correlated with the control–cash flow deviation, and board affiliation. The results are supportive of the positive incentive hypothesis and the negative entrenchment hypothesis put forth by La Porta et al. (2002, Journal of Finance 57, 1147–1171) and Claessen et al. (2002, Journal of Finance 57, 2741–2742). The negative relation between equity investment and firm’s value further supports the agency postulation that corporate excess and abnormal equity investments represent a leeway for controlling shareholder to exploit wealth of minority shareholders. This study potentially contributes to the literature of business ethics by portraying an empirically testable linkage from controlling owner’s ethical choices to his actions and therefore firm’s value. Yin-Hua Yeh, Ph.D., is Professor and Director of the Graduate Institute of Finance at Fu-Jen Catholic University (FJU) in Taiwan. He is also the Director of the Center for Corporate Governance and Business Ethics at FJU. His main research and teaching areas are corporate governance, corporate finance, and merger and acquisition. Tsun-Siou Lee, Ph.D., is Professor of Finance at National Taiwan University. His main research and teaching areas are corporate governance, futures and options, and financial innovation. Pei-Gi Shu, Ph.D., is Professor of Business Administration at Fu-Jen Catholic University in Taiwan. He is also the Vice Dean of Management College at FJU. His main research and teaching areas are mutual funds and behavioral finance.     

非流通股与过度股权融资

In the Chinese stock market, the price of exchangeable stock is determined by the discounted future uncertain cash flow, while the price of non-circulating stock depends on per book value. In general, because investors holding non-circulating equity maintain the control power, corporate finance and investment decisions reflect their interests. The pricing mechanism of non-circulating stock violates the basic pricing principle of the capital market. Therefore, corporate finance decisions deviate from the NPV (net present value). As a result, excessive equity financing problems would occur in the listed companies. Translated from Shijie Jingji Wenyuan 世界经济文源 (World Economic Forum), 2004, (4): 41–50     

国有企业利润上缴:国外运行模式与中国的制度重构

国有企业向包括政府股东在内的股权持有者分红是各国通行的做法,但国有企业具体管理体制的不同,造成了各国在分红政策设计和运行模式上的差异。中国国有企业长期以来利润不上缴的格局,不仅助长了企业过度投资,而且维护并强化国有企业的垄断地位,导致巨大的社会福利净损失。现行国有企业红利分配政策存在难以保障国有资本出资人权益等局限性,必须从国有企业理财目标的设定、自由现金流量假说、利润分配模式的选择以及建立有效的激励约束机制等方面,防范国有企业规避利润上缴行为,重构国有企业利润上缴制度。     

Investment–cash flow sensitivities,credit rationing and financing constraints in small and medium-sized firms

The controversy on whether investment–cash flow sensitivity is a good indicator of financing constraints is still unsolved. We apply a comprehensive approach by cross-validating our analysis with both balance sheet and qualitative data on self-declared credit rationing and financing constraints on a sample of mainly small and medium-sized firms. Our qualitative information shows that (self-declared) credit rationing is (weakly) related to both traditional a priori factors—such as firm size, age and location—and lenders’ rational decisions taken on the basis of their credit risk models. We use the qualitative information on firms which were denied (additional) credit to provide evidence relevant to the investment–cash flow sensitivity debate. The evidence shows that self-declared credit rationing significantly discriminates between firms which possess or not such sensitivity, while a priori criteria do not. The same result does not apply when we consider the wider group of financially constrained firms (which do not seem to have a higher investment–cash flow sensitivity), supporting the more recent empirical evidence in this direction.     

现金股利、股权结构和组织特征:一个Logistic分析

本文以763家上海证券交易所A股上市公司2003年的横截面数据为观察值,运用logistic回归分析分别考察了股权结构和组织特征对现金股利发放概率的实证影响。本文发现,股权结构(第一大股东持股、前二大股东持股和前三大股东持股)对现金股利发放概率具有显著的正向影响。公司各项组织特征(成长性机会、每股收益、每股留存盈余、资产规模和财务杠杆)也对现金股利发放概率具有显著的影响。本文的结论支持自由现金流假说。     

中国上市公司现金流管理研究——兼对中美市场现金流管理行为比较研究

This paper examines cash flow management in the Chinese market and compares it to that in the U.S. market. It adopts Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al.’s (1999) method and the best-fitted distribution model to analyze the financial data of Chinese listed firms during 1998–2005 and the forecasted cash flow per share (CPS) data for Chinese firms in the I/B/E/S database during 1993–2005. Results reveal that cash flows reports are not as reliable as people think, and managers manipulate cash flows just as they manipulate earnings. Further analyses show that zero point, last year’s cash flow and analyst cash flow forecast are the three thresholds that influence managers’ decision when they report cash flow performance. Over 16% of the firms with small positive cash flows manipulate their cash flow. Moreover, 16.64% of the firms with small changes in cash flow and 9.81% of the firms with small surprises manipulate cash flows to reach the targets. A comparative analysis shows that cash flow management behaviors around zero and zero changes are more prevalent in the Chinese market than in the U.S. market. Cash flow management around analyst cash flow forecasts, however, is no more prevalent than that in the U.S. market. Translated and revised from Zhongguo Kuaiji Pinglun 中国会计评论 (China Accounting Review), 2007, 5(3): 381–400     

Effects of Foreign Institutional Ownership on Foreign Bank Lending: Some Evidence for Emerging Markets

Despite the large literature on developed countries, little is known about the interactions between corporate governance, foreign ownership, and foreign bank lending in developing countries. Using data from five Latin American countries from 2001 to 2008, we provide one of the first pieces of evidence of how foreign ownership affects the loan cost of borrowers in emerging markets. We find that in terms of foreign bank lending, the cost of debt financing is significantly higher for firms whose largest shareholder is a foreign institutional one. The results support the hypothesis that because of potential agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors, having block institutional shareholders tend to increase the borrowers’ debt burden. There is further evidence supporting this agency conflict hypothesis as we find that the effects of large institutional shareholders on borrowing costs become larger (smaller) when the conflicts are aggravated (mitigated).     

Reconsidering the Common Good in a Business Context

The activism of institutional investors tends more and more toward the supervision and control of the behavior of the managers of big companies. In this article, we present a model based on the creation of an activism index that lets us evaluate such activism’s effect on the sensitivity of the investment policies of a company in the face of financial variables (such as cash flow and liquidity ratio) and market variables (ownership concentration and value creation index). To test our assertions, we analyze firm-level data for United Kingdom (U.K.), Germany, France, Denmark, and Spain during the period 1995–2004. Our results point to a significant reduction in the sensitivity of company investment decisions in the face of these variables, especially relative to intangible capital, as a result of the neutralizing effect of activism on the high agency costs of free cash flow and on the information asymmetries of the market.     

The value of family control during political uncertainty: Evidence from Thailand's constitutional change in 2014

We examine the effect of family control on firm value and corporate decision during Thailand's constitutional change arising from the 2014 coup d'état. We find that Thai family firms perform poorly when compared to non-family firms during the period of political uncertainty. The effect is more pronounced when firms have high expected agency costs from outside investors. Further, we find that family firms delay their investments, hold less cash, pay smaller dividends and have poorer access to debt financing sources relative to non-family firms. The reductions in investment and financing activities may at least partially account for their underperformance. Our evidence is consistent with the view that family control enhances firms' survivorship by establishing political connections in times of political uncertainty at the expense of minority shareholders.     

控股股东控制、管理层激励与公司过度投资

本文基于我国上市公司大小股东间严重代理冲突、控股股东政府性质,以及股权分置改革的制度背景,从公司过度投资的视角对管理层激励效应进行理论分析,并以2004-2009年上市公司为样本,检验了控股股东两权分离程度及其性质对于管理层激励抑制过度投资效应的影响。研究发现,不论是货币薪酬激励还是管理层持股激励都起到了抑制过度投资的作用,但上市公司控股股东的两权分离程度会削弱管理层激励的这种治理效应;而且,公司的政府控制性质在弱化管理层激励抑制过度投资作用的同时,还会强化控股股东两权分离对管理层激励效应的负面影响。考虑股权分置改革影响的进一步研究表明,股改强化了管理层激励对于公司过度投资的抑制作用,同时又弱化了控股股东的两权分离对管理层激励治理效应的负面影响。研究结果不仅为现有文献关于管理层激励与企业绩效关联的结论分歧提供新的解释,对于理解我国上市公司管理层激励的有效性,以及切实改进管理层激励契约等,具有重要参考价值,同时也从新的视角为我国股改的有效性提供了证据。