Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game

Two recent models incorporating fairness considerations into the economics literature based on agents' concerns about the distribution of payoffs between themselves and others (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999,Quarterly Journal of Economics. 114 (3), 769–816; Bolton-Ockenfels, 2000,American Economic Review. 90, 166–193) are investigated using a new three-person ultimatum game: One person allocates a sum of money to two others, one of which is randomly chosen to accept or reject the offer. Rejection gives both the responder and the proposer zero income and a positive consolation prize for the non-responder. The data show essentially no reductions in rejection rates, holding offers constant, with and without consolation prizes, contrary to both models' predictions.     

Learning to Accept in Ultimatum Games: Evidence from an Experimental Design that Generates Low Offers

Focusing on responder behavior, we report panel data findings from both low and high stakes ultimatum bargaining games. Whereas Slonim and Roth (1998) find that offers are rejected fairly equally across rounds in both low and high stakes games, we find that learning does take place, but only when there is sufficient money on the table. The disparate results can be reconciled when one considers the added power that our experimental design provides-detecting subtle temporal differences in responder behavior requires a data generation process that induces a significant number of proportionally low offers.     

Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players?

This article reports two experiments that compared the standard ultimatum game played by individuals with the same game played by three-person groups. In the group treatment, the members of the allocating group conducted a brief, face-to-face discussion in order to decide, as a group, on a proposed division, whereas the members of recipient group held a discussion on whether to accept or reject the proposal. If the proposal was accepted, each group member received an equal share of his group's payoff (the pie in the group condition was three times that in the individual condition). In both experiments, groups offered less than individuals. But as indicated by the low rejection rate in both treatments, groups were also willing to accept less.     

探讨公平理论在薪酬管理中的应用

薪酬是调动员工积极性、主动性、创造性、合作性的重要杠杆之一。面对日益竞争激烈的市场 ,传统的薪酬设计理念显然难于满足朝晖夕阴的市场环境。因此 ,强化薪酬的激励功能 ,才能够从多角度激发员工的潜能 ,提高员工合作效果 ,使员工公平感、留住人才 ,保持良好绩效从而保证企业的良性健康发展。     

Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition

Demands in the Ultimatum Game in its traditional form with one proposer and one responder are compared with demands in an Ultimatum Game with responder competition. In this modified form one proposer faces three responders who can accept or reject the split of the pie. Initial demands in both ultimatum games are quite similar, however in the course of the experiment, demands in the ultimatum game with responder competition are significantly higher than in the traditional case with repeated random matching. Individual round-to-round changes of choices that are consistent with directional learning are the driving forces behind the differences between the two learning curves and cannot be tracked by an adjustment process in response to accumulated reinforcements. The importance of combining reinforcement and directional learning is addressed. Moreover, learning transfer between the two ultimatum games is analyzed.     

Asymmetric Information in Simple Bargaining Games: An Experimental Study

Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at stake: in some cases, the proposer is better informed, in others, it is the responder. We analyze the effects of both types of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto power: the ultimatum and the dictator game. We find that the extent to which proposers demand less in the ultimatum as compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we find informed proposers to exploit their informational advantage by offering an amount that does not reveal the true size of the pie, with proposers in the ultimatum game exhibiting this behavioral pattern to a larger extent than those in the dictator game. Uninformed proposers risk imposed rejection when they ask for more than potentially is at stake, and ask for a risk premium in dictator games. We concentrate on proposers, but also explore responder behavior: We find uninformed responders to enable proposers’ hiding behavior, and we find proposer intentionality not to play an important role for informed responders when they decide whether to accept or reject an offer by an (uninformed) proposer.     

管理层股权激励对公司绩效影响的实证研究

本文以2005年前的上市公司为研究对象,用实证方法研究高管持股与公司绩效之间的关系及其影响因素。实证结果表明,虽然上市公司高管人员的平均持股水平很低,但对高管人员的行为仍有重要的激励作用。当总经理独立于董事会时,股权激励的效果更为明显。此外,公司的规模和控股股东性质等因素也会起到调节高管持股的激励作用。     

经济公平与社会公平协调过程中的微观主体伦理道德行为探析

市场经济条件下，经济公平与社会公平是一对难以磨合的矛盾。传统观点认为，在促进经济公平与社会公平协调发展过程中政府必须发挥作用。笔者认为，市场经济中的微观主体(个人和企业)在经济公平与社会公平协调发展中，同样能够发挥作用。微观主体要发挥这样的作用，前提是，一要“君子爱财，取之有道?”；二要有道德责任感。     

高新技术企业股权激励对自主创新的影响

以2006—2015年中国高新技术上市公司为研究样本,基于Logit模型,运用倾向得分匹配(PSM)法对样本进行匹配,研究了中国高新技术上市公司的股权激励对其自主创新的影响。结果显示:高新技术上市公司实施股权激励对企业的自主创新具有促进作用;相比国有企业,非国有企业实行股权激励对企业自主创新的促进效果更为明显。     

The Core of Large Differentiable TU Games

For suitable non-atomic TU games ν, the core can be determined by computing appropriate derivatives of ν, yielding one of two stark conclusions: either core(ν) is empty or it consists of a single measure that can be expressed explicitly in terms of derivatives of ν. In this sense, core theory for a class of games may be reduced to calculus. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.     

Sex Differences in the Ultimatum Game: An Evolutionary Psychology Perspective

In the two-person ultimatum game, an allocator is required to split a given sum of money with a recipient. Subsequently the recipient can either accept or reject the offer. If it is accepted, both players receive their respective splits, while if it is rejected neither of them get anything. Using evolutionary psychology as the theoretical framework, we predicted and found that males made more generous offers when pitted against a female as opposed to a male. While females made equal offers independently of the sex of the recipient. That male allocators are altruistic towards female recipients and competitive with male recipients is construed as a manifestation of social rules, which evolve from the male pre-disposition to use resources for attracting mates. In contrast, females have not evolved such a pre-disposition, and thus, female allocators are more concerned about fairness when making offers to recipients. Several alternate explanations of the above findings are discussed and the evolutionary explanation is concluded as the most parsimonious one. Other potential moderators that are amenable to evolutionary explanations, namely, physical attractiveness, age and ethnicity of participants, are also discussed in this context. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

股权结构对股权代理成本的影响——来自中国上市公司的实证检验

股权代理成本可细分为两种:一是股东与经营者之间的利益矛盾而引起第一类股权代理成本;二是控股股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突而引起的第二类股权代理成本。在理论分析和研究假设基础之上,本文建立了两个回归模型来分别检验我国上市公司的股权结构对两类股权代理成本的影响,并提出通过调整和完善上市公司的股权结构来降低其股权代理成本的建议。     

论水资源可持续利用的公平与效率

本文强调公平和效率是可持续发展的重要内容之一。论述了水资源可持续利用的公平与效率原则。指出了我国水资源在时空分布和开发利用上既不公平也无效率。要实现水资源利用公平与效率还需解决好几个问题。     

中国网络游戏市场规模的增长模型

在今日中国，“网络游戏”已经是家喻户晓，网络游戏不仅仅已经产业化，而且几乎渗透进了国民经济和人民生活的各个方面。本文主要尝试论证的是，各种经济学因素与网络游戏市场规模的数量关系，并结合中国网络游戏产业9年里的发展事实数据，利用计量经济学知识手段，得出中国网络游戏市场规模的回归模型。为了对所提出的增长模型进行真实验证，本文的数据来源截止于2008年1月，中国出版工作者协会游戏出版物工作委员会，国际数据公司共同发布的《2007年度中国游戏产业报告》。在最后，利用中国出版工作者协会游戏出版物工作委员会，国际数据公司于2009年1月最新发布的《2008年度中国游戏产业报告》的统计数据与模型进行对比论证。·     

基于层级决策外资股权进入模式选择研究

对3452家在华外资企业股权结构的实证分析结果表明，外资的特定优势、风险态度、与东道国的文化差异，东道国的经营风险、行业特性、经营地市场环境、经营地优惠政策等因素，对于独资模式和合资模式的选择有着重要的影响。而在合资方式下的选择中，上述因素的作用明显弱化，外资将会更多地考虑东道国合作方的优势和能力。上述发现支持了层级决策假说。     

承销商托市对新股初始回报的影响--对上海A股市场的实证研究

新股初始回报地下是国内外研究关注的热点。承销商托市不仅是影响新股初回报的重要因素，还是使资本市场健康运作，保护投资者利益的一个关键。但迄今为止，国内对影响新股初始回报因素的讨论均未涉及承销商托市。为此，本文建立了中国股市的收益率分布偏度模型，证实了上海股市承销商托市的存在，发现了托市的行为模式、主要托市对象，分析了托市对股市的影响，为更全面、准确的掌握新股初始回报变化规律，了解中国股市的情况提供了条件。     

Epsilon Cores of Games with Limited Side Payments: Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment

We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility, and demonstrate conditions ensuring that a game with limited side payments has a nonempty -core. Our main result is that, when some degree of side-paymentness within nearly-effective small groups is assumed and large transfers are prohibited, then all payoffs in the -core treat similar players similarly. A bound on the distance between -core payoffs of any two similar players is given in terms of the parameters describing the game. These results add to the literature showing that games with many players and small effective groups have the properties of competitive markets. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71.     

股权分置改革对流通股股东补偿问题的研究

股权分置改革是当前我国资本市场的热点问题，实施股权分置改革试点上市公司的股权分置改革方案的出台，更引起了广泛的关注。本文运用量化分析模型对股权分置改革中有关流通股股东的补偿问题进行了研究，得出了补偿的合理性是影响流通股股东对方案认可的重要因素这一结论，并结合实施股权分置改革试点上市公司所推出的具体方案进行了验证。     

Market Games in Large Economies with a Finite Number of Types

We study market games derived from an exchange economy with a continuum of agents, each having one of finitely many possible types. The type of agent determines his initial endowment and utility function. It is shown that, unlike the well-known Shapley–Shubik theorem on market games (Shapley and Shubik in J Econ Theory 1:9–25, 1969), there might be a (fuzzy) game in which each of its sub-games has a non-empty core and, nevertheless, it is not a market game. It turns out that, in order to be a market game, a game needs also to be homogeneous. We also study investment games – which are fuzzy games obtained from an economy with a finite number of agents cooperating in one or more joint projects. It is argued that the usual definition of the core is inappropriate for such a model. We therefore introduce and analyze the new notion of comprehensive core. This solution concept seems to be more suitable for such a scenario. We finally refer to the notion of feasibility of an allocation in games with a large number of players. Some of the results in this paper appear in a previous draft distributed by the name “Cooperative investment games or Population games”. An anonymous referee of Economic Theory is acknowledged for his/her comments