Conditional versus unconditional bidding in takeovers

This paper explores the properties of multiple conditional takeover bids, and compares them with those of unconditional ones. If the initial takeover bid is unsuccessful, a raider is allowed to make a new tender offer to secure the required number of shares. Numerical analysis shows that the raider's expected profit from a conditional tender offer is higher than his expected profit from an unconditional bid, but still much lower than is predicted by static theories. However, the probability of a shareholder tendering his share is higher under the unconditional rather than conditional bidding. As the time between tender offers goes to zero, we show analytically that the expected profit from engaging in a conditional takeover bidding goes to zero similarly to the case of multiple unconditional offers.     

A note on the hedging effectiveness of GARCH models

This note compares the hedging effectiveness of the conventional hedge ratio and time-varying conditional hedge ratios (of which GARCH ratio is a special case). It is shown that, in large sample cases, the conventional hedge ratio provides the best performance. For small sample cases, a sufficiently large variation in the conditional variance of the futures return is required to produce the opposite result. The result is due to the fact that the hedging effectiveness measure is based upon the unconditional variance; meanwhile, the conventional hedge ratio minimizes the unconditional variance and the conditional hedge ratio aims at minimizing the conditional variance.     

Do Conditional Benefits Reduce Equilibrium Unemployment?

Although unconditional unemployment benefits destroy jobs in competitive and noncompetitive labor markets, conditional benefits can spur job growth in noncompetitive labor markets. Unconditional benefits reduce the penalty of shirking and misconduct, while conditional benefits increase this penalty. This is shown for the efficiency‐wage, no‐shirking model of the labor market developed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) . Switching from unconditional to conditional benefits lowers unemployment. Tough eligibility requirements are thus important components of the welfare state. However, if conditional benefits are financed by a payroll tax, conditional benefits exert upward wage pressure so that unemployment falls by less and may even increase.     

A COMPARISON OF CONDITIONAL AND UNCONDITIONAL APPROACHES IN VALUE‐AT‐RISK ESTIMATION*

In this paper, we attempt to find the most important factor causing the differences in the performance of Value‐at‐Risk (VaR) estimation by comparing the performances of conditional and unconditional approaches. For each approach, we use various methods and models with different degrees of flexibility in their distributions including S_U‐normal distribution, which is one of the most flexible distribution functions. Our empirical results underscore the importance of the flexibility‐of‐distribution function in VaR estimation models. Even though it seems to be unclear which approach is better between conditional and unconditional approaches, it seems to be clear that the more flexible distribution we use, the better the performance, regardless of which approach we use.     

Conditional and unconditional food demand elasticities in a dynamic multistage demand system

This paper estimates conditional and unconditional demand elasticities in a three stage analysis of consumer demand for food and non-food items in Greece. A dynamic version of the AIDS model is specified and estimated, and full system misspecification tests applied. Correction formulas for price and expenditure elasticities are used to calculate unconditional elasticities from conditional demand sub-systems. All food items rank as price inelastic. Deviations between the calculated conditional and unconditional price and expenditure elasticities are found to be significant, demonstrating the importance of correcting conditional elasticities before they can be used for policy purposes or welfare analyses.     

The Political Economy of IMF Conditionality: A Common Agency Model

The paper models the relationship between an aid‐providing international financial institution (IFI) and an aid‐receiving government whose economic policy choices are influenced by a domestic interest group. Two assistance schemes are evaluated: conditional aid in which the IFI makes assistance contingent on less‐ distorting economic policies and unconditional aid which is provided without such conditions. Conditional aid is shown to raise welfare of the receiving country and the world as a whole relative to unconditional aid. The paper also examines how conditional and unconditional aid schemes are influenced by the IFI's opportunity cost of providing assistance and the receiving government's political dependence on a domestic interest group.     

西部财政转移支付制度的渐进式改革

今后一个时期西部转移支付制度改革,应体现渐进式改革的总体思路和指导原则;在转移支付规模保持既有水平下,对现行的无条件拨款和有条件拨款均进行大幅度的结构转换,逐步扩大无条件拨款有条件拨款的规模,消解非规范化的税收返还等补助形式.     

Multilateral bargaining: conditional and unconditional offers

Summary. We present a game in which n persons split a cake, where a distinction between conditional and unconditional offers is made. This distinction sheds light on the contrasting results obtained in the previous literature of multilateral bargaining. By allowing the proposer to make both conditional and unconditional offers, we show that the game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome. Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: March 13, 2001     

Is There a Glass Ceiling over Germany?

This paper analyzes the gender wage gap across the wage distribution using 2010 data from the German Statistical Agency. I investigate East and West Germany and the public sector separately to account for potential heterogeneities in wage gaps. I apply unconditional and conditional quantile regression methods to investigate the differences between highly paid men and women in distributions conditional and unconditional on covariates. The results indicate increasing gender wage gaps in all estimations, suggesting that there is indeed a glass ceiling over Germany even after controlling for a large set of observable characteristics (including occupation and industry). This finding is even more pronounced when also taking bonus payments into account.     

Deriving conditional and unconditional marginal effects in log earnings equations estimated by Heckman's procedure

Although the Heckman approach has often been used in empirical analysis, the marginal effects, necessary to interpret the effect of the regressors on the dependent variable, appeared to be overlooked. Using the Heckman approach, general expressions are derived for calculating the conditional and unconditional marginal effects. Based on a sample of Brazilian women, the conditional and unconditional return to education are calculated for the logarithm of earnings equation estimated by Heckman's procedure, comparing them to the marginal effect of education obtained without correcting for selectivity bias. The same analysis is carried out for a discrete variable ‘black’.     

Social transfers and conditionalities under different regime types

This paper examines the implications of political factors for social policy choices. Specifically, we explore the link between regime type and adoption of unconditional transfers versus transfers conditioned on beneficiaries’ investments in human capital. Due to the direct nature of benefits, unconditional transfers are more likely to be used to buy off opposition and prevent social unrest. As transfers that are conditioned on education and health pay off only in a relatively distant future, they are rarely initiated for political motives and rather defined by interests of long-term development and human capital accumulation. Using the new dataset on Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programs (NSTP) in developing countries, we find that transfers are indeed chosen so as to be unconditional under less democratic regimes. There is some evidence that conditional transfers are more likely to be adopted in democracies. In particular, democracies tend to increase the number of conditional schemes once any social transfer program is introduced.     

Conditional belief types

We study type spaces where a player's type at a state is a conditional probability on the space. We axiomatize these spaces using conditional belief operators, examining three additional axioms of increasing strength. First, introspection, which requires the agent to be unconditionally certain of her beliefs. Second, echo, according to which the unconditional beliefs implied by the condition must be held given the condition. Third, determination, which says that the conditional beliefs are the unconditional beliefs that are conditionally certain. Echo implies that conditioning on an event is the same as conditioning on the event being certain, which formalizes the standard informal interpretation of conditional probability. The game-theoretic application of our model, discussed within an example, sheds light on a number of issues in the analysis of extensive form games. Type spaces are closely related to the sphere models of counterfactual conditionals and to models of hypothetical knowledge.     

Inequity aversion and trustees' reciprocity in the trust game

The introduction of inequity concerns into the Trust Game gives rise to complementary concepts of conditional trustworthiness and unconditional untrustworthiness. When the inequity concern is not accounted for, unconditional untrustworthiness is overestimated. The high proportion of trustees adopting the equal division behavioural norm suggests that an unequal distribution of show-up fees may deter trustors from placing trust, and may eventually reduce the incentive to cooperate for both players. It also follows that increases in income inequality can explain declines in self-reported trust in high-income countries.     

Decomposing changes in the conditional variance of GDP over time

A well established fact in the growth empirics literature is the increasing (unconditional) variation in output per capita across countries. We propose a nonparametric decomposition of the conditional variation of output per capita across countries to capture different channels over which the variation might be increasing. We find that OECD countries have experienced diminishing conditional variation while other regions have experienced increasing conditional variation. Our decomposition suggests that most of these changes in the conditional variance of output are due to unobserved factors not accounted for by the traditional growth determinants. In addition to this we show that these factors played very different roles over time and across regions.     

Invariance of conditional maximum utility

The consumer benefit in a discrete choice model is often measured by maximum utility. We characterize the conditional (on the chosen alternative) and the unconditional distribution of maximum utility. We show that among a wide class of distributions (independent with convex supports) of error terms, the Type I extreme-value distribution is the unique distribution which ensures that all the conditional distributions of maximum utility coincide. Moreover, we show that for i.i.d. (with convex support) error terms, the invariance of conditional expected maximum utility characterizes the multinomial logit model.     

The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses

We randomly draw a game from a distribution on the set of two-player games with a given size. We compute the distribution and the expectation of the number of pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game conditional on the game having nondecreasing best-response functions. The conditional expected number of pure-strategy Nash equilibria becomes much larger than the unconditional expected number as the size of the game grows.     

A cautionary note on computing conditional from unconditional correlations

We show that some care is needed when inferring true unconditional correlations from observed conditional correlations, which is a frequent problem in empirical finance and elsewhere. We give a general formula for the relationship between the two and demonstrate its importance in the context of the bivariate t-distribution.     

A simple method for estimating unconditional heterogeneity distributions in correlated random effects models

I propose a general, simple approach to recovering an unconditional heterogeneity distribution when a conditional distribution has been estimated. The approach can be applied to cross section models and panel data models-both static and dynamic-with unobserved heterogeneity.     

should Transfers To Poor Families Be Conditional On School Attendance? A Household Bargaining Perspective*

This article considers the welfare implications of transfers to poor families that are conditional on school attendance and other forms of investment in children's human capital. Family decisions are assumed to be the result of (generalized) Nash bargaining between the two parents. We show that, as long as bequests are zero, conditional transfers are better for children than unconditional transfers. The mother's welfare may also be improved by conditional transfers. Thus, conditioning transfers to bequest‐constrained families have potentially desirable intergenerational and intragenerational welfare effects. Conditioning transfers to unconstrained families make every family member worse off.     

Social norms and the indirect evolution of conditional cooperation

We develop a model of social norms and cooperation in large societies. Within this framework we use an indirect evolutionary approach to study the endogenous formation of preferences and the co-evolution of norm compliance. The multiplicity of equilibria, which emerges in the presence of social norms, is linked to the evolutionary analysis: individuals face situations where many others cooperate as well as situations where a majority free-rides. The evolutionary adaptation to such heterogenous environments favors conditional cooperators, who condition their pro-social behavior on the others’ cooperation. As conditional cooperators react flexibly to their social environment, they dominate free-riders as well as unconditional cooperators.