经济金融化行为的政治经济学分析--一个演化博弈框架

自2008年美国金融危机发生以来,经济金融化成为国内外学界关注的焦点。文章从政治经济学的角度指出了金融化的本质在于资本积累演变为资本脱离剩余价值的生产与交换而通过金融系统实现增殖的过程,进而通过构建一个包含异质性主体的非对称演化博弈模型,揭示了非金融主体与金融主体之间从普通经济关系到金融关系的动态演变过程及其作用机制。研究表明：(1)经济主体之间的动态关系演变表现为非金融企业主要通过金融活动获取利润,金融企业则关注中间业务和表外业务并将普通家庭纳入其体系使之成为新的利润源泉,而普通家庭则被迫接受强势经济主体的二次分利,这些关系的变化将导致一国经济的金融化乃至金融危机。(2)经济发展状态取决于金融主体与非金融主体之间的相互关系,其中,非金融主体行为起主导性作用。在既定假设下,当非金融主体仅通过其资源保护行为影响金融主体的分利技术时,既可以促使一国经济走向新的稳定状态也可促使其走向崩溃;当非金融主体通过其资源保护行为和分利技术影响金融主体的分利技术时,经济可以实现演化稳定状态。(3)经济主体的金融化行为有三个层面的影响：一是经济主体的金融化行为促进经济主体自身在短期内实现高额资本积累;二是金融主体的分利行为与非金融主体的生产行为经常呈现对立的经济关系并容易被激化;三是没有政府介入的自由市场必然导致矛盾激化而陷入危机。因此,深入理解经济金融化问题的本质及其对经济的影响机制,对当前中国的经济转型和金融改革都具有重要意义。     

America’s flawed paradigm: macroeconomic causes of the financial crisis and great recession

This paper traces the roots of the financial crisis and Great Recession to a flawed U.S. macroeconomic paradigm that was adopted around 1980 with the triumph of neoliberal economics. One flaw concerns the growth model. A second flaw concerns the model of global economic engagement that created a triple economic hemorrhage of spending on imports, manufacturing job losses, and off-shoring of investment. The new growth model hollowed out the economy and relied on growing debt and asset price inflation. As the process deepened the economy needed ever larger bubbles to grow. Financial deregulation and excess kept the model going longer than expected, but it meant the economy experienced a financial crash and deeper collapse when the contradictions finally surfaced. The United States needs a new economic paradigm and a new growth model, but as yet this challenge has received little attention from policymakers or economists.     

Resilience and Dynamism of Embedded Financial Transactions in Cameroon

Following the recent financial crisis, institutional economists have issued a “call” for institutionalist research on alternative financial systems. While suggestions have been forthcoming, (for example, in Volume 48, Issue 4 of the Journal of Economic Issues), most have centered on national-level innovations in advanced capitalist countries, prompting further calls for “community” and individual level anti-capitalist financial relations. With this article, we respond to such calls. We show how networks of finance in Cameroon bridge the formal/informal dualisms in lending/savings activities. We demonstrate that any debates about whether to formalize informal financial institutions or leave them alone weaken in Cameroon because, through networks, people access both formal and informal financial institutions for different purposes and at various stages in the life of these institutions. This dynamism explains why, in spite of the growth of money markets in Cameroon, informal financial institutions have not disappeared, nor declined. In fact, they have expanded, contrary to predictions in existing new institutional economics research. While informal institutions have evolved, they have not necessarily become formal banks, microfinance, or stock markets. Rather, the informal financial institutions have adopted and adapted in terms of both lending and saving practices in a country where growing formal financialization has become the norm. Our findings challenge neoclassical and new institutional economics theories about money, credit, and the actors in the money market.     

Heterodox Economics and its Critics

Heterodox economics has its critics. Most of the criticisms are friendly comments and analysis directed towards improving heterodox economic theory. However, the critics and their criticisms that are the concern of this article are the ones that challenge the existence of heterodox economic theory and the community of heterodox economists as manifested through their graduate programs, conferences, journals and identity. These critics observe that the academic status quo in economics, as manifested in its department and journal rankings, rules of academic engagement, and its institutions and organizations, favor mainstream economics and that it is unlikely to change in the future. Consequently, they argue that heterodox economists can survive only if they become more like mainstream economists. With focus on assimilation, the critics direct their criticisms towards the social characteristics of the heterodox community and to the personal characteristics of heterodox economists. This article is a response to the critics.     

Institutions and Values: A Methodological Inquiry

Economics entails a study of institutions regardless of the school of thought, and it is inherently an analysis of institutional transformation with a vision toward creating positive social change through economic arrangements. However, the conceptions of institutions, identity of individuals, human nature as it pertains to economics, identification of the economic sphere, its concerns, and studying its evolution, all vary substantively across schools of thought. We examine the following issues: (i) the differences in the ontological identity of the individual between heterodox approaches, new institutional economics (NIE), and the neoclassical school; (ii) the central point of divergence between original institutional economics (OIE) and NIE, despite both schools being committed to the project of an “institutionally” centered approach to economics; and (iii) the absence of a cohesive project to explore foundational theoretical congruencies among those heterodox approaches that have a shared vision, values, and a common ontological identity of socially embedded people.     

Property and Industrial Organization in Communist and Capitalist Nations

Endogenous growth theorists argue that certain equity-enhancing social institutions enhance growth. Despite the centrality of inequality in these approaches, there is no sense in which economic actors exercise power or collective action to create and maintain social norms and rules that are personally advantageous but socially costly. This despite the work of neoclassical economists on rent-seeking, which posits that efforts to claim unearned revenues can pose significant costs for growth. The question of the impact of gender equity on economic growth is an instructive context for understanding these contradictions. Even though gender practices are inherently about the exercise of power, that they have become a feature of the neoclassical growth literature alights on obvious tensions in the neoclassical institutionalist paradigm. By incorporating insights from both the rent-seeking and feminist economics literatures, we will present analternative explanation of why gender hierarchies persist despite their obvious economic costs.     

The institutionalisation of political economy in Italy and Spain (1860–1900): a comparative approach

Abstract

The process of institutionalisation of political economy has become of increasing interest in tracing the evolution of economic thought. This paper presents a comparison of the development of these processes in Italy and Spain, through the analysis of the presence of political economy in some institutions in both countries between 1860 and 1900: universities, economic associations, economic journals and national parliaments. This essay aims at supplying new insights to the consolidation of economics as a scientific and socially appreciated field of knowledge, and exploring the influence of the form of institutionalisation on the economic ideas diffused in a particular country.     

The Complementary Relationship Between Institutional and Complexity Economics: The Example of Deep Mechanismic Explanations

Analyzing economic systems from an evolutionary-institutional or a complexity perspective are two complementary approaches to economic inquiry. I discuss three arguments in favor of this hypothesis: (i) eminent institutional economists have examined the economy as what today could be considered a complex system; (ii) complexity economists lack meta-theoretical foundations which could be provided by institutionalist theory; and (iii) institutional economists could benefit from using methods of complexity economics. In this context, I argue that scholars considering the economy to be complex should seek to explain it by discovering social mechanisms instead of focusing on prediction. In order to distinguish between alternative explanations, scholars should refer to the deepness of an explanation, rather than to Occam’s razor.     

经济学家、经济学与中国改革

本文回顾了中国经济学家伴随中国改革成长的历程 ,历数诸多为中国建立现代市场经济制度 ,进行过艰苦的理论和思想探索的经济学家 ;并通过具体实例说明经济学家通过对于现代经济科学认识的深化 ,在改革的重大关头和事件上所发挥的重要作用。中国改革的深入 ,对于经济科学的要求愈来愈高 ,经济学的新课题层出不穷。因此 ,本文提出亟需加快我国经济科学学科建设的若干建议。     

关于现代经济学的几个误读

对现代经济学的阐释中学界普遍存在着以下误读:(1)把市场经济的本质归结为"自由"和"平等",或仅仅是"资源优化配置".遗憾的是,这种脆弱到只敢"说物"而羞于"见人"的市场经济在现实中并不存在.(2)某些主流经济学家在失业问题上的全部智慧,就是终于发现了失业的"深层次"原因在于"都是计划经济惹的祸".市场经济生的病,却要计划经济吃药.这种做法显然连现代经济学的初级水平都不及格.(3)面对两极分化愈演愈烈的态势,现代经济学把分配关系与生产关系完全割裂开来,根本就不承认今日的收入分配问题与市场经济的内在联系.这就使得现代经济学的解释力大打折扣.(4)在今天的经济学界,现代经济学已然被认定为"唯一科学的"经济学.这个"认定"其实是很可疑的,因为经济学不仅过去是而且现在仍然是"一门历史的科学".     

Feminist Ecological Economics and Sustainability

Synopsis New developments in feminist ecological economics and ecofeminist economics are contributing to the search for theories and policy approaches to move economies toward sustainability. This paper summarizes work by ecofeminists and feminist ecological economists which is relevant to the sustainability challenge and its implications for the discipline of economics. Both democracy and lower material throughputs are generally seen as basic principles of economic sustainability. Feminist theorists and feminist ecological economists offer many important insights into the conundrum of how to make a democratic and equity-enhancing transition to an economy based on less material throughput. These flow from feminist research on unpaid work and caring labor, provisioning, development, valuation, social reproduction, non-monetized exchange relationships, local economies, redistribution, citizenship, equity-enhancing political institutions, and labor time, as well as creative modeling approaches and activism-based theorizing.      

Creative vs. Mechanical Evolutionism: A Commentary on Petr

Abstract:

The paper deals with the lack of attention that many socially minded economists pay to social issues, with social costs being a special case. It argues that while these economists acknowledge that social costs exist, and are rooted in the way the economy functions, they do not frame their economic inquiries accordingly. This is because they believe that scientific dialogue is possible only by accepting a commonly shared ground for scientific inquiry that focuses on restricted, but generally accepted goals. This behavior obscures a major implication of systemic openness: The choice of goals and the way scientific inquiry is carried out do not depend on once-and-for-all criteria, but require the explicit formulation of a range of value judgments. The conclusion of the paper is that it is possible to deal with social issues while pursuing scientific dialogue, but this requires framing the dialogue in a twofold manner: identifying the shared grounds of inquiry and identifying the specific issues to be investigated     

财政分权、腐败与治理

财政分权对经济发展的影响已经成为转轨经济学研究的重要问题之一。大多数经济学家往往只看到财政分权对经济发展的促进作用,却忽视了在制度供给失衡的情况下,尤其是对像中国这样的转轨经济而言,它对长期经济发展是不利的,会产生诸如腐败等问题。文章运用中国省级面板数据检验了财政分权与腐败之间的关系。结果表明,财政分权恶化了腐败问题。因此,有必要通过完善财政分权体制来缓解其负面效应,这将有利于中国经济健康发展。     

Slavery,profitability, and the market process

The economic interpretations of the slave economies of the New World, as well as those social interpretations which adopt the neoclassical economic model but leave the economics out, assume everything they must prove. By retreating from the political economy from which their own methods derive, they ignore the extent to which the economic process permeates the society. They ignore, that is, the interaction between economics, narrowly defined, and the social relations of production on the one hand and state power on the other.The author would like to thank the Institute for Humane Studies at George Mason University and the Ludwig von Mises Institute for financial support of this research. Audrey Davidson, Robert Ekelund, Gerald Gunderson, David Laband, Randall Parker, Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., Richard Steckel, and Keith Watson provided useful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Eugene Genovese, Robert Higgs, Murray Rothbard, and three anonymous referees for their comments.     

Truth or precision? Some reflections on the economists’ failure to predict the financial crisis

The failure of professional economic forecasters to predict the financial crises has led many to question the credibility of modern economics as a reliable foundation for economic policy. If economists were unable to foresee so big a crisis, how can they be trusted to cure or prevent it? Several accounts of this failure exist. The paper offers a tentative answer based on the lessons that may be drawn from the wisdom of a short list of past and present economists: Hayek, Neville Keynes, Mankiw, Tinbergen, Maynard Keynes and Lucas. The glue to keep such an odd bunch together is the distinction between truth and precision provided by science historian Ted Porter.     

Cognitive Rules, Institutions, and Competition

Rules exert an important influence on rational individual behaviour. In economic analyses, two different types of rules occur that both induce rule-following behaviour. However, they are rarely distinguished. The differentiation of institutions (as interpersonal rules) and cognitive rules (as intrapersonal rules) allows for a clarification of substantial differences between the two types of rules, for example, concerning the incorporated knowledge and rule-persistence. Furthermore, the analysis of the interrelation of the two types of rules offers fruitful insights that still are not much explored in economics. The important dimensions to be considered are rule-harmony that stabilises institutional arrangements, and rule-conflict that induces pressure on persistent institutions. In this context, competition can be seen as a medium of interaction that allows individual agents to learn both about the behaviour of interacting agents and the nature and effects of the institutional framework. The integration of competition - as the core concept of economics - into the interplay of institutions and cognitive rules explores a missing point within the analysis of the economics of rules.     

Inside the Crystal Ball of Finance: Understanding Financial Economists' Attitudes to Market and Society

Market economists are thought to wield tremendous power—not only over financial markets but over governments that stray from the ‘market way’. Still, there is mystery about what economists think, and how they form their judgements. This article reports results from a survey of over 50 financial market economists from leading financial institutions in Australia conducted in December 2003 and January 2004. It provides insight into the opinions of economists who impact on markets and policy, especially through media commentary. The article identifies their economic and social views, comparing them with the Australian public. We then examine how professional views of economists differ from their personal views. Differences in professional and private views—especially over the role of government and labour markets—are an opportunity to ponder how judgements are formed and used. We offer tentative answers to the question: do these professionals—highly paid for their opinions—occasionally self‐censor?     

The breakdown of the IS–LM synthesis: implications for post-Keynesian economic theory

The monetarist and the new classical economics attack routed the IS–LM version of Keynesian theory and the large scale econometric models from the centre of macroeconomic research. However monetarism and the new classical economics were more successful as a critique of the IS–LM orthodoxy than as a basis for fruitful research and policy analysis.

Post-Keynesian economists also attack the IS–LM orthodoxy, mainly because it misspecified ‘… the economic society in which we actually live’. Post-Keynesians that emphasized financial and labour markets argued that properties of the real world economy made instability normal results ofmarket interactions.

The vacuum in main line theory that developed as the shortcomings of monetarism became evident led to a revival of interest in basic Keynesian propositions. This has spawned what is now labeled a new Keynesian economics. New Keynesian economists conform to the modeling standards set by the new classical rational expectations school but claim to get Keynesian results. To a degree these results are compatible with propositions of post-Keynesian economics.

It is suggested that a convergence between the new and the post-Keynesian economics can be expected, and the result is likely to be fruitful.     

Marketising the commons in Africa: the case of Ghana

The recent surge in the marketisation of the commons in Africa – especially of water bodies – warrants careful political economic analysis. Three questions remain intractable: (1) Were there markets in the beginning? If so, how have they transformed and if not, how did markets arise and transform over the years? (2) what are the outcomes of such markets for people, their livelihoods, and their environment? And (3) how to interpret the outcomes of water markets and whether water should be commodified at all. For new institutional economists, water markets have arisen because of the inferior nature of Indigenous or customary systems which are incapable of offering precisely what water markets offer Africa: economic and ecological fortunes. Using an institutional political economy approach and drawing on experiences in Ghana, the paper investigates the social history of marketisation of the commons and probes the effects of marketisation in terms of absolute, relative, and differential/congruent outcomes as well as the opportunity cost of the current water property rights regime. The empirical evidence shows that markets have been socially created through imposed and directed policies. Some jobs have been created through investment, but such employment is not unique to marketisation and private investment. Indeed, the private model of property rights has worsened the distribution of water resources not only within different property relations in Africa but also between diverse property relations. Water markets have been responsible for much displacement and trouble not only for communities but also nature. Overall, there is no necessary congruence between the promises made by new institutional economists and how communities experience water markets. Tighter regulations for the use of inland and transboundary water sources might temporarily halt the displacement of communities sparked by marketisation of the commons, but only one fundamental change can guarantee community well-being: to regard the access to and community control of water as constitutionally sanctioned human rights and as res communis.     

What made Economists so Politically Influential? Governance-related Ideas and Institutional Entrepreneurship in the Economic Liberalisation of Israel and beyond

Liberal economists are known to be one of the driving forces behind economic liberalisation in various countries, but how did they become so politically influential? Constructivists generally suggest that during economic crises liberal economists persuaded decision-makers to adopt pro-market policy ideas as solutions for economic turbulence. While this answer is true, it is also only partial because it disregards the role played by governance-related ideas and institutional entrepreneurship in the political actions of liberal economists. I argue that ideas regarding decision-making mechanisms provided liberal economists with the basis for creatively exploiting pre-liberalisation institutions, such as central banks and central budget offices, through which these economists enhanced their long-term political influence. An in-depth examination of a paradigmatic case of economic liberalisation driven by liberal economists – Israel's Stabilisation Plan – exemplifies that argument. The existence of like-minded economists and similar pre-liberalisation policy-making institutions in many other countries hints that the Israeli experience is not unique.