Long‐term rates: lower for longer

With the Federal Reserve and other central banks likely to start raising interest rates from next year, the focus is now on how high interest rates might ultimately go. Long‐term analysis of the path of interest rates in the world's main economies suggests that interest rates tend over time to gravitate towards a level reflecting long‐run growth and inflation. But there is scope for real interest rates to depart substantially from growth for lengthy periods of time. Based on our long‐run forecasts for growth and inflation we take the view that long‐term interest rates are likely to settle in at levels a bit lower than their recent historic averages. Structural changes in the world economy and vulnerabilities in the advanced economies are also likely to slow the process by which long‐term rates rise from current levels to their steady state positions. OE forecasts for long‐term rates in the major economies are generally lower at the 1‐year and long‐term horizons than consensus.     

Business,housing, and credit cycles

We use multivariate unobserved components models to estimate trend and cyclical components in gross domestic product (GDP), credit volumes, and house prices for the USA and the five largest European economies. With the exception of Germany, we find large and long cycles in credit and house prices, which are highly correlated with a medium‐term component in GDP cycles. Differences across countries in the length and size of cycles appear to be related to the properties of national housing markets. The precision of pseudo real‐time estimates of credit and house price cycles is roughly comparable to that of GDP cycles.     

Booms and busts in housing markets: Determinants and implications

This study looks at the characteristics and determinants of booms and busts in housing prices for a sample of eighteen industrialised countries over the period 1980–2007. From an historical perspective, we find that recent housing booms have been amongst the longest in the past four decades. Estimates of a Multinomial Probit model suggest that domestic credit and interest rates have a significant influence on the probability of booms and busts occurring. Moreover, international liquidity plays a significant role for the occurrence of housing booms and—in conjunction with banking crises—for busts. We also find that the deregulation of financial markets has strongly magnified the impact of the domestic financial sector on the occurrence of booms.     

What does money and credit tell us about real activity in the United States?

We analyse the forecasting power of different monetary aggregates and credit variables for US GDP. Special attention is paid to the influence of the recent financial market crisis. For that purpose, in the first step we use a three-variable single-equation framework with real GDP, an interest rate spread and a monetary or credit variable, in forecasting horizons of one to eight quarters. This first stage thus serves to pre-select the variables with the highest forecasting content. In a second step, we use the selected monetary and credit variables within different VAR models, and compare their forecasting properties against a benchmark VAR model with GDP and the term spread (and univariate AR models). Our findings suggest that narrow monetary aggregates, as well as different credit variables, comprise useful predictive information for economic dynamics beyond that contained in the term spread. However, this finding only holds true in a sample that includes the most recent financial crisis. Looking forward, an open question is whether this change in the relationship between money, credit, the term spread and economic activity has been the result of a permanent structural break or whether we might return to the previous relationships.     

Slowdown of credit flows in Jordan in the wake of the global financial crisis: Supply or demand driven?

This paper estimates a disequilibrium model of credit supply and demand to evaluate the relative role of these factors in the slowdown of credit flows in the Jordanian economy in the wake of the global financial crisis. The empirical analysis suggests that the credit stagnation is mainly driven by the restricted credit supply amid tighter monetary policy conditions in Jordan relative to the United States, as evidenced by the widened interest differential between the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) re-discount and the U.S. Federal Reserve funds rates. Although it appears that demand side factors related to the slowdown of economic activity have also had an impact, their role has been relatively modest. The estimation results imply that economic policies targeted towards stimulating the supply of credit are likely to be a more effective tool for expanding credit flows relative to demand stimulating policies.     

The great rotation in global credit risks

• ? The pattern of global credit risks looks very different today than in 2007. Risks are now mostly centred in China and emerging markets. “Excess” private debt in China is as high as $3 trillion compared with $1.7 trillion in the US a decade ago. Yet some pockets of significant risk still exist in advanced economies, which not only implies vulnerability to rising interest rates, but also that the scope for rate rises may be limited.
• ? With policy normalisation underway in the US and the scaling back of asset purchases expected to start soon in the Eurozone, we focus on assessing vulnerabilities across global credit markets. This article explores the topic using a top‐down, cross‐country approach. We find that although private debt and debt service ratios look more benign in advanced economies than a decade ago, they have deteriorated markedly in many emerging markets in recent years.
• ? Based on a measure of excess private debt – comparing private credit‐to‐GDP ratios with their trend – China, Hong Kong and Canada are the riskiest. When comparing debt service ratios relative to their long‐term averages, risks are also mainly concentrated in emerging countries. But Canada, Australia and some smaller European countries also have high debt service ratios that have failed to drop since 2007, despite the slump in global interest rates.
• ? Overall, aggregate private debt indicators look less worrying than in 2007. We would also argue that the concentration of excess private debt levels in China reduces the risk of a sudden financial crisis based on massive credit losses, such as the one in 2007–2010. But with corporate debt levels in the US, Canada and some other G7 countries above their long‐term trend, investors need to be attentive to these considerable pockets of risk.

     

Do house price developments spillover across euro area countries? Evidence from a global VAR

This paper empirically assesses the prospects for house price spillovers in the euro area, where co-movement in house prices across countries may be particularly relevant given a general trend with monetary union toward increasing linkages in trade, financial markets, and general economic conditions. A global VAR is estimated for three housing demand variables (real house prices, real per capita income, and the cost of borrowing, captured by a real long-term interest rate) on the basis of quarterly data for 7 euro area countries (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands), which together comprise nearly 90% of euro area GDP, over the period 1971–2009. The results suggest limited house price spillovers in the euro area, albeit with evidence of some overshooting in the first year after the shock, followed by a long run aggregate euro area impact of country-specific changes in real house prices related in part to the country’s economic weight. This contrasts with the impacts of a shock to domestic long-term interest rates, causing a permanent shift in house prices after 2–3 years. Underlying this aggregate development are rather heterogeneous house price spillovers at the country level, with a strong importance for weights – either economic or geographic – in governing their general magnitude. More generally, the impact of financing costs on house prices appears to have grown though time.     

Nonlinearities and Fractional Integration in the US Unemployment Rate*

This paper proposes a model of the US unemployment rate which accounts for both its asymmetry and its long memory. Our approach introduces fractional integration and nonlinearities simultaneously into the same framework, using a Lagrange multiplier procedure with a standard null‐limit distribution. The empirical results suggest that the US unemployment rate can be specified in terms of a fractionally integrated process, which interacts with some nonlinear functions of labour‐demand variables such as real oil prices and real interest rates. We also find evidence of a long‐memory component. Our results are consistent with a hysteresis model with path dependency rather than a non‐accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) model with an underlying unemployment equilibrium rate, thereby giving support to more activist stabilization policies. However, any suitable model should also include business cycle asymmetries, with implications for both forecasting and policy‐making.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The rise in the oil price since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in early August does not radically alter prospects for the world economy; rather it exacerbates existing trends. The US economy was, in any case, heading towards recession and a sizeable overshoot of its budget deficit targets. Japan, especially, but also continental Europe had still not reached the peak of the economic cycle so that inflation and interest rates were still rising. While the higher oil price adds to costs and prices in all countries, the policy response is unlikely to be unborn. In the US the adverse effects on output are being emphasized while elsewhere the inflationary implications are to the fore. In Japan, where acute labour shortages are emerging, the monetary authorities have already raised interest rates and we expect a similar response from the Bunds bank In the US such a move is unlikely; indeed once an agreement on the budget deficit is obtained between President and Congress, we would effect the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates. Despite this view on policy, the forecast offers little prospect of the US avoiding a pronounced slowdown and takes a gloomy view on US growth in the medium term. In Japan and Germany on the other hand the short-term inflation outlook appears containable and growth prospects over the medium term robust. The central forecast is based on a $25 oil price; we explore in a simulation what might happen if the price rose to $45 a barrel for a limited period.     

Secular stagnation ‐ are we stuck in Summers' long winter?

• Stunningly low global long‐term bond yields provide some credence to a secular stagnation view of the world. We present an analytical framework – culminating in a simple scorecard – for assessing the extent to which purported drivers and manifestations of secular stagnation match global economic and financial developments and we compare with a complementary narrative focusing on balance sheet boom and bust. We find some support for each, but think global rates will not stay as low for as long as markets price in.
• Larry Summers has used the term to refer to a situation where demand and supply for savings deliver very low equilibrium real interest rates. The bulge in middle‐aged savers, falling prices of investment goods, and flows of savings ‘uphill’ from emerging markets may have all led to real rates trending much lower in recent decades.
• Another version of the story is that slow technical progress depresses demand for borrowing, and pushes down on real rates. This is less compelling, and based more on anecdote than anything else. There are as many reasons to be optimistic, as pessimistic, about the supply side.
• There are holes in the secular stagnation narrative. Until very recently, G7 savings rates have trended down rather than up, partly because of another decades‐long trend of financial innovation. Furthermore, few economists, nor the Fed or the BoE, expect policy rates in the US or UK to stay low for as long as is priced in to markets.
• A complementary narrative would stress the role of the credit‐fuelled mega‐boom and subsequent balance sheet blow out and Great Recession, and then the long road to financial repair. This is more consistent with the path of savings rates over recent decades, and the policy response – including QE – can explain much of the rest.
• We see the two explanations as complementary and reinforcing. In global terms, they appear no better or worse than each other. Comparing across countries, Japan comes closest to resembling secular stagnation, followed by EZ, US and UK, according to our scorecard.
• We think ultra‐low long rates will not be borne out by the future path of short rates, but acknowledge a significant risk they might, for example, if monetary policy remains too tight on average because of zero bound effects on interest rates and limited scope for fiscal accommodation.

     

International real interest rate equalization. A multivariate time-series approach

This paper investigates the dynamic behaviour of monthly ex post real interest rates from several countries over the period 1980 to 1991. It is found that real interest rates are stationary over this period and that deviations from real interest parity are significant in the short run but disappear in the long run. The latter evidence is established using the concept of co-dependent time series proposed by Gourieroux and Peaucelle (1989) for the analysis of multivariate stationary time series.     

Fiscal consolidation and its cross-country effects

We build a new Keynesian DSGE model consisting of two heterogeneous countries in a monetary union. We study how public debt consolidation in a country with high debt (like Italy) affects welfare in a country with solid public finances (like Germany). Our results show that debt consolidation in the high-debt country benefits the country with solid public finances over all time horizons, while, in Italy, debt consolidation is productive in the medium and long term. All this is with optimized feedback policy rules. On the other hand, fiscal consolidation hurts both countries and all the time, if it is implemented in an ad hoc way, like an increase in taxes. The least distorting fiscal mix from the point of view of both countries is the one which, during the early phase of pain, Italy cuts public consumption spending to address its debt problem and, at the same time, reduces income tax rates, while, once its debt has been reduced in the later phase, it uses the fiscal space to further cut income taxes.     

Forecasting economic activity from yield curve factors

This paper provides clear-cut evidence that the slope and curvature factors of the term structure of interest rates (yield curve) contain more information about future changes in economic activity than the term spread itself, often used in the literature as a predictive regressor of economic activity. These two factors reflect different information about future economic activity, which is smoothed out by the term spread. The paper shows that the slope factor has predictive power on future economic activity over longer horizons ahead, and thus may be interpreted as reflecting future business cycle conditions. On the other hand, the curvature factor, which enters the term spread with opposite sign than the slope factor, has predictive power on shorter movements of future economic activity which may be associated with changes in the current stance of monetary policy. These results hold for a number of world developed economies.     

What's Unique About the Federal Funds Rate? Evidence from a Spectral Perspective*

This paper compares the behaviour of the effective federal funds rate to 10 US interest rates with maturities ranging from overnight to 10 years. Using spectral estimation methods, we identified idiosyncratic shocks to the funds rate and provided evidence on their impact on other rates at various frequencies. Our results suggest that, while all of the interest rates examined have common shocks at low frequencies, the federal funds rate contains some unique information at high frequency, although this information appears to be relevant only at the short end of the term structure. In turn, these results are open to various alternative interpretations.     

Nonlinear autoregressive leading indicator models of output in G‐7 countries

This paper studies linear and nonlinear autoregressive leading indicator models of business cycles in G‐7 countries. Our models use the spread between short‐term and long‐term interest rates as leading indicators for GDP. We examine data admissibility by determining whether these models have the ability to produce time series with classical cycles that resemble the observed classical cycles in the data, and then we ask whether this data admissibility lends itself to better predictions of the probability of recession. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of demographic factors in interest rate forecasting

Slowly moving fundamental time series can be mistaken for time trends. Use of this series can increase credibility of medium-term and long-term forecasts. This paper introduces a new slowly moving fundamental time series—the age distribution of the US population—to explain trends in real US interest rates over the past 35 years. We argue that lifecycle consumption patterns at the individual level can influence aggregate saving and real interest rates. Empirical evidence is presented that supports the relationship between age distribution and expected real interest rates. Simulations of future interest rates are developed.     

Budget deficits and real interest rates: a regime-switching reflection on Ricardian Equivalence

This paper investigates the relevance of the Ricardian Equivalence theorem for the relationship between the budget deficit and real interest rate. In contrast to the existing literature, we focus on regime-change over a long study period and consider nonlinearities. Using a Markov regime-switching model applied to two centuries of annual data, we find evidence that the US economy switches between a Ricardian Equivalence regime, characterized by an insignificant relationship between the adjusted primary budget deficit and real long-term interest rate, and a regime characterized by the traditional view of a positive relationship. We also find evidence that the transition probabilities between regimes are time-varying insofar as a weaker level of economic activity, a lower real interest rate differential between the US and abroad, or higher national debts, is associated with a weaker relationship between budget deficits and interest rates.     

Measuring Synchronization and Convergence of Business Cycles for the Euro area,UK and US*

This paper investigates business cycle relations among different economies in the Euro area. Cyclical dynamics are explicitly modelled as part of a time series model. We introduce mechanisms that allow for increasing or diminishing phase shifts and for time‐varying association patterns in different cycles. Standard Kalman filter techniques are used to estimate the parameters simultaneously by maximum likelihood. The empirical illustrations are based on gross domestic product (GDP) series of seven European countries that are compared with the GDP series of the Euro area and that of the US. The original integrated time series are band‐pass filtered. We find that there is an increasing resemblance between the business cycle fluctuations of the European countries analysed and those of the Euro area, although with varying patterns.     

Forecasting China's foreign exchange reserves using dynamic model averaging: The roles of macroeconomic fundamentals,financial stress and economic uncertainty

We develop models for examining possible predictors of growth of China's foreign exchange reserves that embrace Chinese and global trade, financial and risk (uncertainty) factors. Specifically, by comparing with other alternative models, we show that the dynamic model averaging (DMA) and dynamic model selection (DMS) models outperform not only linear models (such as random walk, recursive OLS-AR(1) models, recursive OLS with all predictive variables models) but also the Bayesian model averaging (BMA) model for examining possible predictors of growth of those reserves. The DMS is the best overall across all forecast horizons. While some predictors matter more than others over the forecast horizons, there are few that stand the test of time. The US–China interest rate differential has a superior predictive power among the 13 predictors considered, followed by the nominal effective exchange rate and the interest rate spread for most of the forecast horizons. The relative predictive prowess of the oil and copper prices alternates, depending on the commodity cycles. Policy implications are also provided.     

GDP trend deviations and the yield spread: the case of eight E.U. countries

Several studies have established the predictive power of the yield curve in terms of real economic activity. In this paper we use data for a variety of E.U. countries: both EMU (Germany, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and non-EMU members (Norway, Sweden and the U.K.). The data used range from 1991:Q1 to 2009:Q3. For each country, we extract the long run trend and the cyclical component of real economic activity, while the corresponding ECB euro area government benchmark bond interest rates of long and short term maturities are used for the calculation of the yield spreads. We also augment the models tested with non monetary policy variables: the respective unemployment rates and stock indices. The methodology employed in the effort to forecast real output, is a probit model of the inverse cumulative distribution function of the standard distribution, using several formal forecasting and goodness of fit evaluation criteria. The results show that the yield curve augmented with the non-monetary variables has significant forecasting power in terms of real economic activity but the results differ qualitatively between the individual economies examined raising non-trivial policy implications.