Earnings Management and the Long-Run Underperformance of Firms Following Convertible Bond Offers

Abstract:  This paper examines whether the long-run underperformance of convertible bond issuers can be explained by earnings management, as reflected in discretionary current accruals around the time of the offer. Consistent with the earnings management hypothesis, we find that convertible issuers who adjust their discretionary current accruals to report higher net income in the issue year will generally experience inferior operating and stock return performance over the five-year post-issue period. Our findings indicate that there is some temporary overvaluation of convertible issuers by the stock market, but that the resultant disappointed investors will subsequently correct their valuation errors. The similarity of our results to those reported within the prior literature on initial public offers (IPOs) and seasoned equity offers (SEOs) suggests that the earnings management hypothesis is not unique to stock offers, but that it actually extends to convertible bond offers.     

The Effect of Earnings Management on the Value Relevance of Accounting Information

This study investigates whether opportunistic earnings management affects the value relevance of net income and book value in determining stock price. We document a decrease in the value relevance of earnings in the year of an equity offering for a group of firms with ex post evidence of earnings management. This decrease is greater for the discretionary component of earnings than for the non‐discretionary component. These results are robust to model specification and the type of offering. However, the results are sensitive to firms' disclosure activity prior to the offering.     

Cross‐Firm Real Earnings Management

Our analysis is rooted in the notion that stockholders can learn about the fundamental value of any firm from observing the earnings reports of its rivals. We argue that such intraindustry information transfers, which have been broadly documented in the empirical literature, may motivate managers to alter stockholders’ beliefs about the value of their firm not only by manipulating their own earnings report but also by influencing the earnings reports of rival firms. Managers obviously do not have access to the accounting system of peer firms, but they can nevertheless influence the earnings reports of rival firms by distorting real transactions that relate to the product market competition. We demonstrate such managerial behavior, which we refer to as cross‐firm real earnings management, and explore its potential consequences and interrelation with the practice of accounting‐based earnings management within an industry setting with imperfect (nonproprietary) accounting information.     

Insider Trading and Earnings Management

Abstract:  This paper analyzes the relationship between earnings management and insider trading, specifically investigating whether discretionary accruals are related to insider trading and valuation. We find strong evidence of insiders managing earnings downward when buying and managing earnings upward when selling. On the marginal basis, value (high book-to-market value) firms manage their earnings upward compared to growth (low book-to-market value) firms, consistent with a signaling hypothesis. However, the opposite is true on the average basis, consistent with an opportunistic hypothesis.     

The Usefulness of Measures of Consistency of Discretionary Components of Accruals in the Detection of Earnings Management

Abstract:  Prior research has shown the prevalence of measurement error in models used to estimate aggregate discretionary accruals. In these models, the incremental information content of the various components of accruals is ignored. Limited prior research and data gathered from firms under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) litigation indicate that managers use either one or more than one component of accruals simultaneously, in a consistent way to manipulate bottom-line earnings in a given direction. I propose two measures that capture the consistency between the discretionary components of accruals and test their significance in earnings management (EM) detection in firms that have artificially added accrual manipulation and firms that were targeted by the SEC for accrual manipulation. There is evidence that this information is incrementally useful in detecting EM. This finding paves the way for improvements in the discretionary accruals measure by including consistency information from the components of aggregate accruals.     

机构投资者持股与会计盈余宣告的信息含量

本文以我国2001—2004年机构投资者持股的上市公司为样本，从机构投资者对上市公司信息利用状况的视角出发，分析了机构投资者持股与会计盈余宣告信息含量的关系，研究结果发现：机构投资者能够相对较早地解读会计盈余信息，其持股比例越高，盈余宣告后的市场反应越小．会计盈余宣告的信息含量越低。在会计盈余宣告前，机构投资者的持股比例高低与市场的累计超额回报正相关；而在盈余宣告后，机构投资者待股公司的市场累计超额回报出现反转。     

The Effect of Earnings Forecasts on Earnings Management

We develop a theory of the association between earnings management and voluntary management forecasts in an agency setting. Earnings management is modeled as a "window dressing" action that can increase the firm's reported accounting earnings but has no impact on the firm's real cash flows. Earnings forecasts are modeled as the manager's communication of the firm's future cash flows. We show that it is easier to prevent the manager from managing earnings if he is asked to forecast earnings. We also show that earnings management is more likely to follow high earnings forecasts than low earnings forecasts. Finally, our analysis shows that shareholders may not find it optimal to prohibit earnings management. Earlier results rationalize earnings management by violating some assumption underlying the Revelation Principle. By contrast, in our model the principal can make full commitments and communication is unrestricted. Nonetheless, earnings management can be beneficial as it reduces the cost of eliciting truthful forecasts.     

The Relationship Between Bank Risk and Earnings Management: Evidence from Japan

Using stock price data drawn from the 1990s in Japan, this paper empirically shows that bank risk is negatively associated with discretionary accruals, indicating that investors misinterpreted high reported earnings as favorable information about bank financial health. We also show that the negative relationship was very powerful prior to the major bank failures in late 1997 and 1998, but it diminished subsequent to the failures. We conclude that investors started to anticipate potential manipulation of financial reports by bank managers more rationally after the major bank failures.     

Accruals Management to Achieve Earnings Benchmarks: A Comparison of Pre-managed Profit and Loss Firms

Abstract:  This study examines whether firms with profits before accruals management are more likely than firms with losses before accruals management to meet or exceed earnings benchmarks when pre-managed earnings are below those benchmarks. We extend Brown (2001) by documenting that the differential propensity to achieve earnings benchmarks by profitable and nonprofitable firms results from differential accruals management behavior. We find that firms with profits before accruals management are more likely than firms with losses before accruals management to have pre-managed earnings below both analysts' forecasts and prior period earnings and reported earnings above these benchmarks.     

A study of earnings-management motives in the Anglo-American and Euro-Continental accounting models: The Canadian and French cases

The purpose of this paper is to investigate factors that potentially influence earnings-management policy with reference to the Anglo-American and Euro-Continental accounting models. Canada and France, respectively, belong to those different socio-economic environments. Earnings-management practices detected in those countries are expected to be affected by specific socio-economic features of the Anglo-American and the Euro-Continental environments. We explain earnings-management practices by incentives suggested in the literature to reveal which motives are prominent within each environment.We tested our earnings-management motives (EMM) model using appropriate panel-estimation techniques over 1674 Canadian and 1470 French firm-year observations. Our results provide evidence that incentives for earnings management for French firms are specifically linked to contractual debt costs and effective tax rate. However, Canadian firms show specific incentives matched with a dynamic capital market. Issuing equity is a strong motive for earnings management in Canadian firms.     

Earnings Management and the Post‐earnings Announcement Drift

We posit that the post‐earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is related to earnings management. Accordingly, we find that firms with large negative (positive) changes in operating cash flows manage accruals upward (downward). Most importantly, we find that PEAD is concentrated largely among those firms that are most likely to have smoothed their reported earnings and is generally associated with discretionary accruals as opposed to nondiscretionary accruals. There is no evidence of a positive (negative) PEAD for those firms with large positive (negative) earnings changes that are least likely to have managed earnings downward (upward).     

The Effect of Earnings Management on the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings

Abstract:   Is earnings management affecting (driving) the measures of earnings conservatism? Ball et al. (2000) point out that the asymmetry in the recognition of good and bad news in earnings (faster recognition of bad news: earnings conservatism) is more pronounced in common‐law than in code‐law based accounting regimes. However, comparative studies on earnings conservatism in Europe have failed to identify significant differences between common‐law and code‐law based countries. We argue that in code‐law based countries managers have incentives to reduce earnings consistently. This enhances the association between earnings and returns in bad news periods. We find that after controlling for discretionary accruals, the differential earnings response to bad news in Germany and France decreases significantly.     

Impact of Segment‐level Natural Resource Operational Risk Reporting on Earnings Predictions

Non‐financial reports alert investors to operational risks associated with issues such as insufficient access to natural resource inputs and related costly interruptions to production, while segment‐level reports alert investors to operational risk distribution across a firm. An important issue, to date unexplored, is how segment‐level non‐financial reporting has an impact on earnings predictions. We report the results of an experiment used to examine how mining company segment‐level water reports affect investors' earnings predictions, where water reports indicate whether the firm and its segments will have access to sufficient water to meet production needs. We find that investors do not change their earnings predictions when firm and segment‐level reports indicate low water risk but they do revise down their earnings predictions when firm and segment‐level water reports indicate high water risk. This is consistent with investors responding to the additional information provided in segment‐level reports confirming that water risk is high across the firm. Regardless of whether firm‐level water reports indicate high or low water risk, when segment‐level reports indicate that one segment is low water risk and another is high water risk, investors revise down their earnings predictions. This is consistent with investors recognizing that natural resource operational risk concentration in one segment can affect earnings more than evenly‐distributed risk. Overall, our findings suggest that belief‐adjustment theory explains how investors react to prospective operational risk information contained in segment‐level water reports according to the similarity of the segment‐level risks, and that this information is factored into earnings predictions.     

Misvaluation and Insider Trading Incentives for Accrual‐based and Real Earnings Management

We investigate the incentives that misvaluation creates for: (1) insider trading; and (2) concurrent earnings management through both accruals and real activities. Managers of overvalued firms have an incentive to sustain overvaluation through income increasing earnings management and, at the same time, to sell their shares (Jensen, 2005 ). Managers of undervalued firms benefit from buying their firm's shares, however the negative effects of downward earnings management may offset incentives to enhance trading advantages. The results indicate that managers of both over‐ and under‐valued firms act opportunistically, managing earnings upward (downward) with accruals while selling (buying) shares. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has been largely ineffective in eliminating trading motivated earnings management. Finally, we do not find evidence of a relationship between managerial trading and real earnings management.     

不同收益水平上盈余信息与股利政策的交互关系研究

以沪深上市公司为样本,检验盈余信息和股利政策在不同收益上的解释作用,并深入研究盈余信息分别与现金股利、股票股利和多种分配方案等三个层面的股利政策的交互关系。结果表明:在大多数收益水平上,盈余信息和股利政策显著影响市场收益水平,而且二者之间存在显著的交互关系。具体而言,现金股利变化与盈余变化在不同收益水平上具有不同的交互影响;而股票股利与盈余信息的交互影响在各收益水平上均不十分突出;多种分配方案中的"综合政策"与盈余变动在各收益水平上表现出较大的正向交互影响。     

The Timing of Asset Sales: Evidence of Earnings Management?

This paper presents empirical evidence from a sample of publicly traded Singaporean firms on the question: to what extent do firms manage earnings through the timing of asset sales? Previous studies have focused on accounting motives behind asset sales, ignoring the need to also consider economic motives. Some empirical evidence is provided to support the hypothesis that managers of firms with decreasing net earnings–per–share smooth earnings upwards using asset sales.     

A Comparison of Earnings Management Between KSE Firms and KOSDAQ Firms

Abstract:   This study investigates differences in earnings management practices of Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) firms and KOSDAQ (a Korean version of the NASDAQ market) firms during the period of 1996–1997. A sample of 1,256 KSE and 577 KOSDAQ firm‐year observations is used to compare earnings management practices of firms listed in the two different stock exchanges. The results of the study reveal that KOSDAQ firms tend to more actively manipulate earnings to avoid losses than KSE firms. KOSDAQ firms generally tend to increase reported earnings more aggressively than KSE firms when their operating cash flows are poor, and play down their reported earnings more when their operating cash flows are exceptionally good. The results of the study are quite robust in the sense that more aggressive earnings management practices of KOSDAQ firms persist even when operating cash flows are controlled.     

环境不确定性对盈余管理的影响

环境不确定性会导致公司报告盈余的波动性很大,管理层试图通过盈余管理降低环境不确定性对公司盈余波动性的影响,公司的成长趋势会影响人们对公司环境不确定影响的评估。本文探讨公司环境不确定性和成长趋势以及它们的交互效应对公司盈余管理行为的影响。研究结果表明,环境不确定性越大,公司的盈余管理程度越高;相对于衰退型的公司,增长型公司的环境不确定性与公司正向盈余管理程度正相关程度较低;衰退型公司与增长型公司的环境不确定性对公司负向盈余管理的影响无显著差异。基于不确定性来源的不同,进一步研究发现,衰退型公司更关注公司的可预测变动,而增长型公司更关注随机因素。     

Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?

Abstract:   This paper examines whether the incidence of earnings management by UK firms depends on board monitoring. We focus on two aspects of board monitoring: the role of outside board members and the audit committee. Results indicate that the likelihood of managers making income‐increasing abnormal accruals to avoid reporting losses and earnings reductions is negatively related to the proportion of outsiders on the board. We also find that the chance of abnormal accruals being large enough to turn a loss into a profit or to ensure that profit does not decline is significantly lower for firms with a high proportion of outside board members. In contrast, we find little evidence that outside directors influence income‐decreasing abnormal accruals when pre‐managed earnings are high. We find no evidence that the presence of an audit committee directly affects the extent of income‐increasing manipulations to meet or exceed these thresholds. Neither do audit committees appear to have a direct effect on the degree of downward manipulation, when pre‐managed earnings exceed thresholds by a large margin. Our findings suggest that boards contribute towards the integrity of financial statements, as predicted by agency theory.