土地市场中政府与开发商的博弈分析

在渐进转型的中国,由于土地市场发育不完全,土地市场中的寻租行为时有发生。本文通过对政府与开发商之间的寻租进行博弈分析,探索在土地征用过程中各方利益群体的行为取向、影响因素及土地市场中的寻租活动给社会造成的巨大损失,并提出了进行制度创新、规范政府行为以限制土地市场寻租的相应对策。     

寻租理论视角下的腐败行为分析

腐败是一种社会现象,更是一种经济现象,由于腐败行为几乎完全符合寻租活动的特点,因此运用寻租理论分析腐败行为是经济学领域研究的重点.市场准入及准出制度、政府的创租行为以及市场信息的不对称等都为寻租提供了土壤,为腐败提供了条件.文章指出,取消经济特权和经济垄断、建立反腐激励机制和约束机制、明晰产权结构以及确保生产要素的自由流动和自由贸易是解决腐败问题的经济学手段.     

政府寻租行为的治理

我国在由传统的计划经济体制向市场经济体制转变过程,经历了双重体制并存的阶段。由于利益激励的驱使,以及缺乏有效的制度约束,人们在追求利益最大化的过程中必将产生大量的寻租行为。本文分析政府寻租的具体表现形式,探讨寻租的成因并在此基础上提出治理政府寻租的政策建议。     

政策市与市场波动——来自制度的视角

本文从制度经济学的视角,考察了政府干预对股票市场的影响。本文认为,政府干预市场,以维护市场的稳定,这是十分必要的。但是如果没有健全的制度作为保证,政府的干预行为很可能因寻租行为的存在而加剧市场的波动。     

腐败模式发展演变的经济原因探讨

本文建立了行贿者和政府官员的博弈模型,对我国腐败模式发展演变的经济原因进行了分析.分析结果表明,随着改革的进行,市场经济在社会生产中的成分日益增加,但政府行政权力远未退出经济生活,因此寻租空间日益扩大,从而推动腐败模式从个人腐败到团体腐败转变.减少国家行政权力对经济活动不必要的干预,对有些可以由市场解决的问题交由市场解决,可以有效降低腐败的发生率.对于必须由政府进行干预的领域,应该做到限制政府官员行为的随意性,使其无法为寻租人带来利益.     

论股份制企业经营者行为制约机制

为防范经营者行为风险,股份企业必须建立经营者行为制约机制体系,以增加经营者不良行为的风险成本,消除经营者的寻租动机。     

对经营代理人寻租行为的理性思考

本文从委托——代理关系的角度,阐述了经营者的寻租行为产生的原因。并提出治理代理寻租行为的建议,以规避其非生产性寻租行为,增进社会福利。     

上市公司的会计寻租行为探析

会计寻租给社会带来很大的危害,引起理论界和实务界的关注,控制上市公司会计寻租行为应建立完善的公司治理结构,规范政府行为,完善法律法规,充分发挥中介机构和独立董事的监督作用,加大惩处力度引入竞争机制。     

寻租定义的困境：旅游市场的寻租行为分析

本通过分析旅游市场不同层面的寻租行为，说明了无法仅仅使用一个学派的寻租定义分析寻租行为，而只能根据经济学各个学派对寻租的不同定义的不同适用性，分析市场中的各种寻租行为。而目前没有一个统一而又准确的，可以解释各种寻租行为的寻租定义，是寻租定义的困境。     

从新制度经济学视角浅谈我国政府行政成本问题

在我国,随着市场经济的不断发展,尤其是在当前经济全球化深入发展的情况下,政府的行政成本问题成为全社会关注的焦点。目前我国政府行政成本过高是由于政府财产权利分配不明晰、政府寻租以及政府行为的制度供给与需求不平衡所造成,从新制度经济学的视角来研究政府成本的控制,目的在于弥补行政制度的漏洞和完善行政体制,建立高效的政府机制,减少制度上的寻租行为。     

浅析会计寻租

会计寻租是一种负和博弈,其本质是利用会计信息来取得非公平的财富转移和资源的不平等配置。通过探究会计寻租含义、会计寻租行为和会计寻租的预防措施等,优化会计行为,提高会计信息质量,促进资本市场的健康发展,为我国的经济建设服务。     

政府会计改革与国家治理研究综述

实现国家治理现代化,政府组织科学的管理机制和程序设计不可或缺,其中最为关键是如何实现政府财政与预算最优管理。合理推动会计改革对改进政府财政与预算管理尤为重要,高效的政府会计治理机制能有效预防和抑制政府官员的权力寻租,由此降低社会交易成本,促成公共资源科学配置,因此,政府会计制度可成为推动国家治理现代化的机制和程序之一。科学变革政府会计对提升政府组织管理能力,开拓国家治理新路径,夯实国家善治之基础均有促进作用。     

借鉴寻租理论加强国防人力资源管理

寻租作为一种非生产性活动产生于"经济人"的趋利避害行为,如果在军队中存在寻租行为,其结果会导致军事人力资源"生产"效率和配置效率的损失,损害军队战斗力的提高和优化。治理寻租行为必须引入竞争机制,实现军事人力资源的必要流动,建立事前监督和事后惩罚机制,加大寻租成本,弱化军人的寻租动机,消除诱发寻租的存在机率。     

The good,the bad,and the ugly: Technology transfer competence,rent-seeking,and bargaining power

In this paper, we explore the relationships between subsidiary technology transfer competence, bargaining power and rent-seeking. In the multinational corporation, technology transfer competence is generally perceived as something desirable. We connect this bright side of subsidiary-level processes to a potentially uglier and darker side of the organization, namely that subsidiaries gain bargaining power that is exercised for bad ends, i.e., rent-seeking. Using an empirical analysis that comprises intrafirm technology transfers, this paper finds that technology transfer competence leads to greater subsidiary bargaining power that in turn increases rent-seeking behavior; but this competence does not directly affect rent-seeking. We suggest that bargaining power offers a key explanation for rent-seeking. This paper advances the understanding of subsidiary sources of power within the multinational corporation and the organizational determinants of rent-seeking, which is relevant to theory development as well as to managers.     

上市公司会计寻租动因分析

"寻租是运用稀缺资源去追求人为地创造财富转移的费用",会计作为一种工具通过资本市场对资源配置的作用,使得会计寻租具有了经济后果。由于会计管制的存在、会计领域产权不清晰、会计信息不对称以及上市公司在我国经济生活中的特殊地位和作用,导致了上市公司会通过会计寻租来达到其自身利益目的不良行为。根据组织行为学和经济学的相关理论对上市公司会计寻租的动因进行分析,不仅能在深层次了解会计寻租产生的根源,而是对治理和消除寻租行为具有一定的理论和现实意义。     

Productive and harmful entrepreneurship in a knowledge economy

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with productive entrepreneurial activities and rent-seeking. Our purpose is to link contributions to the entrepreneurial and the endogenous growth literature. We deal with complementarity between productive entrepreneurship and harmful rent-seeking activities leading to potentially multiple equilibra in the economy. The degree of rent-seeking is endogenous in our model and is influenced by the economy’s legal and institutional framework as well as capital market imperfections. Policy which establishes the legal environment and financial institutions dealing with capital market imperfections together decides which of the potentially multiple equilibria is chosen by the economy. This institutional choice implies the solution to a trade-off between high economic growth on the one and a high level of productivity on the other hand.     

Future rent-seeking and current public savings

The conventional wisdom is that politicians' rent-seeking motives increase public debt and deficits. This is because myopic politicians face political risk and prefer to extract political rents as early as possible. In this paper we study the determination of government debt and deficits in a dynamic political economy model. We show that this conventional wisdom relies on economic volatility being low relative to political uncertainty. If economic volatility is high relative to political uncertainty, then a rent-seeking government actually over-saves and over-taxes along the equilibrium path relative to a benevolent government. This result emerges because of the option value of rent-seeking: a rent-seeking government over-values future funds because of the possibility of using them for future rents instead of cutting taxes in the event of a future boom (when marginal utility of private consumption is low). This over-saving bias is temporary since, in the long run, the rent-seeking government over-borrows relative to the benevolent government as it eventually squanders the funds it has accumulated. We find that both the under-saving and over-saving bias of the government can be solved by a rule of capping deficits.     

Future rent-seeking and current public savings

The conventional wisdom is that politicians' rent-seeking motives increase public debt and deficits. This is because myopic politicians face political risk and prefer to extract political rents as early as possible. In this paper we study the determination of government debt and deficits in a dynamic political economy model. We show that this conventional wisdom relies on economic volatility being low relative to political uncertainty. If economic volatility is high relative to political uncertainty, then a rent-seeking government actually over-saves and over-taxes along the equilibrium path relative to a benevolent government. This result emerges because of the option value of rent-seeking: a rent-seeking government over-values future funds because of the possibility of using them for future rents instead of cutting taxes in the event of a future boom (when marginal utility of private consumption is low). This over-saving bias is temporary since, in the long run, the rent-seeking government over-borrows relative to the benevolent government as it eventually squanders the funds it has accumulated. We find that both the under-saving and over-saving bias of the government can be solved by a rule of capping deficits.     

浅谈会计寻租利弊与对策分析

会计作为社会经济资源配置的重要制度装置之一,其运行具有直接的经济效果,而规范会计运行规则施加有利于自己的影响.本文对会计寻租的利弊进行了详细的分析,并给出了抑制会计寻租的具体对策与建议.     

The Regulation of Pharmacists in Belgium and the Netherlands: In the Public or Private Interest?

The regulation of pharmacists in Belgium and the Netherlands is analysed in order to test the rent-seeking hypothesis put forward in the private interest literature. Both the self-regulation issued by the professional bodies and public regulations are examined. It appears that many regulations in both countries either restrict the entry into the profession or restrict competition within the profession. A qualitative comparative analysis of these regulations in both countries is presented as well as some empirical findings. The economic analysis and the empirical data seem to give some support to the rent-seeking hypothesis.