Entry,exit, and the determinants of market structure

This article estimates a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit for two US service industries: dentists and chiropractors. Entry costs faced by potential entrants, fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short‐run price competition are important determinants of long‐run firm values, firm turnover, and market structure. In the dentist industry entry costs were subsidized in geographic markets designated as Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSA) and the estimated mean entry cost is 11 percent lower in these markets. Using simulations, we find that entry cost subsidies are less expensive per additional firm than fixed cost subsidies.     

Entry Decisions and Adverse Selection: An Empirical Analysis of Local Credit Markets

During the last decades there has been a widespread relaxation of legal entry barriers into the banking industry, with potential benefits for financial integration and competition. Obstacles to banks geographical and business expansion have been removed and branching has been substantially liberalized. This paper analyses the determinants of entry decisions into local credit markets using a unique data set before and after deregulation of the Italian banking industry. We estimate an entry model à la Poisson and find evidence that spreads between loan and deposit rates drive entry only for newly chartered banks, but does not affect the decision to open branches of banks operating in other markets. Branching by outside banks is instead positively correlated with business opportunities in the provision of financial services which do not require the acquisition of substantial proprietary information. Both these results are consistent with the hypothesis that in credit markets incumbents have an informational advantage over new entrants.     

Entry decisions in the generic pharmaceutical industry

Data on all generic drug entries in the period 1984-1994 are used to estimate which markets heterogeneous potential entrants will decide to enter. I find that organizational experience predicts entry. Firms tend to enter markets with supply and demand characteristics similar to the firm's existing drugs. Larger revenue markets, markets with more hospital sales, and products that treat chronic conditions attract more entry. The simultaneous nature of entry leads to an additional interpretation: specialization is profitable because of the severe risk to profits when a market is "overentered." However, I am unable to make any conclusions about the efficiency of entry decisions.     

Going multinational under exchange rate uncertainty

We analyze a model where an exporting firm competes a la Cournot in a foreign market. The firm faces exchange rate uncertainty and has the option to invest abroad. The paper contributes four results. First, real option pricing techniques are used to derive the optimal timing rule of the investment and the price of the firm and foreign competitors. Second, the sunk cost of entry into the foreign market introduces hysteresis in direct investment flows. We find that the degree of hysteresis grows with the number of firms in the industry. Third, we determine the conditions under which dumping may appear and the role of FDI in precluding this type of dumping. Fourth, tariffs have the well known FDI-inducing effect, more so in less competitive markets, and are more effective at deterring delocation. Furthermore, a tariff might have the effect of triggering dumping.     

The deep-pocket effect of internal capital markets

We provide evidence that incumbent and entrant firms' access to business group deep pockets affects the entry patterns in product markets. Relying on a unique French data set on business groups, our paper shows that entry into manufacturing industries is negatively related to the cash hoarded by incumbent affiliated groups and positively related to entrant groups' cash. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that the impact of group cash holdingson entry is more important in environments where financial constraints are pronounced. The cash holdings of incumbent and entrant groups also affect the survival rate of entrants in the three- to five-year post-entry window. Overall, our findings suggest that internal capital markets operate within corporate groups and affect the product market behavior of affiliated firms by mitigating financial constraints.     

Freedom of services and competition in insurance markets: A note

We study entry in markets which are characterized by adverse selection. The analysis is motivated by the introduction of freedom of services in insurance markets at the European Community (EC) level. We assume that entrants in each domestic market (large multinational firms) are more efficient due to scale/scope economies but suffer an informational disadvantage. Incumbent firms, on the other hand, have perfect information about risks but incur higher production costs. We show there may exist competitive equilibria in which both types of firms coexist. The idea is that each technology trades-off production costs with information costs.     

Informational Barriers to Entry into Credit Markets*

Economic theory suggests that asymmetric information between incumbents and entrants can generate barriers to entry into credit markets. Incumbents have superior information about their own customers and the overall economic conditions of the local credit market. This implies that entrants are likely to experience higher loan default rates than the incumbents. We test these theoretical predictions using a unique database of 7,275 observations on 729 individual banks’ lending in 95 Italian local markets. We find that informational asymmetries play a significant role in explaining entrants’ loan default rates. The default rate is significantly higher for those banks that entered local markets without opening a branch, suggesting that having a branch on site may help to reduce the informational disadvantage. We also uncover a positive correlation between banks’ loan default rates in individual local markets and the number of banks lending in that market. We argue that these informational barriers can help to explain why entry into many local credit markets by domestic and foreign banks was slow, even after substantial deregulation. * The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not involve the responsibility of the Bank of Italy. The authors thank Franklin Allen, Dario Focarelli, Andrea Generale, Luigi Guiso, Francesca Lotti, Marco Pagano, Alberto Franco Pozzolo, Paola Sapienza, Alessandro Secchi, two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, the Federal Reserve of Chicago, the 2003 BIS Workshop on Applied Banking Research, the 2003 EARIE Conference, the First Banca d’Italia/CEPR Conference on Money, Banking and Finance, the 2004 FIRS Conference on Banking, Insurance and Intermediation and the 2004 EEA Meeting for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies to all of them.     

Entry into Banking Markets and the Early-Mover Advantage

Using a sample for 1972–2002 with over 10,000 bank entries into local markets, we find a market share advantage for early entrants. In particular, the earlier a bank enters, the larger is its market share relative to other banks, controlling for firm, market, and time effects, with a market share advantage for early movers between 1 and 15 percentage points, depending on the order of entry. The strongest early-mover advantage is for banks that were in our sample in 1972 and survive into the 1990s. Moreover, early entrants appear to have such hold in the market by strategically investing in larger branch networks. Even controlling for the potential survivorship bias, we find that a bank's share decreases by 0.1 percentage points for a change in its order of entry from n th to ( n + 1)th. High growth markets show a smaller difference between late and early movers, consistent with a larger fraction of consumers yet to be locked in with a bank in these markets.     

Finance as a Barrier to Entry: Bank Competition and Industry Structure in Local U.S. Markets

This paper tests how competition in local U.S. banking markets affects the market structure of nonfinancial sectors. Theory offers competing hypotheses about how competition ought to influence firm entry and access to bank credit by mature firms. The empirical evidence, however, strongly supports the idea that in markets with concentrated banking, potential entrants face greater difficulty gaining access to credit than in markets in which banking is more competitive.     

Democratizing entry: Banking deregulations,financing constraints,and entrepreneurship

We examine entrepreneurship and creative destruction following US banking deregulations using US Census Bureau data. US banking reforms brought about exceptional growth in both entrepreneurship and business closures. Most of the closures, however, were the new ventures themselves. Although we find evidence for the standard story of creative destruction, the most pronounced impact was a massive increase in churning among new entrants. We argue that creative destruction requires many business failures along with the few great successes. The successes are difficult to identify ex ante, which is why democratizing entry is an important trait of well-functioning capital markets.     

On the strategic role of high leverage in entry deterrence

This paper examines the strategic role of high levels of debt and bankruptcy threats in deterring entry into monopolistic markets. In the context of an infinite horizon entry game, we show that if a potential entrant has access to debt financing with limited liability, the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium involves the entrant successfully issuing a high level of debt, entering the market and being met with cooperation. If, in addition to the entrant, the incumbent also has access to debt with limited liability, it will be highly levered and will completely pre-empt any entry in equilibrium. Finally, if the incumbent faces a variety of potential entrants with differing abilities to capture market shares, its optimal capital structure will help pre-empt the entry of the tougher entrants, while allowing the weaker ones to share the market. The results of extreme leverage are also shown to hold in an alternative formulation analyzed by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), and thus are robust to model specifications. The empirical implications and possible application to high leverage industries are briefly discussed.     

How Does Financial‐Reporting Regulation Affect Industry‐Wide Resource Allocation?

This paper examines the impact of mandatory reporting and auditing of firms’ financial statements on industry‐wide resource allocation. Using threshold‐induced variation in the share of mandated firms in a given industry, I document that reporting mandates facilitate ownership dispersion in capital markets and spur competition in product markets. I, however, do not find that reporting mandates unambiguously improve the efficiency of industry‐wide resource allocation. With respect to auditing mandates, I find only that they impose a fixed cost on firms, deterring smaller entrants.     

All strategy is local

The aim of strategy is to master a market environment by understanding and anticipating the actions of other economic agents, especially competitors. A firm that has some sort of competitive advantage-privileged access to customers, for instance--will have relatively few competitors to contend with, since potential competitors without an advantage, if they have their wits about them, will stay away. Thus, competitive advantages are actually barriers to entry and vice versa. In markets that are exposed, by contrast, competition is intense. If the incumbents have even brief success in earning greater than normal returns on investments, new entrants will swarm in to grab a share of the profits. Sooner or later, the additional competition will push returns as far down as the firms' costs of capital. For firms operating in such markets, the only choice is to forget about strategy and run the business as efficiently as possible. Barriers to entry are easier to maintain in a competitive arena that is "local", either in the geographic sense or in the sense of being limited to one product or a handful of related ones. The two most powerful competitive advantages-customer captivity and economies of scale-are more achievable and sustainable in circumscribed markets of this kind. Their opposites are the open markets and host of rivals that are features of globalization. Compapies entering such markets risk frittering away the advantages they secured on smaller playing fields.., Ifa company wants to grow but still obtain superior returns, the authors argue, the best strategy is to dominate a series of discrete but preferably contiguous markets and then expand only at their edges. WalMart's diminishing margins over the past 15 years are strong evidence of the danger of proceeding otherwise.     

Predation and its rate of return: the sugar industry, 1887–1914

We show that the price wars following two major entry episodes were predatory. Our proof is twofold: by direct comparison of price to marginal cost, and by construction of a lower bound to predicted competitive price‐cost margins that we show to exceed observed margins. Predation occurred only when its relative cost to the dominant firm, the American Sugar Refining Company (ASRC), was small. Its most clear effect was to lower the acquisition price of entrants and small incumbents. It may also have deterred future capacity additions and raised ASRC's share of industry profits. Predation operated by strengthening ASRC's reputation as a willing predator.     

The role of firm characteristics in pharmaceutical product launches

I examine the determinants of new pharmaceutical launches since 1980 in G7 nations. Both market and firm characteristics, and their interaction, are important in explaining entry. New drugs are 1.5 times more likely to be launched in markets that share a border or a language of a drug company's country of headquarters. The effect of competition depends on the characteristics of both the potential entrant and incumbents: domestic entrants prefer to compete with domestic incumbents. Despite the potential for licensing and low transportation costs, the match between the innovating firm and market conditions remains an important determinant of entry.     

Globalization and Risky Human-Capital Investment

Globalization is supposed to increase the mobility of highly skilled labor and to reduce governments' scope for redistribution. We show that this increases the private incentives for education and may decrease, but may also increase, the government's incentives to provide education subsidies in a framework in which education investment is risky. Globalization shifts the cost of these subsidies to the less skilled. For the welfare implications of globalization the availability of private insurance is crucial. Welfare unambiguously increases if such markets work.     

PROBABILITY OF PRICE REVERSAL AND RELATIVE NOISE IN STOCK AND OPTION MARKETS

In this paper we take a new approach to the study of the interrelation between stock and option markets by extending Stoll's (1989) model of cost components of the bid-ask spread to include an error component in prices. Building upon Stoll's estimates of the probability of price reversals, we determine which of the option or stock markets carries more noise. The empirical results indicate that option markets are noisier than stock markets. Such findings are consistent with the view that option markets serve as a testing ground for noisy new information because of their comparative advantage regarding transaction costs, liquidity, and potential leverage.     

An empirical analysis of the determinants and pricing of corporate bond clawbacks

This paper presents empirical analysis of the factors that affect a firm's decision to use a clawback provision in debt and the yield impact of including the clawback provision. The results show that relatively smaller firms with low credit rating and low profitability favor the usage of clawback provisions. We also find that debt with clawback provisions have the highest yield spread followed by callable bonds and straight debt. Convertible bonds that offer investors the option to convert to equity have lower yield spread. This implies that issuers can trade off flexibility for higher interest cost and that the clawback feature may be a significant financial innovation which reduces information asymmetry and creates an entry point for small firms to gain access to the public bond markets.     

Option Value to Waiting Created by a Control Problem

We study a principal-agent model in which there is an option to defer a capital project approval decision. A control (incentive) problem makes the option to wait valuable when it would not have been valuable otherwise. Deferring the project approval decision has both a cost and a benefit. The cost of waiting is that the agent's uncertainty regarding future project cost realizations cannot be exploited. However, by delaying the first project's approval decision, the principal can condition its approval on the agent's cost report of the second project. Such conditioning can be valuable in the provision of incentives because of a diversification effect.     

Public entrants,public equity finance and creative destruction

We explore the importance of new public firms and public equity finance for R&D and creative destruction in the US high-tech sector. Over 1900 new public firms enter high-tech manufacturing between 1970 and 2004; they are increasingly R&D intensive and rely extensively on public equity finance in the 1980s and 1990s. We estimate dynamic R&D models and find a strong link between public equity finance and R&D for new entrants, but not established entrants or incumbents. Further, recent cohorts of public entrants have a substantial economic impact: by 2000, recent public entrants account for almost half of high-tech sales and more than half of R&D. Variation in the availability of public equity finance has a marked impact on entrant R&D and the rate at which entrants take market share from incumbents. Our findings identify a key channel through which public equity markets facilitate the process of creative destruction.