Strategic Price Discrimination in Compulsory Insurance Markets

This paper considers price discrimination when competing firms do not observe a customer’s type but only some other variable correlated to it. This is a typical situation in many insurance markets—such as motor insurance—where it is also often the case that insurance is compulsory. We characterise the equilibria and their welfare properties under various price regimes. We show that discrimination based on immutable characteristics such as gender is a dominant strategy, either when firms offer policies at a fixed price or when they charge according to some consumption variable that is correlated to costs. In the latter case, gender discrimination can be an outcome of strategic interaction alone in situations where it would not be adopted by a monopolist. Strategic price discrimination may also increase cross subsidies between types, contrary to expectations.JEL Classification No.: L13, G22     

When do auctions ensure the welfare‐maximizing allocation of scarce inputs?

We determine when an unfettered auction will ensure the welfare‐maximizing allocation of a scarce input that enhances product quality and may reduce production costs. A supplier values the input for this “use value” and for its “foreclosure value,” because once the input is acquired, it is unavailable to rivals. An unfettered auction often ensures the welfare‐maximizing allocation of an input increment. However, it can fail to do so when the input would increase relatively rapidly the competitive position of a rival with a moderate competitive disadvantage. Bidder handicapping that ensures auctions generate welfare‐maximizing input allocations differ from standard handicapping policies.     

The economics of network neutrality

Under the current regime for Internet access, “network neutrality,” parties are billed only by the Internet service provider (ISP) through which they connect to the Internet; pricing is not contingent on the content being transmitted. Recently, ISPs have proposed that content and applications providers pay them additional fees for accessing the ISPs’ residential clients, as well as fees to prioritize certain content. We analyze the private and social implications of such fees when the network is congested and more traffic implies greater delays. We derive conditions under which network neutrality would be welfare superior to any feasible scheme for prioritizing service.     

Commitment problems justify subsidies for medical insurance

Consumers who believe that government will provide them with some public medical care, even if they did not purchase medical insurance, may choose to purchase no such insurance. The amount of medical care consumed will then be less than the first-best optimum. Under specified conditions government can then increase the welfare of consumers by subsidizing insurance, or by providing public health care at a more generous level than the minimum it would otherwise give.     

Dynamic competition with network externalities: how history matters

We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes “focal” in the current period, in that agents play the equilibrium in which they join the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists. Yet when faced with higher-quality competition, can a low-quality platform remain focal? In the finite-horizon case, the unique equilibrium is efficient for “patient” platforms; with an infinite time horizon, however, there are multiple equilibria where either the low- or high-quality platform dominates. If qualities are stochastic, the platform with a better average quality wins with a higher probability, even when its realized quality is lower, and this probability increases as platforms become more patient. Hence, social welfare may decline as platforms become more forward looking.     

The Welfare State in a Changing Environment

We analyse how the welfare state, i.e., social insurance that works through redistributive taxation, should respond to increases in risks and to increases in the cost of operating the welfare state. With respect to risks, we distinguish between risks that can be insured and such that cannot (background risks). Insurable risks can be reduced by costly individual self-insurance and by costly social insurance. We show: (i) Self-insurance will be higher the more costly is the welfare state and the larger are background or insured risks. (ii) Full social insurance can only be optimal in a costless welfare state. (iii) The optimal welfare state is not necessarily larger the less costly it is. (iv) The welfare state need not optimally expand when risks increase that it insures. (v) It should, however, expand when risks increase that it does not insure.     

Taxation,imperfect competition,and discontinuities

Most work on taxation assumes that market adjustments to taxation will be small and continuous and so analyzes the effects of taxation using standard marginal methods. However, the world often changes in large and discontinuous ways. This paper looks at the effects of taxation when discontinuities in market adjustments are allowed because market structure is determined endogenously by the discrete entry and exit decisions of firms. The results indicate that the potential for discontinuities generates tax effects that are considerably different from those that emerge when adjustments are small and continuous. With discontinuities, taxes can have large and discrete effects, for example, by increasing prices far in excess of the tax itself or by changing utility in a highly nonmarginal way. Of more significance, with discontinuities taxes can actually increase welfare even when they lessen competition and raise prices. Taxes can also have markedly different effects on the income and welfare of different groups. Consumers are always made worse off by a tax, but a tax may be supported by the firms in an industry if the tax limits entry and thereby increases firm profits.     

The UK equity release market: Views from the regulatory authorities,product providers and advisors

This study investigates the factors constraining the development of the UK equity release market. The results of a thematic review of interviews with industry stakeholders (product providers, advice providers and regulators) suggest that the attractiveness of the equity market for insurance companies (the main funders of the market), has diminished following a decline in annuity business and complications around the capital maturity matching requirements under Solvency II. Product costs (interest charges, and the cost of financial advice) are high. Trust in the market has improved, but remains fragile. Increased entry into the market by recognised brand names, (such as the traditional mortgage providers) would increase competition, reduce costs and promote trust. The risk of reputational damage limits the appeal of the market to new entrants. The no negative equity guarantee, a cost in terms of lower than otherwise loan-to-value ratios, promotes demand by way of the protection it affords to customers and their beneficiaries. Equity release is unsuitable for funding long-term care and policymakers advocating it as such damage the market.     

Is More Targeting Consistent with Less Spending?

Economists often advise governments to target their spending better when cuts are called for. This paper asks whether that advice is consistent with a political-economy constraint that limits the welfare losses to the non-poor from spending cuts. A simple theoretical model shows that the answer is unclear on a priori grounds, and so will depend on the specifics of program design and financing. A case study for a World Bank-supported social program in Argentina illustrates how cuts can come with worse targeting performance; the allocation to the poor falls faster than that to the non-poor. Some lessons are drawn for how the poor might be better protected from cuts.     

Interpretable credit model development via artificial neural networks

Poor credit granting decisions are coming back to haunt providers of loan finance. Past poor credit granting decisions are in part due to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1975). This act requires lenders to explain the decision to grant or refuse credit. As a result, models such as artificial neural networks, which offer improved ability to identify poor credit risks but which do not offer easy explanations of why a loan applicant has scored badly, remain unused. This paper investigates whether these models can be interpreted so that explanations for credit application rejection can be provided. The results indicate that while the artificial neural networks can be used (with caution) to develop credit scoring models, the limitations imposed by the credit granting process make their use unlikely until interpretation techniques are developed that are more robust and that can interpret multiple hidden-layer artificial neural networks. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Welfare to Work,Wages and Wage Growth*

This paper attempts to uncover the effects of a UK welfare‐to‐work programme on individual wage growth by exploiting an expansion to this welfare programme. The conventional wisdom is that such programmes trap recipients into low‐wage, low‐quality work – this comes from the simple argument that the ‘poverty trap’, which a wage subsidy for low‐income workers induces, reduces the benefits to investments, such as on‐the‐job training, and so reduces wage growth. In fact, a wage subsidy will also reduce the costs of, at least, general training because we would normally expect workers to pay for their own general training in the form of lower gross wages. So a wage subsidy is a way of sharing these costs with the taxpayer. Thus, the net effect on wage progression depends on whether it reduces costs by more or less than it reduces the benefits.     

Socially responsible investment in Japanese pensions

As the level of retirement-related assets has grown, so too has public and private interest in so-called “Socially Responsible Investment” (SRI), an investment strategy that employs criteria other than the usual financial risk and return factors when selecting firms in which to invest. This study evaluates whether SRI indices would alter portfolio risk and return patterns for the new defined contribution pension plans currently on offer in Japan. We conclude that SRI funds can be included as an option, albeit with some cost; consequently, mandatory investment in SRI portfolios cannot reasonably be justified.     

Net neutrality and investment incentives

This article analyzes the effects of net neutrality regulation on investment incentives for Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs), and their implications for social welfare. Concerning the ISPs' investment incentives, we find that capacity expansion decreases the sale price of the priority right under the discriminatory regime. Thus, contrary to ISPs' claims that net neutrality regulations would have a chilling effect on their incentive to invest, we cannot dismiss the possibility of the opposite. A discriminatory regime can also weaken CPs' investment incentives because of CPs' concern that the ISP would expropriate some of the investment benefits.     

Naked exclusion with minimum‐share requirements

We consider a class of contracts in which buyers commit to giving a seller some minimum share of their total purchases. We show that such contracts can be used by an incumbent seller to reduce the probability of entry by a rival seller when the incumbent can commit to its selling price as part of the contract. We further show that such contracts can be profitable for the incumbent even when exclusive dealing would not be, and even when buyers can coordinate their accept‐or‐reject decisions. The average price paid by the buyers will be higher and welfare will be lower whether or not the incumbent's exclusionary conduct turns out to be successful in preventing entry.     

Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union

We examine whether the monetary policy committee of a monetary union should publish its voting records when members are appointed by national politicians. We show that the publication of voting records lowers overall welfare. This finding also holds for arbitrary levels of private benefits from holding office and if governments incur costs when replacing committee members. High private benefits of committee members always lower overall welfare, as they induce nonpartisan members to care more about being reappointed than about beneficial policy outcomes. Nonrenewable but long terms for national committee members and delegating the appointment of all committee members to a union-wide authority would be desirable.     

Information-Based Trading and Price Improvement

Abstract:  In this study we test the information hypothesis of price improvement. Our results show that price improvement is negatively related to both the probability of information-based trading and the price impact of trades. We interpret these results as evidence that liquidity providers selectively offer price improvements according to the information content of trades. We also show that liquidity providers offer greater (and more frequent) price improvements when they are at the NBBO, and for stocks with wider spreads, fewer trades, or smaller trade sizes relative to the quoted depth. Buyer-initiated trades receive smaller (larger) price improvements than seller-initiated trades on the NYSE (NASDAQ).     

Welfare implications when closing small open economy models

This paper establishes that the closing method matters when the small open economy model is used for welfare analysis. The differences stem from the impact of the closing method on debt dynamics. When the ad-hoc parameters are set so that the current account volatility is controlled for across models, the welfare properties of versions with portfolio adjustment costs (PAC) and debt elastic interest rates (DEIR) are significantly different from the version with an endogenous discount factor (EDF). Nevertheless, this outcome is an artifact of an unrealistically dispersed distribution of the net foreign assets under PAC and DEIR, and can disappear under alternative calibrations of the ad-hoc parameters. In this sense, a seemingly innocuous application of PAC and DEIR versions may imply spurious results regarding welfare especially if a highly volatile economy is studied. Under commonly used functional forms, the spuriousness of welfare implications is found to be more radical under DEIR than PAC.     

Industrial Sickness, Primary and Secondary: The Effects of Exit Constraints on Industrial Performance

In an attempt to protect workers from unemployment, governmentsin some countries subsidize firms which would otherwise fail.This article examines the effects of such subsidies on output,prices, and welfare. It also briefly reviews the effects forvarying price elasticities of supply and demand, for nontradedand fully traded goods, and for firms in which wages exceedtheir free market level. If the firm produces a nontraded good,the "sickness" of one firm that is subsidized to maintain productioncan spread to other firms that would be viable in the absenceof the subsidies. The analysis shows that the exit constraintshave the most detrimental effect when the elasticity of demandis low and supply elasticity is high, and when the governmentweighs the welfare of the firm's workers and consumers lessthan that of the general taxpayers and the firm owners. Whenlabor costs are higher than their free market levels and outputis thus less than the optimal levels, the subsidies could havean effect similar to that of an optimal production subsidy.In practice, however, this possibility is likely to be outweighedby associated rent-seeking costs and other distortions.     

Providers’ affiliation,insurance and collusion

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the benefits for an insurance company to develop its own network of service providers when insurance fraud is characterized by collusion between policyholders and providers. In a static framework without collusion, exclusive affiliation of providers allows insurance companies to recover some market power and to lessen competition on the insurance market. This entails a decrease in the insured’s welfare. However, exclusive affiliation of providers may entail a positive effect on customers’ surplus when insurers and providers are engaged in a repeated relationship. In particular, while insurers must cooperate to retaliate against a fraudulent provider under non-exclusive affiliation, no cooperation is needed under exclusive affiliation. In that case, an insurer is indeed able to reduce the profit of a malevolent provider by moving to collusion-proof contracts when collusion is detected, and this threat may act as a deterrent for fraudulent activities. This possibility may supplement an inefficient judicial system: it is thus a second-best optimal anti-fraud policy.     

Welcome to the experience economy

First there was agriculture, then manufactured goods, and eventually services. Each change represented a step up in economic value--a way for producers to distinguish their products from increasingly undifferentiated competitive offerings. Now, as services are in their turn becoming commoditized, companies are looking for the next higher value in an economic offering. Leading-edge companies are finding that it lies in staging experiences. To reach this higher level of competition, companies will have to learn how to design, sell, and deliver experiences that customers will readily pay for. An experience occurs when a company uses services as the stage--and goods as props--for engaging individuals in a way that creates a memorable event. And while experiences have always been at the heart of the entertainment business, any company stages an experience when it engages customers in a personal, memorable way. The lessons of pioneering experience providers, including the Walt Disney Company, can help companies learn how to compete in the experience economy. The authors offer five design principles that drive the creation of memorable experiences. First, create a consistent theme, one that resonates throughout the entire experience. Second, layer the theme with positive cues--for example, easy-to-follow signs. Third, eliminate negative cues, those visual or aural messages that distract or contradict the theme. Fourth, offer memorabilia that commemorate the experience for the user. Finally, engage all five senses--through sights, sounds, and so on--to heighten the experience and thus make it more memorable.