Portfolio rebalancing and the transmission of large-scale asset purchase programs: Evidence from the Euro area

The European Central Bank's large-scale asset purchase program targeted safe assets, but also aimed to impact prices of risky assets. The mechanism for this is the “portfolio rebalancing channel”, where financial institutions’ portfolio decisions impact financial prices more broadly. We examine this mechanism using cross-sectional heterogeneity in how the financial portfolios of different sectors of the European economy were affected around the purchase program. We find evidence of rebalancing. In vulnerable countries, where macroeconomic unbalances and relatively high risk premia remained, we document rebalancing towards riskier securities. In less vulnerable countries, based on granular information for large European banks, we document rebalancing toward bank loans.     

Corporate Loan Securitization and the Standardization of Financial Covenants

We examine whether syndicated loans securitized through collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) have more standardized financial covenants. We proxy for the standardization of covenants using the textual similarity of their contractual definitions. We find that securitized loans are associated with higher covenant standardization than nonsecuritized institutional loans. In addition, we show that CLOs with more diverse or frequently rebalanced portfolios are more likely to purchase loans with standardized covenants, potentially because standardization alleviates information processing costs related to loan monitoring and screening. We also document that covenant standardization is associated with greater loan and CLO note rating agreement between credit rating agencies, further supporting the relation between lower information costs and covenant standardization. Overall, our study provides evidence that loan securitization is related to the design of standardized financial covenants.     

Variations in Market Liquidity and the Intraday Interest Rate

Most central banks offer banks participating in large‐value real‐time gross settlement (RTGS) systems a free intraday overdraft facility to discourage banks from actively managing their daylight liquidity. In this paper, we ask whether this facility has kept the intraday interest rate at zero. Using a unique transaction‐level data set on collateralized interbank loans for 2006–12, we find that during periods of financial distress, rates for morning transactions are higher than those in the afternoon. Moreover, this intraday rate correlates with market liquidity, suggesting that rates contain a liquidity premium. This intraday pattern is reduced, but not eliminated by the Eurosystem's accommodative liquidity provision.     

Price Discovery and Dissemination of Private Information by Loan Syndicate Participants

We delineate key channels through which flows of confidential information to loan syndicate participants impact the dynamics of information arrival in prices. We isolate the timing of private information flows by estimating the speed of price discovery over quarterly earnings cycles in both secondary syndicated loan and equity markets. We identify borrowers disseminating private information to lenders relatively early in the cycle with firms exhibiting relatively early price discovery in the secondary loan market, documenting that price discovery is faster for loans subject to financial covenants, particularly earnings‐based covenants; for borrowers who experience covenant violations; for borrowers with high credit risk; and for loans syndicated by relationship‐based lenders or highly reputable lead arrangers. We then ask whether early access to private information in the loan market accelerates the speed of information arrival in stock prices. We document that the stock returns of firms identified with earlier private information dissemination to lenders indeed exhibit faster price discovery in the stock market, but only when institutional investors are involved in the firm's syndicated loans. Further, the positive relation between institutional lending and the speed of stock price discovery is more pronounced in relatively weak public disclosure environments. These results are consistent with institutional lenders systematically exploiting confidential syndicate information via trading in the equity market.     

Why don't Lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults,self-cures and securitization

A leading explanation for the lack of widespread mortgage renegotiation is the existence of frictions in the mortgage securitization process. This paper finds similarly small renegotiation rates for securitized loans and loans held on banks' balance sheets that become seriously delinquent, in particular during the early part of the financial crisis. We argue that information issues endemic to home mortgages, where lenders negotiate with large numbers of borrowers, lead to barriers in renegotiation. Consistent with the theory, renegotiation rates are strongly negatively correlated with the degree of informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders over the course of the crisis.     

Mortgage credit availability in low- and moderate-income minority neighborhoods: Are information externalities critical?

This study conducts a cross-sectional analysis of U.S. metropolitan counties to inquire into the factors affecting white and minority mortgage loan approval rates during 1990–1991. In particular, evidence is sought on whether minority loan applicants are denied credit more frequently than white applicants because of information externalities. Within each county, all predominantly minority, low- or moderate-income census tracts are groupted together, and then regression equations are estimated across counties and tract groupings. Separate approval rate equations are estimated for conventional and federally insured (FHA or VA) home purchase loans. In addition, a regression equation for the percentage of applicants applying for federally insured loans is estimated.Both approval rate regressions indicate that across white tract groupings, the depth of the housing market (the number of sales of owner-occupied units during 1989) has a positive and statistically significant effect on the loan approval rate, consistent with the view that information externalities affect mortgage loan evaluations. However, this relationship appears not to hold across minority tract groupings.     

Exporting Liquidity: Branch Banking and Financial Integration

Using exogenous liquidity windfalls from oil and natural gas shale discoveries, we demonstrate that bank branch networks help integrate U.S. lending markets. Banks exposed to shale booms enjoy liquidity inflows, which increase their capacity to originate and hold new loans. Exposed banks increase mortgage lending in nonboom counties, but only where they have branches and only for hard‐to‐securitize mortgages. Our findings suggest that contracting frictions limit the ability of arm's length finance to integrate credit markets fully. Branch networks continue to play an important role in financial integration, despite the development of securitization markets.     

Formulaic Transparency: The Hidden Enabler of Exceptional U.S. Securitization

Why does the securitization of residential mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, and other such consumer debt in the U.S. exceed the securitization of such debt in Europe by several trillion dollars? The author points out that lemon problems do not stop the sale of used cars but they do prevent the operation of a market in which buyers place sight‐unseen bids for used cars offered by unknown sellers. Buyers prefer to know who the seller is and test‐drive vehicles. Similarly until the 1980s, creditors were willing to forgo the information they could secure in private transactions to get tradability mainly in the case of bonds issued by governments or a few blue‐chip companies. U.S. government policy encouraged the securitization of trillions of dollars of loans made to millions of borrowers. U.S. rules—rather than new financial or information technologies—have strongly encouraged originators of mortgages and other consumer loans to rely on credit scores (commonly referred to as FICO scores) produced by credit bureaus. And reliance on scores that loan originators use but don’t produce helps overcome the information asymmetry problems that would otherwise constrain securitization. The argument turns the usual concern about securitization on its head: transferring risks to investors is normally expected to discourage careful screening of borrowers, but the author’s analysis suggests that formulaic, FICO‐based screening actually enables risk transfer by reducing information asymmetry problems. Moreover, while limiting screening reduces the upfront costs of lending, it also increases loans made to uncreditworthy borrowers. And because increasing loans made to bad borrowers raises the rates good borrowers have to pay (to compensate investors for higher defaults), U.S. rules that sacrifice information for more “complete” markets may be a bad bargain.     

Corporate Debt Structure and the Financial Crisis

We present a DSGE model where firms optimally choose among alternative instruments of external finance. The model is used to explain the evolving composition of corporate debt during the financial crisis of 2008–09, namely, the observed shift from bank finance to bond finance, at a time when the cost of market debt rose above the cost of bank loans. We show that the flexibility offered by banks on the terms of their loans and firms' ability to substitute among alternative instruments of debt finance are important to shield the economy from adverse real effects of a financial crisis.     

Derivatives: Understanding Their Usefulness and Their Role in the Financial Crisis

This article makes two main arguments that are intended to guide policymakers and regulators of financial markets: (1) when used properly, derivatives are enormously useful to companies in managing business risks; and (2) neither derivatives nor derivatives‐related products played significant roles in causing or exacerbating the financial crisis of 2007–2009. The author begins by illustrating the corporate use of derivatives with a detailed example of how a large brewer uses both exchange‐traded wheat futures and over‐the‐counter aluminum swaps to hedge the risks of higher wheat and aluminum prices. In the process, the value of much‐maligned OTC derivatives, and the role of financial intermediaries in facilitating their use, are clearly demonstrated. The second part of the article refutes the popular claims, widely expressed in the media and on Capitol Hill, that derivatives were at the heart of the financial crisis. Losses and failures during the crisis are shown to have resulted primarily from excessive non‐derivative leverage and from investments in non‐derivative mortgage products that fell dramatically in value. The only significant exception involved the insurance company AIG, whose failure and bailout are attributable not only to large losses on credit default swaps, but to comparable losses on non‐derivative mortgage products. Moreover, by the time AIG failed, many other large financial institutions had already either failed or experienced large losses. What's more, and all but forgotten during the controversy, some large banks were able to reduce risk by hedging with those derivatives.     

Small business lending and the bank-branch network

I examine the role of bank’s distance to the borrower and the proximity of other lenders for the transmission of financial shocks across the bank network. I use a novel dataset of small business lending based on information from the Community Reinvestment Act, which measures lending at census tract groups within each county and yields rich variation in the bank–borrower and borrower–competitor distance. I document that small banks with increased liquidity from proximity to local oil booms, originate more loans to firms far from these booms, and lenders with above-average geographic exposure to residential booms reduce lending in census tract groups with stable house prices. Bank–borrower distance is important for credit expansions, with closer firms receiving more credit, but not for contractions. Proximity of competitors plays a key role: consistent with theoretical predictions, both credit expansions and contractions disproportionately affect markets where the bank faces higher competition.     

Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk‐Taking Channel: Evidence from the United States

We present evidence of a risk‐taking channel of monetary policy for the U.S. banking system. We use confidential data on banks’ internal ratings on loans to businesses over the period 1997 to 2011 from the Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms of Business Lending. We find that ex ante risk‐taking by banks (measured by the risk rating of new loans) is negatively associated with increases in short‐term interest rates. This relationship is more pronounced in regions that are less in sync with the nationwide business cycle, and less pronounced for banks with relatively low capital or during periods of financial distress.     

Managerial ability and bank‐loan pricing

This paper examines the impact of borrowers’ managerial ability on lenders’ bank‐loan pricing and the channels through which managerial ability affects bank‐loan pricing. Using a large sample of US bank loans, we provide evidence that higher managerial ability is associated with lower bank‐loan prices. This effect is stronger in firms with high information risk, suggesting that an important channel for managerial ability to affect bank‐loan pricing is through improved financial disclosure to mitigate information asymmetry. The relationship is also stronger for firms with weak business fundamentals, implying that another channel is through improved business performance. Of these two mechanisms, path analysis suggests that the business‐fundamentals mechanism is the more important channel through which managerial ability affects bank‐loan pricing.     

Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS Market

We document that contractual disclosures by intermediaries during the sale of mortgages contained false information about the borrower's housing equity in 7–14% of loans. The rate of misrepresented loan default was 70% higher than for similar loans. These misrepresentations likely occurred late in the intermediation and exist among securities sold by all reputable intermediaries. Investors—including large institutions—holding securities with misrepresented collateral suffered severe losses due to loan defaults, price declines, and ratings downgrades. Pools with misrepresentations were not issued at a discount. Misrepresentation on another easy‐to‐quantify dimension shows that these effects are a conservative lower bound.     

Consumer Preference for Meat in China: A Case Study of Beijing

We analyze Chinese consumer preferences for pork shoulder-cut attributes during the recent period of fluctuating food prices caused by production and market anomalies. Consumers were randomly sampled in Beijing, China. Results indicate that consumers place great importance on where they purchase pork products as well as on whether the animals are raised with organic feed. Whether pork is fresh or previously frozen does not appear to matter much to consumers. This may provide partial support for the Chinese government's policy of using frozen pork reserves to stabilize pork prices.     

Syndicated Loan Announcements and Borrower Value

Announcements of syndication loans increase borrowers' shareholder wealth if they are revolving credit agreements but not if they are term loans. Share price responses to revolving credit announcements are positive and significant, whereas the wealth effect for term loans is negative and significant. The results show that announcements from both the financial press and commercial information providers can affect borrower share price reaction. Overall, single syndication announcements appear to be more newsworthy than multiple announcements reported in the financial press, and we find evidence of information leakage, post‐announcement drift, or both.     

An Empirical Analysis of Analysts' Target Prices: Short-term Informativeness and Long-term Dynamics

Using a large database of analysts' target prices issued over the period 1997–1999, we examine short‐term market reactions to target price revisions and long‐term comovement of target and stock prices. We find a significant market reaction to the information contained in analysts' target prices, both unconditionally and conditional on contemporaneously issued stock recommendation and earnings forecast revisions. Using a cointegration approach, we analyze the long‐term behavior of market and target prices. We find that, on average, the one‐year‐ahead target price is 28 percent higher than the current market price.     

Are Risk Management Disclosures Informative or Tautological? Evidence from the U.S. Banking Sector

Banks experienced increasing risk levels during the latest financial crisis. Investors’ confidence was shaken by the effectiveness of bank risk management practices, which has opened new challenges for bank management in approaching its risk. Understanding and communicating adopted risk management mechanisms is likely to provide insights and enable diagnosis on firm risk exposure. Conveying data that reduces information asymmetry might be reflected on stock performance. Investigating the impact of risk management disclosures content on stock price change and return volatility, using a sample of U.S. national commercial banks during 2009–2010, shows that informative risk management disclosures seems to be valued by investors. This is reflected on current‐year stock prices and reduces the subsequent‐year return variances.     

Option Implied Dividends Predict Dividend Cuts: Evidence from the Financial Crisis

We employ the forward‐looking implied dividend information contained in option prices to predict dividend cuts and omissions during the recent financial crisis. The large number of dividend cuts and omissions during the 2008–09 financial crisis period provides the opportunity to study the predictability of dividend cuts in a controlled environment. Implied dividends and implied volatility, based on put–call parity and computed from put and call option prices, prove to be effective in predicting those cuts, especially compared to only using the equity market and accounting variables conventionally used for this purpose. Options‐derived variables (implied dividends and implied volatility) enhance the ability to identify firms more likely to reduce or omit dividend payments.     

Financial Statements as Monitoring Mechanisms: Evidence from Small Commercial Loans

Using a data set that records banks’ ongoing requests of information from small commercial borrowers, we examine when banks use financial statements to monitor borrowers after loan origination. We find that banks request financial statements for half the loans and this variation is related to borrower credit risk, relationship length, collateral, and the provision of business tax returns, but in complex ways. The relation between borrower risk and financial statement requests has an inverted U‐shape; and tax returns can be both substitutes and complements to financial statements, conditional on borrower characteristics and the degree of bank–borrower information asymmetry. Frequent financial reporting is used to monitor collateral, but only for non–real estate loans and only when the collateral is easily accessible to lenders. Collectively, our results provide novel evidence of a fundamental information demand for financial reporting in monitoring small commercial borrowers and a specific channel through which banks fulfill their role as delegated monitors.