Patent pools,vertical integration,and downstream competition

Patent pools are commonly used to license technologies to manufacturers. Whereas previous studies focused on manufacturers active in independent markets, we analyze pools licensing to competing manufacturers, allowing for multiple licensors and nonlinear tariffs. We find that the impact of pools on welfare depends on the industry structure: whereas they are procompetitive when no manufacturer is integrated with a licensor, the presence of vertically integrated manufacturers triggers a novel trade‐off between horizontal and vertical price coordination. Specifically, pools are anticompetitive if the share of integrated firms is large, procompetitive otherwise. We then formulate information‐free policies to screen anticompetitive pools.     

Market structure and the competitive effects of vertical integration

We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration when firms exert market power upstream and compete in quantities downstream. Contrasting with previous literature, a small degree of vertical integration is always procompetitive because efficiency gains dominate foreclosure effects, and vertical integration even to full foreclosure can be procompetitive. Interestingly, vertical integration is more likely to be procompetitive if the industry is otherwise more concentrated. Extensions analyze welfare effects of integration and the incentives to integrate. Our analysis suggests that antitrust authorities should be wary of vertical integration when the integrating firm faces many competitors and should be permissive otherwise.     

Controlling opportunism in vertical contracting when production precedes sales

In a make‐to‐stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts, when retailers do not observe each other's stocks before choosing their prices, an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market‐wide Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) can restore monopoly power. However other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts, such as buyback contracts, also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly power. We conclude that a more lenient policy toward RPM is unlikely to affect the producer's ability to control opportunism.     

Retailers' choice of product variety and exclusive dealing under asymmetric information

This article considers vertical relations between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer that can independently obtain a low‐quality, discount substitute. The analysis reveals that under full information, the retailer offers both varieties if and only if it is optimal to do so under vertical integration. However, when the retailer is privately informed about demand, it offers both varieties even if under vertical integration it is profitable to offer only the manufacturer's product. If the manufacturer can impose exclusive dealing, then under asymmetric information it will do so and foreclose the low‐quality substitute even if under vertical integration it is profitable to offer both varieties.     

产品内国际分工、区际一体化与生产性服务业集聚——基于我国1995~2011年省级面板数据的研究

基于我国30个省市1995~2011年的数据,从全国和区域两个层面就产品内国际分工、区际一体化对中国生产性服务业集聚的影响进行的实证分析显示：相较于区际一体化,产品内国际分工对我国生产性服务业集聚的促进作用较小,而且这一促进作用目前只在东部地区有所显现。这说明现阶段我国整体仍处于全球价值链低端的情况下,生产性服务业集聚发展更大程度上依赖于国内区域市场的整合;产品内国际分工与区际一体化对生产性服务业集聚的影响,在总体上呈现出相互促进和加强的关系。这意味着随着国内区际一体化进程的不断推进和地区间分工合作关系的进一步增强,产品内国际分工对我国各地区生产性服务业集聚发展的促进作用将得到更充分发挥。     

Exchange Rate Pass‐Through,Domestic Competition,and Inflation: Evidence from the 2005–08 Revaluation of the Renminbi

Import competition from China is pervasive in the sense that for many good categories, the competitive environment that U.S. firms face in these markets is strongly driven by the prices of Chinese imports, and so is their pricing decision. This paper quantifies the effect of the government‐controlled appreciation of the Chinese renminbi vis‐à‐vis the USD from 2005 to 2008 on the prices charged by U.S. domestic producers. In a panel spanning the period from 1994 to 2010 and including up to 519 manufacturing sectors, import price changes of Chinese goods pass into U.S. producer prices at an average rate of 0.7, while import price changes that can be traced back to exchange rate movements of other trade partners only have mild effects on U.S. prices. Further analysis points to the importance of trade integration, variable markups, and demand complementarities on the one side, and to the importance of imported intermediate goods on the other side as drivers of these patterns. Simulations incorporating these microeconomic findings reveal that a substantial revaluation of the renminbi would result in a pronounced increase in aggregate U.S. producer price inflation.     

Sharing Demand Information in a Value Chain: Implications for Pricing and Profitability

While it is known that information exchange (IE) in a value chain improves resource coordination, scant attention has been paid to two issues. The first issue is the effect of relative bargaining strengths of the parties on whether and how IE will be implemented. The second issue is whether a resource-based costing system is adequate to motivate the implementation of information exchange. In this paper, we model a value chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer gets (private) demand information that has the potential of improving the manufacturers resource decisions. In this model, it is always beneficial for the value chain to implement IE. We show that in a monopsony or in a bilateral monopoly when the retailer has sufficient bargaining power, IE can be implemented if and only if the wholesale price compensates him for the loss of the information rent that he would get without IE. Using this model as the benchmark, we also examine other settings where the retailers have less bargaining power due to competition or size. In such settings, even though the retailers are better informed, the manufacturer can implement the IE regime costlessly and appropriate the information rent partially or fully. In effect, the manufacturer benefits both by improved resource coordination and by reduced payment for information rent. In all these settings, we find the retailer will not be motivated to adopt IE solely by a resource-based costing and pricing system.     

Empirical Evidence of Risk Shifting in Financially Distressed Firms

This paper provides evidence of risk‐shifting behavior in the investment decisions of financially distressed firms. Using a real options framework, I show that shareholders' risk‐shifting incentives can reverse the expected negative relation between volatility and investment. I test two hypotheses that are consistent with risk‐shifting behavior: (i) volatility has a positive effect on distressed firms' investment; (ii) investments of distressed firms generate less value during times of high uncertainty. Empirical evidence using 40 years of data supports both hypotheses. I further evaluate the effect of various firm characteristics on risk shifting, and estimate the costs of the investment distortion.     

The Age of the Dragon: The Effect of Imports from China on Firm‐Level Prices

We analyze the impact of increased import penetration from China on the dynamics of firm‐level output prices in Italy. Accounting for potential endogeneity biases we find a significant and negative causal relationship: a 0.1 percentage point higher Chinese import penetration restrains price growth by 0.17 percentage points per year. This relationship reflects a procompetitive effect induced by cheaper imports, and, thanks to the firm‐level dimension of our data, we show that it is driven by low‐productivity firms within less skill‐intensive sectors. Finally, we show that Chinese import competition also had a dampening effect on Italian overall inflation.     

Managerial academic experience,external monitoring and financial reporting quality

This study examines the effect of managerial academic experience on firms’ financial reporting quality. Using data from China, we find that firms with top managers possessing academic experience exhibit lower levels of both accrual and real earnings management, along with a lower probability of future restatements. This effect is more pronounced for firms with inefficient external monitoring, suggesting that the higher financial reporting quality is mainly explained by the managers’ intrinsic motivation to report truthfully. The results hold when we use firm fixed‐effect regressions, instrumental variable two‐stage regressions, and a propensity score matching (PSM) approach to mitigate the omitted variable and endogeneity concerns. Our study suggests that academic experience can serve as a source of valuable expertise for corporate executives.     

Banks, markets, and efficiency

A competitive financial system can help reduce banks’ monopoly power and the associated inefficiencies. However, according to Diamond (J Polit Econ 105: 928–956, 1997) and Fecht (J Eur Econ Assoc 6(2), 2004) competition with the financial sector may also constrain the amount of liquidity insurance that banks can provide to households affected by unobservable idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. To study this trade-off, we model competition between banks and between banks and financial markets. Our analysis shows that competition between banks and financial markets can constrain the risk-sharing offered by deposit contracts. This effect is the same if competition between banks mainly affects the reallocation of deposits. However, if banking competition primarily affects new deposits, then such competition only limits inefficient monopoly rents without restraining risk-sharing. We would like to thank Diemo Dietrich, Phil Dybvig, Hans Peter Grüner, Martin Hellwig, Elu von Thadden, Uwe Vollmer, Wolf Wagner as well as seminar participants at the Bundesbank, at the University of Mannheim, at the University of Tilburg, at the 3rd Workshop on Monetary and Financial Economics in Halle, at the University of Lausanne, at the First ProBanker Symposium in Maastricht, at the Global Finance Conference 2005 in Dublin, at the European Economic Association Meeting 2005 in Amsterdam, at the International Finance Conference 2005 in Copenhagen, and at the German Economic Association Meeting 2005 in Bonn. We thank Mike Demott for editorial assistance. The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or the Federal Reserve System.     

Selling substitute goods to loss‐averse consumers: limited availability,bargains, and rip‐offs

This article derives the optimal pricing and product‐availability strategies for a retailer selling two substitute goods to loss‐averse consumers and shows that limited‐availability sales manipulate consumers into an ex ante unfavorable purchase. The seller maximizes profits by raising the consumers' reference point through a tempting discount on a good available only in limited supply (the bargain), and cashing in with a high price on the other (the rip‐off), which consumers buy if the bargain is not available to reduce their disappointment. The seller might prefer to offer a deal on the more valuable product, using it as a bait.     

Vertical integration,exclusive dealing,and expost cartelization

This article uncovers an unnoticed connection between exclusive contracts and vertical organization. A vertically integrated firm can use exclusive dealing to foreclose an equally efficient upstream competitor and to cartelize the downstream industry. Neither vertical integration nor exclusive dealing alone achieves these anticompetitive effects. The cartelization effect of these two practices may be limited when downstream firms are heterogeneous and supply contracts are not contingent on uncertain market conditions. The extent of cartelization also depends on the degree of downstream market concentration and on the degree to which downstream competition is localized.     

Price‐increasing competition

In a discrete choice model of product differentiation, the symmetric duopoly price may be lower than, equal to, or higher than the single‐product monopoly price. Whereas the market share effect encourages a duopolist to charge less than the monopoly price because a duopolist serves fewer consumers, the price sensitivity effect motivates a higher price when more consumer choice steepens the firm's demand curve. The joint distribution of consumer values for the two conceivable products determines the relative strength of these effects. The analysis provides precise conditions for price‐increasing competition and reveals that it is unexceptional from a theoretical perspective.     

Ownership,incentives, and the hold‐up problem

Vertical integration is often proposed as a way to resolve hold‐up problems. This ignores the empirical fact that division managers tend to maximize divisional (not firmwide) profit when investing. I develop a model with asymmetric information at the bargaining stage and investment returns taking the form of cash and “empire benefits.” Owners of a vertically integrated firm will then provide division managers with low‐powered incentives to induce them to bargain more cooperatively, resulting in higher investments and overall profit as compared with nonintegration. Vertical integration therefore mitigates hold‐up problems even without profit sharing.     

Moral hazard,adverse selection,and health expenditures: A semiparametric analysis

Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care consumption. We propose a two‐step semiparametric estimation strategy to identify and estimate a canonical model of asymmetric information in health care markets. With this method, we can estimate a structural model of demand for health care. We illustrate this method using a claims‐level data set with confidential information from a large self‐insured employer. We find significant evidence of moral hazard and adverse selection.     

Organizational change and accounting: the gunpowder monopoly in New Spain, 1757-87

The Viceroyalty of New Spain was the main source of income for the Spanish Crown and the largest producer of silver in the world throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Carlos III, a member of the Bourbon dynasty, initiated a great tax reform in the viceroyalty during the last third of the eighteenth century, and transferred public activities and leased monopolies were brought under direct state control. This paper focuses on the study of the specific change in the system of administering the gunpowder monopoly in 1766. Institutional sociology provides the theoretical framework for analysing the effects of institutionalized environments on the organizational structure and its expression through a process of bureaucratization as a mean of establishing organizational rationality. The role of accounting in the process of organizational change is analysed from a multidimensional perspective: on the one hand, as an aspect of the organizational structure which enables the improvement of the economic performance of the monopoly and to generate organizational visibility; and, on the other hand, as an element under the control of the creator of environmental rationality.     

Dynamic limit pricing

I study a multiperiod model of limit pricing under one‐sided incomplete information. I characterize pooling and separating equilibria and their existence and determine when these involve limit pricing. For some parameter constellations, the unique equilibrium surviving a D1 type refinement involves immediate separation on monopoly prices. For others, there are limit price equilibria surviving the refinement in which different types may initially pool and then (possibly) separate. Separation involves setting prices such that the inefficient incumbent's profits from mimicking are negative. As the horizon increases or as firms become more patient, limit pricing becomes increasingly difficult to sustain in equilibrium.     

Yardstick and incentive issues in UK electricity distribution price controls

Electricity distribution is a primary candidate for regulation since it is a natural monopoly whose costs it would be inefficient to duplicate in a competitive market. In the UK since privatisation of the electricity industry in 1990, this regulation has emphasised incentives for cost efficiency through the use of RPI‐X price capping applied to 14 regional distribution businesses. The paper examines the issues that have arisen in implementation, including the practice of bench‐marking the operating and capital expenditures of different companies. It analyses how the price set at the beginning of each review period depends on the determination of cost yardsticks, the weighted average cost of capital and the regulatory asset base of the companies. The analytical model is used to evaluate Ofgem's 1999 Distribution Price Control Review and compares it with other European distribution price regulations.     

基于误差修正模型的制造业与生产性服务业、货物贸易的关系研究——以江苏为例

根据江苏省1989-2009年的相关统计数据,对江苏省制造业与生产性服务业、货物贸易的长期和短期的关系进行协整检验并建立向量误差修正模型,结果显示它们之间存在长期的均衡关系和短期的修正效应。制造业的发展带动了生产性服务业的发展,货物贸易的发展促进了制造业和生产性服务业的发展,相对于货物贸易,生产性服务业的作用没有完全显现,加快生产性服务业发展,促进与制造业的有机融合具有非常重要的经济意义。