Bounds on revenue distributions in counterfactual auctions with reserve prices

Measuring auction revenues under counterfactual reserve prices or formats requires knowledge of distributions of bidders' values and private signals. This poses a challenge when bids are observed from first‐price, common‐value auctions. I bound counterfactual revenue distributions without imposing parametric restrictions on the model structure. Using data from U.S. municipal bond auctions, I find first‐price and second‐price auctions under optimal reserve prices lead to little improvement in revenues over existing first‐price formats. The number of bidders has a more significant impact on revenues in optimal auctions. I also find invoking an incorrect assumption of private values in counterfactual analyses results in small errors in predicting revenues from optimal second‐price auctions.     

Collusion in uniform-price auctions: experimental evidence and implication for treasury auctions

We provide experimental evidence that nonbinding preplay communicationbetween bidders in auctions of shares facilitates the adoptionof equilibrium strategies: collusive strategies in uniform-priceauctions, and the unique equilibrium in undominated strategiesin discriminatory auctions. When communication between biddersis introduced, clearing prices and auctioneer profits in uniform-priceauctions fall below those observed in discriminatory auctions.This evidence suggests that uniform-price auctions of Treasurysecurities may result in lower revenues than the currently employeddiscriminatory procedure.     

Complements and substitutes in sequential auctions: the case of water auctions

We use data on sequential water auctions to estimate demand when units are complements or substitutes. A sequential English auction model determines the estimating structural equations. When units are complements, one bidder wins all units by paying a high price for the first unit, thus deterring others from bidding on subsequent units. When units are substitutes, different bidders win the units with positive probability, paying prices similar in magnitude. We recover individual demand consistent with this stark pattern of outcomes and confirm it is not collusive but consistent with noncooperative behavior. Demand estimates are biased if one ignores these features.     

Overlapping tax revenue,soft budget,and rent seeking

This paper investigates how the soft-budget constraint with grants from the central government to local governments tends to internalize the vertical externality of local public investment by stimulating local expenditure when both the central and local governments impose taxes on the same economic activities financed by public investment. The model incorporates the local governments’ rent-seeking activities in a multi-government setting. The soft-budget constraint is welfare deteriorating because it stimulates rent-seeking activities, although a soft-budget game may attain the first-best level of public investment.     

Prepayments,late payments,and sales tax revenue volatility in Texas cities

Local governments with volatile revenues face a variety of managerial challenges. This study examines the impact of prepayments and late payments on sales tax revenue volatility (STRV). Prepayments and late payments have the potential of disrupting the predictability of sales tax revenue. Using a sample of 1,075 cities in Texas over a 15-year period (1998 to 2013), the study finds that late payments impact STRV while early payments do not.     

IPO auctions and private information

IPO auctions, which provide an impartial way of determining IPO pricing and share allocations, offer a natural setting for examining whether institutional investors possess private information, and for measuring how valuable their information is. Analyzing detailed bidding data from Taiwan’s discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions, we find that, relative to retail investors, institutional investors tend to bid higher in auctions when IPO shares are more valuable, and that underpricing is larger in auctions with relatively higher institutional bids. These results imply that institutional investors are better informed about IPO value, and that they obtain higher information rents when they bid higher relative to retail investors. We estimate the value of institutional investors’ private information to be worth about 8.68% of return, which is the extra rate of return they command on their informational advantages over retail investors.     

Unobserved heterogeneity and reserve prices in auctions

This article shows how reserve prices can be used to control for unobserved object heterogeneity to identify and estimate the distribution of bidder values in auctions. Reserve prices are assumed to be monotonic in the realization of unobserved heterogeneity, but not necessarily set optimally. The model is estimated using transaction prices from a used car auction platform to show that the platform enables sellers to capture a large fraction of the potential value from selling their vehicle. Individual sellers benefit mostly from access to a large set of buyers, but the magnitude depends on accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.     

Revenue and optimality in unequal-sized share auctions

This paper analyzes unequal-sized share auctions with symmetric private-value buyers. The property that each buyer can win at most one unit, but variable-sized, makes share auctions situated between single-unit auctions and multiunit auctions. We calculate revenue and optimality of efficient share auctions and discuss how the optimal reserve valuation varies according to risk attitude towards share size.     

Regulating bidder participation in auctions

Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first‐price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends nonmonotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism. As an empirical application, we estimate parameters from first‐price auctions with free entry for bridge‐building contracts in Oklahoma and Texas and predict that an entry rights auction increases efficiency and reduces procurement costs significantly.     

Automatic bankruptcy auctions and fire-sales

We test for fire-sale tendencies in automatic bankruptcy auctions. We find evidence consistent with fire-sale discounts when the auction leads to piecemeal liquidation, but not when the bankrupt firm is acquired as a going concern. Neither industry-wide distress nor the industry affiliation of the buyer affect prices in going-concern sales. Bids are often structured as leveraged buyouts, which relaxes liquidity constraints and reduces bidder underinvestment incentives in the presence of debt overhang. Prices in “prepack” auctions (sales agreements negotiated prior to bankruptcy filing) are on average lower than for in-auction going-concern sales, suggesting that prepacks may help preempt excessive liquidation when the auction is expected to be illiquid. Prepack targets have a greater industry-adjusted probability of refiling for bankruptcy, indicating that liquidation preemption is a risky strategy.     

Closing call auctions and liquidity

The present paper examines the impact of closing call auctions on liquidity. It exploits the natural experiment offered by the introduction of a closing call auction on the Australian Stock Exchange on 10 February 1997. The introduction of the closing call auction is associated with a reduction in trading volume at the close of continuous trading. However, bid‐ask spreads during continuous trading are largely unaffected by the introduction of the closing call auction. Therefore, closing call auctions consolidate liquidity at a single point in time without having any adverse effect on the cost of trading.     

Focused training boosts revenue cycle skills, accountability

In 2009, the MetroHealth System took its first steps toward creating a comprehensive revenue cycle university, with the goal of developing revenue cycle staff talent and achieving best-in-class revenue cycle operations. MetroHealth became a beta site for HFMA's online Credentialed Revenue Cycle Representative (CRCR) program, and asked its revenue cycle leaders to present classes on key revenue cycle issues. As of June 2011, 62 percent of 122 revenue cycle employees who had taken the CRCR course passed the exam. The CRCR designation is now a prerequisite for career advancement in certain revenue cycle areas at MetroHealth.     

The ASC 606 standard,revenue informativeness,and analysts forecast quality

We examine the adoption effect of ASC 606 on revenue informativeness, analyst forecast dispersion, and forecast errors. We find that the adoption of ASC 606 is associated with increases in revenue informativeness but decreases in analyst forecast accuracy and consensus. Such adoption effects are mainly temporary and focused in firms that are more affected by the new standard. Last, we find that firms using the full retrospective adoption method are associated with higher revenue informativeness and lower analyst forecast error than firms using the modified retrospective method.     

Clearing price distributions in call auctions

We propose a model for price formation in financial markets based on the clearing of a standard call auction with random orders, and verify its validity for prediction of the daily closing price distribution statistically. The model considers random buy and sell orders, placed employing demand- and supply-side valuation distributions; an equilibrium equation then leads to a distribution for clearing price and transacted volume. Bid and ask volumes are left as free parameters, permitting possibly heavy-tailed or very skewed order flow conditions. In highly liquid auctions, the clearing price distribution converges to an asymptotically normal central limit, with mean and variance in terms of supply/demand-valuation distributions and order flow imbalance. By means of simulations, we illustrate the influence of variations in order flow and valuation distributions on price/volume, noting a distinction between high- and low-volume auction price variance. To verify the validity of the model statistically, we predict a year's worth of daily closing price distributions for five constituents of the Eurostoxx 50 index; Kolmogorov–Smirnov statistics and QQ-plots demonstrate with ample statistical significance that the model predicts closing price distributions accurately, and compares favourably with alternative methods of prediction.     

Real-time revenue and firm disclosure

Review of Accounting Studies - We examine firm disclosure choice when information is received on a real-time, continuous basis. We use transaction-level credit and debit card sales for a sample of...     

Information feedback in first price auctions

I apply the notion of a self‐confirming equilibrium (SCE) to study how feedback in first price auctions influences bidders' perceptions about their strategic environment, and consequently their bidding behavior. In a private values setting, revealing the two highest bids at the end of each auction is sufficient for bidders to have correct beliefs (justifying the assumption of Nash equilibrium). In contrast, in every symmetric SCE of a symmetric, affiliated, private values model, bidding strategies and revenue are (weakly) higher if only the highest bid is revealed. I also consider interdependent valuations and discuss implications for the empirical auction literature.     

Regulatory learning in failed thrift auctions

We use a sample of failed thrift auctions to examine if regulators learn from early transactions and improve their performance in later transactions. Our findings suggest that experience at failure resolution does not by itself lead to improved regulatory performance. Evidence of regulatory learning is restricted to dealings with repeat acquirers; in cases where an acquiring firm makes abnormal gains, regulators are able to restructure the auction process and eliminate such gains in subsequent acquisitions made by the same acquirers.     

Estimation in English auctions with unobserved heterogeneity

We propose a framework for identification and estimation of a private values model with unobserved heterogeneity from bid data in English auctions, using variation in the number of bidders across auctions, and extend the framework to settings where the number of bidders is not cleanly observed in each auction. We illustrate our method on data from eBay Motors auctions. We find that unobserved heterogeneity is important, accounting for two thirds of price variation after controlling for observables, and that welfare measures would be dramatically misestimated if unobserved heterogeneity were ignored.     

Glamour,value and anchoring on the changing P/E

The fact that value shares outperform glamour shares in the long term has been known for over 50 years. Why then do glamour shares remain popular? The price-earnings (P/E) ratio was the first statistic documented to discriminate between the two. Using data for all US stocks since 1983, we find that glamour shares have a much greater tendency to change P/E decile than value shares. We use TreeAge decision tree software, which has not been applied to problems in finance before, to show that glamour investors cannot rationally expect any windfall as their company's P/E decile changes, whatever their horizon. We infer that glamour investors anchor on the initially high P/E value, underestimate the likelihood of change and are continually surprised. We also seek theoretical justification for why value shares tend to outperform glamour shares. No convincing arguments based on the efficient market hypothesis have been put forward to show that the outperformance of value shares might be due to their being fundamentally riskier. Here, we apply equations from option theory to show that value shares can indeed be expected to outperform glamour shares.     

The interactive effect of revenue diversification and economic base on US local government revenue stability

Over the past 50 years, revenue diversification has emerged as an important trend in US local and state government finance. As a result, the role of the property tax has declined relative to other revenues, such as income taxes, sales taxes and user charges. This article examines the impact of revenue diversification on the revenue stability of local governments and whether the impact varies according to the nature of a jurisdiction's economic base. The findings are highly relevant to autonomous national governments in the EU. In addition, revenue stability is a significant factor that rating agencies take into account when determining a government's capacity to pay off debt, so the article has particular relevance to countries with large debts.