Mandatory information disclosure and innovation: Evidence from the disclosure of operational information

We use a quasi-natural experiment wherein the Shanghai Stock Exchange requires listed companies in certain industries to disclose operational information and a staggered difference-in-differences model to examine the impact of mandatory information disclosure on corporate innovation. We find that companies subject to mandatory operational information disclosure show significantly increased innovation. This effect is pronounced for companies classified as non-state-owned enterprises, facing severe financing constraints and a high degree of shareholder tunneling behavior and in competitive and high-tech industries. Although mandatory operational information disclosure reduces their competitive advantage, companies appear to compensate by increasing innovation. Our study highlights the positive impact of mandatory operational information disclosure, indicating that it contributes to the high-quality development of both capital markets and companies.     

Corporate strategy and information disclosure

We examine voluntary disclosures of information about corporate strategies. We develop a model in which managers choose whether to reveal their strategic plans only to some partners of the firm or also to the outside world. We show that managers face a tradeoff when deciding whether to disclose their private information to outsiders. On the one hand, by disclosing their intentions, managers become reluctant to change their minds in the future. This may lead them to make inefficient project implementation decisions. On the other hand, information disclosure about corporate strategy provides strong incentives for partners of the firm to undertake strategy‐specific investments.     

企业内部控制及其信息披露

按照美国COSO委员会提出的报告,企业的内部控制是受董事会、管理当局和其他职员的影响,为取得经营效果和效率、财务报告的可靠性、遵循适当的法规等目标而提供合理保证的一种过程,应由控制环境、风险评估、控制活动、信息沟通、监督五个方面的内容构成.     

Voluntary disclosure when private information and disclosure costs are jointly determined

Review of Accounting Studies - Classical models of voluntary disclosure feature two economic forces: the existence of an adverse selection problem (e.g., a manager possesses some private...     

论强制性信息披露的适度理性

当经济陷入困境而市场又失灵时，经济学家会寻求政府的庇护；比政府管制过严，经济学家又会反过来寻求市场自由的回规。市场和政府从来就是相互依赖的经济调节手段，但政府对经济的干预存在合理理性。自愿性信息披露与强制性信息披露类似市场与政府对经济的作用，强制性信息披露作为政府对会计的一种干预应有一定的度。     

Signalling by direct disclosure under asymmetric information

In this paper, an informational asymmetry exists between investors and the issuer of an initial public offering about the value of the security. To avoid market failure, a solution is proposed in which the issuer makes a disclosure about firm value that is verified by an investment banker. The investment banker enters into a contingent contract with investors which imposes a penalty if the ex post observable cash flow indicates fraudulent disclosure. A bivariate signalling model is formulated and solved, and testable implications are derived from comparative statics analysis.     

Customer information disclosure and corporate financing constraints

We examine the impact of voluntary customer information disclosure by Chinese-listed companies on their financing constraints from the perspective of information transparency. The results show that voluntary disclosure can alleviate financing constraints, and the effect is pronounced when detailed customer information is disclosed. Analyst following and information opacity are used as a proxy for information transparency to test the mediating effect, and it is found that voluntary disclosure reduces financing constraints by increasing information transparency. In addition, the results indicate that when industry competition is fierce and the quality of internal control is low, disclosure of customer information has a more pronounced effect on the alleviation of financing constraints. Policymakers and corporate decision-makers should be aware that voluntary customer information has great significance for the improvement of information environment in China's capital market.     

Voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry in Denmark

This paper examines if the level of voluntary disclosure affects information asymmetry for industrial companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. Economic theory suggests that disclosing more information should lower the information asymmetry component of a firm's cost of capital [Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2000)]. The results indicate that voluntary disclosure is negatively associated with proxies for information asymmetry. The results are robust even after controlling for various firm characteristics introduced in related literature. Despite differences in institutional settings the findings in our paper are similar to the ones based on US data.     

Correction to: Voluntary disclosure when private information and disclosure costs are jointly determined

Review of Accounting Studies - A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-021-09623-7     

论企业核心能力信息的自愿披露

核心能力信息是区别于其他企业,反映企业持续竞争优势源泉的信息,是企业信息披露战略的重要内容。由于核心能力信息已经超越了传统财务信息的范畴,具有“非规范性”的总体特征,通过自愿性披露揭示企业核心能力信息成为允当选择。本文在分析核心能力信息自愿披露动因的基础上,从资产角度探讨了核心能力的确认方法,并对核心能力自愿披露的实现方式进行了研究,认为核心能力信息的自愿披露应该遵循循序渐进的原则,以非财务报告披露为起点,逐步过渡到管理层讨论与分析(MD&A)披露,最终实现核心能力报告的披露目标。     

金融衍生品法律监管的价值复归与制度重塑

金融衍生品法律监管的价值在于促进金融自由的同时,又不会危及金融安全。现有的法律监管制度贸然地将金融自由置于金融安全之前,造成制度价值错位,导致在监管内容上过度强调风险评估监管技术和过度迷信资本充足监管标准。金融衍生品作为金融自由和金融安全的产物,客观上要求其法律监管的价值取向回归到金融自由与金融安全的对立统一,重塑监管制度内容。     

几个特殊会计信息披露问题的探讨

会计信息披露是指影响股东、债权人或潜在投资者等对公司的目前和将来作出理性判断的,进而影响其决策行为的会计信息都应公布于众。一方面,会计信息披露已成为证券市场有效监管的重要组成部分。公开发行股票公司的信息披露能否做到可靠、全面、及时,直接关系到证券市场的公开、公平、公正原则是否能够得到体现和维护,会计信息披露在遵循成本效益原则和重要性原则下应做到充分披露。另一方面,随着企业经济活动的日益复杂化,现有的企业财务会计报告滞后于环境的变化,显示了它的缺陷和不足,财务报告只注重历史而不注重未来,只注重货币信息而忽视非货币信息,使财务报告的有用性受到了挑战。如果财务报告无法为信息使用者提供有用的信息,那么财务报告存在的合理性就必然受到质疑。下面,笔者对几个特殊情形下会计信息披露问题进行探讨。     

上市金融企业风险信息的披露

本文试图就上市金融企业风险信息披露的框架及内容和上市金融企业公布风险信息应注意的具体问题作一探讨.并以此求教于同行同仁.我们希望本文提出的风险信息披露的框架及内容有益于上市金融企业提高其风险管理透明度和监管部门实施监管.     

Isolating the effect of disclosure on information risk

This study examines companies with two classes of shares that entitle their holders to identical cash flow and voting rights but that are available to mutually exclusive sets of investors: A shares to domestic investors and B shares to foreign investors. Price differences between A and B shares are higher in firms with a greater disparity in the disclosures that they make to domestic and foreign investors. This association is more pronounced when the cost (benefit) of information transfer is higher (lower). The results suggest that disclosure disparity creates meaningful differences in investors' average information precision across A and B shares and thus influences the cross-sectional variation in price differences.     

境外市场客户交易信息披露经验的借鉴与思考

提高信息透明度是市场发展的努力方向之一。目前国内证券期货市场一般做到部分会员层级的数据披露;但是从最新情况来看,部分境外市场已经开始适度公开客户信息,如台湾期货市场2008年4月7日开始公布三大法人的交易及持仓数据。提高市场信息披露程度,适度公开主要交易群体的交易信息,有助于维护不同投资者之间的信息公平,能够利用市场力量来规范和抗衡市场操纵等违规企图,提高监管效率,降低监管成本,值得借鉴。     

Voluntary disclosure of reasons for auditor changes and the capital market reaction to information disclosure

This study examines the association between firm attributes and management’s voluntary disclosure of the reason(s) for auditor changes and evaluates the capital market reaction to information disclosure of the auditor change events accompanied by preexisting red flag and non-red flag issues. We find that managers are more likely to disclose the reason(s) for auditor changes when those changes occurred because of benign business reasons or if the reasons do not indicate the presence of any underlying operating or financial reporting problem. On the other hand, managers are less likely to disclose the reason(s) for auditor changes when those changes are preceded by red-flag situations. Furthermore, auditor changes accompanied by preexisting red-flag situations are viewed negatively by the capital market, implying that the full disclosure of reasons for auditor changes is informative to investors. This observation is supported further by our market-based analyses, which consistently show that auditor changes accompanied by prevailing red flag issues are valued incrementally in the market above and beyond the reportable events (under FRR No. 31) and auditor-initiated changes. The study contributes to the recent policy debate related to mandating the disclosure of the reason(s) for auditor switches. Specifically, the results support the recent debates that the current voluntary disclosure regime results in selective disclosure practices that are likely to contribute to the general lack of transparency with respect to auditor changes.     

CEO compensation, option incentives, and information disclosure

This paper examines the impact of information disclosure on the valuation of CEO options and the incentives created by those options. Prior executive compensation research in the US has made assumptions about key input variables that can affect the calculation of option values and financial incentives. Accordingly, biases may have ensued due to incomplete information disclosure about noncurrent option grants. Using new data on a sample of UK CEOs, we value executive option holdings and incentives for the first time and estimate the levels of distortion created by the less than complete US-style disclosure requirements. We also investigate the levels of distortion in the UK for the minority of companies that choose to reveal only partial information. Our results suggest that there have to date been few economic biases arising from less than complete information disclosure. Furthermore, we demonstrate that researchers using US data, who made reasonable assumptions about the inputs of noncurrent option grants, are unlikely to have made significant errors when calculating CEO financial incentives or option wealth. However, the recent downturn in the US stock market could result in the same assumptions, producing exaggerated incentive estimates in the future.     

Performance volatility,information availability,and disclosure reforms

Using the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley reform as an exogenous disclosure shock, we find that high, relative to low, volatility firms opt for lower levels of information availability pre reform and experience increases in information availability, CEO turnover-to-performance sensitivity, myopic behavior, CEO compensation with a structure tilted towards more cash pay, and a reduction in firm value post the reform. Our findings suggest that mandating high levels of information availability across the board increases managerial evaluation risk and produces additional agency costs for firms with volatile performance.     

会计信息可信度、信息披露管理与资源有效配置

会计信息披露理论认为,自愿性信息披露通过降低投资者和内部人间的信息不对称,优化资源分配和降低资本成本,然而这种效应又依赖于自愿性信息披露可观察到的可信度。由于管理者的自我服务意图,自愿性信息披露的可信度事前很难保障,投资者可能从管理者传递的其他信号推断该自愿性信息披露的可信度。也就是说,会计信息被信息提供者披露并被信息使用者接收,进而在资本市场产生反应,不仅要求会计信息本身具备某种质量特征,还取决于信息使用者对会计信息可信度的主观评价。因此只有以信息使用者可信的方式披露具备质量特征的会计信息,才有助于资本市场资源的有效配置。     

上市公司财务信息披露:政府功能与角色定位

本文针对上市公司财务信息披露问题,探讨政府在这一过程中的功能与角色定位。政府时上市公司财务信息披露具有监管功能,但这种功能是有限度,而且是有条件的。政府监管应当限于市场失灵并能够修补市场失灵的领域。当前在上市公司财务信息披露监管过程中,政府失灵与监管不足并存,这大大降低了政府的监管效率,使其不能达到预期的监管目标,甚至会加剧市场失灵。