Using Intuition in Fuzzy Front‐End Decision‐Making: A Conceptual Framework

The goal of decision‐making during the execution of the fuzzy front end (FFE) is to develop a creative new product concept. Although intuitive decision‐making has been found to increase new product creativity, the theoretical knowledge base as to why and under which conditions intuition use during the process of generating a creative outcome is beneficial, is rather limited. Therefore, this study develops a conceptual framework theorizing why and under which conditions using intuition in FFE execution decision‐making may or may not be (as) beneficial for new product concept creativity. To develop this framework, the authors combine a creativity perspective of the FFE and a dual‐processing perspective of intuition. Interviews with eight FFE practitioners are used to support and illustrate the framework development. The theorizing leads the authors to postulate that intuition use may be beneficial to making generation and evaluation decisions during FFE execution because of the capabilities of the unconscious mind from which intuition results. However, the framework acknowledges that, due to the shortcomings of the unconscious mind, intuition may not be as beneficial to FFE decision‐making in some situations. The authors believe that this framework offers researchers a fertile area for further research and practitioners better insight into when intuition might be effective in FFE execution decision‐making.     

Optimal pricing and advertising strategy for introducing a new business product with threat of competitive entry

The problem of optimal joint pricing and advertising decision making for a new product facing potential competitive entry has received inadequate attention. We propose a model that attempts to find the optimal price-advertising frontier in the face of potential competitive entry that maximizes total discounted profits for pre- and post-entry periods. We find that a firm would charge the price that equates price elasticity to marginal revenue product of advertising (as predicted by [Dorfman, R. and Steiner, P.O. (1954), Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality, American Economic Review, 44(5), 826-836.]) only when the potential effects of pricing and advertising on its market share are not considered. Under optimal conditions, aware that market share is subject to erosion, the firm charges a somewhat lower price than the profit maximizing price, and sets an advertisement expense that is somewhat higher than the profit-maximizing advertising level as predicted by Cournot's monopolistic setting. We illustrate the applicability of our model using business product examples taken from several industries including operating systems, software, pharmaceutical, and telephone switching. Directions for future research with implications for B2B managers (for example, the possible effects of preannouncement to forestall competitive entry) are discussed.     

Timing the Start of Material Substitution Projects: Creating Switching Options under Volatile Material Prices

Firms developing new products often face the challenge of making investment decisions under uncertain input–cost conditions due to the price volatilities of the materials they use. These decisions need to be made long before the final products are launched on the market. Therefore, firms that invest in the opportunity to switch materials in a timely manner will have the flexibility to react to material price changes and realize competitive advantages. However, volatile material prices may also cause a firm to delay investment. Using real‐options reasoning, this paper studies the influence of input‐cost fluctuations on the timing decision to start new product development (NPD) and thus create the follow‐on opportunity to later replace an existing product. A model that combines waiting and switching options to derive influencing factors of the flexibility value that triggers the investment is developed and tested on a sample of material substitution projects from manufacturing firms. The results show how price uncertainty of the new and the old material, their joint price development, the expected project duration, and competitive preemption are related to the propensity to delay the start of NPD. The findings provide new insights on how timing in adopting materials can be used to hedge exposure to volatile material prices. The insights are relevant for adopters and producers of new materials, as well as for policy makers who strive for supporting the diffusion of new materials.     

Information Distribution,Utilization, and Decisions by New Product Development Teams

Typically, organizations use new product development processes composed of activities followed by decision points, where projects are continued or abandoned. A decision maker likely possesses some common information also held by other decision makers and some unique information (that only she/he possesses). If a team relies mainly on overlapping, or common, information, decisions may suffer, but if they share and utilize information originally possessed by a subset of individual members, better decisions can be made. In this paper, the authors designed and conducted four studies to examine the effects of information distribution and utilization on new product team decision‐making. In study 1, the findings show that team members tend to use information possessed by everyone (i.e., common information) but neglect critical information possessed only by one of them (i.e., unique information). This common information bias results in suboptimal new product continuation decisions. In study 2, the interplay between the common information bias and team commitment to the NPD project favored by unique information is examined. The results show that although commitment influences new product development team decisions, the common information bias is stronger. Study 3 was conducted to rule out an alternative explanation for the effect of information distribution—the perception of information importance. In study 4, the focal hypotheses were re‐tested using a different sample to add confidence in the findings.     

New Product Team Decision Making: Regulatory Focus Effects on Number,Type, and Timing Decisions*

Company executives rely on new product development teams to carry out their directives and make decisions according to management's goals. However, team members bring their own motivational perspectives to strategic decisions. This research examines how individual and leadership motivations influence a dyadic team's new product decisions. Specifically, this article investigates how matching vs. mismatched motivations between team members affect new product number, type, and timing decisions. In addition, this study asks how effective leadership‐provided motivations are in guiding teams' new product decisions. A set of hypotheses is developed using regulatory focus theory, which identifies basic motivational differences in individuals (i.e., promotion vs. prevention focus) and their effects on decision making. The hypotheses examine the effects of regulatory focus match vs. mismatch within teams on the likelihood to introduce new products, the timing of new product introductions, and the types of new products introduced. To test the hypotheses, a controlled, yet realistic product management simulation is employed. A total of 124 undergraduate seniors (83 women and 41 men) at a large public university enrolled in a marketing management capstone course participated in this study for partial course credit. Utilizing two‐person teams engaged in a business simulation ensured an appropriate level of controlled complexity in the decision making task, while allowing the phenomena of interest to be isolated and tested. Results show that when dyads share the same motivational approach (regulatory focus match), leadership‐prescribed goal pursuit strategies are largely ineffective. Only dyads that do not share the same motivational approach to decision making (regulatory focus mismatch) make new product decisions consistent with leadership‐prescribed goal pursuit strategies. For regulatory focus match dyads, the results demonstrate that a promotion focus (when compared to a prevention focus) leads to greater numbers of new products introduced, faster new product introductions, and more novel new product introductions. For new product managers, these results carry important implications. Which new product opportunities to invest in and which to forgo is presumably determined by the strategic direction given to teams by top management. Results suggest that when team members share the same motivational approach, this not only influences new product decisions, but also diminishes or eliminates the influence top management can exert on new product decisions. Such “isolation” from leadership influences does not have to be detrimental. For example, companies that seek to insulate new product development teams from influences from the top, such as is the case in many new venture incubations, would be well served to staff those teams ensuring a promotion focus match.     

Clinging to Slim Chances: The Dynamics of Anticipating Regret When Developing New Products

This paper focuses on the effects of anticipated regret during large‐scale investment projects—namely new product development. Anticipated regret means worrying about the future, and decision‐makers experience it prior to both making a decision and knowing the outcome of that decision. It is forward‐looking while actual regret is backward‐looking. Decision‐makers must make project continuation/termination decisions with conflicting pressures. If they continue it, they might receive disconfirming information in the future and therefore regret their decision. If they stop it, they also might regret that decision later, too, if they subsequently conclude it was an error to do so. We term these conflicting pressures anticipated “keep” and “drop” regret, respectively. In the main study, nearly 300 individuals completed a decision‐making exercise in which a failing new product development project was evaluated, and various factors were measured, including both types of anticipated regret at multiple points in the project. The results show that decision‐makers anticipate regret when making project continuation decisions, and anticipated keep and drop regret exert pressures that differ in direction and magnitude. Most interestingly, anticipated drop regret does not diminish as the failing project progresses whereas anticipated keep regret increases as more negative information is received over the course of the project. A second, smaller study was conducted using a different population, and the results of the main study were replicated in this supplemental study, thereby adding confidence in these findings.     

New Products Over the Business Cycle

Studies of new product innovations and new product strategy have traditionally abstracted from the impact of general economic conditions on marketing decision making. Despite the obvious importance of the role that the business cycle plays in determining product profitability, it is relegated to ancillary discussion. Timothy Devinney feels that part of this neglect is due to a lack of academic study of the influence of macroeconomic influences in the determination of marketing strategy. This article attempts to fill a portion of this gap by examining the role that the business cycle plays in new product introductions. The results show that new product introductions, in the aggregate, vary systematically over the business cycle, where the cycle is defined as having income, price, and investment components.     

A Multi-Attribute Product Life-Cycle Approach to Replacement Decisions: An Application of Saaty's System-With-Feedback Method

The lack of investment in new manufacturing technology compromises the long-range competitiveness of a manufacturing company. The choice of appropriate manufacturing equipment is an extremely important management decision. This paper presents a multi-attribute approach to equipment replacement decisions based on the product life-cycle. The problem is formulated using the System-With-Feedback (SWF) model developed by Saaty [10]. Saaty's model is particularly suitable tor the modeling of time-dynamic and tnieraciive elements of such replacement situations.     

Criteria for screening new industrial products

Screening new industrial product ideas—the initial GO/NO GO decision in the new product process—is a critical decision. This article reports the results of an extensive investigation into what criteria managers use in their screening decisions, and how these criteria are weighted and combined.     

Passion for Work,Nonwork‐Related Excitement,and Innovation Managers’ Decision to Exploit New Product Opportunities

This article investigates the role of affect in innovation managers’ decision to exploit new product opportunities—a decision central to the innovation process. The model proposes that different types of passion can trigger managers’ exploitation decisions but that this effect is contingent on experiencing excitement from events outside their work environment. A field experiment with 90 owner–managers of young firms located in an innovation context (business incubators) shows that passion for work and nonwork‐related excitement levels interdependently impact innovation managers’ decision to exploit new product opportunities. Specifically, harmonious passion has a general positive effect on managers’ propensity to exploit. In contrast, the effect of obsessive passion is more complex and contingent on the additional excitement managers experience such that the positive relationship between obsessive passion and the decision to exploit is more positive with higher levels of excitement. These findings extend the product innovation management literature by acknowledging that decision‐makers’ affective experiences influence innovation decisions and provide a first step toward understanding the role of affect and passion in the product innovation context. Second, the finding that obsessive passion and nonwork‐related excitement interact in explaining opportunity exploitation decisions highlights the need to incorporate contingency relationships in models of innovation decision‐making. Third, in drawing on a field experiment and the experimental manipulation of managerial affect during the decision‐making task, this article answers a recent call in the project management literature to pursue less common methodological approaches and develop “broader theoretical schema” in order to enhance our understanding of innovation management. Finally, this study also has implications for practitioners because it can help innovation managers understand their own decision policies. To the extent that innovation managers are able to regulate their affective experiences, this improved understanding might prevent them from premature and faulty decision‐making.     

Exploring Portfolio Decision‐Making Processes*

Portfolio management is the set of activities that allows a firm to select, develop, and commercialize a pipeline of new products aligned with the firm's strategy that will enable it to continue to grow profitably over the long term. To appropriately manage the firm's new product portfolio, decisions must be made about which projects to fund, to what levels, at what point in time. Previous research has investigated portfolio management decisions as individually discrete decisions. Significant streams of research have investigated both project selection and project termination decisions. This research project shows, however, that portfolio decision making may be better understood if it is considered as an integrated system of processes that considers these decisions simultaneously, along with other decisions such as those to continue a project with reduced funding. Using in‐depth data from four diverse case studies, we use a grounded theory approach to develop a general model of how firms make new product portfolio decisions. According to the findings from these cases, effective portfolio decision‐making processes produce a portfolio mindset, focus effort on the right projects, and allow agile decision making across the portfolio's set of projects. Effective portfolio decision making is the result of the interaction between three types of decision‐making processes that managers use in making decisions: evidence‐, power‐, and opinion‐based. Being able to use each of these types of processes to make decisions depends upon having the data inputs that they require. Three domain‐based decision input‐generating processes (i.e., cross‐functional collaboration, practices of critical thinking, and practices of market immersion) are associated with making evidence‐based portfolio decisions. In addition, organizational politics produces the inputs that are associated with power‐based portfolio decision making, while managerial intuition is associated with opinion‐based portfolio decision making. Firm cultural factors, including trust, collective ambition, and leadership style, are associated with how these evidence‐, power‐ and opinion‐based processes are combined into an overall portfolio decision making process, and whether the firm's processes are more rational and objectively made, or more politically and intuitively made. The article presents propositions for how the decision‐making processes interact in their associations with decision‐making effectiveness.     

Launching new product features: a multiple case examination

The present study investigates the strategies that eight companies employed in launching new product features in a variety of markets. A literature review shows that launching new product features is an under‐researched area. This lack of attention may be detrimental to companies, as in many mature markets—such as those for durable consumer goods like television sets, coffee machines or videocassette recorders—the launch of new product features is perhaps the single most important product development activity that companies employ. We sought to address three research questions, namely what are the current strategies used by managers for launching new product features, how do these strategies differ, and what are the opportunities and pitfalls of these strategies? A multiple case study involving 38 managers from different functional backgrounds was used, thereby investigating the feature introductions of eight companies in‐depth. The study first identifies six feature launch decisions: the feature's position in the feature life cycle, the core technology concerned, the focus on feature or product, the differentiation practices used by the firm, feature diffusion in the product line, and the make‐or‐buy decision. Based on these decisions, four distinct feature launch strategies were distinguished: dictatorship, pioneering, establishing, and following. Dictatorship companies launch feature innovations that are based on fundamentally new technologies. Pioneers are not as powerful as dictators and focus on features that are based on applied and proven rather than on fundamentally new technologies. Establishes copy and improve successful features and launch them quickly and broadly as a standard in mass markets. Followers launch standard features that already existed in the mass market. These four strategies describe how the firms in our sample launched new features in the marketplace. As such, they describe when and where in the product line what feature was introduced. Such a typology of feature launch strategies helps to proactively understand the strategies firms have for launching new product features. The article discusses for each strategy the relevant feature launch decisions, possible applications, and opportunities and pitfalls. We conclude with the implications of our study for research and managerial practice.     

The Fuzzy Front End of New Product Development for Discontinuous Innovations: A Theoretical Model

The fuzzy front end of the new product development (NPD) process, the time and activity prior to an organization's first screen of a new product idea, is the root of success for firms involved with discontinuous new product innovation. Yet understanding the fuzzy front‐end process has been a challenge for academics and organizations alike. While approaches to handling the fuzzy front end have been suggested in the literature, these tend to be relevant largely for incremental new product situations where organizations are aware of and are involved in the NPD process from the project's beginning. For incremental new products, structured problems or opportunities typically are laid out at the organizational level and are directed to individuals for information gathering. In the case of discontinuous innovations, however, we propose that the process works in the opposite direction—that is, that the timing and likelihood of organizational‐level involvement is more likely to be at the discretion of individuals. Such individuals perform a boundary‐spanning function by identifying and by understanding emerging patterns in the environment, with little or no direction from the organization. Often, these same individuals also act as gatekeepers by deciding on the value to the organization of externally derived information, as well as whether such information will be shared. Consequently for discontinuous innovations, information search and related problems/opportunities are unstructured and are at the individual level during the fuzzy front end. As such, the direction of initial decisions about new environmental information tends to be inward, toward the corporate decision‐making level, rather than the other way around. In order to cope with the special and complex nature of decisions made at the fuzzy front end of NPD for discontinuous innovations, this process is detailed as a series of decisions occurring over three proposed interfaces: boundary, gatekeeping, and project. The difference between each interface lies in the nature of the decisions made: At the boundary and gatekeeping interfaces, the primary impetus is individual‐level decision‐making; at the project interface, decisions occur at the organizational level. By articulating these processes in the form of a model, we achieve two objectives: (1) We outline a more detailed and comprehensive approach to understanding the nature of the front‐end decision making process for discontinuous innovations; and (2) we detail specific propositions for future research on each stage of the process.     

Strategies of Innovation and Imitation of Product Languages*

Nowadays, design is recognized as a strategic resource. Customers are increasingly paying attention to the aesthetic, symbolic, and emotional value of products, a value that is conveyed by the design language—that is, the combination of signs (e.g., form, colors, materials) that gives meaning to a product. As a consequence firms are devoting increasing efforts to define a proper strategy for the design language of their products. An empirical analysis was conducted on the product language strategies in the Italian furniture industry; in particular, the present article explores the relationship between innovation and variety of product languages. Companies are usually faced by two major strategic decisions. The first one concerns the innovation of product languages: To what extent should a firm proactively propose new design languages or, rather, should adopt a reactive strategy by rapidly adopting new languages as they emerge in the market? The second decision concerns the variety and heterogeneity of languages in their product range. Should a firm propose a single product language to communicate a precise identity, or should it explore different product languages? Of course, the two strategic decisions—innovativeness and variety of product languages—are closed connected. Analyzing more than 2.000 products launched by 210 firms, the present article explores how the variety of product languages is approached in the strategy of innovators and imitators. The empirical results illustrate an inverse relationship between innovativeness and heterogeneity of product signs and languages. Contrary to what is expected, innovators have lower heterogeneity of product languages. They tend to be strongly proactive and limit experimentations of new languages in the market. Imitators, instead—which would be expected to have low variety since they can invest only in languages that have been proven successful in the market—tend on the contrary to have higher product variety. Eventually, by having lower investments in research on trends of sociocultural models, they miss the capability to interpret the complex evolution of products signs and languages in the market. Strategic decisions on innovativeness and variety of product languages are therefore interrelated; counterintuitively companies should carefully analyze these decisions jointly.     

Sequential price and quantity decisions under supply and demand risks

Firms need to deal with not only risks from stochastic demand but also risks from supply side. The supply side risk may be due to parts/service outsourcing, third party logistics, or random yield in production processes. In this paper, we study how firms sequentially make price and quantity decisions under these two risks. The first question we try to answer is how these two risks affect the decisions and profits of the firm. We find that increased supply risk usually causes increased quantity/stocking decision, however, there exists a threshold level of supply risk above which the firm reduces quantity/stocking amount as supply risk increases. This observation may be used in a supply chain setting, where reduction of the supply risk can cause higher delivered quantity and improve supply chain performance. This observation also provides support and insights on prioritizing the risk reduction efforts from marketing and operations to achieve better coordination. At the same time, reduction of the risks help not only firms but also consumers as the optimal price decreases. To further improve decision making process under both uncertainties, we study the impact from information revelation and postponement of decisions. We compare results from different sequential decision making cases. As illustrated in the paper, firms gain competing advantage when decision postponement is available and this advantage becomes further significant as the risks increase. Our numerical examples also indicate that price postponement strategy is usually preferred but the relative profit difference between price postponement and quantity postponement become smaller as consumers become more sensitive to the price.     

THE EFFECT OF REPUTATION ON THE DECISION TO JOINT VENTURE

This paper focuses on the impact that reputation has on the decision to proceed with a strategic alliance. Employing reputation constructs adapted from the Fortune Corporate Reputation Survey, we manipulated a target firm’s reputation in an experimental design. The subjects were placed in the role of CEO of the partner firm and asked whether they would engage in the alliance. Findings indicate that (1) reputation is a multidimensional construct, (2) the personal information-processing characteristics of the decision-maker mediate the reputation effect and may suppress the reputation information, (3) subjects may compensate weaker elements of reputation for stronger ones when making decisions, (4) product and management reputation are the most important factors, and (5) reputation is a factor affecting the decision regardless of whether the proposed target is a supplier or a competitor. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evaluating Product Plans Using Real Options

Product planning helps a company to strategically plan its current and future product platforms and offer product variants in the marketplace. Product platforming is widely touted as a successful strategy for mass customization. However, due diligence should be exercised before implementing any product platform strategy. The product planning exercise should account for future uncertainties. Traditional financial tools such as the net present value (NPV) are static since they do not compensate for any exogenous and endogenous uncertainties during the course of the project. The crux of the problem lies in the evaluation model that is used for evaluating the product planning projects. While many view uncertainties in a product planning project as problematic, it can also be viewed as a source of new opportunities. We argue that uncertainties should be an integral part of the evaluation model. If the future possibilities (or strategic options) are not considered in the evaluation model, a corporation may face a “myopic syndrome”.

In this article, we consider two important product planning decisions—platform decisions and product variant decisions. The platform decision involves strategic selection of a concept product platform from various possible alternative concept product platforms. The product variant decision involves deciding how long a company should continue to offer its current product variant in the marketplace and whether the existing product variant should be discontinued, scaled down, or scaled up with additional product features. To address the two aforementioned decisions, we developed a real options–based methodology that considers technical, project implementation, and market-related uncertainties. The proposed methodology uses a binomial and quadranomial lattice approach to build a decision tree. Product planning decisions at various decision tree nodes are evaluated using a risk-neutral option valuation methodology. We demonstrate the working of the proposed methodology using an illustrative example.     

Managerial determinants of decision speed in new ventures

This study helps to explain why some new ventures make strategic decisions more quickly than others. Drawing on life course theory and human capital theory, I develop a model of how entrepreneurs' individual characteristics affect new venture decision speed. I test the model using survey data from 98 Internet startups and their founder/managers. Results show that firms made faster decisions when they were managed by older entrepreneurs and by those with prior entrepreneurial experience. In addition, exploratory analyses indicating that fast decision‐making firms were more likely to close may indicate that prevailing theory in this area is contextually limited. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Balancing Development Costs and Sales to Optimize the Development Time of Product Line Additions*

Development teams often use mental models to simplify development time decision making because a comprehensive empirical assessment of the trade‐offs across the metrics of development time, development costs, proficiency in market‐entry timing, and new product sales is simply not feasible. Surprisingly, these mental models have not been studied in prior research on the trade‐offs among the aforementioned metrics. These mental models are important to consider, however, because they define reality, specify what team members attend to, and guide their decision making. As such, these models influence how development teams make trade‐offs across the four metrics to try to optimize new product profitability. Teams with such an objective should manage to a development time that minimizes development costs and to a proficient market‐entry timing that maximizes new product sales. Yet many teams use mental models for development time decision making that focus either just on development costs or on proficiency in market‐entry timing. This survey‐based study uses data from 115 completed NPD projects, all product line additions from manufacturers in The Netherlands, to demonstrate that there is a cost to simplifying decision making. Making development time decisions without taking into account the contingency between development time and proficiency in market‐entry timing can be misleading, and using either a sales‐maximization or a cost‐minimization simplified decision‐making model may result in a cost penalty or a sales loss. The results from this study show that the development time that maximizes new product profitability is longer than the time that maximizes new product sales and is shorter than the development time that minimizes development costs. Furthermore, the results reveal that the cost penalty of sales maximization is smaller than the sales loss of development costs minimization. An important implication of the results is that, to determine the optimal development time, teams need to distinguish between cost and sales effects of development time reductions. To determine the relative impact of these effects this study also estimates the elasticities of development costs, new product sales, and new product profitability with regard to development time. Armed with this knowledge, development teams should be better equipped to make trade‐offs among the four metrics of development time, development costs, proficiency in market‐entry timing, and new product sales.     

The Role of Value‐Informed Pricing in Market‐Oriented Product Innovation Management*

Although the positive effect of a market orientation on new product success is widely accepted and the market orientation literature has increased its understanding of how a market orientation leads to performance, the extant literature has overlooked the role of value‐informed pricing in the relationship. Value‐informed pricing is a pricing practice in which the decision makers base the price of the new product on the customers' perceptions of the benefits that the product offers and how these benefits are traded by customers against the price (that has yet to be determined). Considering that pricing mistakes may hit hard on the profitability of product innovations, it is important to firms to have a good understanding of its role. This study develops a framework in which value‐informed pricing is integrated in the relationship between market orientation and new product performance. A distinction is made between customer and competitor orientations, and relative product advantage is also included in the conceptual model. The model is tested on data obtained from managers based on a cross sectional sample of 144 firms. The respondents were involved in a decision‐making process of the pricing of a new product. The model is tested using structural equations modeling. The results show that value‐informed pricing has a strong effect on new product performance. It also reveals that each component of a market orientation fulfills a specific role in a market‐oriented organization. Value‐informed pricing is found to have important mediating effects in the market orientation–new product performance relationship. Results show that firms with a strong customer orientation engage in value‐informed pricing and develop superior benefits to customers in an advantageous product. In turn, both value‐informed pricing and relative product advantage positively affect new product market performance. However, no significant effect of competitor orientation on value‐informed pricing is found. Combined with the finding that competitor orientation negatively affects relative product advantage, this suggests that competitor orientation may hurt new product performance when this orientation is not balanced with a strong customer orientation. The results also portray that value‐informed pricing leads to higher product advantage. Interestingly, this relation is contingent on the degree of interfunctional coordination within the firm. This suggests that the relationship between market orientation and new product performance is strongest if firms integrate value‐informed pricing in the new product development process. In this sense, a market‐oriented firm mirrors the customer value perception that makes a trade‐off between benefits and price.