Alliances and other things

Every time we talk about alliances it is important to clarify what are we talking about. Obviously an acquisition is not an alliance. A McDonalds franchise is not an alliance. A contract to supply tyres for the new VW Beetle is not an alliance. We consider alliances to be other types of agreements between companies, affecting parts of their operations on a permanent or temporary basis, different from the conventional customer/supplier relationships, generally involving sharing resources in some way, while not preventing competition. We will refer in this presentation to alliances as situations where the partners do not individually have the necessary resources to accomplish whatever is their objective and then, they decide to combine their efforts sharing some of their resources. For example, if six airlines, including United and Lufthansa form the so-called Star Alliance, or if Coca-Cola and Nestle decide to get together to produce, sell and distribute Nestea, these are alliances. However, if General Mills decides to distribute its breakfast cereal in China through Nestle or Jaguar and Louis Vuitton decide to sponsor together a golf tournament, these are a conventional distribution agreement, and a conventional joint promotion. If Philips and Sony agreed in some way on the standards for the minidisk, or the high definition TV, things that I do not imply, I am not sure we could call this an alliance, I would call it just a non-competing agreement. Perhaps with a lot of sense, but, at the end, a non-competing agreement.     

Developing the e-scape software system

Most innovations have contextual pre-cursors that prompt new ways of thinking and in their turn help to give form to the new reality. This was the case with the e-scape software development process. The origins of the system existed in software components and ideas that we had developed through previous projects, but the ultimate direction we took with e-scape evolved through a sometimes scary but always fascinating collaboration with TERU at Goldsmiths University of London. The literature refers to ‘agile development’ (Highsmith 2002) and it is certainly a good name for the process we undertook with TERU. It is tempting to believe that one can specify a system, agree it with the clients, and then build it. But not so, … or at least not so in this case. We of course did draw up detailed specifications, but as soon as we started to build it, we or the TERU team would see how much better it could be if only we could just …. In the end, understanding of what is required evolves as the understanding of what is possible develops. So specifications morphed from do-able to maybe; from the firm ground of known technologies to the more shaky territory of the half-known and the “I’ve read about that somewhere”. But the underlying reality was always time and money. The system had to work robustly with enough time ahead of the national pilots for the TERU team to do all the necessary trials and training in schools. And it had to be done within fixed costs agreed at the outset. In this paper I outline the principal challenges that we met along the way and summarise our approach to resolving them.     

An inquiry into progression in primary technology: A role for teaching

Technological activity, taken in a broad craft sense, is not new to primary schools. What is new is its organisation as a serious curriculum subject in which pupils are expected to make valuable progress. Arguing about technology-as-education must include some understanding of what it can offer of wide value to successful students. Unfortunately those who have carried out empirical research in the field of primary technology have been unable to specify what such valuable progression might look like. There are just two rather limited sources of information relevant to development and progress in technology — cognitive psychology and teacher action research. Neither of these is easy to use as they stand because they are either unconnected with the act of teaching, or on a very small and personal scale. However this paper argues that, taken together, they are beginning to show that teaching has valuable and specific tasks to carry out, which can help pupils make recognisable progress in primary technology.     

Some recent methodologies in futures studies: A personal view

Everyone wishes to know what the future holds; to understand the problems ahead so that they may be able to effectively manage possible future adverse events. This need to know and to understand the future is no less real now than it has ever been, and this is particularly true of groups, organizations and institutions, which, in a world of considerable flux, feel particularly vulnerable if they are not aware of the vital forces at work affecting their own fortunes. Consequently, a number of attempts have been made in the recent past to develop ways to become better informed about particular futures for specific needs. These improvements in ways of looking at the future will inevitably continue to develop. Organizational plans will become increasingly dependent upon such studies, and management, particularly R&D management, will need to be able to judge the value of such studies carried out on its behalf just as informed management attempts to assess, for example, the value of economic, market, manpower or raw materials forecasts. The intended purpose of this paper is to reduce some of the ‘futures studies’ mystique and to provide management with a feel for what can be done now as a result of forward thinking. That is, the intention is: —to introduce the concept of a futures study (why forecast?); —to suggest what it should encompass (what to ask for); —to describe some of the more useful methods together with suggested advantages and disadvantages (what are the tools?); —to recommend the type of analysis of a futures study which generates maximum effectiveness in the planning process. It is worth repeating that the emphasis in this paper is placed upon the use to which a good futures study can be put, if effectively commissioned, analysed and implemented.     

Affiliation, integration, and information: ownership incentives and industry structure

This paper presents theory and evidence on horizontal industry structure. At issue is the question: what makes industries necessarily fragmented? The theoretical model examines trade‐offs associated with affiliation and integration, and how they are affected by the contracting environment. I show how contractual incompleteness can lead industries to be necessarily fragmented. I also show that contractual improvements will tend to lead to a greater concentration of brands, but whether they lead industries to be more or less concentrated depends on what becomes contractible. I then discuss the propositions generated by the model through a series of case study examples.     

The Hegemonic Behaviorist Cycle

Values relating to technology and technology education, I will argue, can either be co-constructed or imposed. A teacher employing behaviourist methodologies in the classroom, for example, will inculcate within students, a prescribed set of values relating to technology. They can do this in many ways. In an industrial arts model of technology education, teachers will lead students towards an understanding of technology as a process of fabricating prescribed artifacts with a view to increasing their industry standard psychomotor skills. This, they will argue, will help students gain useful employment in that field of industry. At the other end of the continuum, but still set within the behaviourist paradigm, the teacher might insist that the genetic modification of food is necessary in order to create more efficient production systems in agriculture, or that the only truly sustainable way of maintaining an electricity supply to meet current demands is by nuclear power. In these models, the teacher as expert provides the correct solutions to the prescribed questions. I will argue that this model forms the basis of what I will call a “hegemonic behaviourist cycle”. By this I mean that inculcation into a behaviourist system will serve to shape the learners’ actions when setting into practice what has been learned. I will begin by considering the way values can be formed in a behaviourist setting. I will then explore how technology education set within a behaviouristic system serves to produce unthinking students. I will then go on to explore a learning paradigm in which the formation of values relating to technology is seen as a social process. I will present an argument, in line with current educational thought, that a need now exists to abandon current behaviourist pedagogies and move towards a more broad based learning environment. This, I will argue, is necessary for the development of more informed attitudes about the impact that new and emerging technologies can have on individuals, societies and the world. Values relating to technology will be seen, in this model, to be co-constructed rather than imposed.     

Mass or Only “Niche Customization”? Why We Should Interpret Configuration Toolkits as Learning Instruments

In order to configure individual products according to their own preferences, customers are required to know what they want. While most research simply assumes that consumers have sufficient preference insight to do so, a number of psychologically oriented scholars have recently voiced serious concerns about this assumption. They argue that decades of consumer behavior research have shown that most consumers in most product categories lack this knowledge. Not knowing what one wants means being unable to specify what one wants—and therefore, they conclude, the majority of customers are unable to use configuration toolkits in a meaningful way. In essence, this would mean that mass customization should rather be termed “niche customization” as it will be doomed to remain a concept for a very small minority of customers only. This pessimism stands in sharp contrast to the optimism of those who herald the new possibilities enabled by advances in communication and production technologies as the dawn of a new era in new product development and business in general. Which position is right? In order to answer this question, this research investigates the role of the configuration toolkit. Implicitly, the skeptic position assumes that the individual customers' knowledge (or absence of knowledge) of what they want is an exogenous and constant term that does not change during the interaction with the toolkit. However, learning theories suggest that the customers' trial‐and‐error interaction with the configuration toolkit and the feedback information they receive should increase their preference insight. If this was true and the effect size strong, it would mean that low a priori preference insight does not impede customers to derive value from mass customization. Three experiments show that configuration toolkits should be interpreted as learning instruments that allow consumers to understand their preferences more clearly. Even short trial‐and‐error self‐design processes with conventional toolkits bring about substantial and time‐stable enhancements of preference insight. The value of this knowledge is remarkable. In the product category of self‐designed watches, the 10‐minute design process resulted in additional preference insight worth 43.13 euros on average or +66%, measured by incentive‐compatible auctions. A moderator analysis in a representative sample shows that the learning effect is particularly strong among customers who initially exhibit low levels of preference insight. These findings entail three contributions. First, it becomes evident that the interaction with mass customization toolkits not only triggers affective reactions among customers but also has cognitive effects—a response category not investigated before. Second, it suggests that the pessimism regarding the mass appeal of these toolkits is not justified—mass customization has the potential to truly deserve its name. The prerequisite for this, and this normative conclusion is the final contribution, is that the toolkit should not be interpreted as a mere interface for conveying preexisting preferences to the producer. Rather, it should be treated as a learning instrument. Several suggestions are made for how firms employing this innovative business model could design their toolkits towards this end.     

How Cloudy a Crystal Ball: A Psychometric Assessment of Concept Testing*

Although traditional and conjoint forms of concept testing play an important role in the new product development process, they largely ignore data quality issues, as evidenced by the traditional reliance on the percent Top‐2‐Box scores heuristic. The purpose of this research is to reconsider the design of concept testing from a measurement theory (generalizability theory) perspective and to use it to suggest some ways to improve the psychometric quality of concept testing. Generalizability theory is employed because it can account for the multiple facets of variation in concept testing, and it enables a concept test to be designed to provide a required level of accuracy for decision making in the most effective way, whether the purpose of measurement is to scale concepts or something else, such as to scale respondents. The paper identifies four types of sources—concept‐related factors, response task factors, situational factors, and respondent factors—that can contribute to the observed variation in concept testing and develops six research propositions that summarize what is known or assumed about their contribution to observed score variance. Four secondary data sets from different concept testing contexts are then used to test the propositions. The results provide new insights into the design of concept tests and the psychometric quality of the concept testing data: (1) the concepts facet is not a major contributor to response variation; (2) of the response task factors, concept formulations are a trivial source of variance, but items are not always a trivial source of variance; (3) the situational factors that are investigated are trivial sources of variance; (4) respondents are always a major contributor to the total variation; (5) concepts by respondents are not always a major contributor and the other interactions are often not trivial; and (6) residual error is always a major source of variance. Additionally, the analyses of the secondary data sets enable some useful managerial conclusions to be drawn about the design of concept testing. First, the sample size needed to reliably scale concepts depends on the types of concepts being tested. Second, averaging over items provides considerably more reliable information than relying on a single item. Third, which specific item performs best is inconsistent and very context specific. The popular purchase intention item is never the best single item to use. Fourth, not much is gained by sampling levels of the response task factors. Finally, concept testing should be designed to meet the needs of specific managerial tasks.     

Toward more accurate contextualization of the CEO effect on firm performance

We introduce multiple refinements to the standard method for assessing CEO effects on performance, variance partitioning methodology, more accurately contextualizing CEOs' contributions. Based on a large 20‐year sample, our new ‘CEO in Context’ technique points to a much larger aggregate CEO effect than is obtained from typical approaches. As a validation test, we show that our technique yields estimates of CEO effects more in line with what would be expected from accepted theory about CEO influence on performance. We do this by examining the CEO effects in subsamples of low‐, medium‐, and high‐discretion industries. Finally, we show that our technique generates substantially different—and we argue more logical—estimates of the effects of many individual CEOs than are obtained through customary analyses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Significant Issues for the Future of Product Innovation

In this issue, Merle Crawford and Milton Rosenau present their thoughts on some of the issues confronting product development professionals. Both reflect on the emergence of new products management as a profession—a field with its own requirements for success. Crawford wonders about the sustainability of our current use of teams for much of our work, the need for improved measurements, and the overall relationship between the management of new initiatives and the ongoing work of the organization. As new products work become more integrated with corporate operations, what new responsibilities will we face, beyond our current challenges? Rosenau looks squarely at the complex issues of rewards and compensation. How can we modify systems that have traditionally evaluated individual performance and adjust them to fit various cooperative work patterns necessary in new product development? He calls for formal study of these important issues. These essays continue a year-long series of contributions that the editor-in-chief solicited from members of the editorial board. Members were asked to reflect on changes and opportunities that they feel will influence our profession during the coming decade. Both of these short essays are designed to introduce new perspectives. It is not essential that you agree with the recommendations, but we hope that you are stimulated as you reflect on the issues that are raised.     

A sensemaking perspective on network pictures

This paper examines the concept of network pictures through the lens of the organizational sensemaking perspective. Essentially it develops the concept of network pictures by suggesting we think of them as exercises in sensemaking. It does so by providing an introduction to organizational sensemaking before establishing a degree of commensurability between network pictures and sensemaking. It suggests that what we may then see more clearly is that the concept of network pictures needlessly gets involved in reification when talking of ‘the’ network picture whereas a more dynamic approach leads to ideas of network picturing in which the complete discrediting or collapse of extant sensemaking and network pictures provides a research opportunity that could be jointly explored by both perspectives. The paper concludes that paradoxically ‘finding’ this new sense or new network picture appropriate to radically changed times is facilitated by a process that involves first ‘becoming lost’.     

Causation,counterfactuals, and competitive advantage

Causation is still poorly understood in strategy research, and confusion prevails around key concepts such as competitive advantage. In this paper, we define epistemological conditions that help dispel some of this confusion and provide a basis for more developed approaches. In particular, we argue that a counterfactual approach—one that builds on a systematic analysis of ‘what‐if’ questions—can advance our understanding of key causal mechanisms in strategy research. We offer two concrete methodologies—counterfactual history and causal modeling—as useful solutions. We also show that these methodologies open up new avenues in research on competitive advantage. Counterfactual history can add to our understanding of the context‐specific construction of resource‐based competitive advantage and path dependence, and causal modeling can help to reconceptualize the relationships between resources and performance. In particular, resource properties can be regarded as mediating mechanisms in these causal relationships. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Schedule Emphasis of New Product Development Personnel

The emphasis personnel place on the development schedule is one factor in determining how quickly a new product will reach the market. Normally, each team member will stress different development program aspects in ways that depend on their own background, functional specialty and sense of what their management desires. In this article, Milton Rosenau describes a means to measure the emphasis an individual places on schedule and other program aspects. The results of such a measure can then be used to improve team congruity.     

Criteria for screening new industrial products

Screening new industrial product ideas—the initial GO/NO GO decision in the new product process—is a critical decision. This article reports the results of an extensive investigation into what criteria managers use in their screening decisions, and how these criteria are weighted and combined.     

Adopting Design Thinking in Novice Multidisciplinary Teams: The Application and Limits of Design Methods and Reflexive Practices

Scholarly and practitioner literature have both described the potential benefits of using methods associated with a “design thinking” approach to develop new innovations. Most studies of the main design thinking methods—needfinding, brainstorming, and prototyping—are based either on analyses of experienced designers or examine each method in isolation. If design thinking is to be widely adopted, less‐experienced users will employ these methods together, but we know little about their effect when newly adopted. Drawing on perspectives that consider concept development as broadly consisting of a divergent concept generation phase followed by a convergent concept selection phase, we collected data on 14 cases of novice multidisciplinary product development teams using design methods across both phases. Our hybrid qualitative and quantitative analysis indicate both benefits and limits of formal design methods: First, formal design methods were helpful not only during concept generation, but also during concept selection. Second, while brainstorming was valuable when combined with other methods, increased numbers of brainstorming sessions actually corresponded to lower performance, except in the setting where new members may join a team. And third, increased team reflexivity—such as from debating ideas, processes, or changes to concepts—was associated with more successful outcomes during concept generation but less successful outcomes during concept selection. We develop propositions related to the contingent use of brainstorming and team reflexivity depending on team composition and phase of development. Implications from this study include that novice multidisciplinary teams are more likely to be successful in applying design thinking when they can be guided to combine methods, are aware of the limits of brainstorming, and can transition from more‐ to less‐reflexive practices.     

Teaching New Product Development To Employed Adults

The purpose of this article is to report the lessons derived from broad practical experience in teaching new product development (NPD) to employed adults. My observations are importantly augmented by diverse comments from nine other service providers who also conduct and participate in similar NPD education. Our combined lessons summarize what works and what to be forewarned about. (“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”– George Santayana.) We believe that what we have learned from our very different and extensive involvement can help several audiences: (1) others who offer or plan to offer and deliver NPD education – educators, service providers, or practitioners; (2) organizations that may wish to sponsor NPD training in any form; and (3) those who expect to participate as students in NPD seminars or courses. The article has four main sections, all of which are intended to provide pointers and helpful suggestions based on our collective experience. First is a discussion of issues concerning program set‐up and acceptance. Both sponsors and participants have important responsibilities for this, which are explained. Second is a discussion of practical issues specific to NPD education. The varieties of subject matter and support materials, format options, techniques to sustain interest, instructor characteristics, and client confidentiality are covered. Third is a discussion of practical logistic issues that apply to all adult education but with an emphasis on NPD. Advance warning of what can be and has been encountered may help you circumvent many avoidable problems. Fourth is a brief discussion about the future for NPD education. In this we speculate that the emergence of broadband Internet may provide a new modality, the effectiveness of which is still uncertain. An important insight for you to note is that we do not always do the same thing or approach teaching situations in the same way. What has worked for one of us may not have been effective for another or in another situation. In summary, the experiences we record should help you improve the delivery of NPD education or more efficiently benefit from participation in such training. © 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.     

How New Product Strategies Impact on Performance

What is involved in a successful new product program? Is it high spending on risky R&D? Is it close contact with customers? Is it the overall competitive strength of the firm? Well, it might be any of these things, and more, according to Robert G. Cooper, depending on your definition of success. In an exhaustive examination of the new product strategies and performances of 122 industrial products firms, Cooper found that the strategy that a firm elects for its new product program is closely linked to the performance results that firm achieves. But what's performance? Cooper's analysis uncovered three different and independent ways of viewing new product performance. He brings some clarity to the meaning of a “high-performance” product innovation program, but there's a catch—the strategies leading to high performance in one direction are quite different from the strategies leading to positive results by other measures. In his summing up, Professor Cooper proposes sets of generalized strategies—guides to action—that product innovation managers should consider.     

丰田，亲～

最近，美元兑日元一直在79关口附近徘徊，这件事牵动着丰田章男的神经。丰田需要汇率为80才能维持—定利润水平。稍微再升值到77意味着丰田会有10亿日元的利润被瞬间吞噬掉。虽然，美元兑日元的汇率已有走软的趋势．显然，现在离丰田章男满意的数值110还差很远。     

Prosecution and Leniency Programs: The Role of Bluffing in Opening Investigations

This paper characterizes the optimal investigation and leniency policies when the Competition Authority is privately informed about the strength of a cartel case. I show that the Competition Authority can then exploit firms’ uncertainty about the risk of conviction to obtain confessions even when the case is weak. More generally, I show that offering full leniency allows the Competition Authority to open more successful investigations (what I refer to as the ‘activism effect’ of leniency), which overall raises both cartel desistance and cartel deterrence. Finally, I discuss the policy implications of the model.