PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DECISIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Determining the appropriate degree of protection to provide intellectual property in the United States and abroad is an important public policy issue. This paper addresses the role of intellectual property protection in the firm's decision on the level of investment in research and development. It also focuses on the stimulus that such protection provides for economic growth in both developed and developing countries. The main conclusion is that the benefits of designing and enforcing a mechanism for strong protection of intellectual property generally exceed the costs.     

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This paper studies the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and economic growth for a cross-section of countries for the period 1960–1990. The analysis focuses on effects of IPRs on growth using a quantitative index of IPRs. The paper finds that IPRs affect economic growth indirectly by stimulating the accumulation of factor inputs like R&D and physical capital. The positive effects of IPRs on factor accumulation, particularly of R&D capital, are present even when the analysis controls for a more general measure of property rights     

ATTRACTING SKEPTICAL BUYERS: NEGOTIATING FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS*

Expropriable disclosures of knowledge to prospective buyers may be necessary to facilitate the sale of intellectual property (IP). In principle, confidentiality agreements can protect disclosures by granting the seller rights to sue for unauthorized use. In practice, sellers often waive confidentiality rights. We provide an incomplete information explanation for the waiver of confidentiality rights that are valuable in complete information settings. Waiving sacrifices the protective value of confidentiality to gain greater buyer participation. Buyer skepticism, which reduces participation, arises endogenously from three elements: asymmetric information regarding seller IP, rent dissipation from competition for IP, and ex post costs from expropriation lawsuits.     

BIGGER IS BETTER: MARKET SIZE,DEMAND ELASTICITY,AND INNOVATION*

This article proposes a novel mechanism whereby larger markets increase competition and facilitate process innovation. Larger markets, in the sense of more people or more open trade, support a larger variety of goods, resulting in a more crowded product space. This raises the price elasticity of demand and lowers markups. Firms, therefore, become larger to break even. This facilitates process innovation, as larger firms can amortize R&D costs over more goods. We demonstrate this mechanism in a standard model of process and product innovation. In doing so, we question some important results in the new trade and endogenous growth literatures.     

SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF STRENGTHENING PATENT PROTECTION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY

Since the 1980s, the pharmaceutical industry has benefited substantially from a series of policy changes that have strengthened the patent protection for brand-name drugs as a result of the industry's political influence. This paper incorporates special interest politics into a quality-ladder model to analyze the policy-makers' tradeoff between the socially optimal patent length and campaign contributions. The welfare analysis suggests that the presence of a pharmaceutical lobby distorting patent protection is socially undesirable in a closed-economy setting but may improve social welfare in a multi-country setting, which features an additional efficiency tradeoff between monopolistic distortion and international free riding on innovations.     

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION AND IMITATION: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF JAPANESE F.D.I. IN CHINA

Abstract.  By using data obtained from a questionnaire survey to Japanese firms in China, we empirically examine the effects of the IPR protection against local illegal imitation. No evidence has been found that patent and trademark registration, which constitutes a part of the IPR protection system, has a protective effect. On the contrary, the results suggest that the patent and trademark registration system may play a role in facilitating local illegal imitation and may be easing technology transfer/diffusion in China.     

市场规模与中国省区的产业增长

市场规模和报酬递增密不可分,较大的市场有助于经济的快速增长。我们基于1990—1997年中国省区细分产业数据的研究发现,中国地区产业增长的"中心—外围"趋势加强,但历史产业布局的影响居次要地位。进一步的估计结果证实,国外需求依赖型产业在国外市场规模较大的省区增长较快;较大的本地和地区市场促进了国内市场依赖型产业的增长,但与本地市场相比,来自其他省区的需求的作用并不显著。     

SHAKEOUTS AND MARKET CRASHES*

This article provides a microfoundation for the rise in optimism that seems to precede market crashes. Small, young markets are more likely to experience stock‐price run‐ups and crashes. We use a Zeira–Rob type of model in which demand size is uncertain. Optimism then grows rationally if traders' prior distribution over market size has a decreasing hazard. Such prior beliefs are appropriate if most new markets are duds and only a few reach a large size. The crash occurs when capacity outstrips demand. As an illustration, for the period 1971–2001 we fit the model to the Telecom sector.     

COMPETITION FOR MARKET SHARE OR FOR MARKET SIZE: OLIGOPOLISTIC EQUILIBRIA WITH VARYING COMPETITIVE TOUGHNESS*

For an industry producing a composite commodity, we propose a comprehensive concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, allowing for a parameterized continuum of regimes varying in competitive toughness. Each firm sets simultaneously its price and its quantity under two constraints, relative to its market share and to market size. The price and the quantity equilibrium outcomes always belong to the set of oligopolistic equilibria. When firms are identical and we let their number increase, any sequence of symmetric oligopolistic equilibria converges to the monopolistic competition outcome. Further results are derived in the symmetric CES case, concerning in particular the collusive solution enforceability.     

DIRECTED SEARCH AND FIRM SIZE*

Standard directed search models predict that larger firms pay lower wages than smaller firms, contrary to the data. This article proposes one way to obtain this positive size–wage differential in a directed search setting. I posit that there is an optimal size associated with a firm: A firm suffers a penalty by not operating at its optimal size. I show that if this penalty is sufficiently large the size–wage differential will be obtained. My model also gives a new way to look at the data because it highlights the importance of the distinction between intended and realized firm sizes.     

技术输出与技术产权的国际保护

我国技术和技术产品出口日益发展,出口量仅次于西方几大工业国。随着技术输出的增长,我国的技术流失及其专利保护问题越来越突出。技术流失既有外部因素,也有内部因素,缺乏保密观念、专利意识,人才的非正常外流,以及法制不健全是主要原因。输出技术优势,加强国际交流,是新时期加快我国技术经济发展的重要战略。但要加强知识产权教育,普及专利知识,按照国际惯例,依靠健全的法制保护技术专利,规范技术和技术产品的输出,维护国家、地方和企业利益。     

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MEETS ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY: GLOBALIZATION, INEQUALITY, AND INNOVATION STRATEGIES

I perform a Schumpeterian analysis of a world economy in which heterogenous individuals and firms endogenously respond to stronger global competition by undertaking more education and by spending more in research and development (R&D). A more globalized economy is predicted to exacerbate wage inequality, but to spur human capital accumulation within each country. However, despite its positive level effects on consumption and output, globalization can reduce each country's per-capita output growth rate. R&D specialization allows each country to positively invest in manufacturing, variety proliferation R&D, and product quality upgrading R&D. The existence of such an R&D specialization – jointly with domestic size – allows us to explain some different economic performance about inequality and R&D effort of developed regions, such as the US and the EU countries.     

THE USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INNOVATION BY MANUFACTURING FIRMS IN CANADA

The objective of the paper is to determine how the utilisation of intellectual property rights (IPRs) by Canadian manufacturing firms is related to their characteristics, activities, competitive strategies and industry sector in which they operate. The principal source of information used in this endeavour is the Statistics Canada Survey of Innovation 1999.

The paper starts with an overview of other studies that looked at the use of intellectual property rights in Canada. Follows a conceptual framework presenting variables likely to explain the use specific IPRs by Canadian manufacturing firms.

The use of IPRs is to a great extent correlated with basic economic characteristics of firms, their activities and industry environment. A series of estimated logit regressions predict the probability that a firm will use a specific IPR instrument. Also estimated is the contribution of the use of IPRs to the probability that a firm innovates.

The decision of a firm to use IPRs is often not independent of the decision to innovate. To eliminate the potential endogeneity bias I estimate a two-stage logit model. A comparison of the single- and two-stage logit models shows that the nexus from the protection of intellectual property (patents) to innovation may be weaker than indicated by the single equation model.     

MARKET STRUCTURE, PROGRAM DIVERSITY, AND RADIO AUDIENCE SIZE

This paper examines the relationships among radio station listenership, the number of program formats, and the number of stations. These relationships are statistically significant and consistent with theory, but the interrelationships are numerically small. The results imply that proposals by the federal Communications Commission and Congress to relax ownership restrictions must induce substantial changes in station numbers in order to noticeably increase programming diversity. Merely modest changes in these numbers will have only small diversity effects. The paper's results also imply that merely mandating the number of formats in a market may not be in the interests of listeners.     

ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS AND STOCK MARKET CRASHES*

A theory is developed that explains how stocks can crash without fundamental news and why crashes are more common than frenzies. A crash occurs via the interaction of rational and naive investors. Naive traders believe that prices follow a random walk with serially correlated volatility. Their expectations of future volatility are formed adaptively. When the market crashes, naive traders sell stock in response to the apparent increase in volatility. Since rational traders are risk averse as well, a lower price is needed to clear the market: The crash is a self‐fulfilling prophecy. Frenzies cannot occur in this model.