Political economy of private firms in China

The sweeping change in political economy associated with the rapid growth of the private sector in China is rarely studied empirically in the economics literature. Using four cross-sectional surveys of private firms between 1995 and 2010, we examine the dynamics of rent creation from Party membership and other political connections when the regime changed from anti-capitalistic to pro-capitalistic during the period 2002–2004. We find that entrepreneurs with political connection enjoyed significantly more rents only after the constitutional amendments. This finding sheds lights on the nature of the political economy of today’s Chinese economy. Endogeneity/causality problems are addressed.     

Insolvency regimes and firms' default risk under economic uncertainty and shocks

One of the arguments often advanced for implementing a stronger insolvency and bankruptcy framework is that it enhances credit discipline among firms. Using a large cross-country firm-level dataset, we empirically test whether a stronger insolvency regime reduces firms' likelihood of defaulting on their debt. In particular, we examine whether it reduces default risk during increased economic uncertainty and various external shocks. Our results confirm that a stronger insolvency regime moderates the adverse effects of economic shocks on firms' default risk. The effects are more pronounced for firms in the top half of the size distribution. We also explore channels through which improved creditor rights influence firms' default risk, including dependence on external finance, corporate leverage, and managerial ethics. Our main results are robust to an alternative measure of default risk, inclusion of currency and sovereign debt crisis episodes, and alternative estimations.     

Political participation and entrepreneurial initial public offerings in China

This paper examines the economic consequences of political participation by entrepreneurs in China. Using unique data on political participation and initial public offerings by entrepreneurial firms, we find that firms controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics exhibit superior post-IPO performance. We also find that firms characterized by political participation are subject to less underpricing. Furthermore, the superior performance is concentrated among firms that operate in an environment characterized by rich rent-seeking opportunities instead of abundant business opportunities, suggesting that political participation is facilitating rent seeking rather than serving simply as a proxy for political recognition for entrepreneurship.     

Coups,regime transitions,and institutional consequences

Coups and regime transitions are events that typically are intended to change the basic institutional framework of a country. Which specific institutions change and the consequences of these changes nevertheless remains largely unknown. Change after a coup or transition implies that some form of political or judiciary barrier has been erected or removed. We therefore focus on what happens to the quality of judicial institutions and political corruption around coup attempts and other types of regime transitions. We hypothesize that when coups are conducted by members of the incumbent political elite, they are likely to remove barriers to change while coup makers outside of the ruling elite are more likely to do the opposite and thus protect themselves from what remains of the elite in the political system. Using the new Bjørnskov-Rode coup dataset, our results suggest that successful coups are associated with degradation of institutions, with successful military coups in particular having a significant negative effect. Results are more varied for civilian coups where we find indications of differences depending on whether the coup makers are part of a political elite or not. We also explore whether the incumbent regime influences the effect of coup attempts on institutional change.     

The international competitiveness of Chinese manufacturing firms and the exit of the renminbi–dollar peg

This paper evaluates the implications of a shift from a pegged to a floating exchange rate regime for the international competitiveness and the economic behavior of Chinese manufacturing firms. Using a conceptual framework that characterizes the relationship between the exchange rate regime and the potential source of a firm's competitive advantage, it yields two key analytical results. First, Chinese manufacturing firms may increase their reliance on a low-margin pricing strategy as the exchange rate regime shifts towards a more flexible one. As a corollary, a low-margin pricing strategy may discourage Chinese manufacturing firms from undertaking costly research and development (R&D) activities, and investments in human capital development. Second, Chinese manufacturing firms have the incentive to employ various wage restraint measures under a floating exchange rate regime at least in the short term. These key analytical results provide insights into a number of policy-relevant issues that may arise at the firm-level. It concludes by providing some general directions on the timing of a complete transition to a floating exchange rate regime.     

Finding a Civilisational Idea: “West,” Eurasia,” and “Euro-East” in Russia's Foreign Policy

Civilisations are imagined, ratherm than real, and nations undergoing identity crises typically represent themselves through multiple civilisational visions. Scholars of geopolitics can hardly understand foreign policy without analysing those visions and social contexts, in which they rise and fall. This article selects for analysis three distinct civilisational ideas of Russia – “West,” “Eurasia” and “Euro-East” – associated with Boris Yeltsin, Yevgeni Primakov and Vladimir Putin, respectively. Russia's foreign policy is best understood as reflecting those civilisational ideas rather than merely material power conditions.     

Institutional development and stock price synchronicity: Evidence from China

Better developed legal and political institutions result in greater availability of reliable firm-specific information. When stock prices reflect more firm-specific information there will be less stock price synchronicity. This paper traces the experience of China, an economy undergoing dramatic institutional change in the last 20 years with rich variation in experiences across provinces. We show that stock price synchronicity is lower when there is institutional development in terms of property rights protection and rule of law. Furthermore, we investigate the influence of political pluralism on synchronicity. A more pluralistic regime reduces uncertainty and opaqueness regarding government interventions and therefore increases the value of firm-specific information that reduces synchronicity.     

Income,inequality, and the stability of democracy — Another look at the Lipset hypothesis

This paper studies the endogenous emergence of political regimes, in particular democracy, oligarchy and mass dictatorship, in societies in which productive resources are distributed unequally and institutions do not ensure political commitments. The political regime is shown to depend not only on income levels, but also, in particular, on resource inequality. The main results imply that under any economic environment a distribution of resources exists such that democracy is the political outcome. This distribution is independent of the particular income level if the income share generated by the poor is sufficiently large. On the other hand, there are distributions of resources for which democracy is infeasible in equilibrium regardless of the level of economic development. The model also delivers results on the stability of democracy. Variations in inequality across several dimensions due to unbalanced technological change, immigration or changes in the demographic structure affect the scope for democracy or may even lead to its breakdown. Among other historical examples, the results are consistent with the different political regimes that emerged in Germany after its unification in 1871.     

Default and liquidity regimes in the bond market during the 2002–2012 period

Using a real‐time random regime shift technique, we identify and discuss two different regimes in the dynamics of credit spreads during 2002–2012: a liquidity regime and a default regime. Both regimes contribute to the patterns observed in credit spreads. The liquidity regime seems to explain the predictive power of credit risk on the 2007–2009 NBER recession, whereas the default regime drives the persistence of credit spreads over the same recession. Our results complement the recent dynamic structural models as well as monetary and credit supply effects models by empirically supporting two important patterns in credit spreads: the persistence and the predictive ability toward economic downturns.     

Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralization: The Case of Russia

In a centralized federation, in which tax rates and taxation rules are set by the federal government, manipulating the thoroughness of tax auditing and the effectiveness of tax collection could be attractive for regional authorities. In this article, we test for strategic tax collection empirically using data of the Russian Federation. Russia's regional authorities in the 1990s have always been suspected of tax auditing manipulations in their favour. However, in the 2000s, increasing bargaining power of the centre seems to induce tax collection bodies in the regions to manipulate tax auditing in favour of the federal centre. Our findings confirm the existence of strategic tax collection for the Yeltsin period; the results for the Putin period are however ambiguous.     

Political Connectedness and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany

Abstract. This paper investigates politically connected firms in Germany. With the introduction of a new transparency law in 2007, information on additional income sources for all members of the German parliament became publicly available. We find that members of the conservative party (CDU/CSU) and the liberal party (FDP) are more likely to work for firms than members of left‐wing parties (SPD and The Left) or the green party (Alliance 90/The Greens). Politically connected firms are larger, less risky and have lower market valuations than unconnected firms. They also have fewer growth opportunities, but slightly better accounting performance. On the stock market, connected firms significantly outperformed unconnected firms in 2006, i.e. before the publication of the data on political connections. Differences in stock market performance were much smaller in 2007.     

Looking behind the curtain—effects from modernization of European Union competition policy

The European Commission issued a proposal for reform of some aspects of Communitary competition policy. In particular, proposes a shift from ex-ante control (notification system) to an ex-post control regime of agreements (or decisions) conflicting with Article 81 (Ex-Article 85).We highlight the expected effects of this shift on the type of agreements that firms will implement. The type of agreements has been taken as exogenous in most analysis of the reform proposal. We contend that significant economic effects may result from recognizing the endogeneity of agreements.We predict that the proposed reform will result, in general, in firms implementing less restrictive agreements.     

Varieties of authoritarianism matter: Elite fragmentation,natural resources and economic growth

A broad literature suggests that political regimes matter for the growth effect of natural resources. However, while several studies have concentrated on the difference between democracies and autocracies in this respect, an important topic overlooked so far is the differences between varieties of authoritarian regimes. This study uses the political variation across sub-national regions of the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin to understand how differences in the extent of elite fragmentation in autocracies affects the influence of resource abundance on economic growth in the short run. We find that polities with fragmented elites underperform those with consolidated elites and link this effect to higher costs of fights over rents due to higher political uncertainty.     

Exchange Rate Pass‐through: The Role of Regime Changes

We consider the effect on the degree of exchange rate pass‐through of the exchange rate regime in operation. We test the hypothesis that pass‐through will be lower under a float as firms may be reluctant to pass appreciations or depreciations on to their customers when there is a strong chance that they will be subsequently reversed. Taylor’s hypothesis that pass‐through will be lower in a low‐inflation environment is also considered. Both hypotheses are assessed in relation to the price of manufactured imports into New Zealand and we find that, whereas the shift to a float dramatically lowered the degree of pass‐through, the later shift to a low‐inflation regime has no significant additional effect on the pass‐through relationship.     

Bank loan supply shocks and leverage adjustment

We investigate the effect of bank loan supply shocks on firms’ leverage adjustment. We show that the impact of bank shocks is larger for firms with greater dependence on financially troubled banks. We measure firms’ pre-crisis loan dependence on troubled banks by using matched firm–bank loan data. Using the boom-bust cycle from 1987 to 2014 in Japan as a quasi-experiment, we find that financially constrained firms adjust their leverage slower during credit-crunch periods than during other periods. During credit-crunch periods following banking crisis, firms associated with failing banks or with banks that have a limited capacity to supply loans show a slower adjustment than other firms. Bank shocks have significant effects on small firms’ adjustment but not on that of large firms. These results are robust when we consider demand-side effects and perform other robustness tests. Our results imply that bank shocks have a persistent effect on borrowers’ leverage.     

Political economy of cross-border income shifting: A protection racket approach

Multinational firms often shift their incomes to low-tax jurisdictions, thus robbing host states of tax revenue. I offer a new theory to explain why some firms do this while others do not. I argue that firms that are more vulnerable to government expropriation are, counterintuitively, less likely to shift income offshore, since complying fully with tax law gives the government a greater stake in their survival. Analyzing a registry-based panel data on multinational firms, their tax burdens, and a cross-sectional information of the firms’ connections to tax havens, l find that, other things equal, firms with more concentrated fixed assets are less likely to use havens. These results challenge existing theories of the political economy of development. Whereas the “Pillars of Prosperity” theory suggests that successful states simultaneously develop protection of property rights and fiscal capacity, my results show that perfect property rights protection can actually undermine the state’s ability to tax.     

Rent‐Seeking,Market Structure,and Growth

We study the role of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship in economic growth, in a setting where firms compete in both economic and political markets. Specifically, firms compete for market share through cost‐reducing technological innovation, and they vie for influence over government transfer policy through rent‐seeking activities. We find that rent‐seeking affects growth in two ways: it allows firms to ignore economic competition, leading to less innovation, and it alters the number of firms that are supported in equilibrium. The former effect is negative, while the latter is ambiguous. We show how these effects depend on various characteristics of economic and political markets.     

寡占市场下的广告成因探究

依照微观经济学和产业组织理论,高度集中产业市场中的寡头厂商往往会在价格变量上形成暗中或默契的价格串谋,使产业市场处在一种“准完全垄断”的状态。广告是企业主要的非价格竞争变量之一,重复博弈的结果使得寡头厂商能够走出囚徒困境(放弃产品的广告宣传),而垄断利润的存在导致第三方潜在进入的威胁,在位寡头厂商必然会联合起来进行抵制,通过广告串谋提高市场进入壁垒。     

The effects of the monetary policy regime shift to inflation targeting on the real interest rate in the United Kingdom

This paper studies the effects of the monetary policy regime shift to inflation targeting on the stochastic properties of the real interest rate in the U.K. The empirical analysis suggests a constant mean of the real interest rate that shifts with the monetary policy regime change to inflation targeting in October 1992. The mean-reverting level of the real interest rate has decreased from 5.1% to 2.3% per annum with the change in monetary policy to inflation targeting. In addition, the shift in monetary policy regime to inflation targeting has reduced the volatility of the real interest rate and increased the persistence of real interest rate deviations from the mean. The results suggest that the central bank can affect the stochastic properties of the real interest rate through the choice of monetary policy regime over a long period of time.     

中国民营企业家参政议政与企业规模—效益分析

本文检验了民营企业家参政议政与企业发展路径的关系,企业是选择做大规模还是提高效益?实证结果发现,民营企业家借助参政议政这种战略资源,企业规模首先实现快速扩张,总收入有显著增长,而反映企业变强的效益指标,则在规模扩张两年之后显著超过对比组,其中国家级政治身份样本显著.本文深化了对中国民营企业家参政议政的实证研究,发现了中国民企借助参政议政等资源,通过规模的快速扩张实现盈利能力增强的发展逻辑.