International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices

This paper compares endogenous choices of tradable and non-tradable emission allowances by non-cooperative countries. I find that the cost savings of trading do not necessarily lead to less pollution. In particular, environmentally more concerned countries usually choose less allowances if these are tradable, but this may be offset by the choice of more allowances on the side of environmentally less concerned countries. Moreover, if the establishment of a trading system requires the unanimous approval of all countries, there may be no agreement on trading even if it were to lead to less pollution overall. Conversely, a trading system may find unanimous approval even if it induces more pollution.     

Applying tradable permits to biodiversity conservation: Effects of space-dependent conservation benefits and cost heterogeneity on habitat allocation

This paper is concerned with the cost-effective allocation of habitat for species under spatio-temporally heterogeneous economic development. To address the dynamic dimension of the problem we consider tradable development rights as the instrument of choice. A particular challenge in applying tradable development rights is that the conservation benefit of an individual habitat patch depends on its spatial relationship with other habitat patches and thus is an emergent rather than a fixed property. We analyse with a conceptual model the spatial and temporal dynamics of habitats in a region under a tradable development rights market that takes spatial interaction of habitats explicitly into account. In our analysis two different outcomes may emerge depending on the levels of spatial interaction and cost heterogeneity: an “ordered” structure where habitat patches are clustered in space and are stable over time, and a “disordered” structure where habitat patches are scattered in space and subject to high turnover of destruction and recreation. A high level of spatial interaction or a low level of cost heterogeneity favours an ordered structure while a low level of spatial interaction or a high level of cost heterogeneity favours a disordered structure.     

Environmental Quality,Income Distribution,and Factor Mobility: The Consequences of Local Action

This paper discusses the regressive nature of tax exemptions for children compared to child allowances and estimates the decline in child poverty in several developed countries due to child allowances. The paper then estimates the decline in child poverty in the United States due to tax exemptions for children and simulates the impact of various possible child allowance programs on child poverty in the United States. It finds that a $3000 to $4000 child allowance would reduce child poverty in the United States to the level of other developed nations and, due to the costs associated with child poverty, be a cost effective policy change.     

Productivity Growth of the Nontradable Sectors in China

Little is known about the total factor productivity of the nontradable sectors in China. In this paper we estimate productivity growth of the nontradable sectors by studying the relative price movements of the nontradable sectors vis‐à‐vis the tradable sectors, i.e. changes in the internal real exchange rate. We find that prices of the nontradable sectors have risen significantly faster than those of the tradable sectors since China's accession to the WTO, and as a result China's internal real exchange rate has appreciated faster than the renminbi real effective exchange rate. We also find that the nontradable sectors have seen much lower productivity growth than the tradable sectors. We argue that it is important to raise China's productivity growth in the nontradable sectors through policy actions to achieve growth rebalancing and containing inflationary pressures in the medium run.     

Exchange Rate Populism

East Asian and Latin American economies present opposite exchange rate electoral cycles: exchange rates tend to be more depreciated before and appreciated after elections among East Asian economies, while the opposite is true in Latin America. We propose an explanation for these empirical findings where the driving force of the opposite exchange rate populism in these two regions is their difference in the relative size of tradable and non‐tradable sectors, coupled with the distributive effect of exchange rates. In a setup where policy‐makers differ in their preference bias toward non‐tradable and tradable sectors, the exchange rate is used a noisy signal of the incumbent's type in an uncertain economic environment. The mechanism behind the cycle is engendered by the incumbent trying to signal he is median voter's type, biasing his policy in favor of the majority of the population before elections.     

A monetary model of China–US trade relations

This paper develops a general equilibrium monetary model to study China–US trade relations. The model captures two main features of China–US trade: China's fixed exchange rate regime and the use of the US dollar as the international medium of exchange. The main conclusions of this paper are threefold. First, an improvement in the productivity of China's tradable sector would benefit both China and the US. Second, a RMB appreciation would reduce consumption in the US and increase consumption in China, and would likely reduce China's trade surplus. It would also lead to a contraction in China's tradable sector and an expansion in US's tradable sector. Third, a monetary expansion in the US would hurt China because it would lead to a transfer of wealth from China to the US, a fall in China's relative wage rate and terms of trade, and an artificial expansion in China's tradable sector. A US monetary expansion would also increase China's trade surplus.     

Structural transformation and its implications for the Chinese economy

This study examines China's structural transformation under the assumption that its employment structure converges to that in major developed economies in one and a half decades. The required annual output differentials between tradable and nontradable sectors, productivity increment in the nontradable sector, and government expenditure increment are estimated with the goal of employment stability conditional on population ageing. It appears that labour transfer from the tradable sector to the nontradable sector would be accompanied by relatively large aggregate output changes due to population ageing and efficiency changes in the tradable sector. Consumer price and real exchange rates are less affected during structural transformation. Although fiscal deficit would increase, government expenditure as a tool to stabilize employment is welfare improving as long as job switching is not cost prohibitive.     

Environmental rights on the futures markets an application to the dutch manure market

A study was carried out to analyze futures markets for tradable rights after a cash market was initiated. Furthermore, some indication was given on the size of such a futures market to provide insight into its viability. Futures markets can play a role in solving environmental problems, by making the market for pollution rights (i.e. P₂O₅ rights) and agro rights (milk rights, sugar rights and P₂O₅ rights) more effective and transparent. Moreover, the market for tradable rights would be able to meet the users' need for hedging. This paper investigated the possibility of introducing a futures markets for tradable P₂O₅ rights and the commodity manure. Because there is already a cash market for manure, although not well developed yet, and there will be a cash market for P₂O₅ rights, a futures market is a logical sequel. The futures market can play a role in implementing agricultural policy efficiently and with respect to manure and P₂O₅ rights can be an economically efficient solution to environmental problems.We acknowledge the financial support of the ATA (Agricultural Futures Market Amsterdam).     

Optimal Allocation of Tradable Pollution Rights and Market Structures

Tradable environmental rights are increasingly pursed as a regulatory instrument, to control for environmental quality. However, in the presence of market power, regulation through an allocation of tradable rights generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article analyzes the effect of the initial distribution of tradable rights on the firms’ strategies and performance in abatement and production, and proposes an efficient criterion for the allocation of tradable rights among firms with market power and competitive fringe firms. The suggested criterion maximizes efficiency of the market based regulation. A simple numerical example illustrates the theoretical discussion.I am very grateful to Richard J. Sexton for useful comments and suggestions. I also wish to thank Giacomo F. Bonanno, the editor, anonymous referees, and participants at the CORE workshop “Industrial Economics and the Environment” (2004) for helpful discussions and comments that improved the paper.     

OPTIONS TO THE REALM: A COST NEUTRAL PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE POLITICAL INCENTIVES

In this article, we draw on the literature on political property rights, political accountability, and strategic management and entrepreneurship to propose a cost neutral reform aimed at promoting long‐run economic prosperity. We propose replacing politicians' defined benefit pensions with a financial contract that is tied to economic performance. In particular, we propose a contract that pays out a lump sum to a politician 30 years after their election if real gross domestic product per capita is above some preset benchmark. Furthermore, we show that the contract can be priced such that it is cost neutral in terms of present value with a defined‐benefit pension. We argue that this contract provides a net benefit to society. (JEL D70, D72)     

Tradable pollution permits in dynamic general equilibrium: Can optimality and acceptability be reconciled?

In this paper we study the dynamic general equilibrium path of an economy and the associated optimal growth path in a two-sector overlapping generation model with a stock pollutant. A sector (power generation) is polluting, and the other (final good) is not. Pollution is regulated by tradable emission permits. The issue is to see whether the optimal growth path can be replicated in equilibrium with pollution permits, given that some permits must be issued free of charge for the sake of political acceptability. We first analyze the many adverse impacts of free allowances, and then we propose a policy rule that allows optimality and acceptability to be reconciled.     

Do Slotting Allowances Harm Retail Competition?*

Slotting allowances are fees paid by manufacturers to get access to retailers' shelf space. Both in the USA and Europe, the use of slotting allowances has attracted attention in the general press as well as among policy makers and economists. One school of thought claims that slotting allowances are efficiency enhancing, while another school of thought maintains that slotting allowances are used in an anti‐competitive manner. In this paper, we argue that this controversy is partially caused by inadequate assumptions of how the retail market is structured and organized. Using a formal model, we show that there are good reasons to expect anti‐competitive effects of slotting allowances. We further point out that competition authorities tend to use an unsatisfactory basis for comparison when analyzing welfare consequences of slotting allowances.     

The Optimal Distribution of Pollution Rights in the Presence of Political Distortions

A critical issue in designing a system of tradable emission permits concerns the distribution of the initial pollution rights. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the initial rights should be optimally set, when the determination of the number of tradable permits is subject to the influence of interest groups. According to the Coase theorem, in the case where there are low transaction costs, the assignment of the initial rights does not affect the efficiency of the final resource allocation. In the presence of political pressure, we show that the distribution of the initial rights has a significant effect on social welfare. In contrast to the conventional results, we find that grandfathered permits may be more efficient than auctioned permits, even after taking into consideration the revenue-recycling effect.      

The importance of the design of market-based instruments for CO2 mitigation: An AGE analysis for Spain

In the past few decades, economists have defended the use of market-based instruments (MBI) in environmental and climate policy. There have been many papers which have compared the costs of attaining environmental objectives with MBIs and with command and control instruments. However very few have compared different MBIs in examining these costs. This paper seeks to analyse various MBIs for CO₂ mitigation from the viewpoint of cost-effectiveness, using an AGE (applied general equilibrium) model for the case of Spain. A distinction is drawn between (1) quantity instruments, which represent different extents of a market for emission permits; and (2) price instruments, which represent different types of tax. Each instrument can affect different segments of the emission sources and therefore can have very different effects on the economy as a whole. We show how MBI can help to minimise mitigation costs, but also how taxes and tradable emission permits that are limited or constrained by many exemptions and distortions can raise costs considerably.     

Portfolio allocation and international risk sharing

Abstract We show that recent explanations of the consumption‐real exchange rate anomaly that rely on goods and financial market frictions are not robust to introducing just one additional international asset. When portfolios are selected optimally, international trade in two nominal bonds implies a consumption‐real exchange rate correlation that is too high compared with the data even when there are many shocks. Monetary policy specification plays a potentially important role for the degree of risk sharing provided by nominal bonds, both in the benchmark model with only tradable and non‐tradable sector supply shocks and also in the model that allows for news.     

苏南流动人口生育意愿研究——以吴江流动人口为例

以吴江为例,对苏南流动人口生育意愿中的理想子女数、性别偏好、生育时间与生育动机四个要素分别作了考察。就流动人口的年龄、性别、婚姻状况、收入水平、文化程度等客观要素与生育意愿中四要素的关系进行了分析。生育动机是生育意愿中的核心要素,对理想子女数、性别偏好与生育时间起着决定性的作用。     

Multi-Sector Model of Tradable Emission Permits

This paper presents a multi-sector model of tradable emission permits, which includes oligopolistic and perfectly competitive industries. The firms in oligopolistic industries are assumed to exercise market power in the tradable permit market as well as in the product market. Specifically, we examine the effects of the initial permit allocation on the equilibrium outcomes, focusing on the interaction among these product and permit markets. It is shown that raising the number of initial permits allocated to one firm in an oligopolistic industry increases the output produced by that firm. Under certain conditions, raising a “clean” (less-polluting) firm’s share of the initial permits can lead to reductions in both the product and permit prices. We discuss criteria for the socially optimal allocation of initial permits, considering the trade-off between production inefficiency and consumer benefit.     

The private value of plant variety protection and the impact of exemption rules

Plant Breeders Rights (PBRs) are sui generis IPRs intended to promote plant variety creation. Two characteristics distinguish PBRs from patents: the research and the farmers' exemptions. This article attempts to assess the impact of these exemption rules on the private value of PBRs. For this purpose, a microeconometric model of PBRs renewals is developed and estimated. This model extends previous models of patents renewals by allowing the use of PBRs-specific variables. It is argued that simple tests on the coefficients associated with key PBRs-specific variables can provide insights into the impact of the two exemption rules. Implementation to PBRs in France over the period 1973–2011 for six major crops suggests that neither the farmers' exemption nor the research exemption have a clear-cut effect on the private value of PBRs. We conclude that there is no evidence to argue in favor of a reform of PBRs.     

OBSERVABLE REPUTATION TRADING*

Is the reputation of a firm tradable when the change in ownership is observable? We consider a competitive market in which a share of owners must retire in each period. New owners bid for the firms that are for sale. Customers learn the owner's type, which reflects the quality of the good or service provided, through experience. After observing an ownership change they may want to switch firms. However, in equilibrium, good new owners buy from good old owners and retain high‐value customers. Hence reputation is a tradable intangible asset, although ownership change is observable.     

Airing Your Dirty Laundry: A Quick Marketable Pollution Permits Game for the Classroom

In this article, the authors describe a simple classroom game that demonstrates the advantage of tradable emissions permits in regulating environmental pollution. Students take on the role of polluters who must consider the costs of complying with a uniform reduction and a tradable permits program. The class is divided into high-cost polluters and low-cost polluters so students can observe the gains from trade as high-cost students purchase pollution rights from the low-cost students in the tradable permits scenario. A major advantage of the game is that it can be conducted within as little as 20 minutes and does not require that students have prior knowledge of economics or regulatory policies. This makes the game appropriate for economics and noneconomics courses alike.