Civil war and economic growth: the case for a closer look at forms of mobilization

This paper explores the idea that the lack of robust evidence on the growth impact of civil war could partially be a consequence of considering civil war as a unified conceptual category, regardless of the ordinate of group identity invoked in mobilizing for war. To do so, we distinguish explicitly between episodes of internal conflict where contestants mobilized along the lines of ethnicity and ones where mobilization occurred along other markers of group identity. Using alternative definitions of civil war and System GMM estimation to address the endogeneity of conflict and per capita income, we obtain a negative contemporaneous impact of non-ethnic civil war on economic growth over the period 1975–2005. By contrast, the impact of ethnic war is statistically insignificant.     

The spillover of war in time and space: exploring some open issues

In spite of a voluminous empirical literature, the diffusion of civil war in time and space is still not fully understood and several issues remain open for debate. This article sheds new light on some of these issues. First, we assess the robustness of results to changes in the definition of neighbourhood (spatial dimension) and in the lag structure (temporal dimension). Second, we investigate the factors that determine the strength of civil war diffusion, focusing in particular on (i) the type of war (e.g. its intensity and scope), (ii) the quality of domestic polity, and (iii) interaction opportunities (e.g. ethnic ties and refugee flows). Third, we look at how the occurrence of war in a neighbouring country affects the duration (and not just the onset) of domestic civil war.     

Nepal's civil war and the changing sources of income: The role of sectoral shifts and remittances in mitigation and recovery

Given the increased worldwide unrest and a large number of displaced individuals, understanding the economic impacts of civil war has been the subject of growing attention by academics and policymakers. The 10‐year civil war in Nepal from 1996 to 2006 provides an opportunity to assess the impact of civil unrest on income sources and remittance patterns. In this study, we examine the changes in household income generating processes over the period of the Nepali civilwar. Using survey data from the Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS) in 1995/1996 and 2010/2011, we observe household income and remittance patterns before and after the civil war. Specifically, we employ a difference‐in‐difference estimator that focuses on the heterogeneity in civil unrest within Nepal to examine how the civil war impacted the sources of household income. Within the context of a slower growth rate of income after the revolution for those in the hardest hit districts, we find that there was also a change in the composition of income sources. In particular, our results suggest that there was a shift from a reliance on wages in the nonagricultural sector to wages in the agricultural sector; that there was a shift from external remittances to internal remittances; and finally that home production—the market value of items produced and consumed within the household—may be taking the place of income in regions hit by unrest. “People living in zones of war are maimed, killed, and see their property destroyed. They may be displaced or prevented from attending school or earning a living. To the extent that these costs are borne unequally across groups, the conflict could intensify economic inequality as well as poverty. The destruction (and deferred accumulation) of both human and physical capital also hinder macroeconomic performance, combining with any effects of war on institutions and technology to impact national income growth. Understanding the economic legacies of conflict is important to the design of post‐conflict recovery” (Blattman & Miguel, 2010).     

Regional Inequality and Internal Conflict

This paper studies the influence of regional inequality within countries on internal conflicts. Regional inequalities are measured by the population‐weighted coefficient of variation of regional GDP per capita. As the main innovation, I use a panel dataset of country‐level regional inequalities, which covers 56 countries (835 subnational regions) between 1980 and 2009. I also consider a broader cross section dataset for the year 2005, which covers 110 countries (1569 subnational regions). Conflict is measured by the incidence of civil war (UCDP/PRIO data) and a risk measure of internal conflict (war, terrorism and riots) provided by the PRS Group's International Country Risk Guide. Logit estimations are employed as well as OLS fixed effects panel regressions. I find that regional inequalities increase the risk of internal conflict.     

The human capital consequences of civil war: Evidence from Guatemala

We combine data from the 2002 National Population Census and the distribution of the number of human rights violations and victims across 22 departments to examine how Guatemala's 36-year-long civil war affected human capital accumulation. The year of birth and the department of birth jointly determine an individual's exposure during school age to three different periods of the civil war, namely the initial period (1960-1978), the worst period (1979-1984), and the final period (1985-1996). We find a strong negative impact of the civil war on the education of the two most disadvantaged groups, namely rural Mayan males and females. Among rural Mayan males, those who were school age during the three periods of the civil war in departments where more human rights violations were committed completed 0.27, 0.71, and 1.09 years less of schooling respectively whereas rural Mayan females exposed to the three periods of the war completed 0.12, 0.47, and 1.17 years less of schooling respectively. Given an average of 4.66 and 3.83 years of schooling for males and females, these represent declines of 6, 15, and 23% for males and 3, 12, and 30% for females. Our results are robust to the inclusion of indicators for department of residence, year of birth, and controls for different trends in education and human development in war-affected and peaceful departments of Guatemala and suggest that the country's civil war may have deepened gender, regional, sectoral, and ethnic disparities in schooling.     

The Middle Class Consensus and Economic Development

A middle class consensus is defined as a high share of income for the middle class and a low degree of ethnic divisons. The paper links a middle class consensus to resource endowments, along the lines of the provocative thesis of Engerman and Sokoloff (1997 and 2000). This paper exploits this association using tropical resource endowments as instruments for inequality. A higher share of income for the middle class and lower ethnic divisions are associated with higher income and higher growth, as well as with more education, better health, better infrastructure, better economic policies, less political instability, less civil war and ethnic minorities at risk, more social modernization and more democracy.     

Immigration,Ethnic Diversity,and Political Outcomes: Evidence from Denmark

I study the impact of immigration and increasing ethnic diversity on political outcomes in immigrant‐receiving countries, focusing on immigration and election outcomes in Danish municipalities between 1981 and 2001. A novel instrumental variable strategy based on historical housing stock data addresses issues of endogenous location choices of immigrants and a rich set of control variables is employed to isolate ethnic diversity effects from those of other immigrant characteristics. Increases in local ethnic diversity lead to rightward shifts in election outcomes by shifting electoral support away from traditional “big government” left‐wing parties and towards anti‐immigrant nationalist parties. This holds for both local and national elections.     

Violent conflict and institutional change*

Violent conflict such as civil war may influence institutional quality by changing the political equilibrium or by changing preferences and norms. This study presents empirical evidence that in some cases civil war deteriorates institutional quality. By applying the synthetic control method to 25 cases of civil war between 1960 and 2010, I construct the counterfactual path of institutional quality in the absence of civil war. The effects of civil war are heterogeneous, but for a substantial minority of cases civil war appears to deteriorate institutional quality. These findings have implications for post-civil war economic recovery as well as long run economic development.     

The geography of natural resources,ethnic inequality and civil conflicts

We study whether the spatial distribution of natural resources across different ethnic groups within countries causes spatial inequality and the incidence of armed conflict. By providing a theoretical rent-seeking model and analysing a set of geo-coded data for mines, night-time light emissions, local populations and ethnic homelands, we show that the spatial distribution of resources is a major driving factor of ethnic income inequality. Moreover, a spatially unequal distribution of natural resources induces rent-seeking behaviour and thus increases the risk of civil conflicts. Consequently, we extend the perspective of the resource curse to explain cross-country differences in income inequality and the onset of civil conflicts.     

Putting Bosnia in its Place: Critical Geopolitics and the Representation of Bosnia in the British Print Media

Media reporting of the Bosnian Conflict (1992–1995) was significant in shaping Western policy responses to the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. This article considers the role of the British print media in articulating and representing Bosnia as a place in the geographical imagination. Bosnia, for many, was a sophisticated place in the heart of Europe whilst for others it was Bosnia's Balkan identity and all the associated negative connotations which informed journalistic reports. Representations of Bosnia were further complicated by the use of historical and geographical analogies. Finally I argue that the war of words which defined the Bosnian conflict as a ‘civil war’ and the result of ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ resulted in the war being seen as a humanitarian catastrophe requiring a humanitarian response. These contested and contradictory narratives of place had profound consequences for political and military strategies during the war and for the final settlement at Dayton in 1995.     

Corruption, growth and ethnic fractionalization: a theoretical model

This paper analyzes the existing relationship between ethnic fractionalization, corruption and the growth rate of a country. We provide a simple theoretical model. We show that a nonlinear relationship between fractionalization and corruption exists: corruption is high in homogeneous or very fragmented countries, but low where fractionalization is intermediate. In fact, when ethnic diversity is intermediate, constituencies act as a check and balance device to limit ethnically-based corruption. Consequently, the relationship between fractionalization and growth rate is also non-linear: growth is high in the middle range of ethnic diversity, low in homogeneous or very fragmented countries.     

CIVIL WAR EXPOSURE AND VIOLENCE

In recent years scholars have begun to focus on the consequences of individuals' exposure to civil war, including its severe health and psychological consequences. Our innovation is to move beyond the survey methodology that is widespread in this literature to analyze the actual behavior of individuals with varying degrees of exposure to civil war in a common institutional setting. We exploit the presence of thousands of international soccer (football) players with different exposures to civil conflict in the European professional leagues, and find a strong relationship between the extent of civil conflict in a player's home country and his propensity to behave violently on the soccer field, as measured by yellow and red cards. This link is robust to region fixed effects, country characteristics (e.g. rule of law, per capita income), player characteristics (e.g. age, field position, quality), outliers, and team fixed effects. Reinforcing our claim that we isolate the effect of civil war exposure rather than simple rule breaking or something else entirely, there is no meaningful correlation between our measure of exposure to civil war and soccer performance measures not closely related to violent conduct. The result is also robust to controlling for civil wars before a player's birth, suggesting that it is not driven by factors from the distant historical past.     

Growth in fragile states in Africa: Conflict and post‐conflict capital accumulation

This article analyses the pattern of capital accumulation in Africa and its interaction with political fragility. Political fragility, defined as armed conflict or civil war, retards or reverses gains with respect to capital accumulation, slowing long‐term economic growth. Many countries experience negative rates of capital accumulation, particularly during periods of acute political instability. In post‐war periods, countries generally continue to experience capital destruction, lending support to the “war ruin hypothesis.” This has implications for long‐term economic growth in view of the strong association between capital accumulation and economic performance. The main policy implication of the analysis is that African countries and their international partners should pay more attention to capital accumulation, including capital reconstruction after periods of political instability, to lay the foundations for sustainable economic growth.     

Democratization and civil war

This article examines the impact of civil war on democratization, particularly focusing on whether civil war provides an opportunity for institutional reform. We investigate the impact of war termination in general, along with prolonged violence, rebel victory and international intervention on democratization. Using an unbalanced panel data set of 96 countries covering a 34-year period, our analysis suggests that civil war lowers democratization in the succeeding period. Our findings also suggest that United Nations intervention increases democratization, as do wars ending in stalemates. However, wars ending in rebel victories seem to reduce democratization. These findings appear robust to conditioning, different instrument sets, modelling techniques and the measurement of democracy.     

Aiding refugees,aiding peace?

I add two novel features to the two‐player contest model, the workhorse model of civil war: civilians can flee (i.e., become refugees) and refugees receive aid. I find that aid to refugees can promote peace or fuel conflict, depending on the context.     

The political economy of linguistic cleavages

This paper uses a linguistic tree, describing the genealogical relationship between all 6912 world languages, to compute measures of diversity at different levels of linguistic aggregation. By doing so, we let the data inform us on which linguistic cleavages are most relevant for a range of political economy outcomes, rather than making ad hoc choices. We find that deep cleavages, originating thousands of years ago, lead to better predictors of civil conflict and redistribution. The opposite pattern emerges when it comes to the impact of linguistic diversity on growth and public goods provision, where finer distinctions between languages matter.     

Rooted in Violence: Civil War,International Trade and the Expansion of Palm Oil in Colombia

Internal armed conflict severely inhibits economic growth according to a prominent set of civil war literature. Similarly, emerging scholarship finds that civil war inhibits processes of economic globalisation which are argued to produce economic growth. A case in point is international trade, which is reportedly stymied by intra-state war. In contrast, this article employs a critical theoretical framework which acknowledges the often violent tendencies of globalised capitalism. By analysing Colombia's palm oil industry, this article argues that civil war violence can facilitate international trade. In the case study which is presented, violence perpetrated by Colombia's public armed forces and right-wing paramilitaries has enabled the palm oil sector to enter and compete in the globalised economy. This includes processes of forced displacement, which have acquired land for palm oil cultivation, and violence directed at civil groups deemed inimical to the interests of the palm oil sector. By employing a micro-level approach, this article attempts to isolate violent trends related to palm oil cultivation in Meta, the largest African palm-growing region in Colombia. An attempt is therefore made to give an empirically informed account of how violence in Colombia's civil war is facilitating palm oil exports.     

Spatial–Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal

The Maoist insurgency in Nepal is one of the highest intensity internal conflicts in recent times. Investigation into the causes of the conflict would suggest that grievance rather than greed is the main motivating force. The concept of horizontal or intergroup inequality, with both an ethnic and caste dimension, is highly relevant in explaining the Nepalese civil war. There is also a spatial aspect to the conflict, which is most intense in the most disadvantaged areas in terms of human development indicators and land holdings. Using the intensity of conflict (fatalities) as the dependent variable and HDI indicators and landlessness as explanatory variables, the authors find that the intensity of conflict across the districts of Nepal is significantly explained by the degree of inequalities.     

Aiding violence or peace? The impact of foreign aid on the risk of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa

This paper considers the impact of foreign aid flows on the risk of civil conflict. We improve on earlier studies on this topic by addressing the problem of the endogenous aid allocation using GDP levels of donor countries as instruments. A more structural addition to the literature is that we efficiently control for unobserved country specific effects in typical conflict onset and conflict continuation models by first differencing. The literature often overlooks the dynamic nature of these types of models, thereby forcing unlikely i.i.d. structures on the error terms implicitly.¹ As a consequence, malfunctioning institutions, deep-rooted political grievances, or any other obvious, yet unobserved and time persistent determinants of war are simply assumed away. We find a statistically significant and economically important negative effect of foreign aid flows on the probability of ongoing civil conflicts to continue (the continuation probability), such that increasing aid flows tends to decrease civil conflict duration. We do not find a significant relationship between aid flows and the probability of civil conflicts to start (the onset probability).     

ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND TRUST

Using data from U.S. states, I investigate the relationship between ethnic diversity and trust. I find a negative relationship between ethnic polarization and trust and a U‐shaped relationship between ethnic fractionalization and trust. According to my estimations, (a) going from an ethnic polarization index (PI) of 0 to an ethnic PI of 1 decreases trust by almost 12% points; and (b) trust is minimized when the ethnic fractionalization index is equal to 0.34. (JEL D74, J15, Z13)