Pirates and fishermen: Is less patrolling always bad?

Motivated by the Somali fishermen-pirates, I explore the time allocation decision of potential pirates between piracy and an alternative non-violent occupation, fishing, when the returns of both piracy and fishing are sensitive to patrolling intensity. For a range of parameters, the static model yields multiple equilibria, an “efficient” one with no patrolling and low piracy, a less efficient equilibrium with intermediate levels of both piracy and patrolling and a highly inefficient high-patrolling high-piracy equilibrium. Analyzing the dynamic analogue, I obtain the surprising result that sufficiently low patrolling can be a good strategy.     

Does Peacetime Military Service Affect Crime?

Draft lottery data combined with Danish longitudinal administrative records show that military service can reduce criminal activity for youth offenders. For this group, property crime is reduced, and our results indicate that the effect is unlikely to be the result of incapacitation only. We find no effect of military service on violent crime, on educational attainment, or on employment and earnings, either in the short run or in the long run. These results suggest that military service does not upgrade productive human capital directly, but rather affects criminal activity through other channels (e.g., by changing attitudes to criminal activity).