Coalition Formation and Stability

This paper aims to develop, for any cooperative game, a solution notion that enjoys stability and consists of a coalition structure and an associated payoff vector derived from the Shapley value. To this end, two concepts are combined: those of strong Nash equilibrium and Aumann–Drèze coalitional value. In particular, we are interested in conditions ensuring that the grand coalition is the best preference for all players. Monotonicity, convexity, cohesiveness and other conditions are used to provide several theoretical results that we apply to numerical examples including real-world economic situations.     

Sharing the value‐at‐risk under distributional ambiguity

This paper considers the problem of risk sharing, where a coalition of homogeneous agents, each bearing a random cost, aggregates their costs, and shares the value‐at‐risk of such a risky position. Due to limited distributional information in practice, the joint distribution of agents' random costs is difficult to acquire. The coalition, being aware of the distributional ambiguity, thus evaluates the worst‐case value‐at‐risk within a commonly agreed ambiguity set of the possible joint distributions. Through the lens of cooperative game theory, we show that this coalitional worst‐case value‐at‐risk is subadditive for the popular ambiguity sets in the distributionally robust optimization literature that are based on (i) convex moments or (ii) Wasserstein distance to some reference distributions. In addition, we propose easy‐to‐compute core allocation schemes to share the worst‐case value‐at‐risk. Our results can be readily extended to sharing the worst‐case conditional value‐at‐risk under distributional ambiguity.     

Condorcet's Jury Theorem and the reliability of majority voting

The effect on the Jury Theorem of dependency among votes is discussed. Condorcet's original model and theorem depend crucially on the assumption of independence and the applicability of the binomial distribution. Two simple extensions of the binomial distribution are used to illustrate the effects of dependency on the quality of group decision making. With the correlated binomial model, it is possible to isolate the effect of pairwise dependency. In the presence of fairly strong pairwise dependency, we are not even guaranteed the natural property of monotonicity with respect to voters. A Pólya-Eggenberger model illustrates the effect of contagion on group competence. A special case of the beta-binomial distribution is used to demonstrate that, even in the presence of synergetic group effects, we are not guaranteed infallible decisions from a very large group. Consequences for an epistemic theory of democracy are indicated.     

A flexible binomial option pricing model

This article develops a flexible binomial model with a “tilt” parameter that alters the shape and span of the binomial tree. A positive tilt parameter shifts the tree upward while a negative tilt parameter does exactly the opposite. This simple extension of the standard binomial model is shown to converge with any value of the tilt parameter. More importantly, the binomial tree can be recalibrated through the tilt parameter in order to position nodes relative to the strike price or barrier of an option. The rate of convergence is improved as a result. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 19: 817–843, 1999     

侵权责任法第八十七条的博弈论分析

由于高空抛物侵权责任实际上是侵权人与无辜第三人之间的博弈,通过博弈论这一法经济学分析方法对高空抛物侵权责任进行分析,将无辜第三人分为侵权人之外的可能加害的建筑物使用人和物业公司两种,通过两者的优势比较得出的结论是物业公司赔偿方案比现行高空抛物侵权责任立法更有效率。     

两岸知识产权保护政策选择的动态博弈分析

文章构建了两岸知识产权合作保护问题的博弈分析框架,以考虑大陆和台湾在知识产权领域合作的均衡条件以及影响因素,得出从长远看合作是两岸知识产权保护领域里的最佳政策选择,其中台方非理性的概率P是关系到两岸知识产权合作能否达成均衡的关键。政治因素以及大陆山寨文化的盛行对两岸知识产权领域的合作有重要影响,构建两岸沟通平台与协调处理机制可以提高台商非理性因素,增加两岸知识产权合作的可能性。     

TUG‐OF‐WAR,MARKET MANIPULATION,AND OPTION PRICING

We develop an option pricing model based on a tug‐of‐war game. This two‐player zero‐sum stochastic differential game is formulated in the context of a multidimensional financial market. The issuer and the holder try to manipulate asset price processes in order to minimize and maximize the expected discounted reward. We prove that the game has a value and that the value function is the unique viscosity solution to a terminal value problem for a parabolic partial differential equation involving the nonlinear and completely degenerate infinity Laplace operator.     

From value chains to technological platforms: The effects of crowdfunding in the digital game industry

This study contributes to understanding the effects of crowdfunding on the value creation process in the digital game industry. Specifically, it integrates the value chain logic with the platform logic to examine collaborative value creation enabled by opening up the business models of game developers to the crowd. Through a multiple case design this research shows that the benefit of using crowdfunding goes well beyond fundraising. As an implementation of open innovation, crowdfunding unifies the channels that bring capital, technology and market knowledge from the crowd into the game. This finding leads to the exploration of a new complex system of interactions between game developers and value chain stakeholders, and invokes the analysis of crowdfunding as a form of technological platform to identify and analyze new types of collaboration and competition. This research limits its findings to the effects of reward-based crowdfunding. Other forms of crowdfunding require further investigations. The paper also aims to help practitioners understand how crowdfunding is transforming the game industry.     

Contracting in dynamic games

We study the bargaining problem in the dynamic framework. The classical way of solving a dynamic bargaining problem is to transform the extensive form game into the normal form and then apply the theory of bargaining well developed for normal form games. This means that the parties sign a binding contract in the beginning of the game which defines their actions for the full duration of the game. In this article, we consider the setting where the players monitor the contract as the game evolves. The main purpose of the article is to study conditions under which the players do not have a rationale to renegotiate a new contract at any intermediate time period; i.e., the contract is time consistent. Time consistency restricts the set of bargaining solutions in dynamic games. We will show that time consistency of the contract is guaranteed if the bargaining solution satisfies the controversial independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives property.     

要素禀赋差异与企业产权博弈

企业契约的参与要素包括财务资本与智力资本,不同要素的禀赋特征决定了要素所有权主体在企业内部的谈判能力,企业的实质是要素所有者之间的一种递进谈判机制与过程。通过构建基于要素禀赋特征的企业产权博弈矩阵,发现不同社会经济状态下的要素禀赋特征内生决定了企业的产权安排方式。因此,伴随着知识经济发展,智力资本拥有企业产权是社会经济发展的必然。     

LIMIT THEOREMS FOR PARTIAL HEDGING UNDER TRANSACTION COSTS

We study shortfall risk minimization for American options with path‐dependent payoffs under proportional transaction costs in the Black–Scholes (BS) model. We show that for this case the shortfall risk is a limit of similar terms in an appropriate sequence of binomial models. We also prove that in the continuous time BS model, for a given initial capital, there exists a portfolio strategy which minimizes the shortfall risk. In the absence of transactions costs (complete markets) similar limit theorems were obtained by Dolinsky and Kifer for game options. In the presence of transaction costs the markets are no longer complete and additional machinery is required. Shortfall risk minimization for American options under transaction costs was not studied before.     

Option pricing for the transformed‐binomial class

This article generalizes the seminal Cox‐Ross‐Rubinstein (1979) binomial option pricing model to all members of the class of transformed‐binomial pricing processes. The investigation addresses issues related with asset pricing modeling, hedging strategies, and option pricing. Formulas are derived for (a) replicating or hedging portfolios, (b) risk‐neutral transformed‐binomial probabilities, (c) limiting transformed‐normal distributions, and (d) the value of contingent claims, including limiting analytical option pricing equations. The properties of the transformed‐binomial class of asset pricing processes are also studied. The results of the article are illustrated with several examples. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl. Fut Mark 26:759–787, 2006     

Can creative firms thrive without copyright? Value generation and capture from private-collective innovation

Accounts of the copyright industries in national reports suggest that strong intellectual property (IP) rights support creative firms. However, mounting evidence from sectors such as video game production and 3-D printing indicate that business models based on open IP can also be profitable. This study investigates the relationship between IP protection and value capture for creative industry firms engaged in collective/open innovation activities. A sample of 22 businesses interviewed in this study did not require exclusive ownership of creative materials but instead employed a range of strategies to compete and capture value. Benefits for some firms resemble those for participants in private-collective innovation (PCI), originally observed in open-source software development. Advantages of PCI include the ability to commercialize user improvements and a reduction in transaction costs related to seeking and obtaining permission to innovate existing ideas. Some creative firms in this study were able to generate and capture value from PCI in two directions: upstream and downstream. These dynamics offer a mechanism to understand and articulate the value of openness for creative industries policy and management of creative organizations.     

Value Creation,Management Competencies,and Global Corporate Citizenship: An Ordonomic Approach to Business Ethics in the Age of Globalization

This article develops an “ordonomic” approach to business ethics in the age of globalization. Through the use of a three-tiered conceptual framework that distinguishes between the basic game of antagonistic social cooperation, the meta game of rule-setting, and the meta-meta game of rule-finding discourse, we address three questions, the answers to which we believe are crucial to fostering effective business leadership and corporate social responsibility. First, the purpose of business in society is value creation. Companies have a social mandate to organize mutually advantageous cooperation. Second, business ethics should teach the management competencies necessary to fulfill business’s societal mandate. These competencies are optimization competence in the basic game of value creation, governance competence in the meta game of (political) rule setting, and the three discourse-related skills of orientation competence, reception competence, and communication competence necessary for engaging in the meta-meta game. Third, companies can help solve global problems through global corporate citizenship if they participate as political and moral actors in rule-setting processes and rule-finding discourse aimed at laying the foundation for value creation on a global scale.     

A PROPERTY TAXATION MECHANISM WITH SELF‐ASSESSMENT

This paper analyzes a variant of the classic idea for property taxation based on owner's self‐assessment. To induce reporting of market values tax authorities announce to purchase some of the properties randomly at declared values under certain conditions. These conditions are based on properties of the distribution of declared values. It is proven that a unique Nash equilibrium of this taxation game among tax payers exists in which all of them report market values and tax authorities do not purchase any property.     

An investigation into gambling purchases using the NBD and NBD–Dirichlet models

Past research on gambling behavior has focused largely on cognitive and affective explanations, but has not explored the influence of past gambling behavior or habit. In this study, it was hypothesized that gambling behavior followed predictable patterns based on past behavior. We found that these patterns could be described by the negative binomial distribution (NBD) and NBD–Dirichlet models at game and category levels, respectively. An empirical study using the 1999 Australia Productivity Commission survey dataset provided some support for the usefulness of these models in describing gambling consumption. The paper explores the implications for identifying problem gambling and influencing gamblers’ behavior.     

国际贸易与环境协调发展研究

国际贸易与环境保护之间虽然存在着相互影响的关系,但是简单的贸易制裁措施并不能有效地实现环境保护的目的,因为贸易制裁措施并没有从根本上解决环境资源的产权缺乏问题。将环境问题与贸易问题关联来改善越境污染的思路就是利用贸易合作的丰厚利益来维系环境合作的脆弱结构。其局限是改变了原有贸易博弈的支付函数,从而影响贸易合作的稳定性。作为发展中国家,在贸易与环境的关联博弈中更应该立足于眼前利益,立足于贸易合作,并着眼未来,循序渐进地逐步提高环境管制标准,推动贸易与环境的协调发展。     

跨国公司直接投资区位选择的博弈分析

本文运用经济学、博弈论等有关原理,推导出了在完全信息动态博弈下的跨国公司直接投资区位选择模型。该模型主要分析了市场容量、东道国税率、知识产权保护力度等因素对跨国公司直接投资区位选择的影响。最后,对我国政府在如何制定政策吸引外商直接投资方面给出了建议。     

An empirical investigation of the pollution haven effect with strategic environment and trade policy

Using a new dataset on the stringency and enforcement of environmental policy, this study is the first to find robust confirmation of a pollution haven effect in a cross-country context by accounting for strategically determined environment, trade, and intellectual property right (IPR) policies. A simple game theoretic approach to policy determination is described which suggests an identification strategy based on other country characteristics. It is found that for the top 20th percentile of countries in terms of growth in U.S multinational affiliate value added, as much as 8.6% of that growth between 1999 and 2003 can be attributed to declining relative stringency and enforcement of environmental policy. The results are robust to a number of identification tests, weak IV tests, and third country spatial effects. Further, evidence is found that relatively ‘footloose’ industries are more likely to be affected by environmental policy than more traditionally ‘dirty’ industries and enforcement of environmental policies tends to be a more important deterrent than the stringency of the policy set.     

运用期权定价模型评估公司价值

本着把期权思想应用于公司价值评估,分别运用二叉树模型和Black-Scholes模型计算公司价值,并对这一方法的应用价值及局限性进行一定的探讨。