EQUILIBRIA IN NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES I: PERTURBATIONS BASED REFINEMENTS OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM

The concept of Nash equilibrium is widely used to analyse non-cooperative games. However, one of the problems with that concept is that many games have multiple equilibria. Recent work has concentrated on reducing or refining the set of Nash equilibria in some games. In this paper, we survey some equilibrium concepts based on perturbations of strategies that refine the set of Nash equilibria. We discuss the pros and cons of each concept and its relationship to the others by the use of numerous examples and intuition. It is hoped that this survey will enable the economist to consider the relevance of a particular equilibrium concept to a given economic model of interest. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.     

UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN FINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING*

This paper examines when a finitely repeated game with imperfect monitoring has a unique equilibrium payoff vector. This problem is nontrivial under imperfect monitoring, because uniqueness of equilibrium (outcome) in the stage game does not extend to finitely repeated games. A (correlated) equilibrium is equilibrium minimaxing if any player's equilibrium payoff is her minimax value when the other players choose a correlated action profile from the actions played in the equilibrium. The uniqueness result holds if all stage game correlated equilibria are equilibrium minimaxing and have the same payoffs. The uniqueness result does not hold under weaker conditions.     

WELFARE IN THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN EXPORT TAXES UNDER BERTRAND DUOPOLY

In the Eaton and Grossman Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (1986), pp. 383–406 model of export taxes under Bertrand duopoly, it is shown that welfare in the Nash equilibrium in export taxes is always higher than welfare under free trade for both countries.     

CYCLICAL SHOCKS IN A MODEL OF EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT

The paper shows a model which displays a procyclical movement of job creation as a rational expectations equilibrium.     

STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA IN A MODEL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH WITH INPUT INTERDEPENDENCE

Two countries face a strategic interdependence in producing intermediate goods. Producing these intermediate goods requires both domestic capital and another imported intermediate good. Individually, both economies determine a balanced growth path by taking into account this interdependence in different grades of awareness. By allowing for strategic interactions in the analysis, we adapted a two‐agent dynamic setting and find an interior Markov perfect equilibrium as well as an open‐loop equilibrium reflecting these different degrees of reaction. We find that main results resemble each other but growth rates will be higher when strategies are dynamically updated.     

ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF GOVERNMENT BORROWING IN A DYNAMIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM

Abstract.  This paper constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model with money in consumers' utility functions and investigates the equilibrium dynamics of government's debt. The limitation level of the government borrowing for which a dynamic equilibrium and the no Ponzi Game condition are compatible with each other is explicitly derived. The critical level depends on the long-run interest rate, primary balance, money supply etc.     

FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION

In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent‐holding firm negotiates with its rival firm about payments for licensing a cost‐reducing innovation. Applying the Nash bargaining solution, we compare two licensing policies, a fixed fee and a royalty. Our results are as follows. Royalty licensing is better than fixed fee licensing for both firms if the innovation is not drastic. So, royalty licensing is always carried out. Moreover, though there exists a case in which consumers prefer fixed fee licensing, royalty licensing is always superior to fixed fee licensing from the social point of view.     

EVALUATION OF ASIAN AIRPORTS AS GATEWAYS: APPLICATION OF NETWORK EQUILIBRIUM MODEL

This research applies the bi‐level market model to the Asia‐based international air transport markets. The model is a two‐stage game in which airlines act as leaders and passengers act as followers. Airlines are assumed to control flight frequencies, and passengers are assumed to choose their optimal route. At the equilibrium point, we have subgame perfect equilibrium. We apply this model to 2003 Asia‐based international air transport markets and conduct some scenario studies. We find that discounting landing charges at Narita Airport increases the passenger flow but diminishes the gateway function for trans‐Pacific transport.     

INTERNATIONAL DEVIATIONS FROM THE LAW OF ONE PRICE: THE ROLE OF SEARCH FRICTIONS AND MARKET SHARE*

This article examines the size and persistence of international deviations from the law of one price in an industry with search frictions. Cost differences lead foreign and domestic firms to price differently within countries. When local firms are more common in each country, there are large and persistent price differences across countries. Large and persistent changes in international relative costs lead to large and persistent changes in international relative prices. Dynamic considerations imply that the amount of a cost shock firms pass through to prices is U‐shaped in the market share of firms receiving the shock.     

ON THE INEFFICACY OF TEMPORARY POLICY IN A DYNAMIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH MONEY*

We construct a dynamic economy with many consumers with money in their utilities. Two main results—a turnpike theorem and inefficacy of temporary policy—are established in a dynamic general equilibrium framework in which price effects generated through markets are explicitly factored in. Turnpike, which is perfectly independent from wealth distribution among the heterogeneous consumers, will be globally attractive. Temporary policy is not effective not only for the future but for the current economy if the long‐run interest rate level is low. The inefficacy result coincides with an intuitive explanation by the standard permanent income hypothesis.     

ESTIMATING THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM BENEFITS OF LARGE CHANGES IN SPATIALLY DELINEATED PUBLIC GOODS*

The purpose of this article is to report a new approach for measuring the general equilibrium willingness to pay for large changes in spatially delineated public goods such as air quality. We estimate the parameters of a locational equilibrium model and compute equilibria for alternative scenarios characterizing the availability of public goods within a system of communities. Welfare measures take into consideration the adjustments of households in equilibrium to nonmarginal changes in public goods. The framework is used to analyze willingness to pay for reductions in ozone concentrations in Southern California between 1990 and 1995.     

我国各省市农业投入与产出的效率评价

发展两型社会农业的重要前提就是对农业生产效率进行评价。将DEA评价方法应用于2008年我国31个省市农业生产的效率评价。通过各个省市农业生产的投入与产出数据的分析,发现北京等5个省市农业生产的产出已达到规模最优,农业生产在投入结构上也是技术有效的;我国其它的26个省市农业生产效率还比较低,这些省市农业生产投入结构不够合理。总体上,我国农业生产的技术化程度还不高,在技术效率和规模效率方面需要加强。     

EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF AVERAGE COST PRICING EQUILIBRIA: A DEGREE THEORETIC APPROACH

This paper considers the issues of existence and uniqueness of average cost pricing equilibria within the context of a single, regulated, multiproduct monopoly with additively separable costs. We employ basic degree theoretic arguments to establish conditions under which an average cost pricing equilibrium exists. The degree theoretic approach permits the development of uniqueness results in a very natural manner.     

我国房地产市场的泡沫检验——基于现值模型

本文以35个大中城市指数为基础,利用现值模型对我国东中西部地区房地产市场泡沫的存在性进行了检验.检验结果表明,我国东部和西部地区存在明显的房地产泡沫,其中东部特别是长江三角洲地区的房价租金比涨幅最大.而中部地区除武汉之外的房价租金比一直较为平稳,几乎不存在泡沫现象.     

区域财政横向均衡与改革发展新突破

认为全面深化改革仍需从财政体制上取得新突破。主张对中国经济区合纵连横,即将东、中、西"三大部"纵向区域调整为泛珠三角、泛长三角和大环渤海"三大块"横向区域,依托这一天然的均衡性区域平台在介于国家与省级之间实施区域财政横向均衡制度,以确保公共服务均等化而又不损坏财政经济增长的效率机制;并通过对常住人口统计中创造财富外溢或享有公共服务外溢等非真实因素剔除后"标准人"的假定与论证,解决了政府间财力均衡公式化分配的难题。     

基于竞争视角的广州高星级酒店集聚分析

高星级酒店在空间上的集聚,提升了区域竞争能力但亦加剧了内部竞争。文章分析了广州高星级酒店集聚特征和集聚动力,从区域竞争和产业内部竞争分析其竞争结构,并从政府、企业层面提出了对策思考。     

集群企业竞争优势的共享性资源观

首先通过构建资源观(RBV)对影响企业竞争优势的资源划分矩阵,提出针对集群企业的RBV资源三分法之外的第四类资源———共享性资源;而后在综合借鉴相关理论研究的基础上,基于RBV的理论分析框架,阐明了共享性资源的特质及其核心要义;接着通过分析共享性资源异质性的构成,阐明了基于共享性资源的集群企业竞争优势理论观点;最后做出简要总结,并指出研究的不足及今后相关领域进一步研究的方向。