央行发布《2007年国际金融市场报告》

近日，央行发布了由央行上海总部组织编写的《2007年国际金融市场报告》。该《报告》共分三大部分，分析了国际金融市场运行的宏观环境、国际金融市场运行状况和中国金融市场与国际金融市场的联系。     

2007年第三季度中国73家企业上市创新记录29家VC/PE支持企业海内外融资138亿美元

选自清科集团SOHU博客 2007年第三季度中国企业上市劲头十足,根据大中华区著名创业投资与私募股权研究、顾问及投资机构清科集团近日发布的《2007年第三季度中国企业上市报告》,2007年第三季度共有73家中国企业在境内外资本市场上市,融资218.56亿美元;其中33家企业在海外各市场上市,融资74.67亿美元;境内资本市场本季度表现超越海外市场,吸引了40家企业上市,融资达143.89亿美元,创历史新高.     

金融动态

证监会发布《中国资本市场发展报告》;2008金融展喜迎奥运年;2007年农信银支付清算系统业务量快速增长。     

中国房产泡沫初显

中国社会科学院不久前发布的报告“2007年中国服务行业发展报告”说，中国房地产市场的泡沫已经浮现，在规模、结构、价格和利润等方面都有着明显的不合理因素。     

深圳证券交易所发布2006年度股票市场绩效报告

为提高市场透明度、增强市场运作效率，深圳证券交易所于2007年3月通过金融创新实验室首次向市场发布《2006年度股票市场绩效报告》，深交所今后将定期报告市场绩效指标。目前中国证券市场正经历转折性变化，面临重要发展机遇，发布市场绩效报告的意义重大。不仅顺应了全球证券交易所发展与改革潮流，而且体现了交易所对建设一个高质量市场的重视。     

从广告投放透视银行竞争态势

2008年3月,CTR市场研究发布了<2006～2007年中国银行业广告投放分析报告>.该报告以CTR全国广告监测网络为基础,以7×24小时不间断监测方式.收集了2006年1月1日～2007年12月31日银行业中国地区广告投放数据(不含信用卡广告数据),并在此基础上撰写而成.通过广告投放状况分析,报告揭示出银行业竞争发展方面的几个显著变化.     

"次货危机"何以演变成全球金融危机

引言 　　2007年3月13日,美国住房抵押贷款银行家协会公布的报告显示,次级房贷市场出现危机.消息传来,美国股市全面下挫.……     

中国房地产走向的思考

近几年来,国内房价一直在涨。2004-2006年全国房价上涨分别是9.7%、7.6%、5.6%,如果说早几年的涨幅还算比较温和的话,2007年房价上涨则一浪高过一浪。2007年12月28日国家发改委、国家统计局最新公布的一份报告显示,2007年1-11月,全国房地产市场运行呈现三大特点:(1)市场需求旺盛;(2)以住房为主的房地产开发投资增速继续加     

全球经济金融环境面临转折

2007年中期,世界银行发布报告称,过去几年是全球经济史上发展速度最快的时期。然而,风云突变,全球金融市场陷入连绵动荡,导致与其紧密联系的实体经济问题缠身。全球投资者溯本清源地追问,发现风暴肇始于美国房地产市场下滑带来的信贷市场危机。     

半导体市场前景堪忧

国际数据公司（IDC）最近发布一份报告,称受2007年年底开始的经济衰退的影响,2009年世界范围内的半导体市场将遭遇22个百分点的滑坡。IDC在报告中称,由于2008年第四季度的疲软表现,全球半导体市场下滑了两个百分点,并预测此后至2010年,全球半导体市场将不会恢复。而2009年,半导体市场在主要生产及销售市场的单位出货量、低利用率和价格侵蚀方面,将继续面临两位数的下降。该骤然下滑将不仅仅影响美国和欧洲,还将波及日本和亚太地区。     

European Banking Integration: Don’t Put the Cart before the Horse

This paper reviews the progress in European banking integration over the last twenty years, and evaluates the current system of banking supervision and deposit insurance based on ‘home country’ control. The public policy implications to draw from the paper are threefold: First, after a relatively slow start, European banking integration is gaining momentum, in terms of cross‐border flows, market share of foreign banks in several domestic markets, and cross‐border M&As of significant size. If this trend continues, the issue of adequate supervision and safety nets in an integrated European banking market will become even more pressing. Second, although until recently banks have relied mostly on subsidiary structures to go cross‐border, this is changing with the recent creation of the European company statute, which facilitates cross‐border branch banking. A review of the case of the Scandinavian bank, Nordea Bank AB, helps to understand some remaining barriers to integration, and the supervisory issues raised by branch banking. Third, it is argued that the principle of ‘home country’ supervision is unlikely to be adequate in the future for large international banks. Because the closure of an international bank would be likely to have cross‐border spillovers, and because some small European countries might be unable to finance the bail‐out of their very large banks, centralization, or at least Europe‐wide coordination, of the decision to close or bail‐out international banks is needed. This raises the issue of European funding of bail‐out costs, European banking supervision, and European deposit insurance.     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

Multinational banking and the international transmission of financial shocks: Evidence from foreign bank subsidiaries

Using bank-level data on 368 foreign subsidiaries of 68 multinational banks in 47 emerging economies during 1994–2008, we present consistent evidence that internal capital markets in multinational banking contribute to the transmission of financial shocks from parent banks to foreign subsidiaries. We find that internal capital markets transmit favorable and adverse shocks by affecting subsidiaries’ reliance on their own internal funds for lending. We also find that the transmission of financial shocks varies across types of shocks; is strongest among subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe, followed by Asia and Latin America; is global rather than regional; and becomes more conspicuous in recent years. We also explore various conditions under which the international transmission of financial shocks via internal capital markets in multinational banking is stronger, including the subsidiaries’ reliance on funds from their parent bank, the subsidiaries’ entry mode, and the capital account openness and banking market structure in host countries.     

The Basel Capital Accords and International Mortgage Markets: A Survey of the Literature

This paper surveys the literature on the impacts of the Basel Capital Accords on banking market profitability, competitiveness, structure and risk‐taking. Special emphasis is applied to the evolution of mortgage markets throughout the world over almost two decades of international bank regulatory policies.     

公开市场操作对债券市场的影响研究

选取2007年1月1日~2014年2月28日为研究区间,观察央行公开市场操作对债券市场的影响,用以判断该货币政策手段所产生的效果。研究发现,在全样本中,无论是放松还是收紧银根的操作,对债券市场的影响均只表现在个别市场,而且影响滞后、较弱。单独研究长期品种操作的结果发现,央行公开市场紧缩操作对债券市场的影响显著,方向与预期一致;而公开市场放松操作在债券市场几乎没有反应,说明没有通过债券市场的传导产生政策效果。     

影子银行对货币政策的影响

随着2007年全球金融危机爆发,学界和社会公众再度提高对金融监管与宏观货币政策的重视。影子银行是金融创新的产物,在给资本市场和产品市场带来活力的同时也使得人们更加关注影子银行对货币市场和货币政策的影响。本文基于信用与宏观经济学理论并利用中国化宏观数据进行论证,将市场利率划分为商业银行体系利率与影子银行体系利率并以贷款基准利率作为商业银行的总体利率,以一年期国债到期收益率作为影子银行利率,以市盈利率作为整个经济体系的实际利率,并利用线性回归给出三者间的关系。结果表明我国的影子银行在一定程度上可以起到降低社会总体融资成本、促进经济增长的作用,但也给物价和金融稳定施加一定的压力,在短期内会加快我国的货币流通速度,降低我国货币政策有效性。     

Designing a U.S. Market for CO2

The United States may soon have a market for carbon. If so, that market will grow out of a cap-and-trade system like the EU's Emissions Trading System for CO₂ or the U.S. Acid Rain Program for SO₂.
This article reviews the historical performance of these two markets, with particular focus on how the flexibility afforded by, as well as restrictions on, the "banking" and borrowing of allowances has affected the evolution of prices. While both markets have generally functioned well, four episodes are used to illustrate the importance of designing the rules to encourage such flexibility.
The 2005 opening of the EU CO₂ market was marked by a surprisingly high price, one that resulted from a delay in institutions with long positions in allowances ("longs") bringing supply to the market.
The 2007 close of the first phase produced a sharp divergence between the spot price at the end of 2007 and the futures price for 2008, reflecting the restriction against carrying over (or "banking") allowances from one phase to the next.
The U.S. SO₂ market's transition to a tighter system in 2000 avoided such a divergence by allowing unlimited banking of allowances into the second phase.
In 2005-2006, the U.S. SO₂ market experienced a surprising price spike attributable to a combination of changing fundamentals and institutional features (notably, the tax treatment of "longs") that undermined the flexibility of the bank.     

Syndicated Leveraged Loans During and After the Crisis and the Role of the Shadow Banking System

In an article published in this journal in 1998, Nobel laureate Merton Miller argued that one of the best weapons available to national economies in their defense against the macroeconomic effects of banking crises is the availability of non‐bank financial institutions and products—or what we now refer to as the “shadow banking system.” Although Miller may have exaggerated the independence of bank‐ and market‐based sources of financing, the author argues that events during and after the recent crisis have shown Miller's claims about the importance of non‐bank investors in the provision of credit to be fundamentally correct. Critics of securitization and the shadow banking system tend to focus on the subprime mortgage story in which the sudden re‐pricing of credit risk and the resulting disappearance of investment demand for ABCP, private‐label mortgage‐related ABS, and ABS CDOs created unexpected and significant downward price pressure on those asset types. But the leveraged loan market tells a very different story. In contrast to the near complete disappearance of private mortgage securitizations, the extraordinary recovery of the U.S. syndicated leveraged loan market demonstrates that the relation between commercial and shadow banking has proved to be a highly productive and resilient one—and very much a two‐way street. When leveraged loans and CLOs experienced problems from 2007 through 2009 due primarily to the widespread liquidity and credit market disruptions that affected essentially all structured credit products, institutional investors in leveraged loans disappeared and the leveraged loan primary market imploded. But when institutional participants recognized the value of the underlying asset—corporate loans—and regained confidence in shadow‐banking products, leveraged lending by banks recovered quickly and dramatically. This outcome is viewed as vindicating Professor Miller's statement about the benefits of shadow markets and securitization— namely, the role of non‐bank investors in diversifying the risk of credit creation while at the same time improving the price discovery process in different markets. The recent history of the U.S. leveraged loan market demonstrates that shadow banking system participants play a critical role in meeting the total demand for such loans, and that the ebbs and flows from institutional leveraged loan markets are strongly connected with the health and integrity of the underlying leveraged bank loan market.     

论银行市场风险的资本计提——兼评内部模型法的适用性

市场风险及其监管资本要求的计量历来为业界和监管当局所关注。近期,次贷危机爆发导致的市场动荡使得全球银行业和监管当局开始重新审视其市场风险管理和监管资本要求。文章结合国际银行业和监管机构计量市场风险及其监管资本要求的当前做法,针对我国银行业的实际情况,重点探索了内部模型法在我国银行业的适用性,尤其是从方法论、特殊风险计量、验证等角度探讨了内部模型法的主要工具——风险价值体系在我国银行业计量市场风险及其监管资本要求的适用性,并从方法论和应用层面提出了相应的政策建议。     

How does competition affect bank risk-taking?

A common assumption in the academic literature and in the supervision of banking systems is that franchise value plays a key role in limiting bank risk-taking. As market power is the primary source of franchise value, reduced competition in banking markets has been seen as promoting banking stability. A recent paper by Martínez-Miera and Repullo (MMR, 2010) shows that a nonlinear relationship theoretically exists between bank competition and risk-taking in the loan market. We test this hypothesis using data from the Spanish banking system. After controlling for macroeconomic conditions and bank characteristics, we find support for this nonlinear relationship using standard measures of market concentration in both the loan and deposit markets. When direct measures of market power, such as Lerner indices, are used, the empirical results are more supportive of the original franchise value hypothesis, but only in the loan market. Overall, the results highlight the empirical relevance of the MMR model, even though further analysis across other banking markets is needed.