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1.
We establish a model wherein a private firm competes with a partially privatized firm whose objective function is endogenously determined through bargaining between owners—the welfare-maximizing government and dividend-maximizing private shareholders. Many existing works on partial privatization have assumed that privatization increases the weight of profits in the partially privatized firm's objective, whereas it decreases the weight of welfare. However, our bargaining approach shows that this result can be reversed.  相似文献   

2.
企业改制模式和改制绩效——基于企业数据调查的经验分析   总被引:21,自引:2,他引:21  
本文以上世纪90年代后半期的企业调查数据为基础,通过建立经济计量模型来研究公有企业的改制绩效,通过相应的技术处理消除企业的各种先天因素或改制前固有的优势,试图测试改制是否能够确实激发出显著的效率效应。分析发现,向私有产权方向改制的企业效率得到显著提高;不同的改制模式是改制绩效的重要决定因素,经营者持大股从效率上来讲是最优的改制方式,而平均分配的股份合作制的改制方式则具有较差的业绩效果。我们还讨论了其原因,以及为什么中国现阶段特定制度环境下最优的公司治理结构是大股东控股。我们认为给定当前制度背景下,最佳的改革方案之一是股权向经营者集中,股权合理定价。因为只有市场的初次分配是有效率的,才能得到收入再分配的源泉。在此基础上,国家可通过各种税收设计,进行较为公平合理的收入再分配。  相似文献   

3.
The literature on mixed oligopoly shows that when production costs are quadratic the public firm is privatized if the competition in the product market is high enough. Similarly, when the public firm is less efficient than private firms and the marginal costs of production are constant, the government privatizes the public firm if its efficiency is low enough. In this paper we analyze this issue assuming that the public firm maximizes the weighted sum of consumer surplus, private profit and the profit of the public firm. If all firms have the same marginal cost of production we obtain that for some value of parameters the government does not privatize the public firm regardless of how many private firms are competing in the product market. We also obtain that the consumer surplus can be lower in the mixed oligopoly than in the private oligopoly.  相似文献   

4.
In this paper, we examine whether labor protection determines the decision to retain a golden share in privatized firms. Using a sample of firms privatized in developing and industrialized countries, we find a negative relation between the likelihood of observing a golden share and labor protection. However, we find that this relation does not hold in the post-financial crisis period, suggesting that the recent crisis is associated with an increase in government control. Furthermore, we show that privatized firms in countries with strong labor protection are penalized with a higher cost of equity. Overall, our results underline the importance of labor protection for an important government control mechanism, namely golden shares, as well as for equity financing costs of privatized firms.  相似文献   

5.
The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms, but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they set up a multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage stake. In this framework, we show that the decision to merge by firms depends on the degree to which goods are substitutes and on the percentage of the shares owned by the government in the multiproduct firm.  相似文献   

6.
This paper analyses the determinants of privatization prices in a multi-industry study using a sample of 68 recently privatized firms from Turkey. Results show that revenue and market characteristics are significant determinants of privatization prices while current cost and profit indicators are not. It is argued that potential buyers regard these state firms as inefficient, therefore do not take into consideration their current costs and profits in determining their value. When the dependent variable is altered by dividing the firm's privatization price by the firm's sales (revenues), it is found that sales-adjusted privatization prices are responsive to firms profit margins. However, this result does not hold when the sample is restricted to a single industry. Profit margins along with other profitability and firm efficiency measures are no longer significant determinants of sales-adjusted privatization prices in the cement industry analysis. Unexploited production opportunities measured by capacity utilization ratios, and complete private ownership resume a more important role.  相似文献   

7.
Partial privatization in mixed duopoly with price and quality competition   总被引:2,自引:2,他引:0  
We analyze price and quality competition in a mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing private firm competes against a state-owned public firm. We first show that the welfare-maximizing public firm provides a lower quality product than the private firm when they are equally efficient. In order to maximize social welfare, government manipulates the objective of the public firm that is given by a convex combination of profits and social welfare. It is demonstrated that an optimal incentive of the public firm is welfare maximization under the absence of quality competition, but it is neither welfare maximization nor profit maximization under the presence of quality competition. The result supports a completely mixed objective between welfare and profit maximizations or partial privatization of the public firm.   相似文献   

8.
When the government bargains with a private firm, the firm cares about only its own profits, but the firm's profits may also enter into the government's utility function. As a result, the government will not bargain as aggressively for a low price. This can lead the government to “over pay” for quality. In contrast to the standard holdup problem, this reverse‐holdup problem can give the firm an incentive to overinvest in non‐contractible quality. The paper also discusses some examples where the reverse‐holdup problem may explain excessive quality in government procurement.  相似文献   

9.
This paper reconsiders the classic issue of whether provision of a public good should be undertaken directly by the government or through private contracting (Hart, Andrei, & Robert, 1997). We consider a third alternative of provision by a mixed ownership firm. We assume that this mixed ownership firm provides the government principal with a combination of the contracting problems it faces in the two more extreme alternatives. We show that full government ownership and provision is never optimal and that frequently the mixed firm undertakes intermediate investments that also prove welfare superior to fully private contracting. These results carry over to an extension in which the agent is presumed to be a foreigner.  相似文献   

10.
When and how to privatize a public firm? This paper suggests that a welfare‐enhancing privatization may be triggered by a negative demand shock. When the shock is relatively mild, it is optimal to privatize a public firm by means of stock market listings; when the shock is sufficiently large, a public–private‐firm merger becomes optimal. This paper also considers a government that cares about privatization revenues and about social welfare. It characterizes how the weight attached to privatization revenues and the improvement in production efficiency of the privatized public firm through a stock market listing may affect the government's choices concerning privatization.  相似文献   

11.
In this paper, we analyze the level of media plurality in a market with two private news firms (private duopoly) and in a market with a private news firm and a public news firm (mixed duopoly). In the private duopoly news firms maximize profits. In the mixed duopoly, the private news firm maximizes profits, while the public news firm maximizes social welfare. We show that, in spite of the public news firm maximizing social welfare, neither media plurality nor social welfare needs to be higher under the mixed duopoly compared with the private duopoly. This will depend on the relation between the costs of adapting news to readers' political preferences, the intensity of the readers' political preferences, and the size of the advertising market.  相似文献   

12.
While privatization of state-owned enterprises has been one of the most important aspects of the economic transition from a centrally planned to a market system, no transition economy has privatized all its firms simultaneously. This raises the question of whether governments privatize firms strategically. In this paper we examine the determinants of the sequencing of privatization. To obtain testable predictions about the factors that may affect sequencing, we investigate the following competing government objectives: (i) Maximizing efficiency through resource allocation; (ii) maximizing public goodwill from the free transfers of shares to the public; (iii) minimizing political costs; (iv) maximizing efficiency through information gains; and (v) maximizing privatization revenues. Next, we use firm-level data from the Czech Republic to test the competing predictions about the sequencing of privatization. Consistent with the hypotheses of a government priority on revenues and public goodwill, we find strong evidence that more profitable firms were privatized first. The sequencing of privatization is also consistent with maximizing efficiency through information gains. Our results indicate that many empirical studies of the effects of privatization on firm performance suffer from a selection bias.  相似文献   

13.
Partial Ownership For The Public Firm And Competition   总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7  
This paper investigates the issue of partial ownership (partial privatization) of a state-owned public enterprise. We elaborate on the framework of Matsumura (1998) by allowing for managerial inefficiency, and show that under moderate conditions partial ownership is a reasonable choice of government in a monopoly market as well as in a mixed duopoly market, where a public firm competes with a profit-maximizing private firm. We also provide some economic rationale on the result that neither full privatization nor full nation-alization is optimum.  相似文献   

14.
Location of public and private firms under endogenous timing of choices   总被引:2,自引:2,他引:0  
This paper studies the choices of locations in a mixed duopoly when production costs are endogenously determined and the public firm maximizes a weighted sum of social surplus and its profits. We find that the locations of the two firms are decided simultaneously when the weight of the public firm’s profits in its objective function is high enough. When this is not the case we find that one firm (not always the public firm but sometimes also the private one) behaves as a leader in the choice of location and location decisions are made sequentially. Moreover, in equilibrium, the production cost of the public firm is never higher than that of the private firm.  相似文献   

15.
In this paper, we present a mixed oligopoly model where electric power generators compete in supply functions in a liberalized market. A former monopolist, the state‐owned generator, is assumed to be (partially) privatized. First, we obtain that there is a relationship between privatization and the number of electric power generators concerning the level of consumer surplus and total welfare. Indeed, a fully state‐owned generator is socially optimal, lowering private generators' profits and enhancing consumer surplus; that is, if the degree of privatization decreases, consumer surplus increases compensating the damage imposed on generators' profits. Second, as the number of generators increases, full privatization may provide similar levels of consumer surplus and social welfare than those observed in a mixed oligopoly. Moreover, it is also obtained that price‐cost margins increase as marginal cost increases. Overall, our results suggest that the state‐owned generator should be privatized when entry barriers are low enough, and competitiveness is enhanced. Otherwise, a state‐owned generator may protect consumers, enhancing consumer surplus.  相似文献   

16.
政治庇护与改制:中国集体企业改制研究   总被引:9,自引:1,他引:9  
公有产权的政治庇护理论认为拥有公有企业控制权的政府会从公有企业的持续经营中获取政治收益(就业、税收、企业利润以及个人福利等),政府或政府代理人的收益将会影响公有企业的改制决策。本文通过1998年至2003年全国规模以上集体企业的大样本数据,检验了政治庇护理论对公有企业改制原因的预测。结果表明,当集体企业为政府或政府代理人贡献的政治收益越高,集体企业在生产投入和产品销售上越依赖于政府,集体企业相对于地方经济越重要时,集体企业越不容易发生改制。这些结果有力地支持了政治庇护理论,并为企业改制政策制定和实施提供了重要的参考依据。  相似文献   

17.
In this paper the following results of a transition from public to private ownership are obtained: The manager of a public firm engages in less effort than is efficient; in a privatized firm the manager's effort is chosen efficiently. The reward to the manager of a public firm is more differentiated than efficient. In the case of an unfavourable economic environment the reward is higher than efficient. On the other hand, the manager in a privatized firm is always rewarded efficiently. It is irrelevant whether the public manager is incompletely informed about the particular mix of government's multiple objectives as long as the government chooses the incentive-compatible reward for the manager.
Zusammenfassung Wird ein Unternehmen vom öffentlichen ins private Eigentum übergeführt, so gilt folgendes: Im öffentlichen Unternehmen sind das Ausmaß der Forschungs- und Entwicklungsinvestitionen sowie der Arbeitseinsatz des Managers niedriger als im Kostenminimum. Im privatisierten Unternehmen werden dagegen der Arbeitseinsatz des Managers und die Forschungs- und Entwicklungsinvestitionen in kostenminimierendem Umfang gewählt. In der öffentlichen Unternehmung führt Informationsasymmetrie zu einer stärkeren Spreizung der Managerentlohnung als im privatisierten Unternehmen. In privatisierten Unternehmen ist die Managerentlohnung so niedrig, daß der Manager nur seinen Reservationsnutzen erhält.
  相似文献   

18.
In this paper we analyze the optimal output determined by a competitive firm facing uncertain demand. We analyze the effect of introducing uncertainty and the effect of increasing uncertainty on the optimal output, under the assumption that the utility function of the firm depends both on profits and on regret. We show that if the firm is more risk averse to profits than to regret (in a sense described below), both effects tend to decrease the optimal output. Similar effects of introducing uncertainty and of increased uncertainty were previously shown by Sandmo (1971) to exist in the case where utility is defined on profits only. Thus, this paper provides conditions under which the above results hold true, even when utility is defined on regret and on profits.  相似文献   

19.
This paper uses a real-option model to examine the net benefit to a government from using tax cut and/or investment subsidy as incentives to induce immediate investment. Although earlier papers generally concluded that investment subsidy dominates tax cut, it is observed that many governments use a combination of subsidy and tax cut. We show that, when the government uses a different discount rate from private firms, and when it has to borrow money to provide an investment subsidy, it is possible to get an internal optimum; that is, it might be optimal for the government to provide an investment subsidy as well as charge a positive tax rate on the profits from the project. Thus, we provide an explanation for the puzzling fact that many governments provide an investment subsidy to a firm while simultaneously taxing its profits.  相似文献   

20.
This study analyses the impact of ownership structure and market liquidity on company value. We investigate different aspects of ownership: the risk of political interference, private investors vs. the state acting as influential blockholders, and preferential political treatment of companies. Using a unique dataset of Polish partial privatizations initiated by shares transfers to entities under limited government influence, we find that government divestments can enhance company value, due to reduction in risk of political interference. A potential increase in the liquidity of trades in transferred companies’ shares also boosts their market value. On the other hand, an increased likelihood of the emergence of private blockholders able to expropriate minority shareholders reduces the firm’s market value. Our results support the political view of privatization: governments have objectives different to profit maximization, which leads to suboptimal investment from this point of view and lower market value of companies. We also develop a model to empirically distinguish between different aspects of ownership on company value.  相似文献   

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