Vertical versus horizontal tax externalities: An empirical test

We study taxation externalities in federations of benevolent governments. Where different hierarchical government levels tax the same base, one can observe two types of externalities: a horizontal externality, working among governments of the same level and leading to tax rates that are too low compared to the social optimum; and a vertical externality, working between different levels of government and leading to suboptimally high tax rates. Building on the model of Keen and Kotsogiannis [Keen, Michael J., Kotsogiannis, Christos, 2002. Does federalism lead to excessively high taxes? American Economic Review 92 (1) 363–370], we derive a discriminating hypothesis to distinguish vertical and horizontal tax externalities based on measurable variables. This test is applied to a panel data set on local taxes in a sample of Swiss municipalities that feature direct-democratic fiscal decision making, so as to maximize the correspondence with the “benevolent” governments of the theory. We find that vertical externalities dominate – they are thus an observed empirical phenomenon as well as a notable extension to the theory of tax competition.     

Economics of externalities and public policy

In this paper we study a particular case of “multiple” externalities associated to the production of a good/activity, whose external effects can change from positive to negative depending on the level of output (intersecting externalities). To analyze their impact on the public policy we propose a very simple two-agent partial equilibrium model in the technological context of externalities. In a static framework, the centralized solution always implies an optimal policy, which may consist of taxation or subsidization depending on the individual optimum and on the technology parameters. In a dynamic model with local knowledge of the efficiency function and instantaneous output adjustments, such an optimal policy can be structurally stable or unstable. In the latter case, under small changes of the parameters the policy may switch from low taxation/subsidization to high taxation/subsidization or vice versa, or even jump discontinuously from taxation to subsidization or vice versa. Furthermore, the decentralized solution based upon “tradable rights” can be economically equivalent to the centralized solution in the form of taxation policy but the two solutions may be not politically equivalent.

Productivity change and externalities: empirical evidence from Hungary

This paper contributes to the analysis of the impact of externalities on the host country’s total factor productivity by taking into account different dimensions of spillover effects. Namely, engagement in exporting and foreign ownership is generally perceived as being beneficial to individual firms and the economy as a whole. The approach used in the current research accounts for different internal as well as external factors that individual firms face and evaluates the effect on changes in productivity, technology as well as the efficiency of domestic firms. The empirical analysis focuses on Hungary. While the country leads the group of post-socialist countries in the amount of attracted foreign direct investments (FDI) the effect of this policy on the economy remains unclear. The research finds that different externalities play a different role in productivity, technological and efficiency change in different types of firms and sectors of the economy.     

Upstream-downstream transactions and watershed externalities: Experimental evidence from Kenya

Where environmental policies or projects seek behavioral change, understanding underlying norms and preferences is essential to securing environmental outcomes. This study models a payment for environmental services intervention in an experimental field laboratory in Nyanza Province, Kenya. Upstream and downstream individuals are paired in a standard investment game, in which the upstream mover's investment represents land use decisions and the downstream mover responds with a choice of compensation payment. The experimental intervention introduces an enforcement treatment on the downstream movers' compensation decisions for a single round. Underlying social preferences and identity appear to shape individual transactions between upstream and downstream individuals. Upstream first movers are sensitive to the removal of the enforcement on their downstream partners in the second round, and make decisions consistent with crowding out of social preferences. The results suggest that environmental interventions may affect resource decisions for individuals who are not themselves direct targets of enforcement.     

Taxation under oligopoly in a general equilibrium setting

Taxation under oligopoly is analyzed in a general equilibrium setting where the firms are large relative to the size of the economy and maximize the utility of their shareholders. Assuming that preferences are either identical and homothetic or identical and quasi‐linear, then the oligopoly model is an aggregative game, which greatly simplifies the comparative statics for the effects of taxation. This novel analysis of taxation leads to a number of counterintuitive results that challenge conventional wisdom in microeconomics. A lump‐sum tax may increase the price of the oligopolistic good and decrease welfare whereas a profits tax may decrease the price of the oligopolistic good and increase welfare. A profits tax is shown to be superior to a lump‐sum tax. Furthermore, in line with conventional wisdom, total tax revenue is always higher with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax that leads to the same price for the oligopolistic good.     

Fiscal decentralization and tax collection: evidence from the rural property tax in Brazil

The present paper investigates whether the decentralization of the rural land property tax (ITR) in Brazil increases the aggregate volume of tax collection from this source. We apply a difference-in-differences strategy where treatment is defined as the switch from a federal administration to the decentral management of the ITR by a municipality. The panel data from 2002 to 2017 show that decentralization leads to an average increase in overall ITR collection by about 42% in the first year, which rises to 109% in the 8th year. Our results are robust to balancing with entropy weights, the anticipation of treatment as well as the multi-period staggered timing of the ITR decentralization. Due to these peculiarities of our research design, we show that the increase in ITR collection is related to a more efficient tax management, i.e., a rigorous implementation and charge of tax duties.     

Corporate tax policy and heterogeneous firm innovation: Evidence from a developing country

This paper adds to the literature by identifying the causality of corporate tax policy on firm innovation in a developing country. We exploit the China’s 2006 corporate income tax base reform to integrate the tax system between foreign-invested and state/collective-controlled firms as a natural experiment. The difference-in-differences strategy documents a positive effect of corporate tax deduction on firm patenting. The effect is particularly significant if a firm is of larger size or locates in eastern provinces. We also examine possible channels behind the findings, including changes in R&D and capital investment, intangible assets, financial constraints, and new product sales.     

Internalization of externalities and local government consolidation: empirical evidence from Japan

The fact that jurisdictional consolidation overcomes externality problems in the provision of local public goods is one of the best-known benefits of consolidation in the theoretical literature. Nevertheless, previous studies provide little evidence of how public service spillover effects influence consolidation decisions. This study empirically tests the hypothesis that spillovers induce consolidation, using voting data on the consolidation of Japanese municipalities. The extent of spillovers is measured by estimating the demand function for public goods with externalities. It is found that residents of the municipalities that can internalize a large amount of public goods spillovers through municipal consolidation tend to favor consolidation. This result supports the theoretical inference that spillovers in local public goods affect utility gains from jurisdiction integration, thus serving as one of the key impetuses for boundary reform. Moreover, after controlling for the spillover effects, economies of scale, population share, differences in median income, and unconditional grants can help explain consolidation preference.     

Network externalities in consumer spending on lottery games: evidence from Spain

We use data from two nationally representative Spanish surveys in 2005 and 2006 to investigate spending on lottery games. Estimates from Tobit and double hurdle models of participation in lottery markets and spending on lottery tickets find that frequent participation in one game is not associated with an increased or decreased probability of participating in other games, but is associated with increased spending on other games. Consumer spending on different lottery games exhibits inter-related consumption decisions. Also, the assumptions underlying the double hurdle model, but not the Tobit model, better describe consumer spending on lottery tickets in Spain.     

Outsourcing of accounting tasks and tax management: evidence from a corporate tax rate change

The aim of this article is to investigate if small firms react to a national corporate tax rate reduction by managing their taxable income. In contrast to previous studies, we also analyse whether outsourcing of accounting tasks affects the magnitude of the reaction. Based on a sample of Finnish firms and measures of earnings management, evidence is provided that firms with an internalized accounting function are more active tax planners in this context. This study suggests that outsourcing of accounting tasks increases the corporate tax reporting quality.     

Corporate tax competition: A meta-analysis

Do jurisdictions compete over corporate taxes? The extent of uncooperative strategic government interactions in corporate tax policy remains unclear, because the results reported in relevant econometric studies vary considerably. This paper applies meta-analysis and meta-regression methods to a novel dataset consisting of 604 observations on corporate tax competition reported in 33 primary studies. The results point to the presence of corporate tax competition effects, and there is no consistent evidence for publication selection bias. The analysis, however, reveals that several data and specification choices systematically affect the results reported in the literature: the choice of the weighting scheme applied in estimating the corporate tax function and details of the econometric estimation strategy are significant when it comes to explaining variation in reported results. Furthermore, we find that accounting for partisan politics and country size matters.     

Exogenous tax changes and interest rates: testing for Ricardian equivalence using an efficient markets model

This article tests the Ricardian theory (i.e., Barro 1974) using Mishkin’s (1981, 1982) efficient markets model of interest rates. Employing Romer and Romer’s (2010) measure exogenous tax changes, I am able to test whether the U.S. bond market reacts in a Keynesian or Ricardian manner to exogenous tax policy changes. This helps avoid the endogeneity problems associated with measuring the interest rate effects of deficits and provides a cleaner test of the pure Ricardian thought experiment. I find a significant negative relationship between tax changes and interest rates which is inconsistent with the Ricardian model and support the Keynesian crowding out framework.     

Estimating the elasticities of gasoline demand: an instrumental variable approach

This article uses a new identification strategy to estimate the demand for gasoline. I show that the monthly gasoline price is endogenous to gasoline demand at the state level, and that gasoline tax and domestic oil first purchasing price together are strong and valid instruments to correct for the endogeneity bias. In addition to estimating the price elasticity, this article also provides an estimate of the income elasticity. These updated estimates are critical factors in evaluating the environmental effect of gasoline tax and forecasting gasoline consumption.     

Testing for forward-looking behaviour: evidence from the enactment of smoking restrictions

This paper develops a new test for forward-looking behaviour based on the establishment of public smoking restrictions. Given that the announcement of these restrictions effectively increases the future cost of smoking, we should expect forward-looking smokers to curb their consumption before the restriction is effective due to complementarity between present and future consumption. I perform the estimation using detailed, high-frequency household-level purchase data. The results provide evidence against the forward-looking behaviour of smokers. Households do not reduce their cigarette purchases before announced public smoking restrictions are established; they only do so once the restriction is in effect.     

An economic-ecological model of urban growth and urban externalities: empirical evidence from Italy

The importance of urban size for urban sustainability is well known; it plays an important role in the possibility of shaping the quality of urban living conditions. For this reason, it is important to study urban dynamics in connection with the issue of environmental quality. Moreover, awareness of the existence of cyclical patterns in urban dynamics, which we stress in this paper, can be useful for the formulation of environmental policies enabling a steady state equilibrium to be reached in terms of sustainability by flattening out the cyclical waves. A number of more quantitative models for the interpretation of urban growth has been provided; these models are related to the well-known ecological prey-predator model of Lotka–Volterra, and provide a good interpretative framework of the territorial phenomena, characterised by strong feed-back mechanisms. Recently, a pure economic model, linking the per-capita income and the urban rents has been suggested as a possible interpretative model of urban growth which is characterised by two main advantages: (a) its capacity to overcome some of the limits of the previous prey-predator models, like the necessity to apply the concept of an urban carrying capacity; (b) its pure economic feature. The present paper presents the model and the logic behind it and provides an empirical analysis of the model based on the Italian case. An econometric model is presented on the relationship between urban population growth and urban rent, based on a database of 95 Italian cities in time series from 1963 to 1996; the feedback mechanisms between the two variables emerge. This work represents the first attempt to provide an estimate of the prey-predator model based on real data.     

Numerical simulation on property tax reform: evidence from China

This article analyses the property tax reform in China in a computable general equilibrium model that recognizes the interaction between and among housing markets in different provinces and macroeconomic development. Using real data in 2010, we present the benchmark equilibrium for reference property and income tax rates. Then, we examine different property and income tax policies and make a comparison of their production, consumption, welfare and national income. We find that the implementation of property tax would decrease the house production at the expense of welfare in taxed area. The expansion of the taxed regions may increase the total social welfare and national income. Even though property tax policy may not be able to change the income distribution in China, increasing income tax rate could narrow the income disparity. Finally, this article shows the reliability of the conclusions when sensitivity analysis on optimal condition of equilibrium computation is performed under varied property tax policy.     

The costs of tax havens: evidence from industry-level data

ABSTRACT

Multinational enterprises make use of tax havens to avoid paying corporate income taxes and this costs 100 billion USD and more in lost government revenue worldwide according to an increasing number of recent studies. None of those studies assigns these costs to industries. I aim to shed more light on this gap by using some of the best available industry-level US data to determine to what extent the location of the MNEs’ profit is aligned with the location of their economic activities. My first finding is that the most important tax havens for US multinational enterprises are the Netherlands, Ireland and Luxembourg (all EU member states). Second, I systematically identify the specific industries in specific tax havens responsible for the costs, which should be useful information for tax authorities aiming to reduce tax avoidance. Finally, I argue that the current data are not detailed enough to provide a reliable industry breakdown of the costs, but the prospect of combining input-output tables with forthcoming country-by-country data seems more promising.     

Intergovernmental fiscal transfers and local tax efforts: evidence from provinces in China

This paper explores the incentive effects of total central fiscal transfers and its components – tax rebates and equalization grants – on provincial tax efforts in China. Our theoretical model predicts negative impacts on provincial tax efforts from both total fiscal transfers and equalization grants, while the effects of tax rebates are theoretically unclear. Using Chinese provincial panel data from 1995 to 2007, our empirical study provides significant evidence on the theoretical implications.     

Transaction tax and stock market behavior: evidence from an emerging market

This study examines the impact of a stamp tax rate increase on market behavior, using data from two stock exchanges in China. We find that when the tax rate increases from 0.3 to 0.5% (which implies that the transaction cost increases by about 1/3) trading volume decreases by 1/3. This implies an elasticity of turnover with respect to a stamp tax of −50% and an elasticity of turnover with respect to transaction cost of −100%. The markets’ volatility significantly increases after the increase in the tax rate. Furthermore, the change in the volatility structure indicates that the markets become less efficient in the sense that shocks are less quickly assimilated in the markets.

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