Careers and Survival: Competition and Risk in the Hedge Fund and CTA Industry

Investors in hedge funds and commodity trading advisors (CTAs) are concerned with risk as well as return. We investigate the volatility of hedge funds and CTAs in light of managerial career concerns. We find an association between past performance and risk levels consistent with previous findings for mutual fund managers. Variance shifts depend upon relative rather than absolute fund performance. The importance of relative rankings points to the importance of reputation costs in the investment industry. Our analysis of factors contributing to fund disappearance shows that survival depends on absolute and relative performance, excess volatility, and on fund age.     

Implicit incentives and reputational herding by hedge fund managers

Several theories of reputation suggest that managers' incentives affect their propensity to engage in herding behavior. This paper investigates these theories by tracking hedge fund managers' herding behavior over their careers. I first examine managerial incentives for herding, and show that more senior managers that deviate from the herd have a significantly higher probability of failure and do not experience higher fund inflows than their less-senior counterparts. These implicit incentives should encourage managers to herd more as their careers progress. I find strong support for this hypothesis: using a number of proxies for herding, I show that more experienced managers herd more than less-experienced managers. Finally, I examine performance differences between more and less-experienced managers, and find that while more experienced managers underperform less-experienced managers, this underperformance does not appear to be caused by differences in herding. Overall, these results are in direct contrast with studies of mutual fund managers, reflecting important difference in implicit incentives between the two industries.     

Recession managers and mutual fund performance

We find that fund managers who began their careers during recessions produce superior returns. This superior performance is not unconditional, as they exhibit better market timing than their non-recession counterparts in recessions, but do not demonstrate better stock picking in booms. Exploring managers' portfolio choices across years, we find that recession managers tilt their investments towards defensive, rather than cyclical, industries during and before recession periods. Overall, our findings support the argument that the economic conditions under which an individual initially entered the labour market exert a long-term impact on her career outcomes and decision-making.     

The seasoned executive's decision-making style

Leaders make decisions every day of their lives, but how they do it changes dramatically over the course of their careers. At lower levels, the job is to get widgets out the door; action is at a premium. At higher levels, the job involves decisions about which widgets to offer and how to develop them. To climb the corporate ladder and be effective in new roles, managers need to change the way they use information and evaluate options. Based on a study of the decision-making profiles of more than 120,000 executives, the authors found that people make decisions very differently in public than they do in private and that the decision styles of successful managers evolve in highly predictable patterns. The most successful managers and executives become increasingly open and interactive in their leadership (or public) styles, and more analytic in their thinking (or private) styles, as they progress in their careers. The research shows that decision-making profiles do a complete flip over the course of a career; that is, the decision profile of a successful CEO is the opposite of a successful first-line supervisor's. When does the major change in focus occur? Somewhere between the manager level and the director level, executives find that formerly effective decision styles no longer work so well. At this point, decision styles fall into a "convergence zone", where managers use all styles more or less equally. From then on, the executives continue to evolve their styles. The most successful managers come to the convergence zone quickly and continue to adjust their styles as their careers progress. Low performers seem to stagnate once they hit the convergence zone; their styles do not evolve in new directions. Clearly, relying on past successes and habits is no guarantee of success-indeed, it may be the road to failure.     

Should hedge funds be cautious reporting high returns?

In a recent article, Schuster and Auer (2012) show that fund managers with a certain positive performance need to be aware of the fact that too high prospective excess returns can lower the empirical Sharpe ratio of their funds. In this note, we investigate the empirical relevance of this effect. We analyse whether hedge funds being evaluated on the basis of the Sharpe ratio negatively influence their performance by reporting too high returns. Our results show that a economically significant number of hedge funds listed in the CISDM hedge fund database has at least once reported a high return causing this effect.     

Fund selection,style allocation,and active management abilities: Evidence from funds of hedge funds’ holdings

This study examines whether funds of hedge funds (FOHFs) provide superior before-fee performance through managers’ fund selection, style allocation, and active management abilities. Using reported holdings of Securities and Exchange Commission–registered FOHFs, we find that FOHF managers have fund selection abilities, as hedge funds held by FOHFs outperform their style indices and over half of the individual hedge funds in the Lipper Trading Advisor Selection System (TASS) database. We also find that FOHF managers add value through active management of FOHFs’ holdings, while evidence on their style allocation abilities is mixed. Our findings suggest that FOHFs generate superior before-fee performance and that FOHF managers’ skillset is broader than previously documented. Thus, our study helps explain why FOHFs continue to survive and suggests that FOHF fee structure reform merits consideration.     

Career concerns and peer effects in institutional tournaments: Evidence from ECB reserve currency portfolios

Using data on European Central Bank's (ECB's) reserve currency portfolios, we find that money managers react to relative rankings (i.e., own vs. peers’ performance) by adjusting portfolio active risk levels measured ex ante by actual deviations from their benchmark. This occurs in the absence of explicit incentives as no monetary reward is promised for winning this “tournament” among portfolio managers. We collect information on managers’ characteristics, including age, education, tenure, salary, and career path, and investigate the role played by implicit incentives. We provide evidence that both individual career concerns and institutional peer pressure contribute to the documented relationship between ranking and risk taking.     

A tale of feedback trading by hedge funds

This paper studies the extent of feedback trading at the factor level by hedge fund managers. We show that fund managers continuously adjust their exposure to different risk factors conditional on the recent performance of these factors. The majority of managers apply a positive feedback strategy, whereas the remaining managers use a negative feedback strategy. In addition, we find some evidence for factor timing ability, although managers appear to be more backward looking than forward looking. We show that positive feedback trading can be beneficial to fund performance in our setup. If managers applied the positive feedback strategy more aggressively, however, they could benefit more from it. As such, the “smart switching benchmark” can be used to assess the risk-adjusted performance of hedge funds.     

The fragile capital structure of hedge funds and the limits to arbitrage

During a financial crisis, when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices, hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash. The paper explains this phenomenon. We argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds, combined with low market liquidity, creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds' arbitrage capabilities. We present a model of hedge funds' optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors. We show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions. The model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage.     

Style chasing by hedge fund investors

This paper examines whether investors chase hedge fund investment styles. We find that better-performing and more popular styles are rewarded with higher inflows in subsequent periods. This indicates that investors compare hedge fund styles in terms of recent performance and popularity, and they subsequently reallocate funds from less successful to more successful styles. Furthermore, we find evidence of competition between individual hedge funds of the same style. Funds outperforming the other funds in their styles and funds whose inflows exceed the average flows in their styles experience higher inflows in subsequent periods. One of the reasons for competition among same-style funds is investors’ search for the best managers. The high minimum investment required to invest in a hedge fund limits investors’ diversification opportunities and makes this search particularly important. Finally, we show that hedge fund investors’ implementation of style chasing in combination with intra-style fund selection represents a smart strategy.     

Leverage-induced systemic risk under Basle II and other credit risk policies

We use a simple agent based model of value investors in financial markets to test three credit regulation policies. The first is the unregulated case, which only imposes limits on maximum leverage. The second is Basle II and the third is a hypothetical alternative in which banks perfectly hedge all of their leverage-induced risk with options. When compared to the unregulated case both Basle II and the perfect hedge policy reduce the risk of default when leverage is low but increase it when leverage is high. This is because both regulation policies increase the amount of synchronized buying and selling needed to achieve deleveraging, which can destabilize the market. None of these policies are optimal for everyone: risk neutral investors prefer the unregulated case with low maximum leverage, banks prefer the perfect hedge policy, and fund managers prefer the unregulated case with high maximum leverage. No one prefers Basle II.     

The performance of emerging hedge funds and managers

This paper provides the first systematic analysis of performance patterns for emerging funds and managers in the hedge fund industry. Emerging funds and managers have particularly strong financial incentives to create investment performance and, because of their size, may be more nimble than established ones. Performance measurement, however, needs to control for the usual biases afflicting hedge fund databases. After adjusting for such biases and using a novel event time approach, we find strong evidence of outperformance during the first two to three years of existence. Each additional year of age decreases performance by 42 basis points, on average. Cross-sectionally, early performance by individual funds is quite persistent, with early strong performance lasting for up to five years.     

Managerial career concerns and the content of corporate disclosures: An analysis of the tone of earnings press releases

This study examines how the narrative content of corporate disclosures is affected by managers’ career concerns, measured by the enforceability of noncompete provisions in employment contracts. We provide empirical evidence that career concerns lead managers to manipulate the content of corporate disclosures by inflating the tone of earnings press releases to convey a more optimistic picture about the firm’s financial performance. We ensure the causality of our findings by exploiting changes to noncompete enforceability following court rulings. We also show that tone inflation is stronger when CEOs are younger, less capable and less experienced, as well as for managers of firms with more independent boards, more analysts following and better governance.     

Does concurrent management of mutual and hedge funds create conflicts of interest?

This paper shows that conflicts of interest may exist in cases where a hedge fund manager starts a mutual fund but not in the opposite case. We compare performance, asset flows, and risk incentives to establish several key differences between these two scenarios: First, prior to concurrent management, hedge fund managers experience worse performance while mutual fund managers achieve better performance relative to their full-time peers. Second, hedge fund managers who choose concurrent management are disproportionately the ones with less experience. Their hedge funds tend to suffer a decline in performance after the event. By contrast, mutual fund managers who choose concurrent management tend to outperform their full-time peers. Based on our findings, we make important recommendations for policy makers and companies. The relevance of our recommendations extends beyond the small share of companies presently engaged in concurrent management.     

Career Concerns and Resource Allocation in Conglomerates

We investigate resource allocation decisions in conglomerateswhen managers are motivated by career concerns. When divisionalcash flows are differentially informative about managerial ability,we show that it is in the managers' interest to overallocateunobservable intangible resources to the more informative divisions.Anticipating this bias, it is optimal for the firm's ownersto also overallocate observable capital to the more informativedivisions. The model provides rationale for corporate socialismand corporate hedging. It also highlights a cost of segmentreporting and tracking stocks, namely, that they allow managersto distort their perceived ability at the expense of investors.     

IS DIVERSIFICATION A JOB SAFETY NET FOR SELL-SIDE ANALYSTS?

We study sell-side analysts’ motives to diversify their portfolios across industries. Despite the negative association between diversification and accuracy, more than 60% of analysts cover multiple industries. We argue that analysts’ choice to diversify is rooted in concerns about future job security. We find that more diversified analysts are less likely to experience job turnover and leave the profession but are not more likely to advance their careers. For experienced and all-star analysts, diversification does not improve career outcomes. We conclude that industry diversification is a safety mechanism for inexperienced and unranked analysts who are concerned about job security.     

Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives

Under the principal-agent framework, we study and compare different compensation schemes commonly adopted by hedge fund and mutual fund managers. We find that the option-like performance fee structure prevalent among hedge funds is suboptimal to the symmetric performance fee structure. However, the use of high water mark (HWM) mitigates the suboptimality, though to a very limited extent. Both our theoretical models and simulation results show that HWM will induce more managerial efforts only when a fund is slightly under the water but it will unfavorably dampen incentives when a fund is too deep under the water and when the manager’s skill is poor. Allowing managers to invest personal wealth in their own funds, however, helps align interests and provides positive managerial incentives.     

The Performance of Hedge Fund Strategies and the Asymmetry of Return Distributions

We present hedge fund performance estimates that adjust for stale prices, Fama‐French risk factors and skewness. We contrast these new performance estimates with traditional performance measures. Using three‐factor models to adjust for staleness in prices and to incorporate Fama‐French factors along with the Harvey‐Siddique (2000) two‐factor model that incorporates skewness, we find that for the period 1990–2003, all hedge fund categories achieve above average performance when measured against an aggregate market index. More significantly, however, when we estimate performance at the individual hedge fund level, we discover that only 40 to 47% of the funds are shown to achieve an above average performance over that time period depending on the model used. These results have important implications for investors, endowments and pensions when they choose hedge fund managers.     

Incentives and risk taking in hedge funds

We study how incentive fees and manager’s own investment in the fund affect the investment strategy of hedge fund managers. We find that loss averse managers increase the risk of the fund’s investment strategy with higher incentive fees. However, risk taking is greatly reduced if a substantial amount of the manager’s own money (at least 30%) is in the fund. Using the Zurich hedge fund universe, we test the relation between risk taking and incentive fees empirically. Hedge funds with incentive fees have significantly lower mean returns (net of fees), while downside risk is positively related to the incentive fee level. Fund of funds charging large incentive fees achieve relatively high mean returns, but with significantly higher risk as well.     

Perceptions and experiences of career success among aspiring and early career accountants and the role of organisational support

Positive perceptions of career success are critical among accounting professionals, given their connection with performance, turnover and organisational commitment. Drawing on career stage theory, this study explores the perceptions and experiences of career success among 475 aspiring (Accounting/Finance students), 305 early career accountants (ECAs) and 165 managers/recruiters in Australia. Findings reflected both objective and subjective dimensions of career success alongside notable differences between aspiring accountants and ECAs, highlighting shifting views across the career stages of exploration and establishment. While ECAs were largely positive about their access to career success, managers/recruiters identified ways to create further opportunities for ECAs' career success.