Peer Effects among Swimmers

We develop a novel identification strategy and examine various aspects of peer effects using swimming data. We find that the performance of adjacent competitors positively influences swimmers' performances. In particular, swimmers are influenced by slower‐lane peers, suggesting that being chased improves one's performance. We use absenteeism data to directly compare the performances of swimmers with and without peers. We have found that swimmers swim faster with peers swimming behind them than when swimming alone, but that they swim slower with peers swimming ahead. Finally, we find that observability is a key determinant of peer effects, by comparing freestyle and backstroke competitions.     

Within-series momentum in hockey: No returns for running up the score

Drawing on data from 916 Division 1 men’s college hockey games played during a recent six-year period in the Western Collegiate Hockey Association (WCHA), we find evidence that positive momentum within 458 two-game series does not exist when controlling for team quality. We find that neither victory nor the margin of victory in Game 1 of a two-game series is predictive of the outcome of Game 2. We suggest that loss aversion should be considered in relation to questions of momentum.     

Golden cages for showy birds: Optimal switching costs in labor contracts

Under what circumstances do workers sign contracts with high quitting penalties? Our answer points to market transparency. When the worker's performance is privately observed by the incumbent firm, alternative employers face an adverse selection problem. As a result, efficient separations can only take place through involuntary layoffs and there is no role for quitting fees. In contrast, when performance is public, quitting fees are useful devices to appropriate the surplus from workers’ reallocation. Separations are amicable and take the form of quitting after downwardly renegotiating the fees. Qualitative features of contracts are independent of the distribution of ex-post bargaining power. The impact of switching costs on total welfare and its distribution depends on the degree of market transparency and the ex-ante distribution of market power.     

Communication and reputation in procurement auctions — Some empirical evidence

This paper studies communication and reputation in market interactions using data from online procurement auctions. Positive reputation ratings and engaging in communication increase a bidder’s probability of winning. Messages are primarily used to reduce the asymmetric information associated with transactions.     

Transfer fee regulations in European football

We analyze the impact of three different transfer fee systems on payoffs, contract lengths, training and effort incentives in European football. The different regimes, being used until 1995 (“pre-Bosman”), currently in use (“Bosman”), and recently approved (“Monti”) differ with respect to the transfer fee an initial club is entitled to depending on whether a player has a valid contract or not. We show that the different systems differ only with respect to the contract length if the contract which maximizes the expected joint surplus of the initial club and the player is feasible under each system. Otherwise, regime P is strictly dominated by regime B in terms of expected social welfare. Regime M leads to higher effort but lower incentives to invest in training compared to system B.     

WHO SEARCHES?*

We consider a directed search model with buyers and sellers and determine whether buyers look for sellers or vice versa. The buyers and sellers can choose to search or wait; what they do in equilibrium depends on the relative size of the two populations and the price formation mechanism. We study bargaining and auctions and find that when one population is much larger than the other the former searches and the latter waits. Under auction with roughly equal populations some buyers and sellers search and some wait. Our results challenge the practice of postulating who searches and who waits.     

Branching bandits: a sequential search process with correlated pay-offs

This paper presents a model of a sequential search process for the best outcome of many multi-stage projects. The branching structure of the search environment is such that the payoffs to various actions are correlated; nevertheless, it is shown that the optimal strategy is given by a simple reservation price rule.     

JOB SATISFACTION OF THE HIGHLY EDUCATED: THE ROLE OF GENDER, ACADEMIC TENURE, AND EARNINGS

The determinants of job satisfaction are estimated for PhD‐level scientists in the United States across academic and nonacademic sectors. In initial estimates, female scientists report lower job satisfaction than males in academia but higher job satisfaction than males in the nonacademic sector. While academic scientists with tenure have substantially greater job satisfaction than nonacademic scientists, we show that the magnitude of this influence varies by gender. After correcting for the lower evaluation placed by females both on earnings and on tenure, female academic scientists actually match nonacademic scientists in reporting greater job satisfaction than men.     

Sorting versus screening: Search frictions and competing mechanisms

In a market where sellers compete by posting trading mechanisms, we allow for a general search technology and show that its features crucially affect the equilibrium mechanism. Price posting prevails when meetings are rival, i.e., when a meeting by one buyer reduces another buyer's meeting probability. Under price posting buyers reveal their type by sorting ex-ante. Only if the meeting technology is sufficiently non-rival, price posting is not an equilibrium. Multiple buyer types then visit the same sellers who screen ex-post through auctions.     

Skating on thin ice: rule changes and team strategies in the NHL

Abstract.  In an effort to stimulate a more exciting and entertaining style of play, the National Hockey Association (NHL) changed the rewards associated with the results of overtime games. Under the new rules, teams tied at the end of regulation both receive a single point, regardless of the outcome in overtime. A team scoring in the sudden-death 5-minute overtime period would earn an additional point. Prior to the rule change in the 1999–2000 season, the team losing in overtime would receive no points while the winning team earned 2 points. This paper presents a theoretical model to explain the effect of the rule change on the strategy of play during both the overtime period and the regulation time game. The results suggest that under the new overtime, format equally powerful teams will play more offensively in overtime resulting in more games decided by a sudden-death goal. The results also suggest that while increasing the likelihood of attacking in overtime, the rule change would have a perverse effect on the style of play during regulation by causing them to play conservatively for the tie. Empirical data confirm the theoretical results. The paper also shows that increasing the rewards to a win in regulation time would prevent teams from playing defensively during regular time.     

Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: Theory and experiments

This study presents a laboratory experiment of the first and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values, where the distribution of bidder valuations may be unknown. In our experimental setting, in first price auctions, bids are lower with the presence of ambiguity. This result is consistent with ambiguity loving in a model that allows for different ambiguity attitudes. We also find that the first price auction generates significantly higher revenue than the second price auction with and without ambiguity.     

Olympic Games: No legacy for sports

Countries whose cities host the Summer Olympic Games increase significantly their success during the competition. We study whether such effect is lasting or not. We compute the effect of hosting on the total number of medals in the subsequent games. To confront the issue that the selection of the host city is endogenous, we use a natural counterfactual: countries whose cities also bid for the Olympics but were not selected by the International Olympic Committee. In all cases, we find that Olympic success on medals fades away immediately after hosting.     

Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining

In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully characterize an optimal mechanism under general conditions. Surprisingly, in this optimal mechanism, the seller never allocates the object to the regular buyer regardless of his bargaining power in the resale market. The seller sells only to the publicly known buyer, and reveals no additional information to the resale market. The possibility of resale causes the seller to sometimes hold back the object, which under our setup is never optimal if resale is prohibited. We find that the seller?s revenue is increasing in the publicly known buyer?s bargaining power in the resale market. When the publicly known buyer has full bargaining power, Myerson?s optimal revenue is achieved; when the publicly known buyer has no bargaining power, a conditionally efficient mechanism prevails.     

虚拟团队信任影响因素实证研究

虚拟团队的信任是人力资源管理与组织行为学领域的一个重要研究课题。相比较对传统面对面团队信任影响因素的大量研究,虚拟团队信任影响因素的研究尤其是实证方面的研究相对较少。本文在对虚拟团队产生背景、虚拟团队信任及其影响因素研究现状分析的基础上,整合个体、团队及组织三大层面,综合分析影响虚拟团队信任的个体特征（正直、能力、善意、信任倾向）、团队特征（领导有效性、目标明确性、任务依赖性、成员异质性）、组织特征（组织制度保障性、组织愿景）三层面十大因素,构建了虚拟团队信任影响因素的研究框架,进而提出相应的研究假设。通过选取实际企业中的虚拟团队为研究样本,验证这些因素对虚拟团队信任的影响。经实证研究发现,正直、能力、善意、信任倾向、领导有效性、目标明确性、任务依赖性、组织制度保障性、组织愿景均正向影响虚拟团队信任,而成员异质性则并非如先前所假设的那样成为虚拟团队信任的影响因素。     

Contest architecture

A contest architecture specifies how the contestants are split among several sub-contests whose winners compete against each other (while other players are eliminated). We compare the performance of such dynamic schemes to that of static winner-take-all contests from the point of view of a designer who maximizes either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. For the case of a linear cost of effort, our main results are: (1) If the designer maximizes expected total effort, the optimal architecture is a single grand static contest. (2) If the designer maximizes the expected highest effort, and if there are sufficiently many competitors, it is optimal to split the competitors in two divisions, and to have a final among the two divisional winners. Finally, if the effort cost functions are convex, the designer may benefit by splitting the contestants into several sub-contests, or by awarding prizes to all finalists.     

新企业创业团队股权分配的影响因素

以创业团队的股权分配均等程度为因变量,建立了新企业创业团队股权分配均等性的影响因素理论框架,并利用大样本数据进行实证研究。结果显示:公平与利己是新企业创业团队股权分配中同时存在的两种机制;创业者们既会按照公平原则,根据初始贡献特别是财务贡献分配股权,也会受到利己理性的影响,在先前成员关系较弱的情况下将尽可能少的股权分配给合作伙伴,此时股权会相对集中。     

Search in cities

The aim of this paper is to expose the recent developments of urban search models which incorporate a land market into a search-matching framework. Using these models, we will be able to explain why unemployment rates vary within a city, how city structure affects workers’ labor-market outcomes, how unemployment benefits and the job-destruction rate affect the growth of cities and why workers living far away from job centers search less intensively and experience higher unemployment rates than those residing closer to jobs. We are also able to explain why, as compared to whites, black workers spend more time commuting to work but travel less miles and search for jobs over a smaller area.     

Non-constant discounting in continuous time

This paper derives the dynamic programming equation (DPE) to a differentiable Markov Perfect equilibrium in a problem with non-constant discounting and general functional forms. Beginning with a discrete stage model and taking the limit as the length of the stage goes to 0 leads to the DPE corresponding to the continuous time problem. The note discusses the multiplicity of equilibria under non-constant discounting, calculates the bounds of the set of candidate steady states, and Pareto ranks the equilibria.