Challenging the enforcement of environmental regulation

If a firm can contest the enforcement of an environmental regulation, neither increasing the probability nor severity of the fine will guarantee a reduction in a firm's illegally dumped waste. A policy that can unambiguously decrease illegal dumping is lowering the cost of legal disposal. This result occurs because the use of monitoring and fines to increase the probability or severity of enforcement triggers investment to evade enforcement, while a decrease in the costs of legal disposal does not. Investment in the resources to evade enforcement decreases the attractiveness of monitoring by significantly increasing the costs of environmental audits, administrative hearings, and judicial procedures. This occurs even with a high degree of regulator information about the firm's cost structure and no monitoring errors. In addition, if the regulator can only imperfectly monitor a firm's behavior so the firm can be accused of another firm's behavior, observable commitment to challenge enforcement will lead to overinvestment in resources to evade enforcement, an increased level of illegal dumping, and an overall increase in total costs relative to the unobservable case.     

On the relative performance of alternative regulatory instruments for constraining a firm's profitability

The issue addressed in this paper is whether certain types of regulatory instruments perform better than others when the regulator's objective is simply to restrain the regulated firm's profitability. Price cap, profit cap, profit/sales and mark-up-on-average cost caps are considered as regulatory instruments, whilst expense preference, profits, and sales revenues are considered as potential arguments in the firm's objective function. The main finding is that, for the range of objective functions considered, the price cap leads to the best outcome from an economic welfare standpoint.     

Exports and Indirect Hedging of Foreign Currency Risk

We present a model of a risk-averse competitive exporting firm under exchange rate risk. Direct hedging instruments are not available. However, there are domestic assets whose prices are correlated to the foreign currency. We consider a market for futures contracts in these domestic assets and investigate the firm's indirect hedging and export policy. It is shown that the availability of many financial instruments correlated with foreign exchange may, under some circumstances, provide the same results as a perfect hedge.
JEL Classification Numbers: F21, F31.     

Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement

Laws often encourage violators to self-report their behavior.This article studies self-reporting enforcement regimes whenviolators can engage in "avoidance" activities—activitieswhich lower an offender's risk of apprehension and punishment.Avoidance activities impart two advantages to self-reportingenforcement regimes over and above advantages identified inprior work. First, self-reporters do not engage in the costlyavoidance activities that they would otherwise undertake. Second,by avoiding avoidance, self-reporting can sometimes permit thegovernment to deter offenses with less enforcement effort.     

Environmental Protection,Agency Motivations,and Rent Extraction: The Regulation of Water Pollution in Louisiana

Direct environmental regulation has been in place in the United States for more than twenty-five years. Yet there has been little study of what actually affects regulatory enforcement levels. This study examines enforcement issues by focusing on water quality enforcement by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality. The study finds that penalties are more likely to occur, and are likely to be higher, the more serious a firm's violation of a regulation. Penalties are also more likely, and likely to be higher, if a firm has a previous record of environmental violations. In contrast to other studies, however, we do not find that enforcement varies across regional offices. In addition, we did not find any systematic effects of the Weingast and Moran (1983) theory of legislative dominance. We did, however, find evidence of rent extraction, along the lines of McChesney (1987; 1991).     

Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects: Statistical Evidence from Payroll Records

We develop and estimate an agency model of worker behavior under piece rates and fixed wages. The model implies optimal decision rules for the firm's choice of a compensation system as a function of working conditions. Our model also implies an upper and lower bound to the incentive effect (the productivity gain realized by paying workers piece rates rather than fixed wages) that can be estimated using regression methods. Using daily productivity data collected from the payroll records of a British Columbia tree-planting firm, we estimate these bounds to be an 8.8 and a 60.4 percent increase in productivity. Structural estimation, which accounts for the firm's optimal choice of a compensation system, suggests that incentives caused a 22.6 percent increase in productivity. However, only part of this increase represents valuable output because workers respond to incentives, in part, by reducing quality.     

Regulating oligopolistic industries: A generalized incentive scheme

This paper deals with the design of regulatory mechanisms for oligopolistic industries. The proposed incentive scheme consists of two parts: a subsidy depending upon a firm's contribution to an equilibrium price reduction, and a tax equal to the profit of the previous period. This mechanism is as effective in regulating oligopolies as the well-known incremental surplus subsidy scheme in a monopoly framework. The proposed scheme provides appropriate incentives to enforce competitive behavior in a Cournot oligopoly. The scheme is welfare improving even if firms collude.     

Patent Enforcement, Innovation and Welfare

This paper analyzes how the Southern patent enforcement affects the Northern firm's choice of licensing, subsidiary production or exports for serving the Southern market, and the innovation rate in the North and ultimately the welfare in the South. We show that for imperfect patent enforcement, licensing contract leads to more innovation in the North relative to subsidiary or exports. When both subsidiary and exports are very costly options, no patent enforcement in the South is best for the South. However, when either subsidiary operation or exports can be organized cheaply, the Southern government chooses some positive degree of patent enforcement. We also establish that strengthening of patent enforcement in the South may lead to more licensing and less subsidiary operations or exports.     

Taxing multinationals: The scope for enforcement cooperation

Policymakers seeking to raise more tax revenues from multinational enterprises have two alternatives: to raise tax rates or to devote more resources to improve tax compliance. Tougher tax enforcement increases the cost of profit shifting, and thus mitigates tax competition. We present a tax-competition model with two policy instruments (the corporate tax rate and the tightness of tax enforcement). In line with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project, we analyze the scope for enforcement cooperation among asymmetric countries, considering that taxes are set noncooperatively. We show that the low-tax country may fail to cooperate if asymmetry is large enough and that tax havens would never agree to cooperate. Then we identify two drivers for enforcement cooperation. The first driver of cooperation is the complementarity of enforcement actions across countries. This is because the efficiency loss from enforcement dispersion is greater under complementarity. The second driver of cooperation is tax leadership by the high-tax country, which acts as a level-playing field in the tax competition and reduces the extent of disagreement on enforcement.     

Entrepreneurship in the shadows

I develop a dynamic model of forward-looking entrepreneurs, who decide whether to operate in the formal economy or informal economy and choose how much to invest in their businesses, taking government policy as given. The government has access to two policy tools: taxes on formal business activity and enforcement (or policing) discouraging informality. The main focus of the paper is on transitional dynamics under different initial wealth levels. Whether an initially small business will be trapped in the informal economy and remain small forever or grow quickly and become a large formal business depends on tax and enforcement policies. High tax rates accompanied by loose enforcement – which is mostly the case in less-developed countries (LDCs) – induce tax avoidance, discourage investment in formal businesses, and drive the entrepreneurial activity towards the informal sector even though the initial wealth level is high. Lowering taxes on formal activity joined with strict enforcement can help reducing the magnitude of poverty traps in LDCs – such as the MENA region, Latin America and developing Asia.     

Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect Compliance – A Case Study

In this paper, we aim to include rule making, implementation, monitoring and enforcement costs into the cost comparison of policy instruments. We use a simple partial equilibrium model and apply it to the textile industry. The model includes discrete abatement functions and costly monitoring and enforcement. The case study uses individual firm data to simulate the differences in abatement costs and compliance decisions between firms. We compare combinations of regulatory instruments (emission taxes, emission standards and technology standards) and enforcement instruments (criminal fines, civil fines and transaction offers). We show that the inclusion of information, monitoring and enforcement costs indeed alters the relative cost efficiency of the different instruments.     

以德报怨策略与企业机会主义行为:基于高新技术企业的研究

基于自我执行协议理论及交易属性,集中探讨企业采取以德报怨策略应对合作者剥削行为的驱动因素以及企业以德报怨策略如何影响合作者机会主义行为。通过对173个中国高新技术企业买方数据问卷调查,采用PLS对假设进行检验。结果显示,交易属性中的交易可观察性是以德报怨策略的前因变量,并且受交易复杂性的影响。同时,以德报怨策略能够减少交易双方的机会主义行为。     

Marketed tax avoidance: an economic analysis∗

Recent years have witnessed the growth of mass-marketed tax avoidance schemes aimed at the middle (not top) of the income distribution, with significant implications for tax revenue. We examine the consequences for the structure of income tax, and for tax authority anti-avoidance efforts, of tax avoidance of this type. In a model that allows for both demand- and supply-side considerations, we find that: there is an endogenous threshold income below which taxpayers do not avoid, and above which they avoid maximally; the per-dollar price of tax avoidance is decreasing in income under progressive taxation; endogenous adjustments in the price of avoidance make supply less responsive to anti-avoidance activity than thought previously; and avoidance may drive a non-monotone relationship between tax rates and tax revenue. These findings suggest that new approaches to anti-avoidance, beyond legal enforcement, might be needed.     

Minimum Quality Standards, Entry, and the Timing of the Quality Decision

This paper examines the effects of the imposition of minimum quality standards (MQS) on a vertically differentiated natural duopoly with free entry. It is shown that the welfare effects of MQS are crucially dependent upon the timing of the quality choice with respect to the decision to enter the market. If irreversible decision to enter is taken without pre-commitment to a specific quality level then a welfare improving MQS always exists. If, however, a firm's product quality must be decided prior to entry then a MQS is either redundant or counterproductive, since it can induce a monopoly.     

Games with Partially Enforceable Agreements

This paper analyzes games with imperfectly enforceable agreements. It develops a dynamical model in which players are randomly paired into single shot games at each moment. Initially players decide whether to honor an agreement, and then they choose whether to complain to an enforcement agency. The probability of success of a complaint is endogenous; it depends upon whether the defendant breached and upon the aggregate behavior of all players. In the most interesting equilibria of the dynamical system some individuals honor and some individuals complain while others do not, and the net effect of the existence of an enforcement agency is positive.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.     

市场结构、流通能力与我国农产品流通企业扩张绩效

通过对企业扩张影响因素全面的理论梳理,构建一个新的企业扩张行为分析模型,可以认为企业扩张行为并非是外部因素决定的,企业扩张行为绩效的决定是内部性的.在这一企业扩张新假设条件下,企业在竞争中的能力的积累是流通企业扩张行为取得绩效的根本来源.运用这个模型对中国农产品企业扩张问题进行实证研究,从而对我国农产品流通企业扩张的合理化提出相关建议.     

无就业增长与非均衡劳工市场动态学

本文直接模拟了劳工市场的非均衡过程、工资动态轨迹、经济人的最优行为和适应性优化行为。劳动供给源于家庭的效用最大化 ,劳动需求源于企业的利润最大化。企业的适应性优化行为和若干制度因素构成了工资刚性的基本要素 ,劳工市场的供求力量也是影响工资变动的重要因素。根据劳动生产率的变化对工资进行适应性的调节是现实世界企业工资决策的普遍实践。工资刚性与高劳动生产率并存是造成无就业增长的真正原因     

The Effect of Style,Feedback, and Context on Portfolio Exploratory Behavior

This paper reports empirical evidence for the impact of investor style differences and context on exploratory behavior within the management of investment portfolios. The paper looks at the effect of short-term feedback and context on behavior and offers new perspectives on the processes by which decisions are made under conditions of rapid change and uncertainty. The results show that search behavior is affected by feedback on short-term investment returns and the volatility of those returns, conditional upon investor style and context, with considerable evidence of both reactionary behavior and avoidance within the domain of losses. No evidence is found to support the disposition effect, with investors instead found to be more likely to review and cut material losses based upon overall context. The paper briefly considers cognitive explanations for the results and examines further evidence relating to the process of decision making within complex systems, the applicability of feedback loop models, and the impact of uncertainty on choice preference.     

Optimal monitoring of credit-based emissions trading under asymmetric information

Project-based emissions trading schemes, like the Clean Development Mechanism, are particularly prone to problems of asymmetric information between project parties and the regulator. In this paper, we extend the general framework on incomplete enforcement of policy instruments to reflect the particularities of credit-based mechanisms. The main focus of the analysis is to determine the regulator??s optimal spot-check frequency given plausible assumptions of incomplete enforcement under asymmetric information on reduction costs and heterogeneous verifiability of projects. We find that, depending on the actual abatement cost and penalty schemes, optimal monitoring for credit-based systems is often discontinuous and significantly differs from the one to be applied for cap-and-trade schemes or environmental taxes. We conclude that, in a real-world context, project admission should ultimately be based on the criterion of verifiability.     

论公安机关柔性执法

公安部门作为社会公共安全管理部门,需要通过推行柔性执法,充分发挥公安部门的职能作用。柔性执法对公安管理提出新要求,要求民警在执法过程中,必须改变以往的单纯依靠处罚手段,充分体现以人为本思想来实现社会管理职能。当前民警柔性执法在执法理念、履行职责、执法行为和队伍素质等方面还存在问题,需要通过公安部门自身的不懈努力和社会公众的良性互动来达到实现公安管理新跨越的目标。