Organized Labor and the Political Economy of Product Market Distortions

Why are economic reforms reversed through strikes and demonstrationsin some countries, but backed by the labor movement in othercountries? Why do product and labor market distortions differso much across countries? This article addresses these questionsby means of a simple, heuristic model of the economy that replicatesin an integrated manner several independent results from therecent political economy literature. Unlike most of this literature,however, the model focuses on the role played by organized labor,rather than by rent-seeking firms and guilds. A two-stage gamebetween the government and organized labor determines the levelof product market distortions (for example, import tariffs).In the first stage, the players may undertake costly actions,such as redistributing income or striking, in order to increasetheir bargaining power. In the second stage, they negotiateover product market distortions and wages. Under very generalassumptions, several policy regimes exist: Changes in the keyparameters of the economy may trigger a switch in the strategyof trade unions from confrontation to cooperation and hencechange the policy regime. Cross-country data highlight that,in spite of its simplicity, the model reproduces some observedempirical regularities.     

Short-term pain for long-term gain: Market deregulation and monetary policy in small open economies

This paper explores the effects of labor and product market reforms in a New Keynesian, small open economy model with labor market frictions and endogenous producer entry. We show that it takes time for reforms to pay off, typically at least a couple of years. This is partly because the benefits materialize through firm entry and increased hiring, both of which are gradual processes, while any reform-driven layoffs are immediate. Some reforms – such as reductions in employment protection – increase unemployment temporarily. Implementing a broad package of labor and product market reforms minimizes transition costs. Importantly, reforms do not have noticeable deflationary effects, suggesting that the inability of monetary policy to deliver large interest rate cuts in their aftermath – either because of the zero bound on policy rates or because of the membership in a monetary union – may not be a relevant obstacle to reform. Alternative simple monetary policy rules do not have a large effect on transition costs.     

Structural reforms in a debt overhang

The effects of reforms in product and labor markets are assessed in an economy where credit restrictions and long-term debt combine to produce a persistent recession with slow deleveraging following a negative financial shock. We show that product market reforms stimulate output and employment even in the short run, despite their deflationary effects. By favoring a faster recovery of investment and collateral values, such reforms bring forward the end of the deleveraging phase. This channel is missing in the case of labor market reforms, which have more modest effects on economic activity.     

Is there a dark side of competition? Product market competition and auditor-client contracting

This study establishes the informational value of a company's product market competition, derived from qualitative nonfinancial disclosures, in the audit contracting process. Greater product market competition could either serve as means of mitigating agency costs between managers and shareholders or heightening managerial rent-seeking activities and the incentive to distort disclosures. Consequently, greater competition could either increase or decrease audit engagement risk. We find that greater product market competition is associated with greater engagement risk. Auditors respond to the higher risk by assessing greater audit fees. Although auditors respond by charging higher fees and dedicating greater effort to these engagements, we nonetheless find that audit quality is negatively affected by greater competition. Our findings are consistent with the dark side hypothesis of product market competition. Overall, our study provides evidence that company-level competition effects convey valuable information to auditors.     

产业政策与信贷资金配置效率

基于上市公司逐笔银行贷款合约数据,本文考察了产业政策对信贷资金配置效率的影响。研究发现,当上市公司处于国家产业政策支持的行业时,公司所拥有的政企关系对银行贷款合约制定的积极作用会更大,全要素生产率对银行贷款合约制定的积极作用会更小,基于分省产业政策以及上市公司全部贷款数据的分析进一步确认了上述结论。从影响因素来看,当上市公司为国有企业、所在省份固定资产投资增速越高、法治环境越差时,产业政策的影响会越明显。本文的证据表明,通过加强法治建设、为不同所有制企业提供公平的竞争环境、改善产业政策的制定与实施,能够提升产业政策指导下的信贷资金配置效率。     

The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment

We develop a two-tiered agency model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an internal capital market. By rent-seeking, division managers can raise their bargaining power and extract greater overall compensation from the CEO. And because the CEO is herself an agent of outside investors, this extra compensation may take the form not of cash wages, but rather of preferential capital budgeting allocations. One interesting feature of our model is that it implies a kind of "socialism" in internal capital allocation, whereby weaker divisions get subsidized by stronger ones.     

Economic Globalization and Financial Development in East Asia: A Panel Cointegration and Causality Analysis

This study examines the role of economic globalization in financial development in eight East Asian economies. The heterogeneous panel cointegration test reveals that cointegration is present among economic globalization, institutions, financial development, real gross domestic product per capita, and financial reforms. The Granger causality test results indicate that economic globalization has a significant causal influence on institutional quality, and institutional reforms have in turn facilitated and supported financial development, in particular of the banking sector in East Asia. Economic globalization is also found to have a favorable causal impact on stock market development without going through the institutional quality channel.     

现阶段寻租对国有商业银行竞争力的影响及其治理

寻租现象普遍存在于社会经济各个领域,具有非生产性的基本特征,其产生和存在与特定的制度、体制环境相关.在中国经济体制转轨的背景下,国有商业银行正处于商业化、市场化改革的特定发展阶段,这造成了在银行监管领域、银行与政府之间、国有企业与国有银行之间和银行内部普遍存在寻租行为.这些形式各异的寻租行为从多个方面制约着国有商业银行竞争力的提高.本文在对寻租的特性进行界定的基础上,对国有商业银行运营中的寻租行为及其对国有商业银行竞争力的影响机制进行了分析,并建议重点通过制度的完善和创新、引入竞争机制和优化社会环境三个方面对寻租行为加以治理.     

Competition on the Nasdaq and the Impact of Recent Market Reforms

This paper examines the effect of recent market reforms on the competitive structure of the Nasdaq. Our results show that changes in inventory and information costs cannot explain the post-reform decrease in bid-ask spreads. We interpret this as evidence that the reforms have reduced Nasdaq dealers' rents. Additionally, we find that the difference between NYSE and Nasdaq spreads have been greatly diminished with the new rules. Further, the reforms have resulted in an exit, ceteris paribus , from the industry for market making. Overall, our results provide strong evidence that the reforms have improved competition on the Nasdaq.     

On the political economics of tax reforms: survey and empirical assessment

Political constraints and incentives are the true driver of tax reforms. This paper reviews the political economics literature on personal income tax systems and reforms to see how political mechanisms help explain tax reforms. We take some of the implications of these theories to the data using LABREF, a database that identifies labor tax reforms in the European Union for the period 2000–2007, and control for economic and labor market factors. We find that political variables carry more weight than economic variables, and we show empirical regularities that support political economy theories. We also find that governments tended to reform more in better economic times, engaging in pro-cyclical behavior.     

Stock market development under globalization: Whither the gains from reforms?

Over the past decades, many countries have implemented significant reforms (including financial liberalization, privatization, and regulatory and supervisory improvements) to foster domestic capital market development. Despite these policies, the performance of capital markets in several countries has been disappointing. To understand the effects of reforms, we study the impact of six capital market reforms on domestic stock market development and internationalization. We find that reforms tend to be followed by increases in domestic market capitalization and trading. But reforms are also followed by an increase in the share of activity in international equity markets, with potential negative spillover effects.     

Politicians and the IPO decision: The impact of impending political promotions on IPO activity in China

This paper shows that incentives created by the impending turnover of local politicians can accelerate the pace of initial public offering (IPO) activity in certain politicized environments. Focusing on China, we exploit a research setting where politicians are rewarded for capital market development, firms rely on political connections for access to capital, rent-seeking behavior is rampant, and the objectives of the state might not be to maximize capital market efficiency. We find that the rate of exchange eligible firms engaging in an IPO temporarily increases in advance of impending political promotion events. This effect holds for both state-owned and non-state-owned entities. For state-owned firms, the effect is strongest in those provinces where the politicians are more likely to be rewarded for market development activity. For non-state-owned firms, the temporary increase in IPO activity appears to be (rationally) opportunistic in nature, with the effect stronger around events more likely to disrupt the firms' political connections. Promotion period IPOs underperform non-promotion period IPOs in terms of both future financial performance and long-run stock returns, have controlling shareholders who retain a larger fraction of the company, and are more likely to divert proceeds away from their intended use after the offering.     

股票市场开放与企业投资效率——基于“沪港通”的准自然实验

资本市场的持续对外开放是党的十九大强调的重要举措。本文基于沪港通开通这一准自然实验,检验了股票市场开放对企业投资效率的影响。结果发现:沪港通的开启促进了标的公司投资效率的提高,这一影响主要体现在信息环境不透明、治理水平低的公司;机制分析发现,沪港通开启后,公司信息质量的提高和分析师预测准确度的增加是股票市场开放影响标的公司投资效率的重要渠道;最终标的公司在沪港通开通后经营业绩也得到提升。本文结论表明,股票市场开放改善了公司的投资效率,提高了对实体经济的服务能力,这对党的十九大提出的“深化资本市场对外开放”和“金融服务实体经济”系列改革有重要启示。     

中国居民货币需求结构及其对货币需求函数的影响

失业率对中国居民货币需求量存在显著性关系,证券收益率与改革的市场化进程对货币需求存在不同层次的影响。M2的动态模型显示,失业率、利率及市场化率一期滞后值对M2有显著性影响,当期居民收入及其一期滞后值也对M2有显著性影响。因此,中国货币当局应充分关注利率、失业率以及中国市场经济改革进程对微观主体——居民货币需求的影响,以使货币政策更好地促进经济发展。     

后危机时期国际信用衍生品市场的调整对我国的启示

此次国际金融危机以来,经过各国监管当局及市场各方的努力变革,全球信用衍生品市场正朝着更成熟稳健的方向发展,简单化产品重回市场主导地位,清算机制的完善降低了市场风险,信用衍生品市场规范和市场自律管理得到加强。当前,我国信用衍生品市场已初步建立起有序的监管体系和制度框架,发展信用衍生品市场具备了较好的市场基础,下一阶段,应充分发挥有利条件,克服不利因素,通过创新促进发展,推动我国信用衍生品市场健康发展。     

寻租、R&D投资与公司业绩——基于民营上市公司的经验证据

本文手工搜集了2005-2009年中国民营上市公司R&D投资及高管政治联系的数据,从寻租行为与R&D投资活动的竞争性视角,实证研究了两者对公司业绩的影响趋势。本文结果表明,R&D投资持续、稳定地对公司业绩具有显著地提升作用,而寻租行为虽然短期对公司业绩有利,但却显著地损害了公司未来的业绩。本文研究结果表明,R&D投资,而非寻租,才是公司持续性业绩增长的关键。     

Microstructures,financial reforms and informational efficiency in an emerging market

This paper investigates the effects of microstructures and financial reforms on time-varying informational efficiency in an emerging equity market setting. Our data comprises of firm level data from the Trinidad and Tobago Stock Exchange, over the period 1990–2013. Using a dynamic panel regression framework while controlling for firm size, we find that microstructures, specifically liquidity, volatility, automation and the number of shareholders have an important role in influencing the time-varying efficiency of this emerging market. The financial reforms, namely liberalisation and regulation are not found to have a notable influence. We also consider heterogeneity at the firm level, finding that the microstructures of the banking firms listed in this market have a greater impact on market efficiency, in relation to the other listed firms.     

所有权类型、政治寻租与公司社会责任报告:一个分析性框架

本文综述了西方社会责任报告的理论基础,结合中国转轨经济的制度特征,利用新政治经济学中的寻租理论,构建我国公司社会责任报告的分析性框架。本文认为,我国的公司社会责任报告与信息披露,可以看作是新兴市场中政府的政治干预下企业进行政治寻租的行为,企业的所有权结构对其有影响作用。在此基础上,文章分析了我国现行社会责任报告模式的缺陷,并提出构建以需求为导向的社会责任报告体系。     

Investor type trading behavior and trade performance: Evidence from the Thai stock market

This paper examines the trading behavior and decomposes the trading performance of foreign, individual and institutional investors as well as proprietary traders in a dynamic emerging stock market, the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Foreign investors follow a positive feedback, momentum strategy and are good short term market timers but have poor security selection performance in poor markets, thus suggesting that they have a macro (market timing) but not a micro (security selection) informational advantage relative to local investors. Institutions and proprietary traders have poor security selection trading performance. Individuals display herding behavior and have fairly good security selection performance, but individual investors appear to compensate proprietary traders for the provision of short term liquidity by proprietary traders, so individuals' security selection gains are canceled out by market timing losses.     

Investor type trading behavior and trade performance: Evidence from the Thai stock market

This paper examines the trading behavior and decomposes the trading performance of foreign, individual and institutional investors as well as proprietary traders in a dynamic emerging stock market, the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Foreign investors follow a positive feedback, momentum strategy and are good short term market timers but have poor security selection performance in poor markets, thus suggesting that they have a macro (market timing) but not a micro (security selection) informational advantage relative to local investors. Institutions and proprietary traders have poor security selection trading performance. Individuals display herding behavior and have fairly good security selection performance, but individual investors appear to compensate proprietary traders for the provision of short term liquidity by proprietary traders, so individuals' security selection gains are canceled out by market timing losses.