Redacted Disclosure

In this paper we investigate a firm's decision to redact proprietary information from its material contract filings. Information redaction results when the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) grants a firm's request to withhold information from investors in its material contract filings, presumably because the information is proprietary. We hypothesize that when firms redact information, measures of adverse selection deteriorate. That is, the redaction of proprietary information from material contracts should be associated with: a larger adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread, reductions in market depth, and lower market turnover. In addition, we conjecture that the decision to redact depends on whether the firm plans on raising capital, the competitiveness of the firm's industry, and the performance of the firm. Overall the results of our analysis generally support our predictions. We find that when firms redact information, contemporaneous measures of the adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread rise, and market depth and share turnover deteriorate; this suggests an increase in adverse selection. We also find firms are less likely to redact when they issue long‐term debt and are more likely to redact when they are in a competitive industry or experience losses.     

TRADING COSTS OF NON‐U.S. STOCKS ON THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE: THE EFFECT OF INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP,ANALYST FOLLOWING,AND MARKET REGULATION

We investigate the differences in market microstructure between U.S. and non‐U.S. stocks cross‐listed on the New York Stock Exchange using a sample of 316 pairs of matched stocks. We find that non‐U.S. stocks have wider spreads and larger adverse‐selection costs than U.S. stocks even after controlling for macro‐level institutional differences. Regression analysis shows that spreads and adverse‐selection costs are negatively correlated with institutional ownership and analyst followings. Thus, the higher spreads and adverse‐selection costs for non‐U.S. stocks can be partly explained by the lower institutional ownership and analyst following of non‐U.S. stocks. In addition, we find that although the spreads and adverse‐selection costs for non‐U.S. stocks are significantly higher before the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), the differences become even greater after Regulation FD, suggesting that Regulation FD has improved the information environment for U.S. stocks.     

Information Asymmetry and Asset Prices: Evidence from the China Foreign Share Discount

We examine the effect of information asymmetry on equity prices in the local A‐ and foreign B‐share market in China. We construct measures of information asymmetry based on market microstructure models, and find that they explain a significant portion of cross‐sectional variation in B‐share discounts, even after controlling for other factors. On a univariate basis, the price impact measure and the adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread in the A‐ and B‐share markets explains 44% and 46% of the variation in B‐share discounts. On a multivariate basis, both measures are far more statistically significant than any of the control variables.     

The Components of the Bid‐Ask Spread: the Case of the Athens Stock Exchange

We analyse the components of the bid‐ask spread in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE), which was recently characterised as a developed market. For large and medium capitalisation stocks, we estimate the adverse selection and the order handling component of the spreads as well as the probability of a trade continuation on the same side of either the bid or the ask price, using the Madhavan et al. (1997) model. We extend it by incorporating the traded volume and we find that the adverse selection component exhibits U‐shape patterns, while the cost component pattern depends on the stock price. For high priced stocks, the usual U‐shape applies, while for low‐priced ones, it is an increasing function of time, mainly due to the order handling spread component. Furthermore, the expected price change and the liquidity adjustment to Value‐at‐Risk that is needed are higher in the low capitalisation stocks, while the most liquid stocks are the high priced ones. Moreover, by estimating the Madhavan et al. (1997) model for two distinct periods we explain why there are differences in the components of the bid‐ask spread.     

Adverse-Selection Costs and the Probability of Information-Based Trading

Prior studies offer various empirical models to decompose the observed bid‐ask spread into the adverse‐selection and transitory (order‐processing and inventory‐holding) components. There is limited evidence, however, on whether the spread components estimated from these models indeed measure what they purport to measure. In this study, we show that the estimates of the adverse‐selection component given by these models are positively and significantly related to the probability of information‐based trading (PIN), after controlling for the endogeneity of the PIN and other stock attributes. These results provide direct empirical support for the spread component models examined in the present study.     

Do banks care about analysts' forecasts when designing loan contracts?

We investigate whether banks rely on the information content in equity analysts’ annual earnings forecasts when assessing the risk of potential borrowers. While a long literature finds that analysts provide useful information to market participants, it is not clear that banks, which have access to privileged information, would benefit from publicly available analysts’ forecasts. If, however, banks do rely on this information, then more precise private information in earnings forecasts may inform banks. We focus our analysis on the requirement of collateral because it is a direct measure of default risk, whereas other loan terms such as interest spread and debt covenants can also protect against other risks, such as asset misappropriation. The direct link between collateral and default risk allows us to examine whether information from analysts is relevant to banks when designing loan contracts. Consistent with our predictions, we find that higher precision of the private information in analysts’ earnings forecasts is associated with a lower likelihood of requiring collateral, and this effect is larger when a borrower does not have a prior relationship with the lender or their accounting or credit quality is low. We also find that this association disappears after the implementation of Regulation FD, consistent with this regulation reducing analysts’ access to private information.     

Intraday futures market behaviour around major scheduled macroeconomic announcements: Australian evidence

This paper examines intraday futures market behaviour around major scheduled macroeconomic information announcements on the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE). Prior literature analysing intraday price behaviour around announcements is extended to trading volume and quoted bid–ask spreads. The analysis of price volatility, trading volume and quoted bid–ask spreads indicates that the majority of adjustment to new information occurs rapidly, within 240 seconds of the scheduled time for major announcements, with some evidence of abnormal activity prior to announcements. Analysis of quoted bid–ask spreads suggests that they significantly widen in the 20 seconds prior to announcements and remain significantly wider for 30 seconds following announcements. The increase in quoted spreads is related to both expected and unexpected volatility, implying that market participants increase quoted spreads around information announcements as a consequence of adverse selection costs.     

Is faster or slower trading better? An examination of order type execution speed and costs

We examine order type execution speed and costs for US equity traders. Marketable orders that execute slower exhibit lower execution costs. Those who remove liquidity faster and pay higher trading costs transact in smaller size, spread trading across more venues, take more liquidity, and are better informed. Nonmarketable limit orders that execute slower exhibit greater adverse selection; and larger, uninformed traders who concentrate their trading in fewer venues submit them. Our findings suggest that slowing down the trading process, when faster options exist, can benefit certain market participants who seek to cross the bid–ask spread.     

Related securities and price discovery: Evidence from NYSE-listed Non-U.S. stocks

In this paper we analyze whether handling related securities improves a market maker's information environment and helps to incorporate new information in stock prices. Our empirical tests are focused on New York Stock Exchange specialists and the U.S. share in price discovery of 64 British and French companies cross-listed on the NYSE. We define related securities as stocks from the same country, the same region, or other foreign stocks. We find strong evidence that a higher prominence of related stocks in the specialist portfolio is associated with a higher U.S. share in price discovery of our sample firms. We interpret our findings as evidence that concentrating market makers in similar stocks reduces information asymmetries and improves the information environment as market makers can extract information relevant to a stock from order flow to related securities. To support our argument, we show that the adverse selection component of the bid–ask spread is negatively related to the prominence of other foreign stocks in the specialist portfolio.     

Specialists,Limit‐Order Traders,and the Components of the Bid‐Ask Spread

This study compares the components of the bid‐ask spread estimated from quotes that reflect the trading interest of specialists with those estimated from limit‐order quotes and all available quotes for a sample of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks. The results show that the adverse selection component of the spread estimated from specialist quotes is significantly smaller than the corresponding figures from limit‐order quotes and entire quotes. We interpret this as evidence that NYSE specialists transfer at least a part of adverse selection costs to outsiders through the discretionary use of limit orders. Our results show that the estimation/interpretation of the components of the spread using quote data that include both specialist and limit‐order interests is problematic.     

An Examination of the Differential Impact of Regulation FD on Analysts' Forecast Accuracy

Regulation fair disclosure (FD) requires companies to publicly disseminate information, effectively preventing the selective pre‐earnings announcement guidance to analysts common in the past. We investigate the effects of Regulation FD's reducing information disparity across analysts on their forecast accuracy. Proxies for private information, including brokerage size and analyst company‐specific experience, lose their explanatory power for analysts' relative accuracy after Regulation FD. Analyst forecast accuracy declines overall, but analysts that are relatively less accurate (more accurate) before Regulation FD improve (deteriorate) after implementation. Our findings are consistent with selective guidance partially explaining variation in the forecasting accuracy of analysts before Regulation FD.     

The impact of mandatory IFRS reporting on institutional trading costs: Evidence from Australia

This study examines the impact of mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on the market quality of the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 200 constituent stocks. Using traditional metrics that are consistent with prior literature (i.e., bid‐ask spreads), the first stage analysis confirms that stock liquidity has improved. However, when the analysis is extended to consider the trading costs incurred by market participants (i.e., execution shortfall), results suggest liquidity has not changed significantly. The paper utilizes rich unique datasets that contain detailed trade information, and findings are robust after controlling for trade difficulty and market conditions. In the era of High Frequency Trading (HFT) and occurrences of ‘fleeting’ liquidity, this paper provides some evidence that while IFRS may have enhanced ‘visible’ bid‐ask spreads, tangible liquidity for market participants, particularly global institutional investors, has not improved significantly.     

Modeling the bid/ask spread: measuring the inventory-holding premium

The need to understand and measure the determinants of market maker bid/ask spreads is crucial in evaluating the merits of competing market structures and the fairness of market maker rents. This study develops a simple, parsimonious model for the market maker's spread that accounts for the effects of price discreteness induced by minimum tick size, order-processing costs, inventory-holding costs, adverse selection, and competition. The inventory-holding and adverse selection cost components of spread are modeled as an option with a stochastic time to expiration. This inventory-holding premium embedded in the spread represents compensation for the price risk borne by the market maker while the security is held in inventory. The premium is partitioned in such a way that the inventory-holding and adverse selection cost components, as well as the probability of an informed trade, are identified. The model is tested empirically using Nasdaq stocks in three distinct minimum tick size regimes and is shown to perform well both in an absolute sense and relative to competing specifications.     

Relation between bid–ask spread,impact and volatility in order-driven markets

We show that the cost of market orders and the profit of infinitesimal market-making or -taking strategies can be expressed in terms of directly observable quantities, namely the spread and the lag-dependent impact function. Imposing that any market taking or liquidity providing strategies is at best marginally profitable, we obtain a linear relation between the bid–ask spread and the instantaneous impact of market orders, in good agreement with our empirical observations on electronic markets. We then use this relation to justify a strong, and hitherto unnoticed, empirical correlation between the spread and the volatility per trade, with R ²s exceeding 0.9. This correlation suggests both that the main determinant of the bid–ask spread is adverse selection, and that most of the volatility comes from trade impact. We argue that the role of the time-horizon appearing in the definition of costs is crucial and that long-range correlations in the order flow, overlooked in previous studies, must be carefully factored in. We find that the spread is significantly larger on the NYSE, a liquid market with specialists, where monopoly rents appear to be present.     

An evolutionary multi‐objective optimization of trading rules in call markets

We evaluate an agent‐based model featuring near‐zero‐intelligence traders operating in a call market with a wide range of trading rules governing the determination of prices and which orders are executed, as well as a range of parameters regarding market intervention by market makers and the presence of informed traders. We optimize these trading rules using a multi‐objective population‐based incremental learning algorithm seeking to maximize the trading volume and minimize the bid–ask spread. Our results suggest that markets should choose a small tick size if concerns about the bid–ask spread are dominating and a large tick size if maximizing trading volume is the main aim. We also find that unless concerns about trading volume dominate, time priority is the optimal priority rule. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Trader Anonymity, Price Formation and Liquidity

Using data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange we analyze price formationand liquidity in a non-anonymous environment with similarities to thefloor of the NYSE. Our main hypothesis is that the non-anonymity allows the specialist to assess the probability that atrader trades on the basis of private information. He uses this knowledgeto price discriminate. This can be achieved by quoting a large spread and granting price improvement to traders deemed uninformed.Consistent with our hypothesis we find that price improvement reflects loweradverse selection costs but does not lead to a reduction in the specialist's profit. Further, the quote adjustmentfollowing transactions at the quoted bid or ask price is more pronounced than the quote adjustment aftertransactions at prices inside the spread. Our results indicate that anonymity comes at the cost ofhigher adverse selection risk.     

Optimal execution of open-market stock repurchase programs

This paper formalizes the following intuition about open-market share repurchases. Firms do open-market share repurchases to return free cash, which would otherwise be wasted. However, when the firm goes to buy its own shares with this cash, it has inside information and hence the actual execution is characterized by adverse selection. The market knows that the firm has inside information, and consequently the ask price is high to compensate for this adverse selection problem. This implies that, all else equal, the greater the adverse selection problem compared to the cash waste problem, the higher the ask price, and, therefore, the wider the bid–ask spread and the lower the share repurchase completion rate. We test this implication on a sample of U.S. firms and report evidence consistent with the model.     

Does Regulation Fair Disclosure affect analysts’ forecast performance? The case of restructuring firms

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate how the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD) influences analysts?? forecast characteristics for restructuring firms. The Reg. FD requires all firms disseminate material information not only to some institutional investors and certain financial analysts, but to all market participants simultaneously. We expect that the regulatory effect of Reg. FD on financial analysts?? forecast performance would be pronounced because of uncertain earnings signals and information complexity produced by restructuring activities. Particularly, we examine how the enactment of Reg. FD affects the relationship between analysts?? earnings forecast attributes and the occurrence and magnitude of restructuring charges. Our general finding is that analysts?? forecast errors and forecast dispersion have declined in the post-FD period for restructuring firms. However, such an impact cannot be persistent with an increase in the relative magnitude of restructuring charges, the proxy for restructuring complexity. This study provides additional evidence that Reg. FD has limited private information, and attempts to provide all users with the same access to information within the context of firms reporting restructuring charges.     

Disclosure and liquidity management: Evidence from regulation fair disclosure

We examine the effect of the firm’s information environment on its liquidity policy by exploiting a natural experiment involving Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD). We find, on average, Regulation FD has a negative impact on firm cash holdings. We also directly evaluate changes in firm disclosure policy and find the negative Regulation FD-cash holdings relation is stronger for firms that increased public disclosure and holds largely for firms that faced lower proprietary costs of public disclosure. Furthermore, we find this negative relation is more pronounced for firms with limited access to the credit market. We capture the medium-term effect of Regulation FD two years before and two years after the implementation. Overall, our results suggest that the change in the amount of information disclosed in response to Regulation FD, an externality effect, affects information asymmetry between firms and outside investors and thus cash holdings.     

Share repurchase tender offers and bid–ask spreads

This paper examines the impact of share repurchase tender offers on the market microstructure. We find that there is a temporary reduction in the bid–ask spread, and a temporary increase in volume and quotation depth during the offer period. Our evidence suggests that the bid–ask spread is asymmetric during the offer period with the bid-side spread smaller than the ask-side spread. The temporary reduction in the spread around offers is consistent with the competing-market-maker hypothesis which predicts that the intensified competition for the market maker raises bid prices and narrows the spread asymmetrically during the offer period.