Financing Local Police Spending in England and Wales: Fiscal Federalism in Practice

Since 1995, police forces in England and Wales have been able to raise revenues locally to supplement grants from central government. We analyse the variation across police force areas in locally raised police revenues over the 2000s, and we find that three‐quarters of the temporal and spatial variation in local revenues per head can be explained by differences in incomes, prices and local preferences. A particularly robust parameter is the effective local community tax price associated with raising revenue. We discuss the police funding model in the wider context of fiscal federalism, and we point to alternative funding structures that could be adopted.     

Introduction: Fiscal Aspects of Evolving Federations

There has been a resurgence of interest, in many parts of the world, in problems of multilevel government finance. Recent and ongoing political and economic developments raise questions about the role of the nation, subnational governments, and supranational public authorities in the provision and financing of public-sector programs. This paper presents an overview of these developments that may assist in understanding some of the motivation behind the articles presented in this special issue and in appreciating some of their potential applications. The articles are briefly summarized, and some issues that remain on the agenda for future research are identified.     

Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants

This paper describes the tax and expenditure externalities that can occur in a federation, focusing on the (relatively neglected) vertical tax and expenditure externalities which arise when state governments' tax and expenditure decisions affect the federal government's budget constraint and vice versa. Formulas are derived for matching grants which correct the distortions in governments' decision-making caused by fiscal externalities. With vertical tax externalities, the matching revenue grant may result in transfers from the state government to the federal government. With vertical expenditure externalities, the federal government should provide a matching expenditure grant equal to the additional federal revenue that is generated from an additional dollar spent by a state on productivityenhancing activities such as education.     

Testing for Vertical Fiscal Externalities

The purpose of this paper is to design a test of whether the vertical external effects associated with tax base sharing among local and regional governments have become internalized via the intergovernmental transfer system. Such tests are important in the sense that the income tax rates chosen by different levels of government will generally be correlated, even if the resource allocation is optimal from society's point of view. By using panel data for the Swedish local and regional public sectors, the results imply that an increase in the regional income tax rate induces the municipalities in the region to decrease their income tax rates. In addition, we are able to reject the null hypothesis that the vertical external effects have become internalized.     

Fiscal federalism and local public finance: A computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework

This paper attempts to make an argument for the feasibility and usefulness of a computable general equilibrium approach to studying fiscal federalism and local public finance. It begins by presenting a general model of fiscal federalism that has at its base a local public goods model with (1) multiple types of mobile agents who are endowed with preferences, private good endowments, and land endowments, (2) local governments that produce local public goods funded by a property tax, and (3) a land market that capitalizes local policies to equilibrate supply and demand. To this, a state (or national) government producing a state public good is added, and all levels of government abide by majority rule voting. A computable general equilibrium framework is derived from this theoretical model and calibrated to New Jersey micro tax data. It has been applied elsewhere to study the dominance of property in local tax bases as well as the general equilibrium effects of state or national intergovernmental programs such as redistributive grants in aid, district power equalization, and the deductibility of local taxes. Results in these areas are summarized and potential future applications discussed.     

Fiscal severity and the choice of budget gap closing strategies

The great recession of 2008 forced US local governments to pursue a series of measures to maintain a balanced budget. The authors investigated local governments’ response to the great recession with a focus on Florida, where a crash in the housing market led to a severe erosion of the property tax base. Following the classic cutback management theory, the authors examine how the severity of fiscal stress affected the choice of budget-balancing strategies by Florida’s local governments. The severity of fiscal stress was found to affect not only the number of budget gap closing strategies but also the pattern of adoption of these strategies consistent with the administrative response model.     

Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for Corruption?

This paper examines the effect of fiscal decentralization in a country on the level of corruption. Using a tax competition framework with rent-seeking behavior, it is shown theoretically that fiscal decentralization, modeled as an increase in the number of competing jurisdictions, leads to a lower level of corruption. This result is then tested using a small, cross-country data set. The empirical results are not very strong, but they suggest that the hypothesized relationship between decentralization and corruption may indeed exist.     

我国地方财政支出对区域差距的影响

地方财政支出是政府统筹区域经济协调发展的重要手段。根据近十年来我国区域经济增长的敛散性以及我国地方财政支出对区域经济差距影响的实证检验,结果表明:经济增长的收敛模式在全国范围内没有绝对收敛,也没有条件收敛,三大地区中只有东部地区存在“俱乐部收敛”现象;地方财政支出总体上没有达到缩小地区经济差距的效果,突出表现在中部地区;地方科教文卫支出和社会保障支出比重的提升有利于缩小区域经济差距,而地方行政管理费用的扩张则扩大了区域经济差距。     

Electronic Commerce and the State Retail Sales Tax: A Challenge to American Federalism

Electronic commerce, by magnifying problems with the existing sales tax, has precipitated reexamination of basic precepts of fiscal federalism in the United States, not just taxation of remote sellers. This paper examines: key features of electronic commerce; the Internet Tax Freedom Act and the Commission it mandates; tax assignments in the United States; problems in assigning sales taxes to subnational governments; constitutional impediments to requiring remote vendors to collect sales and use taxes; tentative findings of the National Tax Association's project on taxation of electronic commerce; and implications of the current debate over taxation of electronic commerce for intergovernmental fiscal relations in the United States.     

Efficiency and the optimal direction of federal-state transfers

It seems to be widely believed that the case for centralizing revenue-raising is stronger than that for centralizing expenditure decisions, so that federal governments should typically make transfers to lower-level (state) governments. This paper argues, however, that pure efficiency considerations may plausibly point in exactly the opposite direction. This arises because of a vertical fiscal externality: the typical state may neglect the impact that its tax decisions have on the federal tax base. The optimal federal response is to internalize this distortion of state decisions by means of offsetting subsidy on the common tax base, the financing of which may plausibly require transfers from the states.     

A Note on Intertemporal Fiscal Competition and Redistribution

This paper studies fiscal competition among jurisdictions in a dynamic framework, where the degree of mobility of private capital across jurisdictions boundaries is perfect. The optimal tax on mobile capital is a source tax that taxes away factor rents. Further we show that taxation of mobile capital can redistribute income in favor of the immobile factor labor. This is because the factor rents generated by public inputs and appropriated by mobile capital exceed the efficient level of public expenditure for investments. JEL Code: H21, H23, H42, H71     

Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization

This paper analyzes the relation between tax competition and fiscal equalization. In particular, it asks the question whether fiscal equalization schemes can mitigate inefficient tax competition. Two transfer schemes are considered: tax revenue and tax base equalization schemes. The paper shows that equalizing transfers may internalize fiscal externalities. In particular, in a small open economy tax base equalization yields efficient tax rates. Thus, transfer mechanisms with an explicit redistributive character do not always impair efficiency.     

Education, Mobility of Labour and Tax Competition

We show that wage-taxfinanced subsidies encourage investment in risky education andoffer welfare gains. Tax competition and labour mobility maylead to substantial erosion of regional taxation. On the otherhand, mobility insures against region-specific shocks encouraginginvestment in education. Thus, welfare effects on the educatedand the owners of the fixed factor may go in either direction.Tax competition is especially fierce if the governments careabout the owners of the fixed factor. Elimination of their interestsfrom the governments' objective functions results in a Pareto-improvementin a federation with tax competition.     

Electoral Competition as a Determinant of Fiscal Decentralisation*

This paper estimates the effect of government electoral strength on fiscal decentralisation. Using a panel of democracies, we find that greater government electoral strength at the central level, measured by the share of seats held by the governing party in the legislature, reduces expenditure centralisation. Revenue centralisation is less affected by electoral strength.     

地方财政风险监控体系的建立及实证分析

地方财政风险监控体系的研究已经成为一个世界性的课题.本文在总结国内外地方财政风险管理的基础上,提出了地方财政风险监控的债务指标和综合指标的两层指标体系,建立了地方政府债务风险值L和地方财政风险综合值F两套监控标准.并通过对重庆市40个区县数据的计算结果,验证了L和F相关性,给出了相应的对策建议.     

Tax Setting in a Federal System: The Case of Personal Income Taxation in Canada

In a decentralised tax system, the effects of tax policies enacted by one government are not confined to its own jurisdiction. First, if both the regional and the federal levels of government co-occupy the same fields of taxation, tax rate increases by one layer of government will reduce taxes collected by the other. Second, if the tax base is mobile, tax rate increases by one regional government will raise the amount of taxes collected by other regional governments. These sources of fiscal interdependence are called in the literature vertical and horizontal tax externalities, respectively. Third, as Smart (1998) shows, if equalisation transfers are present, an increase in the standard equalisation tax rate provides incentives to raise taxes to the receiving provinces. A way to check the empirical relevance of these hypotheses is to test for the existence of interactions between the regional tax rate, on the one hand, and the federal tax rate, the tax rate set by competing regions, and the standard equalisation tax rate, on the other hand. Following this approach, this paper estimates provincial tax setting functions with data on Canadian personal income taxation for the period 1982–1996. We find a significant positive response of provincial tax rates to changes in the federal income tax rate, the tax rates of competing provinces, and the standard equalisation rate (only for receiving provinces). We also find that the reaction to horizontal competition is stronger in the provinces that do not receive equalisation transfers.     

Local Public Funding of Higher Education When Skilled Labor is Imperfectly Mobile

If higher education is publicly funded by local (sub-federal) jurisdictions, while skilled labor is heterogeneous in responding to wage differentials between jurisdictions, the spillovers that result give rise to a disparity between the centralized output-maximizing allocation of resources to higher education and decentralized equilibria. Generally, decentralization leads to under-provision, which can be offset by inter-jurisdictional subsidies based on gross migration flows. But the extent of the discrepancy depends on the local balance of political forces. Indeed, when the welfare of native-born emigrants is highly valued while new immigrants carry little political weight, over-provision in equilibrium is possible.     

Challenges of Fiscal Policy in Emerging and Developing Economies

This article presents a systematic analysis of the availability and use of fiscal space in emerging and developing economies. We report two major results. First, emerging and developing economies built fiscal space in the run-up to the Great Recession of 2008–2009, which was then used for stimulus. Since then, fiscal space has shrunk and remains narrow as these economies have taken advantage of historically low interest rates. Second, fiscal policy in emerging and developing economies has become countercyclical (or less procyclical), i.e., “graduated,” since the 1980s, as most clearly demonstrated during the Great Recession. The move towards graduation is most pronounced for those economies with greater fiscal space, which suggests that fiscal space matters for a government’s ability to implement countercyclical fiscal policy.     

财政层级改革、竞争效应与税收征管

以"省直管县"财政体制改革为准自然实验,运用双重差分模型,从企业实际税率的角度考量财政层级改革对县级政府税收征管行为的影响.结果显示:"省直管县"财政体制改革加剧了县级政府间的税收竞争,显著弱化了县级政府税收征管努力,降低了辖区内企业的实际税率,并且对于处于不同市场化水平和不同行业集中度的企业具有异质性影响.