国际贸易对碳减排协议的促进作用——理论框架及减排意愿的数值一般均衡情景模拟

全球碳减排谈判是具有外部性特征的多方合作博弈。文章首先构建一个单一商品无贸易多国模型,对各国的碳减排意愿进行刻画,利用相关数据对不同情景下的各国碳减排意愿进行数值一般均衡模拟;在此基础上,将国际贸易因素引入模型,重新对各国的减排意愿进行情景模拟。数值模拟结果表明:(1)经济规模越大,全球变暖持续的时间跨度越长,温度上升带来的效用损失越大,各国单方面减排意愿越强;(2)国际贸易的存在更有利于各国碳减排意愿的提高,因为各国通过减产实现减排的同时,其贸易条件得到改善,从而将减产带来的效用损失部分转嫁到其他各国;(3)当前,假借碳减排之名而抬头的新贸易保护主义不仅无法促进各国碳减排,反而将阻碍全球碳减排协议的达成。     

Carbon Abatement and International Spillovers

Carbon abatement policies in large open economies affect both the allocation of domestic resources and international market prices. A change in international prices implies an indirect secondary burden or benefit for all trading countries. Based on simulations with a large-scale computable general equilibrium model of global trade and energy use, we show that international spillovers have important welfare implications for carbon abatement policies designed to meet exogenous emission reduction targets. We present a decomposition of the total welfare effect of carbon abatement policies into a primary domestic market effect (at constant international prices) and a secondary international spillover impact as a result of changes in international prices. This decomposition reveals the extent to which domestic abatement costs are increased or decreased as a result of the impact of carbon abatement on international prices.     

Enforcement of Intellectual Property,Pollution Abatement,and Directed Technical Change

We theoretically investigate the interaction between endogenous enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs) and tax-financed pollution abatement measures. IPRs affect dirty and clean intermediates alike such that higher IPR enforcement may promote the transition to the clean technology, if this technology is productive enough. If the green technology is relatively unproductive, higher IPRs promote the dirty technology while pollution is increasing. As households are due to subsistence consumption subject to a hierarchy of needs, the level of IPR enforcement as well as the level of abatement measures depends on the state of technology and is increasing during economic development. Thus, if the incentive to enforce IPRs is low the level of abatement measures is also low. This argument provides a theoretical foundation for the observed clash of interests in international negotiation rounds regarding the harmonization of IPR protection and actions to combat climate change.     

Dynamic Games of Environmental Policy in a Global Economy: Taxes versus Quotas

The effects of environmental policy on the global environment as an international public good with a stock externality and national welfare are examined in a model with trade in a polluting commodity. The welfare effects of environmental policy, decomposed into terms of trade, abatement cost, and environmental damage effects, induce governments to adopt a strategic use of their policy measures. In the absence of international cooperation on environmental policy, it is demonstrated that the emission tax game brings about larger strategic distortions than the emission quota game.     

Transboundary Pollution and International Migration

We analyze the welfare effects of international migration in the presence of transboundary pollution. We use a simplified Copeland and Taylor (1999) model, where the (developed) home country's pollution abatement technology is superior to that of the (less developed) foreign country. If there is no trade, workers will migrate from the foreign country to the home country. The foreign country gains from migration, but whether the home country gains or not depends on the abatement‐technology gap and the magnitude of the coefficient of transboundary pollution. World welfare will increase under migration. If there is free trade in goods, international migration occurs when the home country specializes in the production of the environmentally sensitive good. In this case, migration will result in increased production of the manufactured good and increase the level of world pollution.     

基于服务贸易拓展的服务型企业国际化战略研究

自20世纪80年代以来,随着全球经济和产业革命的发展,世界服务贸易得到了迅速发展,同时服务贸易主体逐渐由劳动密集型行业向技术和知识密集型行业转变。许多国家普遍认为,扩大国际服务贸易越来越成为发展中国家改善国际贸易地位,提高经济效率及国际竞争力,乃至增加外汇收入、扩大社会就业的重要途径。本文在探讨我国加入WTO后服务贸易发展与服务市场进一步开放的基础上,就中国服务贸易拓展的战略思路及服务型企业国际化战略进行了深入研究,并提出相应的对策建议。     

政治竞争与相互直接投资

This paper investigates a basic question about the international political economy—why is international trade not free? To answer this question, we modified Grossman and Helpman (1994) by considering that interest lobbies make political contributions to both the incumbent government and the political challenger in order to influence the incumbent government’s choice of trade policy. By examining the contribution schedules under a framework of bilateral direct investments, we find that the modified Ramsey rule still holds under our setting.     

Do technology externalities justify restrictions on emission permit trading?

International emission trading is an important flexibility mechanism, but its use has been often restricted on the ground that access to international carbon credits can undermine the domestic abatement effort reducing the incentive to innovate and, eventually, lowering the pace of climate policy-induced technological change. This paper examines the economics that is behind these concerns by studying how a cap to the trade of carbon offsets influences innovation, technological change, and welfare. By using a standard game of abatement and R&D, we investigate the main mechanisms that shape these relationships. We also use a numerical integrated assessment model that features environmental and technology externalities to quantify how limits to the volume, the timing, and the regional allocation of carbon offsets affect climate policy costs and the incentive to invest in innovation and low-carbon technologies.Results indicate that, for moderate caps on the amount tradable emissions permits and sufficiently high technology spillovers, global innovation and technical change would increase and that this additional innovative effort could lead to economic efficiency gains. The numerical analysis confirms that when constraints are close to 15% of domestic abatement, efficiency losses are small because they are partly compensated by more technological spillovers and lower energy prices. Under a broad range of parameters, restrictions are costly for the constrained countries, but always beneficial for unconstrained ones.     

Incentives to Diffuse Advanced Abatement Technology Under the Formation of International Environmental Agreements

We analyse the incentives for polluting firms to diffuse and adopt advanced abatement technology in a framework in which governments negotiate an international environmental agreement. These incentives crucially depend on whether the underlying environmental policy instrument is an emission tax or an emission quota. The results for the international setting fundamentally differ from those for the national setting that have been elaborated upon in the earlier literature. In particular, equilibrium diffusion and adoption of advanced abatement technology are not necessarily optimal under the tax regime and may be even lower than those under the quota regime.     

Climate Policy,Learning, and Technology Adoption in Small Countries

A significant reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions requires international cooperation in emission abatement as well as individual countries’ investment in the adoption of abatement technology. The existing literature on climate policy pays insufficient attention to small countries, which account for a substantial proportion of global emission. In this study, we investigate how climate policy and learning about climate damage affect investment in abatement technology in small countries. We consider three alternative climate policy instruments: emission standards, harmonized taxes and auctioned permits. We say that learning is feasible if an international environmental agreement (IEA) is formed after the resolution of uncertainty about climate damage. We find that, either with learning and quadratic abatement costs or without learning, harmonized taxes outperform emission standards and auctioned permits in terms of investment efficiency. Without learning, a large cost of nonparticipation (that a country incurs) in the IEA can be beneficial to the country. Whether learning improves investment efficiency depends on the size of this nonparticipation cost.     

Politics of Intra-firm Trade: Corporate Price Planning and the Double Role of the Arm’s Length Principle

Intra-firm trade is an emerging issue. One of its key elements is the international shifting of profits, for example, through transfer pricing that big enterprises use to cross-subsidise their subsidiaries, often to avoid taxes. Accounting rules conceal much of the information about transfer pricing, reproducing secrecy and facilitating the use of administered prices. Given the prevalence of administered price setting, a significant amount of international trade cannot be meaningfully analysed as market transactions. This provokes questions about the validity of market assumptions in research on trade in particular and global capitalism more generally. Our specific contribution focuses on the role of the arm’s length principle and the significance of cross-subsidisation and other forms of corporate planning in intra-firm trade. Under certain conditions, price planning by private corporations should be analysed as political rule within the economic sphere. Since the politics of the world economy is not merely related to governmental intervention, corporations should also be theorised as potentially political entities. Crossing the disciplinary boundaries between political economy and normative political theory, we suggest that the politicisation of intra-firm trade opens possibilities for creating more effective responses to price administration and for creating more democratic ways of governing the global economy.     

The long term impact of economic development in developed countries on developing countries since 1820

The linkages between the economic development of developed and developing countries are analyzed historically. The analysis is divided into epochs, distinguished by global trade regimes and by common characteristics of long term economic growth. The break throughs in long distance transport technology which occured during the industrial revolution created a global economy in which the rythm of economic activity in developing economies became linked to that of developed economies. The major transmission mechanisms were international trade, international migration and international capital flows. Exports were the main engine of growth in developing countries. But the effects of export expansion varied across countries. The speed of transmission of the industrial revolution to developing countries depended on their institutional readiness; countries with most developed capitalist institutions in factor markets were the first to develop. The extent of diffusion of the benefits of growth from export expansion within developing countries also depended on the nature of their institutions, both economic and political. Finally, policies with respect to international trade, investment and agriculture were also critical to the speed and diffusion of economic development.The research underlying this paper is the result of a twentyfive year collaboration with Professor Cynthia Taft Morris. She is indebted to the World Bank for financing the research in this paper as part of the background studies for the World Development Report 1991. She is also indebted to Sherman Robinson for his comments.     

国际贸易的内生化新体系:新兴古典贸易理论

新兴古典经济学派从消费者与生产者的统一出发,构建了贸易产生的内生化新体系。该体系拓展了国际贸易的新理论建构,以专业化与分工为基础,引进外生交易费用、内生交易费用、市场组织与层系等参数,可使得国际贸易在经济中的产生内生化,并由此形式化贸易的发展历程,为国内贸易与国际贸易建立统一的基础,克服以新古典经济学为框架的传统国际贸易理论中国际贸易与国内贸易具有不同基础的理论困难,提供了国际贸易理论的全新思路,对21世纪全球市场的形成与发展具有重要的启示意义。     

Games of Climate Change with International Trade

We analyse games of greenhouse gas emission reduction in which the emissions and the emission reduction costs of one country depend on other countries' emission abatement. In an analytically tractable model, we show that international trade effects on costs and emissions can either increase or decrease incentives to reduce emissions and to cooperate on emission abatement; in some specifications, optimal emission reduction is unaffected by trade. We therefore specify the model further, calibrating it to larger models that estimate the costs of emission reduction, trade effects, and impacts of climate change. If trade effects are driven by total emission reduction costs of other countries cooperation is slightly more difficult than in the case without trade effects. If trade effects are determined by relative emission reduction efforts in other countries, cooperation becomes easier. Carbon leakage does not affect our qualitative insights, although it does change the numbers.     

Environmental regulation and technology transfers

This paper analyzes the situation in which a national government introduces environmental regulations. Within the framework of an international duopoly with environmental regulations, an environmental tax imposed by the government in the home country can induce a foreign firm with advanced abatement technology to license it to a domestic firm without this technology. Furthermore, when the domestic firm's production technology is less efficient than that of the foreign firm, the foreign firm may freely reveal its technology to the domestic firm. These improvements through the voluntary transfer of technology imply that environmental regulations have positive impacts on innovation.     

International emissions trading in a political economy

We examine whether the international emissions trading (IET) scheme can reduce global emissions in a political economy framework. Countries act noncooperatively when choosing the tradable emission permits and the environmental tax. The formulation of environmental policies is influenced by interest groups. Our results show that the effect of IET on global emissions depends crucially on which policies are influenced by lobbying activities. In the case where only environmental taxes are influenced by lobbying, IET tends to reduce global emissions when the capitalists’ political power is strong and, surprisingly, when the environmentalists’ political power is weak.     

The Strategic and Effective Dimensions of the Border Tax Adjustment

Between 2001 and 2011, the Kyoto Protocol has experienced defections of two countries that took part in its negotiation and accounted for around 44% of all parties' emissions. The border tax adjustment, a tax levied on imports to reproduce domestic taxation on similar goods, is advocated to prevent such compliance failures as well as to support unilateral pollution regulations by mitigating firms' competitiveness losses and carbon leakages. The paper investigates whether this trade instrument can constitute a decentralized solution to achieve the first‐best in a noncooperative framework. It develops a two‐country two‐firm reciprocal‐market model of trade with global pollution and country heterogeneity. Countries' interactions are studied following a noncooperative game theory approach, for two scenarios defined by the possibility to implement a border tax adjustment to sanction unilateral deviation from the cooperative situation. The paper predicts first that this opportunity modifies the countries' choices of strategies toward more compliance; second that among the strategic and effective dimensions of the border tax adjustment, only the former allows to achieve the first‐best; finally that the border tax adjustment fosters countries' participation in the cooperative international environmental agreement.     

Multinational taxation and international emissions trading

Many studies have shown that the activities of multinational corporations are quite sensitive to differences in income tax rates across countries. In this paper I explore the interaction between multinational taxation and abatement activities under an international emissions permit trading scheme. Four types of plans are considered: (1) a single domestic permit system with international offsets; (2) separate national permit systems without trade; (3) separate national permit systems with limited offsets; and (4) an international permit trading system. For each plan, I model the incentives for the multinational firm to choose abatement activities at home and abroad and to transfer emissions credits between parent and subsidiary. Limits on trading across countries restrict efficiency gains from abatement, as is well known. But if available offset opportunities are limited to actual abatement activities, those activities are also more susceptible to distortions from incentives to shift taxable income. Transfer-pricing rules can limit but not always eliminate these distortions. In a system of unlimited international trading, abatement is efficiently allocated across countries, but tax shifting can still be achieved through intra-firm transfer pricing. From the basis of efficiency for both environmental and tax policies, the best design is an international permit trading system with transparent, enforceable transfer-pricing rules.     

THE NON‐TRADED SECTOR,LOBBYING, AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN THE CUSTOMS UNION AND THE COMMON MARKET

This paper models immigration policy as the outcome of political competition between interest groups representing individuals employed in different sectors. In standard positive theory, restrictive immigration policy results from a low‐skilled median voter voting against predominantly low‐skilled immigration. In the present paper, in contrast, once trade policies are liberalized, restrictive immigration policy results from anti‐immigration lobbying by interest groups representing the non‐traded sectors. It is shown that this is in line with empirical regularities from recent episodes of restrictive immigration legislation in the European Union. It is further shown that if governments negotiate bilaterally over trade and migration policy regimes, the equilibrium regime depends (i) on the sequencing of the international negotiation process and (ii) on the set of available trade and migration policy regimes. In particular, the most comprehensive and most welfare‐beneficial type of liberalization may be rejected only because a less comprehensive type of liberalization is available.     

Environmental Barriers to Trade: The Case of Endangered Sea Turtles

In April of 1998, the World Trade Organization pronounced the US Sea Turtle Conservation Act in violation of the GATT. This paper presents a stylized Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model in which the fatal entrapment of sea turtles in nets of the shrimping industry is a negative externality that reduces global utility. Three trade equilibria are simulated: free trade, trade ban, and free trade with subsidization. With free trade, a transfer of abatement capital from the North to the South results in a Pareto improvement upon the trade ban. The simulations indicate that a cooperative outcome which obtains global efficiency may be feasible but is improbable.