MARKET SEGMENTATION STRATEGIES OF MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS*

We analyze a multiproduct duopoly and ask whether firms should offer general purpose products or tailor their offerings to fit specific consumer needs. Offering a targeted product has two effects: utility increases for some consumers due to increased fit, whereas utility decreases for others due to increased misfit. Previous work has not considered these two effects jointly and has therefore not been able to capture the tradeoff inherent in market segmentation. We show that in addition to the degree of fit and misfit, the intensity of competition and the fixed cost of offering an additional product determine firms' market segmentation strategies.     

ASYMMETRIC MARKET SHARES,ADVERTISING AND PRICING: EQUILIBRIUM WITH AN INFORMATION GATEKEEPER*

We analyze how asymmetric market shares impact advertising and pricing decisions by firms that have loyal, non‐shopping customers and can advertise to shoppers through a ‘gatekeeper.’ In equilibrium, the firm with the smaller loyal market advertises more aggressively but prices less competitively than the firm with the larger loyal market. Our results differ significantly from earlier literature which assumes that shoppers observe all prices and finds that the firm with the smaller loyal market adopts a more competitive pricing strategy. The predictions of the model are consistent with advertising and pricing behavior observed on price comparison websites such as http://Shopper.com .     

MARKET STRUCTURE AND PRICING STRATEGY OF CHINA'S AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY*

In this study, using market‐level data on quantities, prices' and automobile characteristics from 1995 to 2001, we conduct a market analysis of the Chinese automobile industry under imperfect competition. On the demand side, we apply a nested multinomial logit model to the national market share data in order to ascertain the demand features of China's automobile market. On the supply side, we assume Bertrand behavior to uncover the markups set by automobile manufacturers. Our empirical results suggest that some large automobile manufacturers set high markups, indicating their strong market power in China's automobile market. However, their declining markups in the late 1990's imply a reduction in market control by the major producers.     

ASYMMETRIC DYNAMIC PRICING IN A LOCAL GASOLINE RETAIL MARKET*

Asymmetric‐price adjustment is a common phenomenon in many markets around the world, particularly in retail gasoline markets. This paper studies the existence of this phenomenon in the retail gasoline market in the city of Santiago, Chile, using a data set of weekly gas station prices that covers a period of almost four years. We found that prices adjust asymmetrically, and the asymmetry is different for branded gas stations and unbranded stations. In addition, we found that the asymmetry for high‐margin stations is statistically equivalent to that for low‐margin stations. This evidence is suggestive of collusion as a rationale for the asymmetric pricing policy observed.     

MARKET PERFORMANCE WITH MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS*

We revisit the fundamental issue of market provision of variety associated with Chamberlin, Spence, and Dixit‐Stiglitz when firms sell multiple products. Both products and firms are (horizontally) differentiated. We propose a general nested demand framework where consumers first decide upon a firm then which variant to buy and how much (the nested CES is a special case). We use it to determine the market's biases when firms compete in product ranges and prices. The market system attracts too many firms with too few products per firm: firms restrain product ranges to relax price competition, but this exacerbates over‐entry.     

MARKET MAKING OLIGOPOLY*

This paper analyzes price competition between market makers who set costly capacity constraints before they intermediate between producers and consumers. The unique equilibrium outcome with pure strategies at the capacity stage is the Cournot outcome. The paper thus provides a rationale for Cournot‐type competition between market makers. This contrasts with previous findings in the literature, where due to the absence of capacity constraints that are set ex ante the Bertrand result typically obtains.     

CONSUMER SWITCHING COSTS AND FIRM PRICING: EVIDENCE FROM BANK PRICING OF DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS*

We employ extensive information on bank deposit rates and area migration patterns to examine pricing relationships implied by switching costs. We argue that, because of the trade‐off between attracting new customers and exploiting old ones, banks offer higher deposit rates in areas experiencing more in‐migration. Further, because greater out‐migration implies that a locked‐in customer will not be with the bank for as many periods, banks will offer lower deposit rates in areas exhibiting greater out‐migration. Also, because this effect of out‐migration logically depends on the extent of in‐migration, an interaction effect exists. We find evidence strongly supporting these relationships.     

PRODUCT QUALITY AND MARKET SIZE*

Do larger markets offer better products? The question has implications for theories of cities and theories of market organization. We document that in the restaurant industry, where quality is produced largely with variable costs, the range of qualities on offer increases in market size. In daily newspapers, where quality is produced with fixed costs, the average quality of products increases with market size, but the market does not offer much additional variety as it grows large. These results are consistent with IO theories of endogenous product quality and with theories that emphasize the consumption advantages of cities.     

PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND AGENCY COSTS*

We model the effects of competition on managerial efficiency and isolate the agency effect of competition, present only in firms subject to agency costs, from the direct pressure effect of competition, which is present in all firms. Using a unique set of Canadian data that surveys both firms and their employees, we then evaluate the empirical significance of these two effects. We find that competition has a significant direct pressure effect as well as a significant agency effect. Both effects increase the importance firms place on quality improvements and cost reductions as well as on contractual incentives and employee effort.     

DESIGNING A MARKET STRUCTURE WHEN FIRMS COMPETE FOR THE RIGHT TO SERVE THE MARKET*

In many industries, a regulator designs an auction to select ex‐ante the firms that compete ex‐post on the product market. This paper considers the optimal market structure when firms incur sunk costs before entering the market and when the government is not able to regulate firms in the market. We prove that a free entry equilibrium results in an excessive entry when the entry costs are private information. Then, we consider an auction mechanism selecting the firms allowed to serve the market and show that the optimal number of licences results in the socially optimal market structure. When all the potential candidates are actual bidders, the optimal number of firms in the market increases with the number of candidates and decreases with the social cost of public funds. When the market size is small, as the net profit in the market decreases with the number of selected firms, entry is endogenous. As increasing competition in the market reduces competition for the market, the optimal structure is more concentrated than in the previous case.     

OPERATING SYSTEM PRICES IN THE HOME PC MARKET*

Because the demand for OS is a derived demand revealed through the demand for PCs and because its elasticity is relatively small, the profit‐maximizing price of DOS/WIN that would result from a static equilibrium is much higher than the observed price. We investigate this assertion empirically by fitting a differentiated‐products model of the home PC market to panel data of all PC brands sold in the G7 countries over the period 1995–1999. The results confirm that the low value of the aggregate elasticity of demand for PCs is the result of differentiation and substitution among PCs.     

RETAIL GASOLINE PRICE DYNAMICS AND LOCAL MARKET POWER*

Using monthly data from the 48 contiguous states (except Nevada) for the 1988–2002 period, it is shown that retail gasoline prices respond faster to wholesale price increases than to equivalent wholesale price decreases. Moreover, markets with high average retail‐wholesale margins experience a slower adjustment and a more asymmetric response. Since gasoline is the only variable input, average margins in a state likely reflect the degree of retail market power. This suggests that sticky prices and response asymmetries in the gasoline market are, at least partially, a consequence of retail market power.     

MARKET POWER AND PRICE MOVEMENTS OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE*

This paper develops and tests implications of an oligopoly‐pricing model. The model predicts that during a demand expansion, the short run competitive price is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium but in a recession, firms set prices above the competitive price. Thus, price markups over the competitive price are countercyclical. Prices set during a recession are more variable than prices set in expansions because firms employ mixed strategy pricing in recessions. The empirical analysis utilizes Hamilton's time series switching regime filter to test the predictions of the model. Fourteen out of fifteen industries have fluctuations consistent with this oligopoly‐pricing model.     

PRICES AND ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURE IN OFFICE SUPPLY SUPERSTORES*

We consider the relationship between prices and market structure for office supply superstores in the U.S. which was central to the Federal Trade Commission's opposition to the merger of Staples and Office Depot. Due to potential biases in a standard regression, we employ a two‐stage approach in which a model of endogenous market structure provides correction terms for a second stage price regression. Using a cross‐section of data on market structures and Staples' prices, we find that excluding the correction term substantially distorts the importance of competitors as the two‐stage model yields stronger negative relationships between prices and market structure variables.     

A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON INDUSTRY R&D AND MARKET STRUCTURE*

This paper aims to shed some new insights on the long‐debated and both extensively and intensively explored relationship between market concentration and industry R&D intensity. In order to do so, this study develops, from a classic Dorfman‐Steiner [1954] model of firm R&D, a model of industry R&D, where consumer preference over quality and price, R&D technology, and the joint distribution of firm‐specific technological competence and market share jointly determine the level of industry R&D intensity. The joint distribution term, which reflects both the underlying distribution of firms‐specific technological competence and the strength of its link with market share, suggests that the concentration‐R&D relationship differs depending on the strength of the link or simply the appropriability of R&D in terms of market share: A positive relationship is predicted for low‐appropriability industries, where market concentration supplements low R&D appropriability, while a negative or an inverted U‐shaped relationship for high‐appropriability industries. An empirical analysis of data, disaggregated at the five‐digit SIC level, on R&D and market concentration of Korean manufacturing industries provides supportive evidence for the predictions.     

THE ROLE OF EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS IN FACILITATING MARKET TRANSACTIONS*

We examine the relationship between market conditions and the adoption of exclusive contracts. In particular, we develop a matching model in which agents may decide to adopt exclusive contracts to reduce bilateral bargaining inefficiencies in the presence of private information. We show that it is optimal for agents to adopt exclusive contracts in thin markets but not in thick markets and that for intermediate levels of market thickness strategic complementarities lead to multiple equilibria. We study the welfare properties of market equilibria and discuss under what circumstances courts should enforce exclusive contracts.