THE EFFECTS OF FIRM BOUNDARY AND FINANCING CONSTRAINTS ON UTILITY COSTS: THE CASE OF MUNICIPALLY OWNED ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION UTILITIES

ABSTRACT: A number of studies have examined costs and potential for scale and scope economies in electricity distribution; however, few if any, have examined this area in terms of the unique constraints associated with municipal ownership or historical and regulatory constraints associated with former municipal ownership. This paper focuses on 19 distribution‐only municipally owned utilities for a ten‐year period (1988–97). Distortions from variable outputs but largely fixed inputs are minimized. The data used were collected specifically to assess productivity, cost, and efficiency performance and include value‐based capital inputs and service prices. Outputs include energy conveyed and number of connections; inputs include capital, system losses, labour, and materials. We examine the effect of using third‐party financing (e.g., connection charges), with its inherent principal‐agent problems, on utility costs, as well as the effect of shared services and multi‐utility output (e.g., electricity and water). A translog total cost function is estimated. Our findings suggest significant returns to scope but also significant increases in costs associated with the use of third‐party financing. The results also suggest scale diseconomies. Shared outputs, which have been greatly restricted or eliminated under restructuring, may have provided larger, and now lost, economies than the scale returns blindly pursued by some through restructuring or incented/forced mergers or divestitures. Finally, it is clear that third‐party financing can raise costs; such financing is widely used among utilities providing electricity, gas, water, and telecommunications, and should be closely scrutinized.     

TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY IN THE INDIAN TEXTILES INDUSTRY: A NON‐PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS OF FIRM‐LEVEL DATA

The Indian textiles industry is now at the crossroads with the phasing out of the quota regime that prevailed under the Multi‐Fiber Agreement until the end of 2004. In the face of a full integration of the textiles sector in the WTO, maintaining and enhancing productive efficiency is a precondition for competitiveness of the Indian firms in the new liberalized world market. In this paper, we use data obtained from the Annual Survey of Industries for a number of years to measure the levels of technical efficiency in the Indian textiles industry at the firm level. We use both a grand frontier applicable to all firms and a group frontier specific to firms from any individual state, ownership or organization type in order to evaluate their efficiencies. This permits us to separately identify how locational, proprietary and organizational characteristics of a firm affect its performance.     

Public Sector Banks in India: Rationale and Prerequisites for reform

This paper contributes to the debate on public sector banks by suggesting several rationales for government ownership of banks in India. The paper then proceeds to argue that due to high economic costs, the current public sector banking system is unsustainable. Although a policy of wider private ownership was introduced in the 1990s, it is suggested that there are several prerequisites to be met before such a reform can be more fully implemented. It is argued that these prerequisites arise from the rationales for government ownership, and they include a credible bank regulatory regime, and government promotion of co‐operative banks and credit unions.     

DEMOCRATIC AID AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF RECIPIENTS

We investigate whether democratic aid flows, which are directed toward the democratization of recipients by covering democracy‐related programs and government and civil society activities, affect the future political regime of recipient countries. We introduce a multinomial multivariate logit model and we use 5‐yr averaged data covering the period 1972–2004 for 59 democracy aid‐recipient countries categorized into three broad classes according to the prevalent political regime. We find strong evidence that democratic aid flows are positively associated with the likelihood of observing a partly democratic or a fully democratic political regime in democratic aid‐recipient countries and that this result is robust to the potential endogeneity of democratic assistance.(JEL D70, F35, C25)     

ON THE DETERMINANTS OF EDUCATIONAL CORRUPTION: THE CASE OF UKRAINE

This article utilizes a unique data set to examine the relationship between a group of potential explanatory variables and educational corruption in Ukraine. Our corruption controls include bribing on exams, on term papers, for credit, and for university admission. We use a robust nonparametric approach in order to estimate the probability of bribing across the four different categories. This approach is shown to be robust to a variety of different types of endogeneity often encountered under commonly assumed parametric specifications. Our main findings indicate that corruption perceptions, past bribing behavior, and the perceived criminality of bribery are significant factors for all four categories of bribery. From a policy perspective, we argue that when bribe control enforcement is difficult, anti‐corruption education programs targeting social perceptions of corruption could be appropriate. (JEL K42, J16, C14)     

Technology and incentive regulation in the Italian motorways industry

Making use of an original dataset containing information on 20 Italian motorways concessionaires over the 1992–2004 period, we study the technology prevailing in the motorways industry in Italy. We focus on the estimation of the technical progress for the years covered by our sample, and on the measurement of the economies of scale and density. We find that the industry has experienced significant technical progress and that there are sizeable economies of density and scale (at least up to a medium-large network size). These results provide valuable insights for regulatory purposes, notably for the definition of the optimal dimension of the network of a concessionaire and the correct setting of the X factor in the price cap formula, which is used to regulate the toll levels. We also control for the effects on the performance of the concessionaires due to the changes in the ownership structure and the regulatory regime, both introduced by the recent reform of the industry. We find that the productivity of the concessionaires has not increased with the adoption of a price cap regime, while it has benefited from the privatization process.      

LABOR MARKET IMPACTS OF SMOKING REGULATIONS ON THE RESTAURANT INDUSTRY

This paper examines the impact of smoking regulations on restaurant employment in West Virginia, a state with a high rate of smoking prevalence. Using a confidential establishment‐level dataset, our results suggest that smoking bans reduced restaurant employment by between 0.7 and 1.5 workers, depending on model specification. We find that smoking restrictions have heterogeneous impacts across establishments, with the largest impacts on mid‐sized establishments, defined as those with 10–29 employees. Our results also suggest that the impact of smoking restrictions was larger in counties with higher rates of smoking prevalence. (JEL L51, D78, H0)     

CREATION OF A SEPARATE TELECOM REGULATORY AGENCY: A DURATION ANALYSIS OF ITS TIME PATTERN

At the center of the issues set out in the 1997 WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunication Services was the creation of separate telecom regulatory agencies. Using the Cox proportional hazards model, this study examines how a country's socioeconomic factors affect the country's incentive to reorganize its regulatory structure and create a separate telecom regulatory agency. The main empirical findings suggest that a country's incentive to institute a separate telecom regulatory body is greater when its telecom sector performance is relatively poor and its political environment is more competitive with few institutional barriers. (JEL L52, L96 )     

PUTTING THE CIVIL SOCIETY SECTOR ON THE ECONOMIC MAP OF THE WORLD

ABSTRACT ** : The past twenty‐five years have witnessed a spectacular expansion of philanthropy, volunteering, and civil society organizations throughout the world. Indeed, we seem to be in the midst of a ‘global associational revolution,’ a worldwide upsurge of organized private voluntary activity. Despite the promise that this development holds, however, the nonprofit or civil society sector remains the invisible subcontinent on the social landscape of most countries, poorly understood by policymakers and the public at large, often encumbered by legal limitations, and inadequately utilized as a mechanism for addressing public problems. One reason for this is the lack of basic information on its scope, structure, financing, and contributions in most parts of the world. This lack of information is due in part to the fact that significant components of the nonprofit sector fall within the non‐observed, or informal, economy, and in part to the way even the observed parts of this sector have historically been treated in the prevailing System of National Accounts (SNA). This paper provides an overview of a series of steps that have been taken over the past 20 years by researchers at the Johns Hopkins University in cooperation with colleagues around the world and, more recently, with officials in the United Nations Statistics Division and the International Labour Organization to remedy this situation, culminating in the issuance and initial implementation of a new United Nations Handbook on Nonprofit Institutions in the System of National Accounts and the forthcoming publication of a new International Labour Organization Manual on the Measurement of Volunteer Work. Taken together, these efforts point the way toward putting the civil society sector on the economic map of the world for the first time in a systematically comparative way.     

Pricing Discretion and Price Regulation in Competitive Industries

Price capped firms enjoy a large degree of pricing discretion, which may harm customers and competition. We study two alternative regulatory regimes to limit it: the first regime (Absolute) places a fixed upper limit to the prices charged in captive markets, while the other regime (Relative) constrains the captive prices relatively to the competitive ones. Under the Relative regime, captive prices are only weakly lower and competitive prices are always higher than under the Absolute regime. However, the number of competitors and/or their output may be higher under the Relative regime. While the effects on aggregate welfare are ambiguous, there is some evidence that the Relative regime is more likely to increase consumers’ surplus and social welfare the more efficient are the competitors.     

Regulatory reform and labour earnings in Portuguese banking

This study examines changes in union contracts and wage structure during and after the introduction of regulatory reforms (deregulation and privatisation) in the Portuguese banking sector. The main finding is that, despite a relative wage erosion detected in the contract data, banking workers were able to enjoy an increasing wage premium in the period 1985–2000, probably reflecting the increasing profitability of the industry and the rise in labour productivity. The evidence also shows that some specific groups benefited relatively more than others: the least skilled and educated workforce and male workers gained more from the regulatory reforms. However, this unequal sharing of the wage premium did not raise wage inequality across ownership groups in the industry. I thank Mark Stewart, Odd Rune Straume, Ian Walker and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments. I am indebted to the Ministério do Trabalho e da Solidariedade for allowing the availability of data from Quadros de Pessoal. Financial support was provided by the Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia under the grant BD/SFRH/2000/1291.     

Private Sector Involvement in Infrastructure Projects

There has been little systematic discussion of the issues associated with private involvement in infrastructure. Analysis of the relative performance of the private and public sector in different phases of infrastructure provision suggests that, in most cases, the private sector will be most efficient in the construction phase but the public sector will be best equipped to handle the risks associated with ownership. The situation is less clear-cut with respect to operation—a mixture in which core operations are undertaken by the public sector owner with peripheral operations being contracted out may be optimal in many cases.     

Politics,institutions, and outcomes: Electricity regulation in Argentina and Chile

Risk, whether market or political, is an important determinant of private investment decisions. One important risk, subject to control by the government, is the risk associated with the hold-up problem: governments can force utilities to shoulder burdensome taxes, to use input factors ineffectively, or to charge unprofitable rates for their service. To attract private investment governments must be able to make commitments to policies that are nonexpropriative (either to contracts that guarantee very high rates of return or to favorable regulatory policies). These commitments, of course, must be credible.

Judgments about the credibility of commitments to regulatoty policies are based upon two political factors: regulatory predictability and regime stability. Regulatory predictability implies that the regulatory process, in which prices and levels of service are set, is not arbitrary. If the condition of regulatory predictability holds, then investors can forecast their returns over time and hence can calculate the value of their investment. If there is regime stability, then there is minimal risk of wholesale changes in the way the government regulates the industry—the most extreme type of change being the denial of property rights, or expropriation. We argue that three characteristics of the regulatory process are, in turn, important determinants of regulatory predictability: agenda control, reversionary regulatory policy, and veto gates. Moreover, regime stability is also, in part, a function of these three characteristics. We examine our theory of political risk and regulatoty commitment by comparing the cases of Argentine and Chilean electricity investment and regulation.     

THE EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP IN NGOS’ COMMERCIAL VENTURES

ABSTRACT: Amidst pressure to become self‐financing, Non‐Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have become increasingly involved in profit‐generating business ventures. Because NGOs are traditionally financed by donations with the expectation that they focus on their social mission, the commercialization of NGOs has generated criticism. This paper examines the effect of ownership on investment incentives in NGOs’ commercial ventures, using an incomplete contracts framework. NGO‐ownership helps minimize the tension between primary social mission and managerial decisions. However, external ownership provides better incentives to invest in mission‐enhancing innovations. Finally, because relationships with firms are repeated, NGOs may use relational contracts to align their ventures’ incentives. However, such contracts need to be credible to work.     

THE EFFECTS OF ENDOGENOUS MARKET ENTRY OF PHYSICIAN‐OWNED HOSPITALS ON MEDICARE EXPENDITURES: AN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES APPROACH

This study examines the effect of physician‐owned hospitals (POHs) on Medicare per enrollee expenditures at the metropolitan area (MSA) level nationwide, spanning the 8‐year time period from 1998 to 2005. The study uses fixed effects panel data estimation with instrumental variables to account for the bias introduced by endogenous POH market entry (i.e., POHs may be more likely to open in high‐growth/high‐demand markets with high levels of Medicare per enrollee expenditures). After controlling for other variables that are likely to affect expenditures (especially the age and sex distribution of the MSA), we find no association between POH presence and Medicare expenditures per enrollee at the MSA level. The results are robust to changes in model specification, estimation technique, and definition of geographic market. These findings suggest that the “demand inducement” aspects of physician ownership of acute care hospitals (if any) have no meaningful impact on market‐level Medicare expenditures per enrollee. Current policies based on an assumption that POHs are associated with significant increases in total expenditures may need to be reassessed. (JEL I11, L10, C33)     

USING COMMERCIAL DISCIPLINE TO IMPROVE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE PROCUREMENT: MISPLACED ENTHUSIASM?

Australia, like other democracies, has long sought to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of procurement for national defence. A recent review exhorted Defence procurement managers to exert greater “commercial discipline.” Similar calls have been made in other countries. This paper tests such public sector emulation of commercial practice by comparing the relative effectiveness of procurement via in‐house arrangements; a public procurement agency detached from Defence; and privatized provision. We show that what matters is not public or private ownership but how ownership and management are integrated and what incentive structures are applied. (JEL H44)     

PUBLIC SERVICE PERSPECTIVES ON REFORMS OF ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION AND SUPPLY: A MODULAR ANALYSIS

ABSTRACT ** : This article analyzes organizational change in electricity distribution and retail businesses and its impact on public service issues. Organizational change has resulted from the European electricity directives, especially the EU Electricity directive 2003/54/EC , which has imposed major transformations on these activities, requiring legal unbundling of electricity distribution networks by 1 July 2007. Organizational change has also resulted from an adaptation of companies to the newly competitive environment. This has led to a diversity of organizational choices across Europe. We analyze this diversity by using a modular approach, which decomposes reforms in electricity distribution and retail into logical ‘blocks’. We then examine how European countries have dealt with two policy and regulatory issues related to customer protection in that new environment: the regulation of quality of distribution, which is a task of regulators, and energy affordability policies for vulnerable customers, which are a central aspect of public service policies in the electricity sector.     

FOREIGN ENTRY INTO U.S. SERVICE INDUSTRY BY TAKEOVERS AND THE CREATION OF NEW FIRMS

We study the relation between foreign entry in U.S. service sector industries and the revealed comparative advantage of the investing country using U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis firm‐level data on all foreign takeovers and new foreign‐owned firms from 1998 to 2008. We find foreign acquisitions in the service sector are in industries of U.S. comparative advantage while new foreign firms are in industries of investing country's comparative advantage. This suggests that foreign acquisitions in the service sector are not directly related to foreign investors' competitiveness in the industry of investment. In contrast foreign investors in new service sector firms come from countries with a competitive edge in the industries of investment. We also find that foreign investors of new service sector firms are from Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) countries with a comparative disadvantage in royalties and trademarks. (JEL F21, F23, G34)     

The Rise of the Maquiladoras: A Mixed Blessing

Mexico experienced a tremendous expansion of its export‐processing maquila sector during the 1990s. Since one of the main objectives of the maquiladora program was to promote formal employment, we study how the rapid increase in maquiladora activity has affected labor market outcomes and welfare in Mexico. We develop a heterogeneous‐firm model with imperfect labor markets that captures salient features of the Mexican economy such as the differences between maquila and non‐maquila manufacturing plants and the existence of an informal sector. We calibrate the model's parameters to match key cross‐sectional moments characterizing the Mexican economy. We find that the expansion of the maquila sector during the 1990s was a mixed blessing for Mexico. Our quantitative model indicates that the skill premium decreased by 2.7%, informality increased by 0.9%, and overall welfare decreased by 3.7%.     

THE EFFECT OF WELFARE ASSET RULES ON AUTO OWNERSHIP,EMPLOYMENT, AND WELFARE PARTICIPATION: A LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS

This paper investigates how asset tests for welfare eligibility affect auto ownership, employment, and welfare participation for single mothers without a college degree. We combine longitudinal data from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation with data on state‐level welfare program rules from the Urban Institute and data on state‐level controls to test whether these single mothers were more likely to (1) own a car, (2) be employed, and (3) be off of welfare, depending on the welfare asset rules instituted in their state. We find evidence that, taken as a group, the asset rules have a statistically significant effect on the probability of car ownership. Ordinary least squares results and cross‐sectional two‐stage least squares (2SLS) results using the asset rules to instrument for car ownership show a large, positive, statistically significant effect of car ownership on employment. However, in 2SLS models controlling for prior car ownership and prior employment, the asset instruments are weaker and we do not find an effect of car ownership on employment. Of significance for policy makers, we find that the asset rules do not have a statistically significant joint effect on welfare participation, even after addressing possible endogeneity. (JEL I38, J68, J08)