POLITICS AND LENGTH OF TIME TO BANK FAILURE: 1986–1990

This paper extends research on the savings and loan (S&L) industry to the banking industry in order to determine whether political influence affects the length of time from initial undercapitalization until ultimate bank failure. Results suggest that undercapitalized banks with representation on the House banking committee were allowed to remain open longer than were other undercapitalized banks. These results provide evidence that membership on relevant House committees matters.     

THE WAIVER PORK BARREL: COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP AND THE APPROVAL TIME OF MEDICAID WAIVERS

Recent growth in Medicaid spending has forced states to look for ways to slow the program's rate of growth. Under the Medicaid program's rules, state governments must submit a waiver to the federal government in order to implement a cost-saving program. The time required to process a waiver varies from 14 days to over three years. This study examines the determinants of the time it takes to process a waiver and the number of revisions required before final approval. The results indicate that an increase in the tenure of the state's delegation to the House oversight committee reduces the time to approval for Freedom of Choice waivers. However, more liberal committee members appear to delay waivers. The results complement the existing literature on the pork barrel by showing that seniority on a committee is an important determinant-not only of monetary benefits but also of nonmonetary benefits. ( JEL H51, 118)     

ALL IN: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE VOTING ON INTERNET GAMBLING RESTRICTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

In 2006, the U.S. Congress passed the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) which prohibited financial institutions from processing transactions arising from online gaming activities, thereby severely hindering U.S. residents from participating in online casino games, primarily poker. Enactment of this legislation followed lobbying and political pressure from a variety of interest groups. By examining House roll call votes, we identify empirically the sources of political influence that resulted in passage of the internet gambling legislation. We find that party affiliation was of primary importance, with Republicans more likely to vote in favor of the bill. The percentage of constituents who are Evangelical Christians and also the number of gambling establishments in the district were positively associated with votes for the bill. However, contributions from the gaming industry decreased the probability a congressman would vote for the bill. (JEL D72, L83)     

INFLUENCE, ELECTIONS, AND THE VALUE OF A VOTE IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

This paper investigates the extent to which interest groups use their campaign contributions to affect election outcomes as opposed to influencing candidate policy choices directly. It also reveals how much value interest groups place on gaining one more favorable vote in the House of Representatives. The empirical estimates suggest that gaining influence dominates helping favored candidates win the election as a means to affect defense spending policies. Political action committees differ in interesting ways, however, with the more ideological peace groups placing greater emphasis on changing electoral outcomes than do investor lobbies representing the defense industry.     

DO STOCK RETURNS VARY WITH CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS? BUSH VS. GORE: THE FLORIDA RECOUNT

I examine the relation between campaign contributions and stock returns during the Florida recount period of the 2000 presidential elections. Using the full population of publicly traded firms, I find an economically significant positive (negative) relation between pre‐election campaign contributions to Bush (Gore) and stock returns during the 37‐day election recount period. This relation exists for both the level and partisanship of contributions, and exists incrementally at both the firm and industry levels. These relations are robust to several different specifications, including alternative event windows that exclude the potentially confounding House/Senate races. The firm‐level analysis is consistent with contributions being influence‐motivated.     

Bankruptcy "Reform" in Congress: Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process

Both ideology and interest group interventions are importantin voting on bankruptcy legislation. Roughly 15 votes in theU.S. House of Representatives appear to have been changed directlythrough interest group pressures proxied by campaign contributions.Many more could have been changed if resources could be fullydevoted to spot purchases, but most contributions appear tohave been aimed at maintaining legislation on the agenda. Inthe U.S. Senate, state interests in homestead exemptions influencedvoting. Although committee markups demonstrate an ideologicallineup that is not distinct from floor voting, committees promotebargaining on destabilizing issues.     

The Role of Political Parties in the Organization of Congress

This article examines theory and evidence on party competitionin the U.S. Congress in the allocation of members to committees.Parties allocate members to committees to maximize the jointutility of its members, taking into account how the committees'memberships affect the legislation adopted by the legislature.Parties are constrained by both institutional rules and theheterogeneity of party members' preferences. Interest groupratings from the U.S. House of Representatives provide evidencethat the parties stack committees in a manner consistent withthe predictions of the theoretical model. Alternative hypothesesexplain no more than half the committees in the U.S. Congress,while the party competition hypothesis is consistent with theoverall structure of the committees. Model selection tests thatnest the party competition and representative majority partyhypotheses reveal that the party competition hypothesis is supportedby the data while the representative majority party hypothesisis not.     

TRACING THE EFFECTS OF GUARANTEED ADMISSION THROUGH THE COLLEGE PROCESS: EVIDENCE FROM A POLICY DISCONTINUITY IN THE TEXAS 10% PLAN

The Texas 10% law states that students who graduated among the top 10% of their high school class are guaranteed admission to public universities in Texas. We estimate the causal effects of this admissions guarantee on a sequence of connected decisions: students' application behavior, admission decisions by the university, students' enrollment choices conditional on admission; as well as the resulting college achievement. We identify these effects by comparing students just above and just below the top 10% rank cut off. We assume that other student characteristics and incentives are continuous at this cut off. We find that students react to incentives created by the admissions guarantee—for example, by reducing applications to competing private universities. The effects of the admissions guarantee depend on the university and the type of students it attracts. The 10% law is binding and alters the decisions of the admissions committees. We find little evidence that the law increases diversity or leads to meaningful mismatch for the marginal student admitted. (JEL I23, I28)     

Voting in small committees

We analyze the voting behavior of a small committee that has to approve or reject a project proposal whose return is uncertain. Members have diverse preferences: some of them want to maximize the expected value, while others have a bias towards project approval and ignore their information on the project value. We focus on the most efficient use of scarce information when members cannot communicate prior to voting, and we provide insights on the optimal composition of the committee. Our main result is that the presence of biased members can improve the voting outcome, by simplifying the strategies of unbiased members. Thus, committees with diverse members perform as well as homogeneous committees, and even better in some cases. In particular, when value-maximizing members outnumber biased members by one vote, the optimal equilibrium becomes unique.     

Do interest groups reward politicians for their votes in the legislature? Evidence from the great recession

ABSTRACT

Interest groups lobby politicians in various ways to influence their policy decisions, especially, their voting decisions in the legislature. Most, if not all, of the studies on this issue examine ”pre-vote” lobbying activities of interest groups that occur before politicians vote in the legislature. In this paper, however, I examine ”post-vote” lobbying activities of interest groups that occur after politicians vote in the legislature. By using data on the amount of monetary contributions given by interest groups to the members of the U.S. House of Representatives who have served in the 109th (2005–06) through 111th (2009–10) Congress, I find evidence that voting in favour of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008, one of the most significant pieces of legislation and possibly the biggest government bailout in U.S. economic history, has increased the amount of monetary contributions that politicians receive from the interest groups in the financial sector after the passage of the EESA. I also discuss two reasons for such post-vote lobbying and find empirical evidence for one of them.     

Majority committees

Suppose an m-member committee is to be selected by a set of voters from a set X of M > m nominees. If A is an m-member committee, and if as many voters prefer A to B as prefer B to A for every other committee B of m nominees, then A is a majority committee of size m. Although the existence of majority nominees (m = 1) has been extensively analyzed, little attention has been given to conditions that imply the existence of majority committees of size m ? 2. Known restrictions on voters' preferences on X that guarntee the existence of a majority nominee could be applied directly to voters' preferences on m-member committees. However, this definitional exercise lacks intuitive appeal, and a different approach is taken in this paper. The paper presumes that profiles of voters' preferences on X are either dichotomous or single peaked. Both cases ensure the existence of a majority nominee. Independence-monotonicity assumptions are then used to connect voters' preferences on X to their preferences on committees of equal size. Although these assumptions guarantee the existence of majority committees when m = 1 and when m = M ? 1, they do not generally do so when 1 < m < M ? 1. The latter observation motivates additional restrictions on profiles. In the dichotomous case, we consider profiles in which all voters have the same number k of nominees in their preferred subsets, and show that this restriction guarantees the existence of a majority committee of size m for 1 < m < M ? 1 only when k = 1 or k = M ? 1. In the single-peaked case, we consider profiles in which all voters have the same most-preferred (peak) nominee, and prove that this guarantees the existence of a majority committee of size m for every m between 1 and M ? 1.     

THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORM IN THE MIXED MARKET FOR FOSTER CARE

ABSTRACT ** : This paper uses proprietary quality of care data to examine the consequences of organizational form in privatized US foster care services. The contract failure hypothesis generically proposes that nonprofits should provide higher quality services, relative to for‐profits, when output is costly to observe. Advocates argue that the nonprofits offer important consumer protections when public services are contracted to private agencies. Contrary to expectations, we find that nonprofit firms do not offer higher quality services. We explore the possibility that monitoring efforts by state regulators or competition among foster care agencies effectively mitigate the influence of organizational form in this particular mixed market.     

Collective Leadership,Career Concern,and the Housing Market in China: The Role of Standing Committees

Despite an emerging literature on political determinants of economic performance, little is known about whether standing committees of the Communist Party, an institution of collective leadership, matter for economic development. Using Chinese provincial‐level panel data, we find that a higher ratio of new members in the standing committee of the local Communist Party is correlated with a higher housing sales/gross domestic product (GDP) ratio. Moreover, more new members in the standing committee are also associated with a lower level of GDP per capita and a lower manufacturing output growth rate. The results on the size of the real estate sector are robust to dealing with the endogeneity of the ratio of new standing committee members. Our findings suggest that career incentives of party leadership affected real estate development at the expense of manufacturing growth in the locality, and that the structure of collective leadership has important economic consequences.     

Legislative Organization Under Separate Powers

Existing theories of legislative organization attribute thestrong committee system in the U.S. Congress to members' distributive,informational, or partisan needs. But legislators elsewhereshare these same motivations, yet not all have chosen to organizethemselves in a similar fashion. Therefore the strong committeesystem must derive to some extent from the larger constitutionalcontext, including plurality winner elections, bicameralism,and our focus, the system of separate powers. In particularwe argue that committees established in part to oversee executiveagencies will have preferences biased against those of the executive.Thus committees serve as contrary outliers, acting as a counterweightto executive branch policy making. We find support for thisprediction with data drawn from all standing committees fromthe 80th to 102nd Congresses. We also find that each of theseemingly incompatible theories of legislative organizationpredicts well patterns of committee composition in differentissue areas.     

Ex Post Welfare under Alternative Health Care Systems

The implications of a societal aversion to inequality for the optimal structure of the health care system are studied. The agents are assumed to be ex ante identical, but to differ ex post in the state of their health. Inequality aversion is introduced by postulating a strictly concave ex post social welfare function. It is shown that the optimal public health care system allocates health care differently than would private health insurance; specifically, people who are relatively unhealthy with and without treatment receive more health care, and people who are relatively healthy with and without treatment receive less health care. The aggregate quantity of health care under the optimal public health care system can be either greater or smaller than under private health care insurance. If the public health care system is optimally designed, allowing agents to purchase supplementary private health care insurance cannot raise social welfare and is likely to decrease it.     

HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: WHY IS SUPPLY SO PRICE INSENSITIVE?

Health spending as a percentage of gross domestic product in the U.S. economy is growing, from 5% in 1960 to about 16% in the current period, and it is predicted to grow to as much as 30% in 2050. Then why is the supply of health care in the United States so insensitive to steeply rising prices? This paper conducts an econometric study to show that high health‐care costs have an adverse impact on labor productivity, causing a negative production externality in all industries. So, can the rising cost of health‐care affect the U.S. comparative advantage? The paper seeks answers to these questions in a general equilibrium model and finds that the labor productivity shock is responsible for the sluggish or declining supply of health care. Consumers are able to afford less health care due to a possible decline in real wages. U.S. comparative advantage becomes a nonissue, provided that the equilibrium is stable in spite of a negatively sloped health‐care supply curve. Negative externality, leading to market failure, may be addressed in two alternative ways. (JEL F11, I11, I12, I18)     

Rotating group representatives and group members’ requests in repeated public goods game

ABSTRACT

This study investigated the effect of group representatives on contribution behaviour in response to group members’ requests in repeated public goods games. Data came from 135 students in 15 groups enrolled in the experiment, grouped in the following treatments: no group representatives (NR, NRG) and group representatives (R1, R2). We also tested initial requests wherein the group members’ initial requests (i.e. NRG, R2) mediated the positive relationship between individual-level contribution preferences and group contributions. We used a fixed-effects GLS regression and IV regression to analyse the effect of group representatives and group members’ requests. The results indicated the following: (a) rotating group representative/group members’ requests was related to group contributions at the session (within-members) and group (between-group) levels; (b) the reactions to members’ requests positively predicted group contributions; (c) subjects in the no group representatives treatment formed their requests by relying more on previous group contributions than subjects in the group representatives treatment, who relied more on the previous group members’ requests; and (d) the initial requests explained long-term contribution levels, which resulted in variations in group contributions observed between the NRG and R2 treatments. Our findings highlight the role of rotating group representatives in stimulating cooperation among members, while group members’ requests impel individuals to make contribution decisions at the group level.     

Reduced medical spending associated with increased use of a remote diabetes management program and lower mean blood glucose values

Abstract

Aims: Many new mobile technologies are available to assist people in managing chronic conditions, but data on the association between the use of these technologies and medical spending remains limited. As the available digital technology offerings to aid in diabetes management increase, it is important to understand their impact on medical spending. The aim of this study was to investigate the financial impact of a remote digital diabetes management program using medical claims and real-time blood glucose data.

Materials and methods: A retrospective analysis of multivariate difference-in-difference and instrumental variables regression modeling was performed using data collected from a remote digital diabetes management program. All employees with diabetes were invited, in a phased introduction, to join the program. Data included blood glucose (BG) values captured remotely from members via connected BG meters and medical spending claims. Participants included members (those who accepted the invitation, n?=?2,261) and non-members (n?=?8,741) who received health insurance benefits from three self-insured employers. Medical spending was compared between people with well-controlled (BG ≤ 154?mg/dL) and poorly controlled (BG > 154?mg/dL) diabetes.

Results: Program access was associated with a 21.9% (p?<?0.01) decrease in medical spending, which translates into a $88 saving per member per month at 1 year. Compared to non-members, members experienced a 10.7% (p?<?0.01) reduction in diabetes-related medical spending and a 24.6% (p?<?0.01) reduction in spending on office-based services. Well-controlled BG values were associated with 21.4% (p?=?0.03) lower medical spending.

Limitations and conclusions: Remote digital diabetes management is associated with decreased medical spending at 1 year. Reductions in spending increased with active utilization. It will be beneficial for future studies to analyze the long-term effects of the remote diabetes management program and assess impacts on patient health and well-being.     

权威分配和信息传递

在成员间有利益冲突的情况下,授权是激励组织中成员释放其私人信息的一个重要方式。本文考察了在对多人授权时,权威分配的方式对于信息释放的影响。本文考虑了两种分配方案的影响。其一是所有的成员在形式上有同等的权威(委员会);其二是,某一个成员有全部的决策权威(科层制)。委员会的决策规则虽然在形式上是平等的,但在实质上却可能偏向于某个成员。科层制则在形式上就完全偏向于它的领导。本文表明,权威的集中分配放大了利益冲突的影响。并且,权威分配的形式上的偏向有支配性的作用:它压倒了利益冲突以及实质偏向的影响。     

THE EFFECT OF LEGALIZED GAMBLING ON STATE GOVERNMENT REVENUE

Legalized gambling is an attractive option to state governments facing tightening fiscal constraints. Yet, the empirical evidence on the effect of gambling on state revenues is limited. Most studies examine a single industry in a single state, and for a relatively short period of time. This study provides a more general analysis of gambling industries and their effects on state revenues. We use data on gambling volume and state government revenues net of federal government transfers for all 50 states from 1985 to 2000. We find that lotteries and horse racing tend to increase state revenues, while casinos and greyhound racing tend to decrease state revenues. (JEL H2, H7, L8)