On the uniqueness of fully informative rational expectations equilibria

Summary. This paper analyzes two equivalent equilibrium notions under asymmetric information: risk neutral rational expectations equilibria (rn-REE), and common knowledge equilibria. We show that the set of fully informative rn-REE is a singleton, and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partially informative rn-REE. In a companion paper (DeMarzo and Skiadas (1996)) we show that equilibrium prices for the larger class of quasi-complete economies can be characterized as rn-REE. Examples of quasi-complete economies include the type of economies for which demand aggregation in the sense of Gorman is possible (with or without asymmetric information), the setting of the Milgrom and Stokey no-trade theorem, an economy giving rise to the CAPM with asymmetric information but no normality assumptions, the simple exponential-normal model of Grossman (1976), and a case of no aggregate endowment risk. In the common-knowledge context, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a common knowledge posterior estimate, given common priors, to coincide with the full communication posterior estimate. Received: May 29, 1997; revised version: July 18, 1997     

Rational choice with status quo bias

Motivated by the empirical findings concerning the importance of one's current situation on her choice behavior, the main objective of this paper is to propose a rational choice theory that allows for the presence of a status quo bias, and that incorporates the standard choice theory as a special case. We follow a revealed preference approach, and obtain two nested models of rational choice that allow phenomena like the status quo bias and the endowment effect, and that are applicable in any choice situation to which the standard (static) choice model applies.     

Occupational choice, incentives and wealth distribution

We consider a model of occupational choice in large economies where individuals differ in their wealth endowment. Individuals can remain self-employed or engage in productive matches with another individual, i.e., form firms. Matches are subject to a moral hazard problem with limited liability. The division of the gains from such matches is determined by competitive forces. When the incentive problem is asymmetric, matches are typically wealth-heterogeneous, with richer individuals choosing the occupation for which incentives are more important. The utilities attained within a match depend on the wealth distribution and changes in the latter give rise to ‘trickle down’ effects.     

Competitive equilibria of economies with a continuum of consumers and aggregate shocks

This paper studies competitive equilibria of a production economy with aggregate productivity shocks. There is a continuum of consumers who face borrowing constraints and individual labor endowment shocks. The dynamic economy is described in terms of sequences of aggregate distributions. The existence of competitive equilibrium is proven and a recursive characterization is established. In particular, it is shown that for any competitive equilibrium, there is a payoff equivalent competitive equilibrium that is generated by a suitably defined recursive equilibrium.     

The endowment effect and intertemporal choice: a laboratory investigation

We present a laboratory investigation of intertemporal choice (i.e., elicited discount rates) allowing for the influence of the endowment effect. Consistent with the previous literature, we hypothesize that the endowment effect in an intertemporal choice setting results in substantially higher discount rates relative to when individuals treat the resources in question as found money. Our results support this hypothesis and our experimental design provides a new protocol for conducting choice experiments wherein the endowment effect is an important determinant of behaviour.     

Anticipation effects of technological progress on capital accumulation: a vintage capital approach

Due to embodied technological progress new generations of capital goods are more productive. Therefore, in order to study the effects of technological progress, a model must be analyzed in which different generations of capital goods can be distinguished. We determine in what way the firm adjusts current investments to predictions of technological progress. In the presence of market power we show that a negative anticipation effect occurs, i.e. current investments in recent generations of capital goods decline when faster technological progress will take place in the future, because then it becomes more attractive to wait for new generations of capital goods. In case that only investments in new machines are possible, actually a whole wave of anticipation phases arises.     

DUALITY WITH SECTOR‐SPECIFIC EXTERNALITIES UNDER SOCIAL CONSTANT RETURNS*

We develop dual approaches to quantity and price relationships of production in a general multisectoral model with sector‐specific externalities. The production of each good exhibits socially constant returns to scale but privately decreasing returns. We find that the Stolper‐Samuelson theorem holds for factor intensity ranking from the social perspective and that the Rybczynski theorem holds for factor intensity ranking from the private perspective. The price‐output dual fails to hold in general. Moreover, we re‐establish the Heckscher‐Ohlin theorem in the two‐sector case, as well as the factor endowment–factor price and price‐output comparative statics in the high‐dimension case under proper conditions.     

Pollution effects of free trade areas: Simulations from a general equilibrium model

Abstract

A two-factors, two-goods, three-countries general equilibrium model is developed to assess the effects of a Free Trade Area (FTA) on pollution emissions. It also makes it possible to compare the effects of a discriminating commercial policy with alternative–non discriminating–policies, such as full trade liberalization or non-discriminating protection. A theoretical model is first developed in order to take into account country-differences in factor endowment, environmental regulation, pollution abatement technology, marginal disutilities of pollution, as well as terms of trade effects. This model is subsequently calibrated and computed in accordance with empirical evidence. The main conclusion shows that the move from protection to FTA reduces world pollution emissions. A second result indicates that, in case of full trade liberalization, world pollution is further reduced.     

Dynamic inefficiency in an overlapping generations economy with production

Reichlin [Equilibrium cycles in an overlapping generations economy with production, J. Econ. Theory 40 (1986) 89-102] has shown in an OLG model with productive capital that whenever the steady state is locally indeterminate and undergoes a Hopf bifurcation, it is Pareto-optimal. While these results were established under the assumption of Leontief technology, the author has partially extended them to show that the Hopf bifurcation is robust with respect to the introduction of capital-labor substitution. In this note, we prove that the Pareto-optimality of the steady state does not extend to technologies with capital-labor substitution. When the steady state is a sink or undergoes a Hopf bifurcation, it is characterized by over-accumulation with respect to the Golden Rule—the interest rate is negative—hence not Pareto-optimal. Most importantly, it follows that stabilization policies targeting the steady state leave room for welfare losses associated with productive inefficiency, apart from the very special case of Leontief technology.     

A THEORY OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR

In many countries, especially poor countries, a heavy burden of taxes, fees, bureaucratic hassles, and bribes drives many producers into an informal sector. This paper shows that we can attribute the existence of a large informal sector to the fact that, because productive endowments contain important unobservable components, the state cannot adjust the amounts that it extracts from producers in the formal sector finely according to each producer's endowment. Given this fact, we find that if the endowment of well-endowed producers is sufficiently large relative to poorly endowed producers, or if their number is relatively large, or if the quality of public services is sufficiently low, then the state extracts a large enough amount from producers in the formal sector that poorly endowed producers choose to work in the informal sector. This result obtains both for a proprietary state, which maximizes its own net revenue, and for a hypothetical benevolent state, which would maximize total net output. But, we also find that there exist combinations of the distribution of endowments and the quality of public services such that the policies of a proprietary state, but not the policies of a hypothetical benevolent state, would cause poorly endowed producers to work in the informal sector.     

Entrepreneurial talent, occupational choice, and trickle up policies

We study market inefficiencies and policy remedies when agents choose their occupations, and entrepreneurial talent is subject to private information. Untalented entrepreneurs depress the returns to entrepreneurship because of adverse selection. The severity of this problem depends on the outside option of entrepreneurs, which is working for wages. This links credit, product and labor markets. A rise in wages reduces the adverse selection problem. These multimarket interactions amplify productivity shocks and may generate multiple equilibria. If it is impossible to screen entrepreneurs then all agents unanimously support a tax on entrepreneurs that drives out the less talented ones. However, if screening is possible, e.g., if wealthy entrepreneurs can provide collateral for their loans, then wealthy entrepreneurs do not support surplus enhancing taxes.     

Debt, collateral, and renegotiation under moral hazard

This paper demonstrates that renegotiation will increase initial collateral requirements in debt contracts under moral hazard. Hence, it confirms Smith and Warner's conjecture that severity of contractual covenants and ease of renegotiating debt contracts are positively related, in case where the covenant provision is collateral.     

Best-of-three all-pay auctions

We study a best-of-three all-pay auction. It is shown that with values of winning and without values of losing, this auction is less productive (the players’ total expected effort is smaller) than the one-stage all-pay auction. However, with different values of losing over the contest’s stages it may be more productive than the one-stage all-pay auction.     

Costly investment, complementarities and the skill premium

We propose a new framework to analyse the relationship between the relative high-skilled labour endowment, the skill premium and economic growth. Building on Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), we introduce physical capital; internal costly investment in both capital and R&D; and complementarities between intermediate goods. We only find a positive relationship between the relative labour endowment and both the skill premium and economic growth within determined intervals of relative labour endowment values, which vary with the absolute productive advantage of high over low-skilled labour. The model thus accommodates theoretically mixed empirical results on the relative labour endowment-skill premium relationship. We further find that the impact on both the relative labour endowment and the skill premium of a rise in investment costs or in the complementarities degree depends on: (i) the absolute productivity advantage of high over low-skilled labour; and (ii) the relative labour endowment.     

Income inequality in the trust game

This paper presents an experiment measuring how lab-induced income inequality affects trust and trustworthiness. Low endowment subjects paired with high endowment subjects showed more trust than subjects in other pairs; this trust was reciprocated with high trustworthiness.     

Endowment effects in contests

We experimentally study overbidding in contests and find that overbidding is significantly higher when subjects are given a large per-experiment endowment rather than when the endowment is given per-period. Risk-aversion and non-monetary utility of winning can partially explain our findings.     

Optimal tranching with diverse beliefs

In this paper, we consider the optimal selling strategy for an asset securitization originator (the issuer) when the potential buyers hold diverse beliefs. We find that the tranching process is beneficial to the issuer because it increases the total sale price. We also consider the optimal tranching strategy that maximizes the revenue of the issuer. This helps explain the widespread use of the tranching technique in the asset securitization practice. Our findings are also enlightening to understand the price bubble problem when the junior tranche is interpreted as a collateral.     

A. W. Bob Coats, 1924–2007

The paper shows that the conventional neoclassical interpretation of von Neumann's growth model cannot be sustained. Other than in models in the tradition of Walras and Cassel, in his model there is no given ‘capital’ endowment that constrains productive capacity and provides the basis, in terms of its relative ‘scarcity’, for a determination of the interest rate. Von Neumann's model is rather fully compatible with, and has been anticipated in all relevant aspects by, authors whose contributions can be strictly located within, the classical tradition. This concerns in particular the asymmetric treatment of the distributive variables. Finally it is argued that von Neumann's model may be interpreted as containing inter alia, an answer to the ideas put forward by his fellow-mathematician Robert Remark. Both circumstantial evidence and a careful textual comparison of Remak's paper on ‘superposed price systems’ and von Neumann's analysis support this interpretation.     

Crowding out and crowding in: When does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?

When the risk of default constrains financial contracts, public insurance policies can significantly affect private risk-sharing. This is because by changing income expectations and volatility, redistribution changes the attractiveness of default and thus endogenous borrowing constraints. Extending results by Krueger and Perri (2011) [8], this paper analyses the conditions under which redistribution can improve private insurance by making default less attractive to the income-rich, whose income it reduces. I first explain why public redistribution typically crowds out private insurance in the two-income economy, and identify the role of income persistence and saving after default. Second, I show how, in endowment economies with three income states or more and in economies with capital, redistributive taxes can improve, or “crowd in”, private consumption insurance. Finally, in a quantitative exercise using a realistic income process calibrated to US micro-data, moderate redistribution crowds in private insurance with production but not in an endowment economy.     

Consumption choice and asset pricing with a non-price-taking agent

Summary. This paper develops a pure-exchange model to study the consumption-portfolio problem of an agent who acts as a non-price-taker, and to analyze the implications of his behavior on equilibrium security prices. The non-price-taker is modeled as a price leader in all markets; his price impact is then recast as a dependence of the Arrow-Debreu prices on his consumption, allowing a tractable formulation. Besides the aggregate consumption, the endowment of the non-price-taker appears as an additional factor in driving equilibrium allocations and prices. Comparisons of equilibria between a price-taking and a non-price-taking economy are carried out. Received: March 29, 1996; revised version October 29, 1996