Do people gamble more in good times? Evidence from 27 European countries

We provide evidence of a positive relationship between the intensity of gambling and economic growth in 27 European countries for 2005–2013. Our proxy for gambling is represented by government revenues from taxes on lotteries, betting and gambling. This variable is linked to GDP growth in a panel regression framework and pooled OLS. However, when we split our sample to account for the heterogeneity among European countries, we found that the positive ‘gambling – GDP growth’ relationship is driven extensively by the Central and Eastern European countries. It appears that people in these countries tend to gamble more when the economy is expanding.     

Gambling Taxation: Public Equity in the Gambling Business

Government's intrinsic role in sustaining a viable gambling industry, and its significant revenue stake in industry profitability, can make the public effectively shareholders in the industry. An important social cost of gambling is the potential for corruption of democratic processes through close industry and government links. Government can increase gambling revenues by expanding the tax base, rather than by raising tax rates. Gambling tax rates have fallen in recent decades, while revenues have increased dramatically. This paper analyses the forces encouraging governments to give excessive priority to protecting gambling revenues. It finds gambling taxation is regressive, and increasingly so as access widens. 'Children, madmen and fools' are significant to the market. The transition to a goods and services tax, along with the recent inquiry by the Productivity Commission into gambling, provides an opportunity for gambling policy to be made in a coherent social and economic framework, rather than as ad hoc and short-term solutions to State governments' revenue problems. Such an outcome rests on the Commonwealth government playing a leadership role.     

Volatile Mining Revenues and State Government Budget Decisions

Mining royalties provide a volatile source of revenue for state governments in Australia. We explore the effects of changes in royalty revenue received by a state government on current-year budget decisions about expenditure, tax revenue and the budget surplus. The literature postulates different models for how lower-level government budget decisions respond to a revenue windfall from a higher level of government. Empirical evidence on these models over 1998–2019 provides strong evidence that over a half of a royalty windfall becomes a change in budget expenditure. Estimates of changes to tax revenues and the surplus are not definitive nor robust.     

Monitoring and forecasting annual public deficit every month: the case of France

In this paper we forecast annual budget deficits using monthly information. Using French monthly data on central government revenues and expenditures, the method we propose consists of: (1) estimating monthly ARIMA models for all items of central government revenues and expenditures; (2) inferring the annual ARIMA models from the monthly models; (3) using the inferred annual ARIMA models to perform one-step-ahead forecasts for each item; (4) compounding the annual forecasts of all revenues and expenditures to obtain an annual budget deficit forecast. The major empirical benefit of this technique is that as soon as new monthly data become available, annual deficit forecasts are updated. This allows us to detect in advance possible slippages in central government finances. For years 2002–2004, forecasts obtained following the proposed approach are compared with a benchmark method and with official predictions published by the French government. An evaluation of their relative performance is provided.      

Casino regulations and economic welfare

Abstract This paper studies the entry and tax regulation of oligopolistically competitive privately run casinos and government‐run casinos in a jurisdiction. We highlight three important external effects from casino‐style gambling: non‐casino income creation, social disorder costs, and cross‐border gambling. The laissez‐faire equilibrium need not be overcrowding compared with regulated or government‐run regimes. Entry regulation may lead to higher jurisdiction welfare than tax regulation. Government‐run casinos always operate on a larger scale and achieve higher welfare than other regimes, given the same number of casinos. With an endogenous fraction of external gamblers, a dispersed casino configuration yields higher welfare than a centralized one.     

THE TWO‐WAY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND CORRUPTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH

The existing empirical evidence suggests that in low‐income economies, an increase in government spending leads to a reduction of growth. This article aims to explain this empirical fact by considering a growth model that incorporates a two‐way relationship between corruption and government spending. That is, government spending gives rise to corruption and rent seeking, which feeds back by distorting the structure and size of government spending. In addition, the cost of corruption depends on the wage rate. Therefore, in low‐income economies, increases in government spending tend to generate larger social losses caused by a higher level of rent dissipation and a concomitant rise in corruption and government inefficiency. Consequently, in such economies, an increase in government spending is more likely to result in a decline of economic growth. (JEL H3, O11, O41)     

GROWTH AND VARIABILITY OF SCHOOL DISTRICT INCOME TAX REVENUES: IS TAX BASE DIVERSIFICATION A GOOD IDEA FOR SCHOOL FINANCING?

School districts in Ohio have the option of diversifying their revenue base by adopting income taxes. Using a panel of Ohio school districts that adopted a local income tax from 1990 to 2008, we find that revenues are procyclical and fluctuate only mildly. The estimated short‐ and long‐run income elasticity of school district income tax revenues is 1.05 and 1.04, respectively. We also find that the school district tax base fully adjusts to its long‐run equilibrium within 2 years. Finally, we show that school district income tax adoption does not provide more stability to total school district tax revenues in the short or the long run. (JEL H71, H75)     

SIZE-DISTRIBUTION OF EARNINGS AND HOUSEHOLD INCOMES IN SMALL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

Part I: Availability and meaning of East European distributional statistics are discussed. Part II: Measures of inequality to be used in this study are examined: the Gini coefficient of concentration, though superior to some other single indicators, is found to be an unreliable comparative measure of inequality, and is therefore supplemented by a set of ratios of selected percentiles to the median. Part III: Inequality of full-time gross monthly earnings is measured for (almost) the whole civilian working population and for some subpopulations (selected industries, men, women) in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia through 1970, in Hungary through 1968: the observed inequality appears to be less than in small capitalist countries, in spite of the reversal of the socialist egalitarian trend in the 'sixties. The main factor of equalization of socialist earnings are small interoccupational and interregional differentials and a very flat age profile. Part IV: The socio-economic structure of households, the size of samples underlying the distributional statistics, and the composition of household “revenues” (wage and salary earnings, agricultural incomes, social security payments, relatively unimportant property incomes, as well as non-income cash flows) are examined. Inequality coefficients are estimated for per capita revenues of all households as well as subpopulations of households in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and some information is given on the distribution of household incomes in Yugoslavia. Part V: Limits of desirable equalization of earnings are discussed. With very narrowly dispersed short-term earnings, lifetime earnings tend to be rather unequally distributed because of the variation of earning years among occupations. With largely equalized primary incomes, per capita household incomes tend to be more unequally distributed, in spite of massive transfers, because of the varying ratio of earners to dependents within households. The need of income differentials as incentives to work, the probable trade-off between income equality and economic growth, and socialist distributive principles are outlined.     

Tax and spend or spend and tax? An empirical investigation for Austria

The aim of this contribution is to discriminate between the rivallingspend and tax andtax and spend hypotheses in order to check empirically the relationship between government spending and taxation decisions in Austria. For that purpose, the authors estimate a tri-variate structural VAR Model of Austria's public sector that, besides expenditures and revenues, includes aggregate income as an additional variable. They implement impulse-response functions and frequency domain techniques in order to identify the causal relation between government outlays and receipts. The budget making process is interpreted as an error correction model which allows to estimate to what extent revenues and expenditures are adjusted whenever the government sees its long run budget constraint violate. The empirical findings strongly support the spend and tax view that budget decision-making is significantly dominated by the expenditure side in Austria.We are gratefully indebted to Peter Weiss and three anonymous referees for many valuable comments and suggestion.     

THE EFFECT OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE ON FRESHMAN FINANCIAL AID

When the economy slips into recession, more needy students enroll in college, increasing the need for financial aid while resources for aid become more scarce. We use “Freshman Survey” data from the Higher Education Research Institute to observe changes in financial aid composition from 1980 to 2000. We use state‐level tax revenues, unemployment rates, and personal income growth as macroeconomic indicators. During recessions, we find that the burden of financing a student's college education shifts from states and institutions to families and federal programs. We also show that these macroeconomic fluctuations are increasingly volatile for underrepresented minorities. (JEL I22, H52, E32)     

Fiscal Implications of Immigration—A Net Present Value Calculation

Focusing on the net fiscal effects, the gain from admitting immigrants is computed for a welfare state with large expenditures and a large tax burden (Sweden). Prices and behavior are held constant, which allows a detailed analysis of the effects of immigration. The present value of future tax revenues minus outlays is potentially large; USD 23,500 per young working‐age immigrant, but an average new immigrant represents a net government loss of USD 20,500. The dominant factors are employment rates and age. For young working‐age immigrants, the “break‐even” participation rate for which the gain would be zero is 60%, well below the empirical rate for this group.     

Fiscal federalism in rentier regions: Evidence from Russia

When does sub-national fiscal autonomy prompt regional growth and recovery and, under what conditions, does it have adverse effects? We argue that unearned income streams, particularly in the form of revenues from natural resource production or from budgetary transfers from the central government, transform regions dependent on these income sources into rentier regions. Governments in these regions can use local control over revenues and expenditures to shelter certain firms, i.e., natural resource producers or loss-making enterprises, from market forces. Using fiscal data from 80 Russian regions from 1996 to 1999, we test this hypothesis in both cross-sectional and panel specifications. Our results indicate that tax retention, which is a proxy for fiscal autonomy, has had a positive effect on regional reform and investment since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, we also find that this effect decreases as rentable income streams to regions increase. Journal of Comparative Economics 33 (4) (2005) 814–834.     

Incentives for firms to provide safety: Regulatory authority and capital market reactions

We investigate the relationship between the various incentives that firms have to act safely, focusing on the relationship between the equity losses experienced by a firm following a fatal, accident and the incentive effects created by government regulation. The major findings are that first, the capital market reactions vary dramatically by which agency has regulatory jurisdiction for the accident. And second, the capital market effects tend to be weak (equity values do not decline sizably) where federal agencies rely heavily on an ex ante inspection policy. On the other hand, where ex ante inspection policy is lax or nonexistent, capital market effects tend to be strong - up to an order of magnitude higher per fatality than willingness-to-pay estimates based on labor market data.     

On the efficiency of ‘single window’

In many countries, the process of obtaining government approval for different projects involves interaction with multiple government agencies at various levels. This often makes the approval process inefficient by unnecessary lengthening it. In this paper we study the effect of a re-organization of the approval process towards making it a single window clearance system, on the efficiency of the entire process. We have used the expected queue length and the expected waiting time in the system at the stochastic steady state as measures of inefficiency of an approval system.     

A Political‐Economic Account of Global Tariffs

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the relative importance of three distinct factors that motivate redistributive government policy: tariff revenues, consumer welfare, and producer profits. We generalize Grossman and Helpman's (1994, American Economic Review 84: 833–850). protection‐for‐sale model by positing that government places different weights on these components of the welfare of its polity when it decides which industries to protect and to what extent. Employing tariff data from 40 countries, the predictions from this model are used to estimate these weights. The results are surprising in their range and variety. Developing countries with weak tax systems often weigh tariff revenue heavily, while more developed countries weigh producer interests the most. Very few hold consumer welfare dear.     

IS THE REVENUE ALLOCATION SCHEME OF FORMULA ONE MOTOR RACING A CASE FOR EUROPEAN COMPETITION POLICY?

Recent allegations from participants of the FIA Formula One World Championship (F1) suggest that its authorities violate European competition law in two ways. First, they allegedly abuse market power by forcing unfavorable contracts on media revenue allocation upon teams as a whole and on smaller teams in particular (vertical allocation of media revenue). Second, they allegedly form a cartel with selected teams to the detriment of smaller teams by providing unjustified extra payments to these teams (horizontal allocation of media revenues). In doing so, the cartel members allegedly secure supracompetitive rents from the authorities and cement an unfair competitive advantage over the outsider teams. Employing concentration measures from empirical economics, we present an assessment of whether the current antitrust allegations against F1 may be considered valid or not. We show that the allocation scheme employed in F1 considerably differs from those in other professional sports championships. We find the empirical picture to be consistent with an anticompetitive interpretation of F1 media revenue structures and policies. We conclude that there is merit in initiating an in‐depth antitrust investigation of Formula One motor racing. (JEL K21, L12, L40, L83, Z20)     

The Role of State Fiscal Policy in State Economic Growth

Do state policy makers have the ability to affect a state's rate of economic growth? This article examines one possible source of growth and per capita output level disparities by studying the role that state taxation and public expenditure decisions play in fostering economic development. Using pooled annual U.S. state‐level data from 1972 to 1998, a fixed‐effects model is employed to examine the effects of changing tax rates on both state per capita output levels and growth rates. The results indicate that higher tax rates negatively influence short‐run state economic growth, which lowers state output levels. However, long‐run growth is unaffected by changes in state tax rates, even after adjusting for the effects of initial per capita output levels, state expenditures, and aid from the federal government. Nor do changes in state public spending rates and federal aid permanently alter state growth rates, implying that state fiscal policies have only transitory effects on state growth. (JEL H71, O40, R11)     

VOTER PREFERENCES,INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM

The enormous impact that economic freedom can have on economic outcomes makes an understanding of the factors or forces affecting its level paramount. To what extent do citizen preferences regarding the role of government in the economy drive the level of or changes in economic freedom? We explore this question using a new index of voting in the U.S. Congress constructed consistent with the Fraser Institute indices of economic freedom. We use voting on national legislation to examine state‐level economic freedom to clearly separate the measurement of preferences from policies that at least partly reflect these preferences. We find that Congressional votes, both from the House and Senate, are related to increases in state economic freedom, and that the result is generally statistically and economically significant, and robust to inclusion of a variety of socioeconomic control variables. (JEL D72, H10, H50)     

The social budget policy process in Russia at a time of crisis

ABSTRACT

This article examines the process of Russian social budget formation during 2015–2016, a period marked by a significant reduction in state revenues due to changes in Russia’s economic and international environment. Participants in the budget process included the president, prime minister, the financial–economic and social blocs of government, and experts outside the government. An important concern associated with the social sphere was maintaining political popularity. Budget formation in this area occurred via bureaucratic bargaining, with the president intervening only on the most salient issues. Examples of policy elaboration including indexation of major benefits and the freezing of pension contributions are considered.     

Tax morale,fiscal capacity,and war

This paper studies the effects of mobilization for war on the development of fiscal capacity and the values of tax compliance (tax morale). We propose a dynamic setting where governments may invest resources to improve the efficiency of the fiscal apparatus and the citizens' tax morality in order to raise the necessary revenues for the defense against a threat (external or internal), and parents optimally choose to transmit their preferences of tax compliance to children. Despite fiscal capacity and tax morale are initially substitutes, we show how a dynamic complementarity may arise in equilibrium from a more efficient transmission of the values of tax compliance in countries with high fiscal capacity, and this may explain why they tend to move together over time. Under reasonable conditions, we obtain that the effect of a higher threat of war on the steady-state level of the culture of tax compliance is negative when fiscal capacity is relatively low, and positive when the latter is large. We show cross-country evidence based on war frequency, fiscal capacity, and tax morale that is consistent with the results of our theory.