An Inframarginal Analysis of the Ricardian Model

This paper shows that a 2 × 2 Ricardian model has a unique general equilibrium, and the comparative statics of the equilibrium involve discontinuous jumps. If partial division of labor occurs in equilibrium, the country producing both goods would impose a tariff, whereas the country producing a single good would prefer unilateral free trade. If complete division of labor occurs in equilibrium, both countries would negotiate to achieve free trade. In a model with three countries, the country which does not have a comparative advantage relative to the other two countries, and/or which has low transaction efficiency, may be excluded from trade.     

比较优势理论研究述评

根据比较优势理论研究的新进展,本文对比较优势理论进行了系统述评。本文用超边际分析方法阐述Ricardian模型的均衡解是各国进行专业化分工并出口技术比较优势产品;本文分别用序列分析法和边际分析方法对HOV理论进行了分析,两种分析方法的均衡解都符合比较优势理论的基本思想。比较优势的来源除了技术、要素禀赋,还有规模经济、交易效率等,这些是决定当今国际贸易结构的重要因素。     

Encephalization and division of labor by early humans

We draw on Ricardian comparative advantage between distinct persons to map out the division of labor among proto-humans in a village some 1.7 million years ago. A person specialized in maintaining a cooking fire in the village is of particular interest (Ofek, Second nature, economic origins of human evolution, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001). We are also interested in modeling hunting by village males in teams. The large issue is whether and how specialization (division of labor) and interpersonal trade might have driven brain-expansion in early humans. We emphasize the need for early humans to develop the capacity to see themselves in others’ shoes (other-regardingness) in order for regularized trading to follow division of labor.     

Classical Ricardian Theory of Comparative Advantage Revisited

According to the classical Ricardian theory of comparative advantage, relative labor productivities determine trade patterns. The Ricardian model plays an important pedagogical role in international economics, but has received scant empirical attention since the 1960s. This paper assesses the contemporary relevance of the Ricardian model for US trade. Cross-section seemingly unrelated regressions of sectoral trade flows on relative labor productivity and unit labor costs are run for a number of countries vis-à-vis the United States. The coefficients are almost always correctly signed and statistically significant, although much of the sectoral variation of trade remains unexplained.     

经济发展、地区分工与地方贸易保护

本文运用新兴古典经济理论从分工演进和经济发展角度对地方贸易保护问题进行了系统的理论分析。在对经济发展的一般机制及其与地区分工相互关系进行论述的基础上,我们利用对引入交易费用的李嘉图模型的超边际分析来研究地方贸易保护行为。文章认为,中央政府打破和消除地方贸易保护目标的实现应当围绕引导地方政府特别是落后地区政府决策从短期向长期转变为中心而采取相应措施。     

自然开放度、政策导向开放度与劳动生产率提升——理论和基于中国省际面板数据的实证研究

本文以李嘉图模型为基础,分析了贸易开放对提升中国劳动生产率的效应。本文使用1994-2005年间中国省际面板数据,就贸易开放对提升中国劳动生产率水平所产生的效应进行了实证研究。本文得出两个重要的分析结果:第一,贸易开放可以通过比较优势来确定一国专业化产品的生产,如果一国的比较优势存在于干中学系数较大的部门,贸易开放将提高劳动生产率;但若一国的比较优势存在于干中学系数较小的部门,贸易开放将降低劳动生产率;第二,本文将贸易开放度分解为自然开放度和政策导向开放度,结果发现,当自然开放度较小时,政策导向开放度的增加将降低劳动生产率;当自然开放度较大时,政策开放度的增加将提高劳动生产率水平。     

Comparative advantage and strategic specialization

This paper shows that a strong comparative advantage is necessary for free trade and specialization in a 2 × 2 symmetric Ricardian model to be achieved in a Nash equilibrium. Governments strategically control labor distribution across industries, and representative agents maximize Cobb–Douglas utilities. A Nash equilibrium with complete specialization is achieved if and only if relative productivity exceeds a key value of 3, which is considered a very large number based on previous empirical studies. This paper also introduces a two‐stage game where each government chooses labor distribution first and then tariffs. In this two‐stage game, complete specialization is never achieved for any relative productivity level. Finally, by generalizing the Cobb–Douglas model into constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences, I show that if immiserizing growth effects exist, complete specialization could not be achieved for any level of relative productivity.     

Uncertainty, Insurance, and Division of Labor

This paper develops an equilibrium model to investigate the relationships between transaction uncertainties, risk aversion, insurance, specialization, per capita real income, and productivity progress. It is shown that transaction uncertainties can restrict the division of labor; the level of division of labor decreases with the degree of risk aversion; insurance will promote the equilibrium level of division of labor, per capita real income, and productivity.     

Common factors in the withdrawal of European aircraft manufacturers from the regional aircraft market

The current study provides a model that aims to explain the origin of the competitive advantage of organizations in terms of the ownership structure. We have also studied the interactions between IT use and ownership structure. To reach these objectives, we have classified the organizations in two groups using the cooperative character criterion. The results show that cooperative firms achieve a superior competitive advantage regardless of the amount of IT that the firms use. The study is focused on the Spanish Pharmaceutical Distribution Industry.     

Patterns of Trade and Oligopoly Equilibria: An Example

This paper investigates, via an example, the effects of oligopolistic competition in a two-country two-good "Ricardian" model of international trade. By contrast with results that apply to the competitive free-trade equilibrium, at the oligopoly equilibrium industries with different technologies can profitably survive. Moreover, it is shown that, in an oligopolistic setting, the pattern of trade cannot be inferred either by pre-trade prices or by the comparative advantage principle.     

The division of labor in innovation between general purpose technology and special purpose technology

This paper constructs an endogenous growth model that identifies three patterns in the division of labor in terms of innovation between GPT and SPT sectors: (1) the SPT stage, (2) the GPT-SPT joint-research stage, and (3) the autonomous GPT stage. It is shown that the emergence of GPT only has a temporary level effect, and a negative effect on economic growth. However, the new phenomenon of the autonomous GPT stage has a positive influence on both growth and level effects. This result theoretically explains the emergence and resolution of the IT productivity paradox.     

Ownership Structure, Technological Endowment and Competitive Advantage: Do Democracy and Business Fit?

The current study provides a model that aims to explain the origin of the competitive advantage of organizations in terms of the ownership structure. We have also studied the interactions between IT use and ownership structure. To reach these objectives, we have classified the organizations in two groups using the cooperative character criterion. The results show that cooperative firms achieve a superior competitive advantage regardless of the amount of IT that the firms use. The study is focused on the Spanish Pharmaceutical Distribution Industry.     

Division of Labor, Money, and Economic Progress

This paper develops a general equilibrium model to formalize Adam Smith's insight on the relationship between the division of labor, the emergence of money, and economic progress. The model demonstrates that the division of labor is the driving force behind the emergence of money, and the use of money in turn stimulates further division of labor. It also shows that the use of money substitute can improve welfare.     

An interpretation of unequal exchange from Prebisch-Singer to Emmanuel

Emmanuel's view of the Center-Periphery trade relation is linked to a classical literature in trade and development theory which starts from the work of Prebisch, Singer and Lewis. A very simple general equilibrium Ricardian trade model is formulated to deal with terms of trade determination in the context of class conflict both in the Center and the Periphery. The model focuses attention on the effects of technical progress and changes in income distribution on employment levels in the Periphery, where labor surplus conditions are assumed to prevail.     

MARKET ECONOMIES WITH AN ENDOGENOUS SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOR

I consider a general equilibrium model of a competitive market economy in which production is conducted through an endogenous social division of labor. I represent economic decision makers as “consumer–producers,” who consume as well as produce commodities. In this approach, the emergence of a nontrivial social division of labor is guided by Increasing Returns to Specialization (IRSpec) in production. Under IRSpec, I show existence of competitive equilibria, the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics, and characterize these equilibria. Markets equilibrate through the adjustment of the social division of labor; the production technologies completely determine the equilibrium prices.     

Factor substitution and labor market friction in the United States: 1948–2010

We re-estimate the capital-labor elasticity of substitution and the biased factor-augmenting technological progress using a system approach for the aggregate U.S. economy from 1948 to 2010. Due to (i) the significant impacts of labor market dynamics on economic growth and (ii) the fundamental tension between the short-run data that are available and the long-run parameter that is required in the estimation process, we incorporate labor market friction into a supply-side system to re-estimate these important growth parameters and to explore their sensitivity to the incorporation of labor market friction. Our estimation obtains a significantly smaller-than-unity elasticity of substitution. This result is consistent with labor input measured along the extensive and intensive margin, and in both competitive and imperfect labor markets. Technological progress tends to be purely labor-augmenting, with the average growth rate around 2% per year. These findings are robust to alternatively constructed data sets and different estimation strategies.     

Adam Smith's “tolerable administration of justice” and the Wealth of Nations

Adam Smith argues that a country’s income depends on its labor productivity, which in turn hinges on the division of labor. But why are some countries able to take advantage of the division of labor and become rich, while others fail to do so and remain poor? Smith describes how the security of property rights, through a “tolerable administration of justice,” allows investment and exchange to take place, bringing about economic progress. Recent empirical work on economic development has supported Smith’s emphasis on a country’s political “institutions,” particularly the judiciary, in determining its national income.     

技术进步、优势转换与中国FDI的发展

技术进步、全球化的深入发展改变了发展中国家FDI的相对技术优势,自动化控制技术的发展使小规模定制成为一种时尚,大大降低了规模经济的门槛,使发展中国家原有的小规模技术优势不断弱化,全球化导致的全球消费文化的趋同也大大削弱了发展中国家固有的技术地方化优势;但技术进步导致的产业链拉长,各国产业结构差异的扩大却进一步提升了发展中国家的边际产业比较优势和技术创新升级优势;技术与分工的复杂化,基于价值链和竞合原则的现代分工模式也使逆向技术整合,新产业的蛙跳成为可能,也使所有权优势,内部化优势和区位优势成为自足的对外直接投资条件,进一步增加了发展中国家对外直接投资的机会。只有充分认识到技术进步对发展中国家相对技术优势带来的影响,我们才能抓住技术进步带来的机遇,促进中国跨国企业FDI的更大发展。     

Perfect Competition and Endogenous Comparitive Advantage

This paper analyzes a dynamic Ricardian model of international trade in which relative differences in technology are endogenously determined by investments in innovation by competitive firms. It considers the impact of these investments on trade patterns and the effect of trade patterns on rates of innovation and growth. The main result is that the dynamic effects of trade need not be positive when both countries specialize investments in the goods in which they have a comparitive advantage. In addition, trade can lead to an inefficient pattern of specialization in innovation and have negative welfare effects.     

Ricardian Comparative Advantage and Geographical Concentration

This paper analyses geographical concentration using the continuum‐of‐goods trade model in the presence of labor migration, Ricardian comparative advantage and Marshallian‐type external increasing returns to scale. The findings show that higher transportation costs lead to concentration in one region, and lower transportation costs lead to diversification between the regions. For intermediate transportation costs, asymmetric diversification becomes a stable equilibrium in which the smaller population region has higher wage rates and a smaller externality, and vice versa. However, because the asymmetric equilibrium is an inefficient outcome, it leaves room for government intervention.